BARRY et al v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Filing
64
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 62 Smith Plaintiffs' motion to substitute and granting 63 Smith Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment as to John Brother6 NNNSmith. See document for details. Signed by Judge Rudolph Contreras on February 10, 2020. (lcrc3)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KEVIN BARRY, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No.:
16-1625 (RC)
Re Document Nos.:
62, 63
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING SMITH PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE; GRANTING SMITH PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS TO JOHN BROTHER6 NNNSMITH
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 4, 2020, this Court entered default judgment on the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (“FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1605, claims of the Smith Plaintiffs, a group of hundreds
of individuals who were either directly injured in the 1983 or 1984 terrorist attacks in East
Beirut, Lebanon or who are the immediate family members of such directly-injured individuals.
Kevin Barry, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 16-1625 (RC), 2020 WL 549296 (D.D.C.
Feb. 4, 2020). As the Court noted therein, it was unable to resolve the claim of one recentlydeceased family member claimant, John Brother6 NNNSmith, for whom counsel for the Smith
Plaintiffs indicated that the heirs had not yet appointed a representative of the estate. Id. at *13
& n.30. The Court thus could not approve substitution of a proper party or assess the standing of
the estate to pursue the pending claim. See id. at *13–14. Accordingly, the Court held this claim
in abeyance pending the appointment of a legal representative. Id. at *13 n.30.
The Smith Plaintiffs now indicate that John Brother6 NNNSmith’s heirs have made an
appointment and, accordingly, both (1) move the Court to substitute a legal representative on
behalf of this individual’s estate, see Smith Plaintiffs’ Motion to Substitute and Memorandum in
Support Thereof (“Mot. to Substitute”) 1–2, ECF No. 62, and (2) seek default judgment
concerning liability and an award of compensatory damages on his behalf, see Smith Plaintiffs’
Motion for Default Judgment in Favor of John Brother6 NNNSmith and Memorandum in
Support Thereof (“Mot. Default J.”) 1–2, ECF No. 63. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
grants these motions.
II. ANALYSIS
The Court will first assess the motion to substitute a legal representative for the estate of
John Brother6 NNN Smith and then turn to the question of liability and damages.
A. Motion to Substitute
The Smith Plaintiffs have provided the Court with the information it previously lacked:
the identity of the proposed legal representative for John Brother6 NNNSmith, who passed away
since the filing of the Smith Plaintiffs’ complaint. The Smith Plaintiffs now move to substitute
John Brother6 NNNSmith’s son as the legal representative for his estate. Mot. to Substitute 1–2.
Because a “deceased individual” such as John Brother6 NNNSmith “cannot serve as the
real party in interest in a civil action,” he can no longer bring this claim unless there is an
authorized legal representative. Barry, 2020 WL 549296, at *13 (quoting Mohammadi v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 54 n.2) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1)). “If, as here, ‘a
party dies during litigation, Rule 25 allows for the substitution of a proper party. It states that
once a formal suggestion of death is made on the record, a party or the decedent’s successor or
representative has 90 days in which to file a motion for substitution of a proper party.’” Id.
(quoting Worley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 75 F. Supp. 3d 311, 333 (D.D.C. 2014)).
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Here, the Smith Plaintiffs filed a formal suggestion of death for John Brother6
NNNSmith on February 7, 2020, see Statement Noting a Party’s Death, ECF No. 61, and moved
on that same day to substitute his son as the legal representative of his estate, see Mot. to
Substitute. As the Court has previously discussed, it may “substitute an appropriate person, such
as a close relative, as a representative of’ the decedent’s estate.” Barry, 2020 WL 549296, at *13
(quoting Bluth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1, 22 n.17 (D.D.C. 2016)). Because
the Smith Plaintiffs indicate that the heirs of John Brother6 NNNSmith have appointed his son as
such a representative, see Mot. to Substitute 1, and because this assertion is uncontroverted on
the record before this Court, the Court grants the Smith Plaintiffs’ motion to substitute John
Brother6 NNNSmith’s son to “pursue the decedent’s rights which existed prior to his . . . death,”
id. at 2. 1
B. Motion for Default Judgment
The Smith Plaintiffs additionally move the Court to enter liability concerning John
Brother6 NNNSmith’s claims and to award compensatory damages in an amount equivalent to
that of other similarly-situated Smith Plaintiffs. Mot. Default J. 1–2. Before addressing these
issues, the Court must resolve the threshold question of whether the estate has standing under
Lebanese law to pursue John Brother6 NNNSmith’s intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”) claim. As the Court previously detailed, “Lebanese law allows for the award of
compensation for ‘moral damages,’ such as emotional distress, suffered as the result of the
wrongful death or tortious injury of an immediate relative,’ and the estate of the original claimant
has standing to pursue the claim.” Barry, 2020 WL 549296, at *14 (quoting Estate of Doe v.
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The Court does not identify this individual by name because no pseudonym has been
assigned. The Court is uncertain whether John Brother6 NNNSmith has more than one son; if he
does, the Court notes that it specifically substitutes the individual named in the Smith Plaintiffs’
motion to substitute, ECF No. 62, which was filed under seal.
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Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2011)). Because the son of John
Brother6 NNNSmith, the legal representative of his estate, is such an immediate relative, the
Court concludes that the estate has standing to pursue his claims.
Moreover, for the same reasons detailed in its earlier disposition, the Court finds entry of
default judgment concerning liability and damages to be proper here. Concerning liability,
because the uncontroverted record before the Court establishes that John Brother6 NNNSmith is
the immediate family member (brother) of an individual who was injured in the 1983 attack, the
Court looks to general principles of tort law that govern IIED claims. See id. at *14–15, *17–21
(noting need to establish “a theory of liability” under the FSIA and discussing relevant theory of
liability for immediate family member Smith Plaintiffs). Applying these principles here, for the
same reasons articulated in detail in Barry, id. at *17–21, the Court finds that John Brother6
NNNSmith has established liability for his IIED claim.
The sole remaining question, then, is the proper measure of damages to award. The
Special Master’s report and recommendation initially suggested that the Court award the baseline
Heiser framework figure of $1.25 million for the sibling of a directly-injured claimant, and the
Smith Plaintiffs now move for an award in this amount. Mot. Default J. 2 (citing Report and
Recommendation of Special Master Griffin (“R. & R.”) 1010–12, ECF No. 40; R. & R.
Appendix C at 14, ECF No. 40-3). See also Barry, 2020 WL 549296, at *22 (discussing Heiser
framework for FSIA damages). The Court sees no reason to depart from the awards that it
granted to other Smith Plaintiffs who share the same familial relationship (sibling) with a
directly-injured claimant. Thus, it awards $1.25 million to the estate of John Brother6
NNNSmith.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Smith Plaintiffs’ motion to substitute (ECF No. 62) and the
Smith Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment (ECF No. 63) are GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 10, 2020
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
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