ANDERSON v. KRUEGER

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Rudolph Contreras on 5/17/17. (ms)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
DARNELL N. ANDERSON,
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
Civil Action No. 17-0538 (RC)
)
J.E. KREUGER, Warden,
)
)
Respondent.
)
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Darnell Anderson and four co-defendants (Obbie English, James Bates, Joseph
Jenkins, and Edward Warren) were tried in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See
Pet. ¶¶ 1, 4; Mem. in Support of Facts (“Pet’r Mem.”) at 1. Petitioner was convicted of first
degree murder while armed, among other offenses. Pet. ¶ 4. “[E]xcept that some of the
convictions merged and [were] vacated on remand,” the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
affirmed the convictions. See Jenkins v. United States, 113 A.3d 535, 539 (D.C. 2015), cert.
denied sub nom. Anderson v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1507 (2016).
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. Generally, Petitioner contends that the Superior Court erred when it denied
his motion to sever, id. ¶ 9(d); see Pet’r Mem. at 14-17, and that the Court of Appeals erred when
it “overlooked or misapprehended critical facts pertain[in]g to [his] severance issues,” Pet. ¶

1

11(a)(3); see Pet’r Mem. at 18-21. He asks this Court to vacate his conviction and sentence, and
to order a new trial. Pet. ¶ 12A.
A District of Columbia prisoner “may challenge [his] conviction[] collaterally by filing a
motion in Superior Court pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110, which has been described as ‘a
remedy analogous to 28 U.S.C. § 2255’ for attacking a federal conviction.” Hood v. Spaulding,
__ F. Sup. 3d __, __, 2017 WL 1232401, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2017) (quoting Blair-Bey v.
Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (additional citation omitted). He “has no recourse
to a federal judicial forum unless the local remedy is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of his detention.’” Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (quoting
D.C. Code § 23-110(g)); see Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Section
23-110(g)’s plain language makes clear that it only divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
habeas petitions by prisoners who could have raised viable claims pursuant to section 23110(a).”).
It does not appear that Petitioner has filed a motion in the Superior Court under D.C.
Code § 23-110, yet he contends that this remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Pet’r Mem. at 17.
Petitioner notes that his conviction has been affirmed on direct appeal, see id. at 17-18, and the
Court of Appeals’ purported errors are not matters properly brought in the Superior Court, see id.
at 17, 22. Further, Petitioner asserts that “the filing of the D.C. Code [§] 23-110 [m]otion would
be ‘futile’ and that a ‘miscarriage of justice’ would occur should [this] Court fail to review the
issues that are now before it.” Id. at 22.
“[I]t must be remembered that direct appeal is the primary avenue for review of a
conviction or sentence, and mere lack of success on that appeal does not pave the way for
2

collateral attack.” Garris, 794 F.2d at 727 (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations
omitted). In essence, Petitioner asks this federal district court to review the rulings of the District
of Columbia courts, and this Court has no authority to do so. Richardson v. District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[F]ederal district courts lack
jurisdiction to review judicial decisions by state and District of Columbia courts.”); see 28
U.S.C. § 1257; D.C. Code § 11-721(a)(1).
The Court will dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: May 17, 2017

/s/
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge

3