COCKRUM et al v. DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC. et al

Filing 26

Memorandum in opposition to re 23 MOTION to Dismiss under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act, 21 MOTION to Dismiss under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act filed by ROY COCKRUM, SCOTT COMER, ERIC SCHOENBERG. (Berwick, Benjamin)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
ROY COCKRUM, SCOTT COMER, and )
ERIC SCHOENBERG,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
) Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-1370-ESH
)
DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, )
INC., and ROGER STONE,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS’ SEPCIAL MOTIONS TO DISMISS UNDER THE
D.C. ANTI-SLAPP ACT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 3
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 3
I.

The D.C. Circuit’s Opinion in Abbas Bars Application of the D.C. Anti-SLAPP
Act in this Court, and Abbas Remains Good Law and Binding on this Court ................... 3
A.

The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Abbas properly holds that the D.C. AntiSLAPP Act is inapplicable in federal court ............................................................ 3

B.

Footnote asides in Abbas and Mann do not undermine Abbas as
controlling precedent .............................................................................................. 5

II.

Even if the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act Applied in Federal Court, It Does Not Apply to
this Case .............................................................................................................................. 6

III.

If the Court Applies the Anti-SLAPP Act’s Procedure in this Case, It Should
Allow for Discovery Before Requiring Plaintiffs to Respond ............................................ 9

IV.

In All Events, Defendants’ Motions Should Be Denied ................................................... 11

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 11

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Federal Cases
*Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC
783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ......................................................................................... passim
*Deripaska v. Associated Press
No. 17-cv-913, Mem. Op., ECF No. 16 (Oct. 17, 2017) ................................................... passim
Easaw v. Newport
No. 17-cv-28-BAH, 2017 WL 2062851 (D.D.C. May 12, 2017) ................................................5
Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick
264 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001) .....................................................................................................10
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Company
559 U.S. 393 (2010) .....................................................................................................................4
United States v. Torres
115 F.3d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................................2
State Cases
Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Mann
150 A.3d 1213 (D.C. 2016) ............................................................................................... passim
Doe I v. Burke
91 A.3d 1031 (D.C. 2014) ...........................................................................................................8
Doe v. Burke
133 A.3d 569 (D.C. 2016) ...........................................................................................................8
State Statutes
D.C. Code § 16-5501(1)...................................................................................................................7
D.C. Code § 16-5501(3)...............................................................................................................7, 8
D.C. Code § 16-5502 .......................................................................................................................8
D.C. Code § 16-5502(a) ...............................................................................................................7, 8
D.C. Code § 16-5502(b).................................................................................................................11
D.C. Code § 16-5502(c)(2) ......................................................................................................10, 11
Federal Rules
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 .........................................................................................2, 4, 5
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ........................................................................................6
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ...............................................................................2, 4, 5, 6, 10
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) ...........................................................................................10

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INTRODUCTION
As the Complaint sets forth, Plaintiffs come before this Court seeking redress for injuries
sustained when Defendants conspired with a foreign adversary and an entity described by the
CIA Director as a non-state hostile intelligence service to expose the private information of
Plaintiffs and others to all the world based on Plaintiffs’ participation in the 2016 election.
Seeking to escape liability, Defendants recast the attack on Mr. Cockrum, Mr. Comer, and Mr.
Schoenberg—and on the democratic process—as the Trump Campaign “conspiring with others
to speak about” Plaintiffs. Def. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.’s Spec. Mot. to Dismiss Am.
Compl. (“Campaign Br.”) at 1, ECF No. 21; see Def. Roger Stone’s Spec. Mot. to Dismiss Am.
Compl. (“Stone Br.”) at 1, ECF No. 23. The factual gymnastics required to configure Plaintiffs’
lawsuit as an attack on the Trump Campaign and Roger Stone’s rights to “speak about them”
would doom the Special Motions, if the Court could reach their merits. But the Court cannot
reach the merits because the Special Motions are precluded by binding D.C. Circuit precedent, as
this Court recently held.
Just over a month ago, this Court decided Deripaska v. Associated Press, No. 17-cv-913,
Mem. Op., ECF No. 16 (Oct. 17, 2017) (hereinafter “Deripaska Mem. Op.”). That holding
forecloses Defendants’ Special Motions, as Defendants themselves rightly concede. See
Campaign Br. 1 (“We acknowledge that this Court recently ruled in another case that the
District’s Anti-SLAPP Act does not apply in federal court. . . . We nevertheless present this
motion in order to preserve the anti-SLAPP defense, for appeal or in case of other intervening
developments.”); Stone Br. 6. In Deripaska, this Court correctly ruled that the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion in Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
forecloses consideration of a Special Motion to Dismiss brought pursuant to the D.C. Anti-

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SLAPP Act. Deripaska Mem. Op. at 1. There, the D.C. Circuit held that, because the AntiSLAPP Act conflicts with Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal
court sitting in diversity must apply the Federal Rules rather than the procedural rules outlined in
the Act. Neither the en banc D.C. Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme Court has overruled Abbas, so it
remains controlling precedent in this Court. See United States v. Torres, 115 F.3d 1033, 1036
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
While Defendants ask this Court to read Abbas as overruled by a footnote in a recent
D.C. Court of Appeals decision, see Campaign Br. 11; Stone Br. 12 (citing Competitive Enter.
Inst. v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1238 n.32 (D.C. 2016)), this Court rightly rejected an invitation to
do just that in Deripaska. Mem. Op. at 5. Defendants also misinterpret the scope of the conflict
with the Federal Rules that the D.C. Circuit identified in Abbas, as well as the degree to which
Mann may limit that conflict. Therefore, this Court, as it did in Deripaska, should reject
Defendants’ Special Motions to Dismiss.
Even if the Anti-SLAPP Act did apply in this Court, however, Defendants’ motions
would fail. This case is about the Defendants’ conspiracy with state and non-state adversaries of
the United States to expose to the public a trough of stolen private correspondence, including
private information about the Plaintiffs. The D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act is designed to protect
speakers in political or policy debates against defamation or similar suits filed in order to stifle
the speech of those who may present an opposing point of view. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1332 (citing
Council of the District of Columbia, Committee on Public Safety and the Judiciary, Report on
Bill 18-893, at 1 (Nov. 18, 2010)). D.C. courts have never applied the Anti-SLAPP Act to a
claim of public disclosure of private facts, nor to any case presenting allegations remotely akin to

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those presented here. This Court should reject Defendants’ invitation to extend D.C. AntiSLAPP law to cover these claims.
Furthermore, the private information about the Plaintiffs contained in the tens of
thousands of emails that WikiLeaks posted online is not addressed to any matter of public
concern, as required for protection under the Act. Plaintiffs’ claims are unrelated to the
Defendants’—or anyone else’s—point of view on the Plaintiffs’ sexuality, health information,
social security numbers, or other personal identifying information. Plaintiffs’ suit does not seek
to suppress anybody’s speech. Rather, Plaintiffs want to obtain redress for the suffering they
have endured and to ensure that future Americans who wish to participate in the political process
will not see their private information stolen and weaponized.
Finally, if this Court finds it has the authority to apply the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act, and that
the Act in fact encompasses claims like Plaintiffs’, it should defer ruling on the Special Motions
until Plaintiffs have conducted adequate discovery as permitted by the Act.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs provide the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter in their
Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, also filed today, and
incorporate those points herein by reference.
ARGUMENT
I.

The D.C. Circuit’s Opinion in Abbas Bars Application of the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act
in this Court, and Abbas Remains Good Law and Binding on this Court.
A.

The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Abbas properly holds that the D.C. AntiSLAPP Act is inapplicable in federal court.

Abbas, like this case, dealt with whether a special motion to dismiss available under the
D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act could be entertained in federal court. To answer this question, the court of

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appeals in Abbas turned to the familiar Erie doctrine, which requires federal courts sitting in
diversity to apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure where there is any conflict between those Rules and state procedural rules. Looking to
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Company, 559 U.S. 393, 399
(2010), the D.C. Circuit explained that a federal court applying Erie must determine whether the
state procedure in question “attempts to answer the same question” as a federal procedural rule;
if it does, and there is a conflict, the Federal Rules govern. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1333. With that
lens, the D.C. Circuit identified several components of the Anti-SLAPP Act that “answer the
same question” as Federal Rules 12 and 56. Id. The D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act, like those Rules,
“establishes the circumstances under which a court must dismiss a plaintiff’s claim before trial.”
Id. But where the Anti-SLAPP Act allows dismissal if the plaintiff cannot show a “likelihood of
success on the merits,” the Federal Rules place a much lower burden on a plaintiff opposing pretrial dismissal. Id. at 1334.
The defendant in Abbas argued to the court that the Anti-SLAPP Act imposes the same
standard for deciding whether a case may proceed to trial as does the federal summary judgment
standard. Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1334. The Anti-SLAPP Act, according to the defendant, was “just
another way of describing the federal test for summary judgment,” and the only effect of the Act
was to “layer[] a right to attorney’s fees in this category of cases on top of the existing federal
procedural scheme.” Id. But the D.C. Circuit rejected this reading of the Act, noting that “the
D.C. Court of Appeals has never interpreted the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act’s likelihood of success
standard to simply mirror the standards imposed by Federal Rules 12 and 56.” Id. at 1335.
Because of this conflict, the court could not apply the Act to dismiss the claim. Id. Abbas
“forecloses application of D.C.’s Anti-SLAPP Act in federal court.” Deripaska Mem. Op. at 1.

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B.

Footnote asides in Abbas and Mann do not undermine Abbas as controlling
precedent.

The D.C. Circuit’s holding in Abbas remains good law and has not been overruled or
superseded. In a footnote following its discussion of the Anti-SLAPP Act’s conflict with Rules
12 and 56, the D.C. Circuit in Abbas left open the possibility that if “a State anti-SLAPP act did
in fact exactly mirror Federal Rules 12 and 56,” an “interesting issue could arise” that “could
matter for attorney’s fees and the like.” Id. at 1335 n.3. But the court concluded that it need not
“address that hypothetical here because, as we have explained, the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act’s
dismissal standard does not exactly mirror Federal Rules 12 and 56.” Id. Defendants argue that
this footnote, plus another footnote in the D.C. Court of Appeals’ decision in Competitive
Enterprise Inst. v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213 (D.C. 2016), add up to Abbas’s reversal. But, as this
Court already decided in Deripaska, they are wrong. Deripaska, Mem. Op. at 1.
By selectively quoting from a footnote in Mann, Defendants claim to have found the
“hypothetical” Abbas declined to answer in the D.C. Courts of Appeals’ statement that the AntiSLAPP Act’s “likelihood of success” standard is akin to the federal summary judgment standard.
But the most important part of that footnote—and a part omitted by Defendants—is the D.C.
Court of Appeals’ recognition that “[t]he applicability of the Anti-SLAPP statute in federal court
is not for this court to determine.” Mann, 150 A.3d at 1238 n.32. In other words, the court in
Mann expressly did not—and could not—take a position on whether a federal court could apply
the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act. Any argument that this footnote in Mann renders Abbas bad law is
misleading.
Nevertheless, Defendants endeavor to make that very argument. In so doing, the
Campaign leans on a recent D.C. District Court decision in Easaw v. Newport, No. 17-cv-28BAH, 2017 WL 2062851, at *10 (D.D.C. May 12, 2017), where the Court noted that “when a

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decision by the D.C. [Court of Appeals] clearly and unmistakably renders inaccurate a prior
decision by the D.C. Circuit interpreting D.C. law, this Court should apply the D.C. [Court of
Appeals]’s more recent expression of the law.” Campaign Br. 11. The Campaign says that Mann
“clearly and unmistakably” renders Abbas “inaccurate.” Id. 1
But this argument falls short. While the footnote in Mann does state that the Anti-SLAPP
Act’s “likelihood of success” standard “mirror[s] the standards imposed by Federal Rule 56,” the
D.C. Court of Appeals called attention to different burden-shifting requirements in the D.C. and
federal procedural regimes. See id. at 1237 (“[W]e agree with Abbas that the special motion to
dismiss is different from summary judgment in that it imposes the burden on plaintiffs.”). The
Mann court also expressly identified differences between the standard for dismissal in the AntiSLAPP Act and the one applicable under Federal Rule 12(b)(6): the Anti-SLAPP Act’s standard
is “more demanding.” See Mann, 150 A.3d at 1221 n.2. A far cry from overruling Abbas, then,
the reasoning in Mann actually supports Abbas’s holding regarding the procedural
irreconcilability of the Anti-SLAPP Act and the Federal Rules.
*

*

*

In short, the D.C. Circuit properly held in Abbas that the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act does not
apply in this Court. That decision remains good law. Because the Anti-SLAPP Act does not
apply in this Court, Defendants’ Special Motions should be denied. See Deripaska, Mem. Op. at
5.
II.

Even if the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act Applied in Federal Court, It Does Not Apply to
this Case.
Defendants’ motions fail for an additional reason. This suit is about the Trump Campaign

and Roger Stone’s participation in a conspiracy to publicize private information about private
1

Mr. Stone makes a similar argument. Stone Br. 8-9.
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individuals in the course of interfering in the 2016 presidential election. The Trump Campaign
and Roger Stone are free to speak in political and policy debates however they would like; but
the Anti-SLAPP law provides no protection to those who conspire to make public stolen private
information.
The District of Columbia enacted its Anti-SLAPP Act in 2010 to discourage “lawsuits
filed by one side of a political or public policy debate aimed to punish or prevent the expression
of opposing points of view.” Abbas, 783 F.3d at 1332. To weed out early in litigation claims
brought as speech suppression, the Anti-SLAPP Act instituted certain procedural hurdles to trial
on the merits in speech-related suits, such as those alleging defamation or libel. One such
restriction is that defendants “may file a special motion to dismiss any claim arising from an act
in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest.” D.C. Code § 16-5502(a).
The Act defines an “[a]ct in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public
interest” to mean “[a]ny written or oral statement made . . . [i]n a place open to the public or a
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest,” or an “expression or expressive
conduct that involves petitioning the government or communicating views to members of the
public in connection with an issue of public interest.” D.C. Code § 16-5501(1). Under the Act, an
“issue of public interest” is one “related to health or safety; environmental, economic, or
community well-being; the District government; a public figure; or a good, product, or service in
the market place.” D.C. Code § 16-5501(3). Defendants seek to shoehorn their conspiracy into
the definition of “an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest,” but
this effort fails on multiple grounds.
To begin, no case from a D.C. Court applying the Anti-SLAPP bears any resemblance to
the circumstances of this case. This suit concerns Defendants’ participation in a conspiracy to

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post stolen private information to the Internet for the world to see. D.C. courts have applied the
Anti-SLAPP Act just a handful of times and in narrow circumstances—each of which fall
squarely within the Act’s targeted protection of speech in “furtherance of the right of advocacy
on issues of public interest,” D.C. Code§ 16-5502(a). See Mann, 150 A.3d at 1221 (claims
against writers who criticized the work of a well-known climate scientist in articles published on
the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s and National Review’s websites); Doe v. Burke, 133 A.3d
569, 571 (D.C. 2016); and Doe No. 1 v. Burke, 91 A.3d 1031, 1034 (D.C. 2014) (claims against
Wikipedia contributor who added publicly available information about litigation arising from a
mass shooting in Baghdad to a Wikipedia page about a lawyer involved in such litigation).
Applying D.C.’s Anti-SLAPP law here, where Defendants conspired with foreign adversaries to
disclose—globally and permanently—private facts about Plaintiffs would stretch the Act to
cover activity well outside existing interpretations of D.C.’s Anti-SLAPP law.
What is more, even if the Anti-SLAPP law could be extended to reach defendants who
conspire to disclose stolen information, by the Act’s very terms, it does not protect disclosure of
stolen private information about individuals’ sexuality, health, personal information, and social
security numbers. That information is not an “issue of public interest,” which it must be for the
Act to apply. D.C. Code § 16-5502. Distorting the text of the Anti-SLAPP Act, Defendants claim
that speech need only be “directed primarily toward” such an issue in order to receive protection
under the Act. See Campaign Br. 14; Stone Br. 16. But that is not what the Act says. The Act
defines an “issue of public interest” very clearly—and without qualification—as one “related to
health or safety; environmental, economic, or community well-being; the District government; a
public figure; or a good, product, or service in the market place.” D.C. Code § 16-5501(3). The
private information released about Plaintiffs does not fall within this definition. Defendants also

8

read the Act’s requirement that speech be “in connection” with an “issue of public interest” to
sweep in any publicized stolen email sitting in the same inbox as an email addressed to an “issue
of public interest.” See Campaign Br. 15; Stone Br. 17. But the relevant “connection” under the
Act is to the topic of “public interest,” not to the speaker’s email platform.
Finally, in this case the policy of the Act would protect Plaintiffs, not Defendants.
Recognizing that the language of the statute is not on their side, Defendants make a vague policy
argument that declining to apply the Anti-SLAPP Act in this case will stand in the way of
journalism that relies on large volumes of government documents, such as that at issue in the
Pentagon Papers case. See Campaign Br. 15; Stone Br. 17. (This is an odd choice, since neither
New York nor D.C. had an anti-SLAPP statute in place in the early 1970s when the New York
Times and Washington Post published their landmark reporting on the war in Vietnam). But the
real policy interests at stake in this litigation rest firmly on the side of Plaintiffs. If a person’s
decision to contribute labor or money to an electoral campaign means sacrificing the right to
privacy—that anything said by or about the person in electronically stored communications can
be hacked and posted online for the world to see—those willing to participate in advocacy for
political candidates will quickly shrink. And that, it seems, would be the very opposite of the
result intended by the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act. For these reasons, even if the Act could ever apply
in this Court, it would not apply to this suit.
III.

If the Court Applies the Anti-SLAPP Act’s Procedure in this Case, It Should Allow
for Discovery Before Requiring Plaintiffs to Respond.
If the Court finds that the Anti-SLAPP Act applies in this Court and should apply to this

case, it should also permit discovery, which is allowed under the Act, prior to ruling on the
Special Motions. The Anti-SLAPP Act provides that “[w]hen it appears likely that targeted
discovery will enable the plaintiff to defeat the motion and that the discovery will not be unduly

9

burdensome, the court may order that specified discovery be conducted.” D.C. Code § 165502(c)(2). The Mann court admitted that this provision, which requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate that discovery would likely defeat a motion to dismiss before being permitted to
engage in such discovery, is inconsistent with the Federal Rules. Mann, 150 A.3d at 1237. And
the Defendants themselves stress the difference between the Act and the Rules with regards to
discovery, claiming that “the Anti-SLAPP Act protects defendants more than Rule 56 does. The
Act requires courts to decide motions before discovery; the Rule does not.” Campaign Br. at 6.
The Defendants have not explained, or even tried to explain, how this Court could apply the
Anti-SLAPP Act’s discovery standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage in a way that does not
radically upend the procedural posture in which federal litigation ordinarily proceeds. Thus, if
this Court applies the Anti-SLAPP Act, in order to minimize conflict with the Federal Rules, it
should defer any ruling on Defendants’ Special Motions until Plaintiffs have had the opportunity
to conduct sufficient discovery, to the extent permitted by the Act.
Under the Federal Rules, Rule “56(f) facially gives judges the discretion to disallow
discovery when the non-moving party cannot yet submit evidence supporting its opposition,” but
“the Supreme Court has restated the rule as requiring, rather than merely permitting, discovery
‘where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential
to its opposition.’” Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986)) (emphasis added)). Here, the
Defendants have already collected, reviewed, and produced documents related to the very
conspiracy at issue in Plaintiffs’ Complaint in responding to inquiries from Congress and the
Department of Justice. Very little burden would be involved in providing relevant material from
these production sets to Plaintiffs. While under 56(f), Plaintiffs need not show that this material

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would likely defeat Defendants’ Special Motions to Dismiss, it would in fact meet the
heightened burden in D.C. Code § 16-5502(c)(2), and thus Plaintiffs should be permitted to
obtain this information and argue to the Court why it shows Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the
merits of their claims.
IV.

In All Events, Defendants’ Motions Should Be Denied.
As set forth above, the Anti-SLAPP Act does not apply in this Court and does not apply

to this suit. But even if the Act applies here, Defendants’ motions should be denied. When the
Act is triggered, and a defendant “makes a prima facie showing that the claim at issue arises
from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest,” then the burden
shifts to plaintiffs to show they are “likely succeed on the merits.” D.C. Code § 16-5502(b).
Here, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits, for the reasons set forth in their Memorandum
in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss, which they hereby incorporate by reference.2
CONCLUSION
This Court should follow its recent decision in Deripaska, decline to apply the D.C. AntiSLAPP Act, and deny Defendant’s Special Motion to Dismiss. Even if this Court holds that the
D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act applies in federal court, Defendant’s Special Motions should be rejected
because they fail to show they are entitled to its protections. Finally, should the Court determine
that Defendants did make the necessary prima facie showing, their Special Motions nevertheless
should be deferred pending Plaintiffs’ request for discovery under the Act or denied.

2

In the event that this Court finds that the Anti-SLAPP Act does apply in this Court and to this
case, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court provide an additional opportunity to respond
to the Special Motions to Dismiss, following discovery.
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Date: December 1, 2017

/s/ Benjamin L. Berwick
BENJAMIN L. BERWICK (D.D.C. Bar No. MA0004)
United to Protect Democracy
10 Ware St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
[phone]
[e-mail]
IAN BASSIN (NY Attorney Reg. No. 4683439)
United to Protect Democracy
222 Broadway
New York, NY 10038
[phone]
[e-mail]
JUSTIN FLORENCE (D.C. Bar No. 988953)
[e-mail]
ANNE TINDALL (D.C. Bar. No. 494607)
[e-mail]
United to Protect Democracy
2020 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, #163
Washington, DC 20006
[phone]
NANCY GERTNER (M.A. Bar No. 190140)
Fick & Marx
100 Franklin Street, 7th floor
Boston, MA 02110
[phone]
[e-mail]
RICHARD PRIMUS (D.C. Bar No. 472223)
The University of Michigan Law School*
625 S. State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
[phone]
[e-mail]
STEVEN A. HIRSCH (C.A. Bar No. 171825)
Keker, Van Nest & Peters LLP
633 Battery Street
San Francisco, CA 94111-1809
[phone]
[e-mail]
* For identification purposes.
Counsel for Plaintiffs
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