HARRIS et al v. MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT, INC.

Filing 49

ORDER denying Third-Party Defendants' MBI Logistics LLC and Star Transportation's 31 Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint. See attached Order for details. Signed by Judge Amit P. Mehta 7/17/2018. (lcapm2) Modified document type on 7/18/2018 (zjd).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
ISAAC HARRIS, et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
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MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION
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MANAGEMENT, INC.,
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)
Defendant and
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Third-Party Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
STAR TRANSPORTATION LLC, et al.,
)
)
Third-Party Defendants.
)
_________________________________________ )

Case No. 17-cv-01371 (APM)

ORDER
Before the court is a Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint by Third-Party Defendants
MBI Logistics, LLC (“MBI”), and Star Transportation, LLC. See MBI’s Mot. to Dismiss ThirdParty Complaint, ECF No. 31 [hereinafter MBI’s Mot.]; see also Minute Order, July 13, 2018,
(granting Star Transportation’s Motion to Adopt MBI Logistics, LLC’s Pleadings, ECF No. 46).
Of the three indemnification theories asserted by Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Medical
Transportation Management (“MTM”), Inc., Third-Party Defendants challenge only one:
contractual indemnification pursuant to the services agreements between Third-Party Defendants
and MTM (“Services Agreement”). 1 Third-Party Defendants contend that the Services Agreement

1

In MBI’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint, MBI concedes that, under
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, MTM’s claims for statutory and common law indemnification may
proceed. See MBI’s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Third-Party Compl., ECF No. 39, at 1–2.

does not provide indemnification for claims by Plaintiffs, who are employees of Third-Party
Defendants, for the non-payment of wages. The court disagrees.
The Services Agreement contains an indemnification provision in Paragraph 10 that
requires Third-Party Defendants to “defend, indemnify, and hold harmless MTM and MTM’s
Client[s] against any claims, liabilities and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, arising
from performance of any service by [Third-Party Defendants] in connection with this Agreement.”
See MBI’s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Third-Party Compl., ECF No. 39 [hereinafter
MBI’s Reply], Ex. 1, ECF No. 31-1 [hereinafter Services Agreement], ¶ 10 (emphasis added).
Third-Party Defendants contend that the indemnification provision does not apply to the
underlying wage claims against MTM because the payment of compensation to employees is not
a “service” required to be performed under the Service Agreement. MBI’s Mot., Mem. in Supp.,
ECF No. 31-1, at 6; MBI’s Reply Mem. at 2–5.

That argument, however, interprets the

indemnification clause too narrowly. The D.C. Court of Appeals has characterized similarlyworded

indemnification

clauses

as

“broad,”

“sweeping,”

and

“comprehensive.”

See W.M. Schlosser Co., Inc. v. Md. Drywall Co., Inc., 673 A.2d 647, 653–54 (D.C. 1996).
Applying such a construction here, Plaintiffs’ wage claims plainly “aris[e] from performance” of
a service covered by the contract—the provision of transportation services by Third-Party
Defendants to MTM. Put another way, the wage claims against MTM arise only because ThirdParty Defendants “performed” under the Services Agreement. Plaintiffs’ wage claims therefore
are subject to the indemnification clause.
To avoid this result, Third-Party Defendants ask the court to read the indemnification
clause in Paragraph 10 of the Services Agreement in light of another indemnification provision
found in Paragraph 24, which concerns costs and litigation expenses incurred by MTM, including

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attorney’s fees. See MBI’s Reply at 2–4. 2 Third-Party Defendants make this argument for the
first time in their reply brief and, for that reason alone, the court rejects it. See Am. Wildlands v.
Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
In any event, the court finds Third-Party Defendants’ reliance on Paragraph 24 to be
confusing and ultimately incorrect. Third-Party Defendants argue that, because Paragraph 24
specifically references a breach-of-contract claim, the scope of indemnification under that
Paragraph is broader than under Paragraph 10 and, therefore, Paragraph 10 should be construed
narrowly as reaching only “claims based on MBI’s services.” See MBI’s Reply at 3 (arguing that
Paragraph 24 “is general and is applicable for any breach, whereas [Paragraph 10] is limited only
to matters related to the services under the contract”). But this parsing ultimately does not help
Third-Party Defendants because MTM does not contend that its indemnification demand is based
on the breach of any contractual duty owed under the Services Agreement. Rather, MTM argues
only that Plaintiffs’ wage claims arise out of Third-Party Defendants’ “performance of . . .
services.” See MTM’s Third-Party Complaints, ECF No. 24, ¶¶ 4, 17. As discussed, the court
agrees with MTM’s reading; therefore, resort to Paragraph 24 to interpret Paragraph 10 is
unnecessary.
Moreover, Third-Party Defendants misread Paragraph 24.

As the D.C. Circuit has

observed, “indemnification clauses have traditionally been used and interpreted as extending only

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Paragraph 24 of the Services Agreement states:
In the event that Transportation Provider fails to comply with each and every term of this Agreement
or otherwise is in breach of any term of this Agreement; or in the event that Transportation Provider
is required to defend, indemnify and hold harmless MTM with respect to any claim or liability
arising out of performance of any service by Transportation Provider in connection with this
Agreement, Transportation Provider shall pay all of MTM’s costs and litigation expenses, including
reasonable attorney’s fees that may be incurred by MTM.

Services Agreement ¶ 24.

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to third-party claims.” Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Cooper Carry Inc., 861 F.3d 267, 275 (D.C.
Cir. 2017). Paragraph 24’s purpose is to extend indemnification beyond that traditional function
and apply it to first-party claims between the contracting parties. That is why Paragraph 24
contains two introductory dependent clauses, one concerning a “breach of any term of this
Agreement” and the other concerning “any claim or liability arising out of the performance of any
service by [Third-Party Defendant] in connection with this Agreement.”

See Services

Agreement ¶ 24. The former clause covers first-party breach of contract claims between the
parties; the latter clause covers third-party claims “arising out of” the transportation provider’s
services. See James G. Davis Constr. Corp. v. HRGM Corp., 147 A.3d 332, 340–41 (D.C. 2016)
(similarly reading a more broadly worded indemnification provision as reaching first-party
claims). As the indemnification demand at issue here concerns only third-party claims, Paragraph
24’s broader scope is irrelevant.
For the foregoing reasons, Third-Party Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied.

Dated: July 17, 2018

Amit P. Mehta
United States District Judge

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