HUDSON, JR. v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re 33 Order. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 2/5/18. (lcjeb1)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
EUGENE HUDSON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 17-1867 (JEB)
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Eugene Hudson, Jr. brought this action alleging that he was improperly removed
from his position as National Secretary-Treasurer for Defendant American Federation of
Government Employees. Although this litigation has featured some twists and turns — e.g.,
Hudson’s reinstatement via preliminary injunction and his subsequent removal after the Order
was vacated — AFGE now files a straightforward Motion to Dismiss. The Court will largely
grant the Motion, aside from one count alleging retaliatory termination in violation of Plaintiff’s
statutory free-speech rights.
I.
Background
The Court first sets out the conduct for which Hudson was removed and then charts both
the Union’s procedures and the history of the litigation.
A. Factual History
At this juncture, the Court, as it must, treats the allegations in the Complaint as true.
AFGE is a national labor organization with over 1000 affiliated local unions. Its elected national
officers include a National President, National Secretary-Treasurer, and National Vice-President
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for Women and Fair Practices. See ECF No. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 3. Hudson was elected National
Secretary-Treasurer (NST) for consecutive three-year terms in 2012 and 2015. Id., ¶ 6. In
August 2016, Plaintiff announced that he would again run for national office at the next
Convention, to be held in August 2018. At the time, he did not specify the position he sought,
but he clarified in December 2016 that he would run for President. Id., ¶ 8.
One week after the 2016 American presidential election, Plaintiff, using an AFGE
computer and email, directed his subordinate to send an email to “several hundred AFGE
officers and members.” Id., ¶¶ 9, 11. The recipients included both personal and federalgovernment email addresses. Id., ¶ 11. The three-and-a-half-page email did not go through any
formal review process before dissemination. It was entitled, “AFGE, the Trump administration,
and the attack on the way,” and it stated, in relevant part:
For many of us, the results of the November 8th election were
unexpected. There remains much to analyze about the election[,]
. . . [b]ut one thing is certain, the new administration and the
Republican Congressional majority have a bull’s eye planted on the
backs of federal workers and the unions that represent them. The
question is whether we are ready for this assault. . . .
Is AFGE prepared for this? [AFGE] President Cox has spoken up
on this and has reminded us all of some of the efforts that have been
undertaken under the banner of “Too Big to Fail.” Such efforts are
important to support, though I will suggest that we need to
completely rethink the battlefield terrain on which we have been
operating. . . .
The Trump administration, and their allies in Congress, will claim
that they have a “mandate” to reconstruct the federal government
and workforce. Our response should be “mandate my…” There is
no mandate. Trump did not even get the majority of the popular
vote!
Id., Exh. 1 (November 15 Email) at 1-2. The email then lists four items for consideration: 1)
“Recognize that we must fight; we have no choice”; 2) “Rethink the way that we operate as an
2
organization”; 3) “We need to build our support within the larger community”; and 4) “[T]his is
a time for AFGE to join with other unions operating in the federal sector in coordinated
responses to the attacks.” Id. at 2-3. According to Hudson, the “email was not part of [his]
campaign for AFGE office” but rather “valid commentary on public affairs involving AFGE as
an entity and AFGE’s members.” Compl., ¶ 10.
Regardless of its intended purpose, the email rankled several Union officials, including
AFGE’s General Counsel David Borer. Borer sent a memorandum to Union President David
Cox on November 22 regarding potential legal implications of the email. See Compl., Exh. 2.
The memorandum noted possible liability under the Hatch Act, which restricts the political
activity of certain federal employees. Id. at 1. Borer also suggested that Hudson may have
misappropriated Union resources by using its assets “(the email list, staff time, AFGE email, and
AFGE equipment),” id. at 6, and also potentially exposed it to liability because AFGE annually
certifies to its insurance carrier that its General Counsel’s Office reviews all publications.
B. Procedural History
Nearly one month later, National Vice-President Keith Hill filed an internal charge
against Hudson, including, among other allegations, an accusation that Plaintiff’s dispatch of the
November 15 email was “a supreme case of multiple violations.” Compl., Exh. 3 at 1. Hill
believed that, by assigning an AFGE employee the task of sending the email, Hudson had
violated the “ethical conduct requirements for all NEC members” and “exposed AFGE to certain
civil and/or administrative liability.” Id. at 2. “In addition,” Hill continued, “the use of AFGE’s
e-mail directories for personal use is a violation of the policies on official use of AFGE
resources.” Id. He did not, however, cite to any portions of the AFGE Constitution or other
Union guidelines that prohibit such activity. The charge also alleged that Hudson had violated
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the Union’s Constitution on three other occasions, not at issue here. Id. at 1-2. Hill did not serve
Hudson with a copy of the charge as required by the Constitution, but Borer sent it to him on
February 22, 2017. See Compl., ¶¶ 15-17.
The charge proceedings then followed the relevant AFGE guidelines. See Compl., Exh.
Nos. 4 (AFGE Constitution); 6 (Committee of Investigation Guidelines and Procedures Manual).
A three-member Committee of Investigation was appointed and, upon consideration, dismissed
all the charges except the one based on the November 15 email. With regard to that, the COI
found that “probable cause exists for the specific charge of malfeasance of office,” and it cited
three sections of the AFGE Constitution that it believed Hudson had violated. See Compl., Exh.
10 (COI Findings) at 1.
The Committee then referred the charge to the National Executive Council, the Union’s
governing body, which consists of the three national officers as well as the National VicePresidents for the twelve AFGE districts. See Compl., ¶ 3. (Plaintiff did not participate in the
NEC’s deliberations as he was the accused.) Cox promptly informed Hudson of the
Committee’s decision and called a special meeting of the NEC for August 8, 2017, to vote on the
referred charges. See Compl., Exh. 13 (July 19, 2017, Letter from Cox to NEC). The NEC
adopted the Committee’s report, deliberated, and found Hudson guilty by a vote of 12 to 1 (Cox
and Hudson did not vote). See ECF No. 8-1 (August 8 NEC Transcript) at 52-54, 70-72, 82-84.
By the same margin, it then voted to remove him from his position as NST but did not restrict his
union-membership rights. Id. at 94-96. The NEC has not released a written explanation of the
decision. Hudson has appealed the ruling to the National Convention, which will take place in
August 2018.
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On September 12, 2017, Plaintiff then filed this suit, alleging four ways in which his
discharge violated the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). First, he
asserted a claim under Section 101(a)(5) of the Act, which safeguards union members against
improper disciplinary actions, for a denial of a full and fair hearing. Plaintiff next claimed that
AFGE had improperly retaliated against him for exercising free-speech rights guaranteed in
Section 101(a)(2). Count III also alleged unlawful retaliation, but was premised on Section 609,
which prohibits unions from disciplining members for exercising their LMRDA rights.
Hudson’s last count invoked Section 301, which allows a union to sue or be sued for certain
breaches of contract. Hudson therein alleged that Defendant had violated several provisions of
the AFGE Constitution and the COI Manual.
Five days after filing the Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
asking the Court to order Defendant to reinstate him as NST, process the charges anew, conduct
a new hearing without the allegedly biased NEC members, and pay monetary damages. See ECF
No. 4. After a hearing, the Court granted Hudson’s Motion in a written Opinion. See Hudson v.
Am. Fed. of Gov’t Empls., 2017 WL 5449806 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2017). The Opinion began and
ended with Hudson’s first count, which alleged that he had been denied a full and fair hearing.
Based on the “historical animosity” between Hudson and a member of the COI, the Court
concluded that “a reasonable jury would likely find that [the COI member] was biased against
Hudson, precluding him from receiving a full and fair hearing.” Id. at *7. Along with this likely
success on the merits, the Court also found that Hudson had satisfied the other three preliminaryinjunction factors — i.e., irreparable harm to him, balance of the equities, and the public interest.
Having determined that Plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary injunction based on Count I, the
Court reinstated him without addressing the other three causes of action. Id. at *5. AFGE, as a
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result, began to reprocess the charges and has called a Special National Executive Council
meeting for February 6, 2018, to take action on the new Committee of Investigation Report. See
ECF No. 32 (Motion to Stay Briefing), ¶¶ 3-4.
AFGE meanwhile filed this Motion to Dismiss, asserting both that the Court does not
have subject-matter jurisdiction and that the Complaint fails to state a claim. See ECF No. 21.
As to Count I, Defendant argued that the full-and-fair-hearing provisions of LMRDA § 101(a)(5)
do not apply to a union officer’s removal from office so long as his membership rights remain
intact. AFGE made the same case against Count III. In his Opposition, Plaintiff agreed as to
both. See ECF No. 22 (Opposition to Motion to Dismiss) at 17-18. Because the Court had relied
entirely on Count I in its Opinion granting the injunction, this concession led it to vacate that
injunction and accompanying Opinion. See Minute Order of Jan. 12, 2018. Given Plaintiff’s
withdrawal of Counts I and III, the Court here addresses only the remaining two counts below.
II.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a
complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In evaluating Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true . . . and must
grant [P]laintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’”
Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v.
United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (citation omitted); see also Jerome Stevens
Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The pleading rules are “not meant
to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff,” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347
6
(2005), and she must thus be given every favorable inference that may be drawn from the
allegations of fact. Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1113.
Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, id. at 555, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citation omitted). The Court need not accept as true, then, “a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation,” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint.
Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a plaintiff to survive a
12(b)(6) motion even if “recovery is very remote and unlikely,” the facts alleged in the complaint
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
The standard to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is less forgiving. Under
this Rule, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear his claims. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). A court also has
an “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional
authority.” Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.
2001). For this reason, “‘the [p]laintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer
scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion’ than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a
claim.” Id. at 13-14 (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1350 (2d ed. 1987) (alteration in original)). Additionally, unlike with a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding
whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Jerome Stevens, 402 F.3d at 1253;
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see also Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. E.E.O.C., 409 F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
III.
Analysis
AFGE now seeks dismissal of the remaining two counts — Count II, alleging that the
Union removed Hudson in retaliation for exercising his free-speech rights protected under the
LMRDA, and Count IV, alleging that Defendant’s removal decision breached its contract with
Hudson by violating the AFGE Constitution and the COI Manual. The Court takes each count in
turn.
A. Count II
Section 101 of the LMRDA includes a bill of rights, which, inter alia, protects every
union member’s “right to . . . express any views, arguments, or opinions,” 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2),
so long as the speech does not run afoul of the union’s “reasonable rules and regulations.” Id.
§ 411(a)(1). While the parties may have stipulated that § 101(a)(5)’s procedural protections are
not applicable to a removed union officer whose membership rights remain intact, the case law is
clear that Plaintiff’s alleged “retaliatory removal state[s] a cause of action under § 102.” Sheet
Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (removal of elected officer based
on speech). As a result, while Count I does not go forward, Count II is not similarly prohibited.
AFGE admits that Plaintiff “ha[d] the right to express his views and opinions” but argues that he
did “not have a right to do so in a manner that violates AFGE policies.” MTD at 22. According
to Defendant, therefore, Hudson was removed for his “conduct,” not his words. Id. At this
juncture, the Court cannot agree.
In enacting § 101(a), Congress sought to provide “general protection [for] union
members who spoke out against the union leadership,” United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIOCLC v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 109 (1982), allowing them to “say what they think, or perhaps
8
discuss what should be done to straighten out union affairs . . . without being punished for doing
it.” Id. (quoting 105 Cong. Rec. 6477 (1959) (Statement of Sen. McClellan)). The LMRDA’s
bill of rights is not boundless, however; a union may adopt “reasonable rules and regulations”
limiting members’ freedom of speech and assembly. See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). While the bill
of rights was “intended . . . to restate a principal First Amendment value — the right to speak
one’s mind without fear of reprisal[—] . . . there is absolutely no indication that Congress
intended the scope of § 101(a)(2) to be identical to the scope of the First Amendment.”
Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 111. Unlike government regulations, which must be narrowly tailored,
“[u]nion rules . . . are valid under § 101(a)(2) so long as they are reasonable.” Id.
Both sides agree that Hudson had the right to express his views on the incoming
administration. See MTD at 22; Compl., ¶ 68. The only issue, then, is whether some
“reasonable rule” limited that right. It is here that AFGE’s argument falters. While Defendant
asserts that “Plaintiff does not have a protected right to use AFGE’s email system and AFGE
resources to send a personal or political message,” MTD at 22, the Court does not see (and in
multiple briefs AFGE has not shown) where it has adopted such a rule. The only reasonable
inference the Court can draw at this point, therefore, is that one does not exist. In its Reply,
Defendant makes a passing reference to its insurance policy, which requires that the General
Counsel’s Office review certain AFGE publications, see Reply at 4, but that does not suffice
here. First, courts frequently decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a movant’s
reply. See, e.g., Herbert v. Nat’l Academy of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Even if
the Court were to entertain this position, it still fails. AFGE has not connected this insurance
policy to any promulgated rule, nor has it explained why an email would be considered a
“publication” that necessitates GCO review.
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Undeterred, AFGE next asserts that Count II “will soon be rendered entirely moot”
because the Union is “now re-processing the internal disciplinary charges” with an unbiased
panel. See MTD at 32. This Court certainly acknowledges that it may only decide live cases or
controversies and that events may occur while a case is pending that wither a once-fresh suit.
See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013). “But a case ‘becomes moot only when it is
impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’” Id.
(quoting Knox v. Serv. Empls., 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)). Even if the outcome of AFGE’s
second hearing somehow cures the defects that Hudson alleges in Count II, the Complaint’s
request for lost wages and damages means that he could still seek relief for alleged retaliation in
the first hearing. See Compl., ¶ 99(b). In other words, were the Court to decide that AFGE’s
original hearing improperly disciplined Plaintiff for exercising his free-speech rights, Hudson
could obtain a financial recovery. Count II thus survives.
B. Count IV
AFGE next attacks Count IV, an LMRDA breach-of-contract claim. Section 301 of the
Act provides a federal cause of action for “violation of contracts” in certain circumstances. See
29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Complaint alleges that, in removing Plaintiff from his elected position,
AFGE breached two sections of both its Constitution and its Committee of Investigation Manual.
In his Opposition, Hudson also argues that Defendant violated the “implicit premise that internal
discipline proceedings be free of bias.” Opp. at 16. The Court addresses each separately and
ultimately finds them all lacking in merit.
1. AFGE Constitution
Article 23 of the AFGE Constitution provides certain procedural rights for accused Union
members, including the right to a hearing transcript and a written decision. See AFGE
10
Constitution, Art. 23, §§ 5, 8. The Complaint alleges that AFGE violated the Constitution by not
delivering either of these to Hudson. See Compl., ¶¶ 84-98. As to the first, the Court notes that
AFGE has since provided him with a transcript of the proceedings, see ECF No. 8, rendering that
claim moot. As to his right to a written decision, AFGE argues that Article 23, which governs
the processing of internal disciplinary charges for regular members and local officers, is
inapplicable to Plaintiff’s hearing process. As a national officer, the Union argues, the
procedural protections available to Hudson are embodied in Article 13, not Article 23.
Courts defer to “an interpretation of a union constitution rendered by officials of a labor
organization . . . unless the court finds that the interpretation was unreasonable or made in bad
faith.” Noble v. Sombrotto, 525 F.3d 1230, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Monzillo v. Biller,
735 F.2d 1456, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). In determining whether the union’s construction is
reasonable, courts can consider a wide variety of factors including “the rationale underlying the
interpretation” and “avoidance of conflict between different provisions of the constitution.”
Laborers’ Dist. Council v. Laborers’ Int’l Union, 306 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 (D.D.C. 2004) (citation
omitted). Here, the Court finds that AFGE’s interpretation is reasonable.
First, Article 13 states that “[a]ny officer of the Federation may have a charge filed
against him or her for violations of Article 23.” AFGE Const., Art. 13, § 7. It then goes on to
outline how charges against such officers should be processed. Id., §§ 7(a)-(d). Article 23, by
contrast, plainly states that its “due process provisions . . . shall govern at the council level when
a council officer is charged and tried in his or her capacity as a council officer.” Id., Art. 23, § 1.
Implicit in that statement is that any due-process provisions of Article 23 do not attach to charges
against national officers like Hudson. Reading these two articles together, AFGE’s interpretation
— namely that Article 23 details only the offenses for which a national officer can be accused,
11
but the actual hearing process for national officers is fully embodied in Article 13 — is
reasonable and entitled to deference.
Second, Articles 13 and 23 detail similar, but not identical, charge procedures. For
example, charges filed against a national officer “must be filed in writing with the National
President and a copy thereof served by registered mail or personal service upon the officer
charged.” AFGE Const., Art. 13, § 7(a). Article 23, by contrast, requires a member to file
written charges “with the local of which the accused is a member” and serve them “upon the
accused by registered or certified mail at his or her last known address[,] and the local of which
the accused is a member also shall be served at its office or address of its highest ranking
officer.” Id., Art. 23, § 3. If Article 23 applied in toto to charges against national officers, it
would make little sense for each article to have its own slightly different service provision. The
Court thus finds that AFGE’s interpretation should be credited, and, as Plaintiff does not suggest
this interpretation is made in bad faith, the only procedural protections he can rely on are those
contained in Article 13. Because the right to a written decision does not appear there, the
Constitution does not support his breach-of-contract claim.
2. Committee of Investigation Manual
Count IV’s second set of claims alleges violations of the Committee of Investigation
Guidelines and Procedures Manual, a document prepared by AFGE’s GCO and provided to
members who have been appointed to a Committee of Investigation. See COI Manual at 1.
Defendant responds that (1) the Manual is not a “contract” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.
§ 185; (2) even if it were, it does not apply to Article 13 proceedings; and (3) even if it did apply,
Hudson does not allege any violation of the Manual. The Court, finding the first argument
persuasive, goes no further.
12
Section 301 does not provide a right of action every time a union breaks a promise to its
members. It protects only those contracts that are “fundamental agreement[s] of association,”
United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. v. Local 334, 452
U.S. 615, 619 (1981) (citation omitted), under which both the union and its members are bound
by certain terms. See Drywall Tapers & Pointers, Local 1974 v. Operative Plasterers’, 537 F.2d
669, 673 (2d Cir. 1976) (§ 301 encompasses negotiated “agreement[s] of definite content”)
(collecting cases). These documents typically include a union’s collective-bargaining agreement
and constitution. See United Ass’n of Journeymen, 452 U.S. at 623-24. Courts have also
included found jurisdiction based on a breach of a union’s bylaws, which are “analogous to
specific contract terms or to an addendum adding terms to the original contract.” Gable v. Local
Union No. 387 Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural, & Ornamental Iron Workers, 695 F. Supp. 1174,
1177 (N.D. Ga. 1988). When considering whether a union document is included within the
“contract” protected by Section 301, then, the Court assesses the extent to which it “prescribe[s]
the legal relationship and the rights and obligations between” the parties and evinces a negotiated
agreement. United Ass’n of Journeymen, 452 U.S. at 624; Capitol-Husting Co. v. NLRB, 671
F.2d 237, 242 (7th Cir. 1982).
The Manual fails this test in both content and form. First, it does not add any rights or
obligations separate and apart from the Union’s Constitution and bylaws, but merely “explains
AFGE’s disciplinary procedures, the operation of the committee, and [the] responsibilities as a
member of the committee.” COI Manual at 1; see United Ass’n of Journeymen, 452 U.S. at 624;
Local Union No. 657 of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Sidell, 552 F.2d 1250, 1253 n.6
(7th Cir. 1977) (Section 301 jurisdiction is limited “to the situation where there is a written
constitutional document creating rights and duties between two labor organizations”). Second,
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unlike a constitution or bylaws, which are agreements between the union and its members that
can be amended by majority vote, AFGE unilaterally “developed” the Manual as a “guide.” COI
Manual at 1; see Sidell, 552 F.2d at 1253 n.6 (“Where the claimed right is founded only on a
claimed intra-union custom, jurisdiction should not be asserted.”); Local Union No. 115, United
Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus. v. Townsend & Bottum,
Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (Section 301 “covers any agreement, written or
unwritten, formal or informal, which purports to resolve employment controversies”). Hudson’s
complaints regarding departures from the Manual, then, are also not actionable.
3. Fair Hearing
Plaintiff’s final § 301 claim — that he was not afforded a “fair and thorough trial of the
charges” — has a basis in both the AFGE Constitution and in Article 13. See Opp. at 16
(quoting AFGE Const. Art. 13, § 7(c)). Unfortunately for Hudson, that claim does not appear in
Count IV of his Complaint. While that pleading certainly alleges bias and a violation of his
rights to a fair hearing, those claims appear only in Count I, which Plaintiff has since withdrawn.
See Compl., ¶¶ 59-63 (alleging various ways in which “NST Hudson was denied ‘a full and fair
hearing’”). Count IV, by contrast, includes only the four grievances addressed above. A
complaint may incorporate by reference allegations in prior counts, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), but,
as Hudson withdrew Count I, those assertions can no longer support Count IV.
Plaintiff is, of course, free to seek leave to replead Count IV as part of an amended
complaint and to include his full-and-fair-hearing allegations, but he should be aware of a
potential jurisdictional obstacle not raised in the briefing. Count IV is premised on Section 301
of the LMRDA, which provides jurisdiction for “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees . . . or between any such labor
14
organizations.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). On a literal reading of the statute, Hudson seems out of luck
as he is neither an employer nor a labor organization. His Opposition merely concludes that
“[i]ndividual members have standing to sue for breach of that contract.” Opp. at 14 (citing
Wooddell v. Elec. Workers (IBEW), 502 U.S. 93, 98-103 (1991)). Wooddell, however, was a
suit by an individual union member against a local union alleging a breach of the international
union’s constitution by the local union. Id. at 98-99. The Supreme Court concluded it had
jurisdiction under § 301 because the plaintiff had “charged a violation of a contract between two
unions.” Id. at 100. Hudson, by contrast, only alleges that the Union breached a contract with
him. Section 301 jurisdiction may well not extend that far. Id. at 98 n.3 (noting that “a union
member may sue his union for a violation of the union constitution . . . only if it is charged that
the breach alleged violates a contract between two labor organizations”); see Korzen v. Local
Union 705, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A suit on a contract
between a labor organization and a member is not within the scope of section 301.”). In any
event, as it stands now, Count IV must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to
Counts I, III, and IV. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: February 5, 2018
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