KROCKA v. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR THE U.S. ATTORNEYS et al

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 33 Order. Signed by Judge Christopher R. Cooper on 2/19/2019. (lccrc1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
VINCENT J. KROCKA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 17-cv-2171-CRC

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Federal inmate Vincent Krocka brings this action against the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys (“EOUSA”) and its Assistant Director for alleged violations of the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and breach of contract. Krocka lodged a FOIA
request with EOUSA in November 2015 for documents maintained by the United States
Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida related to his criminal case and a related
habeas action. He seeks transcripts and other materials that he says will prove his innocence, or
at least show that he did not receive a fair trial. Krocka Opp’n, ECF No. 24, ¶ 1. EOUSA
provided Krocka 787 pages of responsive records, including 354 pages of transcripts. Not
satisfied, Krocka sued and both parties have now moved for summary judgment. For the reasons
that follow, the Court will grant the government summary judgment regarding its withholdings
and reserve judgment regarding the adequacy of the search.
I.

Background
In October 2008, a jury in the Middle District of Florida convicted Mr. Krocka of ten

counts of sending threatening or extortionate communications to his ex-wife, and six counts of
witness tampering. Gov’t Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF”), ECF No. 22-5,

¶ 1. After the district court set aside two of the convictions and the Eleventh Circuit reversed
two others, id. ¶¶ 2–3, Krocka was sentenced to 121 months in prison, id. ¶ 4. In June 2014, he
filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was
denied. Id. ¶ 5.
In November 2015, Krocka submitted a FOIA request to EOUSA for all investigative
documents, communications, and other records related to his federal criminal and habeas cases
maintained by either EOUSA or the United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of
Florida (“USAO”). Compl. Ex. C, ECF No. 1. His briefing clarifies that he is particularly
focused on the “complete and unredacted hard copies of the entire trial transcript and both pretrial and post-trial transcripts as well as the so called ‘missing’ trial audio tape of the actual trial
in his criminal case . . . , and the audio tapes of any hearings and proceedings occurring in 2012
and thereafter.” Krocka Opp’n ¶ 6.
In response to Krocka’s request, EOUSA asked the USAO to search for responsive
records. Smith Decl., ECF No. 22-3, ¶ 7. The USAO did so, and found Krocka’s physical and
electronic files. Hoobler Decl., ECF No. 22-4, ¶ 10. It recovered two § 2255 case files; neither
contained responsive documents. Id. ¶ 12. Krocka’s criminal case file yielded three boxes
(around 6,000 pages) of potentially responsive records. Id. ¶ 13. Finally, the four Assistant U.S.
Attorneys (“AUSAs”) who worked on Krocka’s case were directed to search their e-mail for any
responsive documents. Id. ¶ 17.
In December 2015, EOUSA informed Krocka by letter that he must make an advance
payment of $295 before it would continue processing his FOIA request. Smith Decl. Ex. 1, ECF
No. 22-3, at 15. The office also explained that Krocka could instead opt to receive the first 100
pages of responsive documents for free. Id. EOUSA closed Mr. Krocka’s request when he did

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not respond to the letter within 30 days. Smith Decl. ¶ 10. In May 2016, EOUSA received a
letter signed by “Michael Sperber POA for Vincent Krocka,” enclosing a check for $295. Id.
¶ 11. EOUSA then reopened Krocka’s FOIA request. Id. ¶ 12.
EOUSA staff asked the USAO to submit potentially responsive materials. Id. ¶ 13.
Pursuant to internal policy, EOUSA “directed the USAO not to submit grand jury records,
records sealed by court order, or public records other than trial or sentencing transcripts.”
Hoobler Decl. ¶ 15. The USAO sent EOUSA 676 pages of non-public records, a 116-page
sentencing transcript, and twelve discs—one containing 238 pages of excerpted trial transcripts
and the rest containing audio files of jail calls made by Krocka. Id. ¶ 16. Pursuant to the
EOUSA directive, “[m]ore than 2,000 pages of public records, including routine district court
motions, briefs, and appellate court records, were not submitted to the FOIA staff” at EOUSA.
Id. The USAO also withheld “presentence reports, grand jury materials, and records sealed by
order of the district court.” Id.
EOUSA then processed the records and released responsive, non-exempt materials.
Krocka received 787 pages, which included 433 pages of non-public records and 354 pages of
public records consisting of the trial and sentencing transcripts. Smith Decl. ¶ 21. EOUSA also
released twelve pages of records that were partially redacted. Id. The agency withheld seven
categories of documents—231 pages—as exempt. Id. ¶ 231.
After Krocka filed suit, the USAO discovered eleven additional discs that it had not
previously provided to EOUSA. Id. ¶ 27. Those discs were marked as government exhibits and
contain recorded jail calls. Three were admitted during Krocka’s trial. An attorney-advisor for
EOUSA has contacted the Bureau of Prisons to determine whether Krocka may have those discs
where he is incarcerated or whether there is someone who can accept them on his behalf. Id.

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¶ 28. 1 EOUSA withheld the remaining eight discs, which were marked but not admitted at his
trial, for the same reason as the original eleven: privacy and safety concerns for the third parties
recorded on the calls. Id. ¶ 29.
Both parties have moved for summary judgment. Those motions are ripe and ready for
the Court’s review.
II.

Standard of Review
FOIA cases are typically resolved on summary judgment. See Brayton v. Office of U.S.

Trade Rep., 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
FOIA requires an agency to conduct an adequate search for responsive documents. An
adequate search is one “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Morley v.
CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Weisberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 705 F.2d
1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). In assessing the adequacy of the search, a court focuses on the
methods and scope of the search, not its fruit. Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency, 315 F.3d
311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003). To obtain summary judgment on the adequacy of its search, the
agency must “show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records,
using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.”
Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Agencies can make this
showing through affidavits describing the search with “reasonable detail.” Id. Such affidavits

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Krocka claims he has not received these discs. Krocka Opp’n ¶ 14. The government
shall inform the Court whether it has provided the discs to Krocka or his representative in the
supplemental declaration ordered below.
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are “accorded a presumption of good faith [and] cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims
about the existence and discoverability of other documents.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926
F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks, citation omitted).
In addition to demonstrating that it conducted an adequate search, the agency must also
justify any withholdings made pursuant to a FOIA exemption. Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565
F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Again, an agency may rely on affidavits providing sufficient
detail regarding the basis for withholding. But, because the primary purpose of FOIA is
disclosure, courts construe the exemptions “narrowly.” DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 795 F.3d 178,
183 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (1989)).
III. Analysis
A. Adequacy of EOUSA’s search
Krocka first challenges the adequacy of the search. Although he does not squarely
contest where the government searched, the Court will construe his pro se challenge as one
encompassing that aspect of the search’s adequacy. The declarations provided by Theodore
Smith, an EOUSA Attorney-Advisor, and Megan Hoobler, a paralegal specialist in the Middle
District of Florida USAO, detail the who, what, when, and where of the search the USAO and
EOUSA conducted. The agency searched locations reasonably likely to contain responsive
documents: the USAO’s physical and electronic case files pertaining to Krocka’s cases as well as
the e-mails of the AUSAs who handled those cases. Hoobler Decl. ¶¶ 10, 17. Those locations
most likely exhausted the places where Krocka’s files might be found. The agency does not,
however, say the “magic words” that it “searched all locations likely to contain responsive
documents.” Huntington v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 234 F. Supp. 3d 94, 103 (D.D.C. 2017)
(quoting Bartko v. Dep’t of Justice, 167 F. Supp. 3d 55, 64 (D.D.C. 2016)). While an agency

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need not search every record system, it must “aver[] that all files likely containing responsive
materials (if such records exist) were searched.” Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. EOUSA’s assertions
that it searched Krocka’s electronic and physical case files and the AUSAs’ e-mails “may come
close, but they ultimately do not pass muster.” Huntington, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 104.
Accordingly, the Court will reserve judgment on the adequacy of EOUSA’s search pending
submission of a supplemental declaration indicating whether the agency searched all files and
locations likely containing responsive material.
What Krocka does squarely dispute is the completeness of the records he received. He
claims he still doesn’t have unredacted transcripts from his trial and other proceedings or the
“missing” audio recording of the trial. He believes EOUSA improperly withheld those materials
pursuant to its policy of not providing public documents to FOIA requesters unless specifically
asked. Krocka Am. Mot. Summ. J. (“Krocka MSJ”), ECF No. 26, ¶¶ 8–9; Krocka Opp’n, ¶¶ 7–
9. 2 But it appears that Mr. Krocka misunderstands the reason the agency did not provide him
with all the transcripts and recordings he seeks. According to the agency, it followed the publicrecords policy by producing transcripts found in Krocka’s case files: the 238 pages of excerpted
trial transcripts and the 116-page sentencing transcript. Gov’t Reply, ECF No. 29, at 2. In its
reply, the agency also says it could not produce a copy of the court reporter’s audio recording of
the trial—which typically are the property of the court reporter—because it does not have one.

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Although he challenges its application in his case, Krocka does not challenge EOUSA’s
general policy of construing FOIA requests as seeking only non-public information unless
specifically requested. Fellow courts in this district have approved this approach. In
Cunningham v. Holder, 842 F. Supp. 2d 338 (D.D.C. 2012), for instance, the court concluded
that a “requirement of a specific request for public records [] makes sense” in light of FOIA’s
statutory requirement to “make records promptly available” and the fact that “public records can
generally be released more quickly” than non-public ones. Id. at 346–47 (citing McLaughlin v.
Dep’t of Justice, 598 F. Supp. 2d 62, 66 & n.2 (D.D.C. 2009)).
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Id. But again, the agency fails to specify something: whether these transcripts were the only
transcripts in its possession or whether there were others that were withheld pursuant to the
public-records policy. If the former, the agency’s representations are “accorded a presumption
of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and
discoverability of other documents.” SafeCard Servs., Inc., 926 F.2d at 1200 (internal quotation
marks, citation omitted).
The Court will thus reserve judgment on the adequacy of the agency’s search. EOUSA is
directed to file a supplemental declaration within fourteen (14) days of this opinion attesting to
the scope of its search and whether it provided Krocka with all transcripts in its possession. As
indicated in footnote 1 above, that declaration should also address the status of the three discs
admitted during Krocka’s criminal trial. Mr. Krocka will have fourteen (14) days thereafter to
respond to that declaration.
B. Withholdings
EOUSA fully withheld seven categories of documents: (1) records sealed by court order;
(2) draft filings; (3) recorded jail calls between Krocka and third parties; (4) letters from thirdparty witnesses and federal inmates to prosecutors; (5) factual backgrounds prepared by law
enforcement officials; (6) e-mails between prosecutors and law enforcement officers regarding
the case; and (7) grand jury materials. The agency also redacted names, contact information,
and/or other personally identifying information on twelve pages of documents released to Mr.
Krocka.
Krocka does not challenge two of these sets of withholdings at all: 153 pages of records
(including medical records and a presentence report) that had been sealed by court order, Smith
Decl. ¶ 16; Hoobler Decl. ¶ 19, and two draft pleadings withheld under Exemption 5 as attorney

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work product, Smith Decl. ¶¶ 24(g), 24(h); Vaughn Index, ECF No. 22-2, at 6 (Bates Stamp Nos.
228–29). The remainder of this section addresses the withholdings and redactions that Krocka
does challenge.
1. Recorded jail calls
The agency withheld eleven CDs of recorded jail calls between Krocka and third parties
on the ground that they contain information exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6, which
protects against unwarranted invasions of personal privacy, and Exemption 7(D), which protects
confidential sources and the information they provide to law enforcement. Smith Decl. ¶ 25; see
also Vaughn Index at 10–11. The Court need only discuss Exemption 7(D). That exemption
applies to information compiled for law-enforcement purposes that “could reasonably be
expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source” as well as “information furnished by a
confidential source.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D); Parker v. Dep’t of Justice, 934 F.2d 375, 380
(D.C. Cir. 1991). A source is confidential within the meaning of this exemption if the source
“provided information under an express assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances from
which an assurance could be reasonably inferred.” Williams v. FBI, 69 F.3d 1155, 1159 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (quoting Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 170–74 (1993)). Krocka
challenges these withholdings because, he says, the third parties “effectively waived any privacy
right” when they chose to speak with Krocka knowing that jail calls were monitored. Krocka
Opp’n ¶ 13. But Krocka’s focus on the third parties is misplaced. The government avers that it
was the local sheriff’s office and jail that “provided the recorded jail calls to federal law
enforcement authorities based upon an assurance that the recorded calls would not be
disseminated further.” Vaughn Index at 11. The D.C. Circuit has concluded that investigative
information shared by local law enforcement “with the FBI on the understanding that the FBI

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would not disclose it to the public, particularly because to do so might reveal the identity of
sources,” was properly withheld under Exemption 7(D). See Williams, 69 F.3d 1159–60.
Consistent with Williams, the Court concludes that EOUSA properly withheld these eleven CDs
pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(D).
2. Letters
The agency also withheld under Exemption 7(D) three letters from individuals who it
says corresponded with the AUSA handling Krocka’s criminal case with an implied assurance of
confidentiality. 3 Smith Decl. ¶¶ 24(c), (d), (e); Vaughn Index at 3–4 (citing Bates Stamp Nos.
222–26). “An implied assurance of confidentiality may be inferred from evidence showing the
circumstances surrounding the imparting of the information, including the nature of the criminal
investigation and the informant’s relationship to the target.” Love v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 13-cv1303, 2015 WL 5063166, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2015) (citing Landano, 508 U.S. at 172). The
“pertinent question” when evaluating the nature of the criminal investigation “is whether the
violence and risk of retaliation that attend the[e] type of crime [involved] warrant an implied
grant of confidentiality for such a source.” Mays v. DEA, 234 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
In Love, for example, the court had “little doubt that [the] source’s confidentiality, if not
expressed, was reasonably implied” because the defendant was charged with and convicted of
solicitation of murder for hire of two of the state’s witnesses in a separate drug-possession case.
2015 WL 5063166, at *6. Here, too, the Court has little doubt that the authors of these letters
provided information to the AUSA under an implied assurance of confidentiality. Mr. Krocka
was charged with and convicted of witness tampering and sending threatening and extortionate

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Because the Court concludes that EOUSA properly withheld these letters under
Exemption 7(D), it does not reach the agency’s arguments regarding Exemptions 6 and 7(C).
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communications, SUMF ¶ 1, crimes which by definition expose cooperating witnesses to a risk
of retaliation and violence. And while Krocka argues that the agency could have redacted “all
personal identifying information” before releasing the letters, Krocka Opp’n ¶ 12, Exemption
7(D) protects both the identity of confidential informants and the information they provide,
Parker, 934 F.2d at 380. Therefore, as the government explains, it would not be enough “to
simply redact the name of the author.” Gov’t Reply at 2. The Court thus concludes that the
agency properly withheld the entirety of these letters under Exemption 7(D).
3. Factual summaries and timelines
Next, the agency withheld under Exemption 5 two factual summaries created by
prosecutors and investigators in preparation for criminal proceedings against Krocka. Smith
Decl. ¶¶ 24(a), (b); Vaughn Index at 1–2 (citing Bates Stamps Nos. 1–221). “Exemption 5
permits an agency to withhold materials normally privileged from discovery in civil litigation
against the agency.” Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Exemption 5
encompasses the work-product doctrine, which shields materials “prepared in anticipation of
litigation,” including “factual materials.” Id. at 620. “Any part of [a document] prepared in
anticipation of litigation, not just the portions concerning opinions, legal theories, and the like, is
protected by the work product doctrine and falls under [E]xemption 5.” Id. This doctrine “can
apply to preparatory work performed not only by attorneys, but also, in some circumstances by
nonlawyers.” Shapiro v. Dep’t of Justice, 969 F. Supp. 2d 18, 28 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1975)).
EOUSA properly withheld these summaries in full under the work-product doctrine. The
agency avers that these documents were prepared in anticipation of Krocka’s criminal
prosecution, and Krocka does not contend otherwise. See Vaughn Index at 1–2 (explaining that

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documents were prepared by “prosecutors and investigators working with and at the direction of
the prosecutions” and were “used by the prosecutor in preparing for and conducting legal
proceedings during the prosecution of the requester”). Instead, he again asserts that “any
identifying information concerning 3rd parties is capable of being redacted, but the Plaintiff is
entitled to know what the ‘facts’ contained in this document” are. Krocka Opp’n ¶ 11. In other
words, he appears to argue that the agency failed to provide “[a]ny reasonably segregable”
information contained in these factual backgrounds pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). But as the
agency explains, it was under no obligation to segregate any information from these materials:
“If a document is fully protected as work product”—that is, if it was prepared in anticipation of
litigation as these factual backgrounds were—“then segregability is not required.” Judicial
Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
4. E-mails regarding prosecution
The agency also withheld as work product under Exemption 5 three e-mails between
AUSAs and law-enforcement personnel about the prosecution. Smith Decl. ¶¶ 24(f), (i), (j);
Vaughn Index at 6–7 (citing Bates Stamp Nos. 227, 230–31). Krocka challenges the withholding
of just one of these documents—Bates Stamp Number 231—again on the basis that the
government could “easily and readily” redact “all personal identifying information.” Krocka
Opp’n ¶ 12. But as with the factual summaries, EOUSA was not required to segregate some of
the information in these e-mails, which are fully protected as work product. According to the
Vaughn Index, Bates Stamp Number 231 is a series of e-mails exchanged on May 15, 2008
between an AUSA, USAO support staff, and a law enforcement officer about “memoranda
prepared by attorneys for the United States” “regarding subpoena for records.” Vaughn Index at
7. Krocka does not dispute that assertion of the work-product doctrine, only that the agency did

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not segregate some information. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the agency properly
withheld these e-mails pursuant to Exemption 5 and was not required to produce redacted
versions.
5. Grand jury materials
Next, EOUSA withheld 300 pages of grand jury materials under FOIA Exemption 3.
Smith Decl. ¶ 17; Vaughn Index at 13. Exemption 3 covers records “specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute . . . provided that such statute [either] (A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B)
establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The D.C. Circuit has explained that “requests for documents
related to grand jury investigations implicate FOIA’s third exemption, because Rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits government attorneys and others from
‘disclos[ing] a matter occurring before the grand jury.’” Lopez v. Dep’t of Justice, 393 F.3d
1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B)). The Circuit has cautioned,
however, that there is no per se rule against disclosure of information related to grand jury
investigations; rather, the “relevant inquiry . . . is whether disclosure of the information requested
would ‘tend to reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury’s investigation, such as the identities
of witnesses or jurors, the substance of testimony, the strategy or direction of the investigation,
the deliberations or questions of jurors, and the like.’” Id. (quoting Senate of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico v. Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 575, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
The 300 or so pages of withheld grand jury materials consist of transcripts of witness
testimony, exhibits, filings containing materials submitted in camera, and returned subpoenas.
Hoobler Decl. ¶ 18. These materials clearly would “tend to reveal some secret aspect” of the

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grand jury’s investigation: the transcripts would reveal the identities of witnesses and the
substance of their testimony, and the exhibits and filings would reveal the strategy and direction
of the investigation. And “all grand jury subpoenas . . . fall within FOIA’s third exemption.”
Lopez, 393 F.3d at 1350. The Court therefore concludes that the agency properly withheld the
grand jury materials pursuant to Exemption 3.
6. Redactions
And last, EOUSA relied on Exemption 7(C) to partially redact twelve pages of
documents released to Mr. Krocka: the hand-printed surname of a third party, see Vaughn Index
at 8 (Bates Stamp No. 232); the e-mail address of a non-supervisory AUSA from an e-mail of a
law enforcement officer to the AUSA regarding attendance at an upcoming sentencing, id. at 9
(Bates Stamp No. 233); the e-mail addresses of non-supervisory AUSAs from an e-mail between
AUSAs regarding attendance at an upcoming sentencing, id. (Bates Stamp No. 234); and the
names, contact information, and other personally identifiable information of third parties from
fax cover sheets from a private detention facility to the Postal Inspector, which were attached to
letters sent by Krocka, id. at 10 (Bates Stamp Nos. 235–43).
Krocka does not challenge these redactions explicitly. Instead, he lists these documents
when arguing in general that the government should be required to provide copies of documents
“redacting any and all names of 3rd parties providing information to investigators but providing
unredacted content to the Plaintiff.” Krocka Opp’n at 17; see also id. ¶ 32. But that is precisely
what the government did with respect to this category of documents that were partially redacted
and released. The Court therefore concludes that these redactions were proper.

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C. Breach of contract claim
Finally, Krocka argues that he entered into a binding contract with EOUSA by paying the
requested $295 for duplication costs. Krocka MSJ ¶ 19; Krocka Opp’n ¶ 23. He contends that
EOUSA breached this contract by failing to release the promised 6,000 pages of records.
EOUSA could not have breached what did not exist. The parties did not enter into a
binding contract for 6,000 pages of records in exchange for Krocka’s $295 because their
interactions lack the basic hallmarks of a contractual relationship: mutual assent to all essential
terms of the contract and intent to be bound. See Henke v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 83 F.3d
1445, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1996). EOUSA’s December 2015 letter to Krocka explained that 6,000
was just an approximate number of pages found and emphasized that “not all of these pages are
likely to be released to you.” Gov’t MSJ, Ex. 3, at 15. Instead of forming a binding contract, the
letter simply clarified for Krocka the requirements he would need to meet—providing in advance
the approximate cost of duplication under federal law, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)—in order for
the agency to respond to his FOIA request. In addition, Krocka will be refunded any balance if
the actual duplication costs are less than $295, unless offset by some other debt that he owes the
federal government. Gov’t Reply at 3 n.2; Hudgins Decl. ¶¶ 6–7.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the government summary judgment on Krocka’s
contract claim as well.

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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment in part. The Court will reserve judgment on the adequacy of the agency’s search
pending submission of the supplemental declaration discussed above. A separate Order shall
accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
Date: February 19, 2019

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