SEAWRIGHT v. POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF POSTAL SERVICE

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 5 USPS' motion to dismiss. This case is hereby closed. The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order to Mr. Seawright's address of record by first-class mail, certified receipt. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 11/26/2018. (lcegs3)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TERENCE T. SEAWRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v.
POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
Defendant.

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) Civil Action No. 18-460 (EGS)
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Pro se plaintiff Terence Seawright (“Mr. Seawright”) brings
several claims against the Postmaster General of the United
States Postal Service (“USPS”), including (but not limited to)
fraud, false claims, defamation, false statements, and
concealment. He alleges that several management-level USPS
employees used his name without his knowledge or permission to
terminate another employee. Pending before the Court is USPS’
motion to dismiss Mr. Seawright’s complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Court has
carefully considered USPS’ motion, Mr. Seawright’s response,
USPS’ reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record
herein. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it
lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Seawright’s claims and DISMISSES his
complaint.
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II. Background
Mr. Seawright alleges that several USPS managers “submitted
a statement using [his] name without his knowledge or
permission, trying to use [him] to help management terminate
[another USPS employee].” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1. 1 According to
Mr. Seawright, this “false statement” affected him and caused
“great hard ship [sic]” for the terminated USPS employee and his
family. Id. Without going into specifics, Mr. Seawright also
alleges that this incident was “not the first time management
has made false statements to financially inconvenience an
employee,” as it was “also done to [him] without just cause.”
Id. at 1-2. To support his allegations, Mr. Seawright includes
USPS paperwork from February 2013, notifying him that he was to
be “placed in an off duty (without pay) status,” and other
documents resulting from that notification. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1.
He also includes letters from other USPS employees confirming
that Mr. Seawright’s name was used without his permission to
terminate another employee. Ex. 2, ECF No. 1-1.
Mr. Seawright brings several claims against USPS including:
“fraud, knowingly and willfully, false claims, punitive damages,
mental anguish, defamation of character, pain and suffering,

When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
filed document.
1

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false statements as to future actions, false statements and
venue, false statement, concealment, false statement,
concealment-failure to disclose, malicious malice, perjury,
misrepresent [sic], conspiracy, falsity, breach of contract.”
Id. at 2. He seeks more than $350,000 in damages. Id.
In May 2018, USPS moved to dismiss Mr. Seawright’s
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
The motion is now ripe.
III. Standard of Review
A “pro se complaint is entitled to liberal
construction.” Washington v. Geren, 675 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31
(D.D.C. 2009) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972)). However, “[a] federal district court may only hear a
claim over which it has subject-matter jurisdiction; therefore,
a [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) motion for
dismissal is a threshold challenge to a court's
jurisdiction.” Gregorio v. Hoover, 238 F. Supp. 3d 37, 44
(D.D.C. 2017) (citations and quotations omitted). To survive
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that the court has jurisdiction by a preponderance
of the evidence. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
561 (1992). “Because Rule 12(b)(1) concerns a court's ability to
hear a particular claim, the court must scrutinize the
plaintiff's allegations more closely . . . than it would under a
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motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Schmidt v. U.S.
Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C.
2011)(internal citations omitted). In reviewing a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court “may consider
materials outside the pleadings” in determining whether it has
jurisdiction to hear the case. Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v.
FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The court must also
accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,
but the court need not “accept inferences unsupported by the
facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual
allegations.” Rann v. Chao, 154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C.
2001).
IV. Analysis
USPS argues that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Mr. Seawright’s claims pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because Mr. Seawright failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies and because the government
has not waived sovereign immunity for the claims that Mr.
Seawright brings. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 5 at 5-12. USPS also
argues that Mr. Seawright’s claims should be dismissed because
he failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2 See id. at
12-16. Mr. Seawright opposes the motion, arguing that he pled
claims “for false statement, concealment, and fraud.” See Pl.’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 7 at 4.
USPS argues that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Mr. Seawright’s claims because Mr. Seawright
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a claim
under the Federal Tort Claim Act (“FTCA”). Def.’s Mot., ECF No.
5 at 7-12. Indeed, Mr. Seawright brings tort claims against USPS
and seeks money damages. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2 (“seeking
$350,000 in damages per person,” the $400 filing fee, and
“damages assessed for all laws broken”). “Because plaintiff
demands money damages from a federal government agency, he must
proceed under the [FTCA], which operates as a waiver of the
government’s sovereign immunity for certain tort
claims.” Edwards v. U.S. Park Police, 251 F. Supp. 3d 109, 111
(D.D.C. 2017) (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6
(1962)).
“The FTCA provides that an action shall not be instituted
upon a claim against the United States for money damages unless
the claimant has first exhausted [his] administrative
Because the Court agrees that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Mr. Seawright’s case, the Court need not
evaluate this argument. See Simpkins v. District of Columbia,
108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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remedies.” McNeil v. United States, 508 US. 106, 107
(1993)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). Indeed, “[a] tort claim
against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within
two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun
within six months after the date of mailing . . . of notice of
final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was
presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); see also Mittleman v. United
States, 104 F.3d 410, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(“[T]he FTCA requires
that claims be presented to the agency in question . . . . [a]
claim not so presented and filed is forever barred.”).
To exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA, “the
claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate
[f]ederal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by
the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.”
28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). “In this Circuit, a claim is considered
adequately presented when a claimant provides the agency with
‘(1) a written statement sufficiently describing the injury to
enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sumcertain damages claim.’” Tookes v. United States, 811 F. Supp.
2d 322, 331 (D.D.C. 2011)(quoting GAF Corp. v. United
States, 818 F.2d 901, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The rationale for
this “jurisdictional prerequisite,” GAF Corp., 818 F.2d at 904,
is that “[n]otice of an injury will enable the agency to
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investigate and ascertain the strength of a claim; [and] the
sum-certain statement of damages will enable it to determine
whether settlement or negotiations to that end are
desirable,” id. at 919–20.
The record establishes that Mr. Seawright did not meet his
“minimal” burden to file an administrative FTCA claim. Tookes,
811 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (“the FTCA only imposes on claimants the
burden of providing notice, not the burden of substantiating
claims”). USPS attaches a declaration from Ms. Kimberly Herbst,
a supervising “Tort Claims Examiner/Adjudicator with the [USPS]
National Tort Center.” Herbst Decl., ECF No. 5-1 ¶ 1. Ms. Herbst
swears that she conducted a search of “all Postal Service Law
Department records of administrative tort claims” and “all
Postal Service tort claim coordinator database records of
administrative tort claims” for evidence of an administrative
claim filed by or on behalf of Mr. Seawright. Id. ¶¶ 4,6. She
found no such records. Id. Because Mr. Seawright did not file an
administrative FTCA claim, the Court lacks jurisdiction over his
claims. See Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 371
(D.C. Cir. 1997)(finding that the district court “lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, or if not jurisdiction, the functional
equivalent of it,” because the plaintiff had not exhausted his
administrative remedies).

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Mr. Seawright does not dispute that he did not file an FTCA
claim. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 7. Instead, he
contends that the Court has jurisdiction over his claims because
his name was used without his permission. See id. at 2-3. He
states that he was unable to resolve his issues with the USPS
and “that’s the reason [he] filed [his] claim in Federal Court.”
Id. at 3. Accepting Mr. Seawright’s allegations as true, he
nonetheless may not escape the jurisdictional prerequisite that
he file an FTCA administrative claim before filing his claim in
federal court. GAF Corp., 818 F.2d at 904.
Moreover, many of the claims raised in Mr. Seawright’s
complaint are claims for which the FTCA expressly does not waive
sovereign immunity. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) expressly
exempts “any claim arising out of . . . libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights.” Compare with Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2 (listing claims
related to USPS’ alleged deceit, including misrepresentation,
defamation of character, and fraud). As Mr. Seawright himself
notes, his claims arise out of deceit, defamation, and
misrepresentation, as his name was used “without [his] knowledge
or consent.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 7 at 2. Thus, his claims must
dismissed, as “[c]laims that fall under one of the exceptions to
the FTCA must be dismissed for lack of subject matter

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jurisdiction.” Edmonds v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35
(D.D.C. 2006).
Finally, Mr. Seawright contends that his claim is a “qui
tam action,” over which this Court has jurisdiction. Pl.’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 7 at 3. However, Mr. Seawright has not followed
the proper procedure for filing a qui tam action under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b)(mandating that a private person bringing a qui tam
suit must do so in the name of the government). Moreover, Mr.
Seawright may not bring a qui tam action “based upon allegations
or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an
administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the
Government is already a party.” Id. § 3730(e).
As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Seawright’s
claims and his arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
V. Conclusion and Order
Upon careful consideration of Mr. Seawright’s arguments and
the applicable law, USPS’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED
for the aforementioned reasons. Mr. Seawright’s case is
DISMISSED with prejudice in its entirety.
This is a final, appealable Order.
SO ORDERED.
Signed:

Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
November 26, 2018

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