CANNON v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 19 Order on Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 11/15/2018. (lcjeb1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NATHANIEL CANNON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 18-624 (JEB)

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Nathaniel Cannon brings this suit alleging that his former employer in
North Carolina, Defendant Charter Communications, violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act when it denied him the reasonable accommodation of working from home. In now moving
to dismiss, Charter argues both that this Court has no personal jurisdiction over it and that the
Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege an ADA claim. Without needing to address the
latter point, the Court will dismiss the case without prejudice as it has no basis to hale Charter
into a District of Columbia court.
I.

Background
As this Opinion concerns only jurisdiction, the Court will not linger on the particulars of

Cannon’s ADA claim. It sets forth the facts as alleged in both the Amended Complaint and the
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. See ECF Nos. 10 (Amended Complaint), 16
(Opposition); Brown v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 151-52 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(court should consider facts alleged in pro se plaintiff’s opposition to motion to dismiss).
“Plaintiff worked at Charter Communications and [its predecessor] Time Warner Cable
in Charlotte, North Carolina[,] from January 6, 2012[,] to October 16, 2017[,] beginning in the
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position of Retention Representative and ending [in the] position [of] Order Management
Scheduling Representative.” Opp. at 3–4. (As Plaintiff misnumbers the pages in his Opposition,
the Court will rely on the ECF pagination.) While there, he “developed additional chronic
medical conditions,” including “hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea[,] . . . [v]ertigo and Sinus
Node Dysfunction with heart arrhythmia.” Id. at 4. After a surgery, he returned to work in
September 2014 and requested the accommodation of working from home. See Am. Compl.,
¶¶ 4, 6. He successfully did so for over two years, but following Time Warner’s sale to Charter,
his new employer terminated the work-from-home program, requiring Cannon to return to the
office in 2017. Id., ¶¶ 13–15. Feeling unable to perform the work in that environment, he “was
forced to resign employment.” Id., ¶ 63. This suit followed, and Charter now moves for
dismissal.
II.

Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a suit

if the court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
personal jurisdiction, FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
and its requirements “must be met as to each defendant.” Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332
(1980). In deciding whether the plaintiff has shown a factual basis for personal jurisdiction,
courts resolve factual discrepancies in his favor. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d
454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). When personal jurisdiction is challenged, “the district judge has
considerable procedural leeway in choosing a methodology for deciding the motion.” 5B
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1351 (3d ed. 2004). The

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court may rest on the allegations in the pleadings, collect affidavits and other evidence, or even
hold a hearing. Id.
III.

Analysis
There are two types of personal jurisdiction that a plaintiff may invoke: general and

specific. Each must meet the requirements of the Constitution’s Due Process Clause. See
United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Cannon here appears to rely
exclusively on the former.
The Due Process Clause permits general jurisdiction when a non-resident defendant
maintains sufficiently systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state, regardless of
whether those contacts gave rise to the claim in the particular suit. See Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1984). General jurisdiction is appropriate
based on “only a limited set of affiliations with a forum,” all of which are tantamount to
Defendant’s domicile. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). For corporations,
general jurisdiction may be asserted if the forum is one in which the corporation is “‘fairly
regarded as at home,’” which has been defined as generally being either its “place of
incorporation” or its “principal place of business.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)).
On this score, Cannon alleges that “Charter has a Government Affairs office in the
District of Columbia conducting business on behalf of Charter Communications by Charter
employees.” Opp. at 2. That is insufficient, as it cannot be said that Defendant is “fairly
regarded as at home” in the District. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137–39 (“[T]he inquiry under
Goodyear is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some
sense continuous and systematic, it is whether that corporation’s affiliations with the State are so

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continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). In fact, Charter avers that it “is a Delaware limited liability
company . . . and has its principal executive offices . . . [in] Stamford, Connecticut.” ECF 13-2
(Declaration of Bradley P. Nelson), ¶ 6.
In any event, even if Plaintiff could demonstrate that Defendant had sufficient contacts
with the District, he still would not satisfy the service requirements of D.C. law. A foreign
defendant must be served “in the District” for the exercise of general jurisdiction. See D.C.
Code § 13-334(a). “Where the basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is § 13334(a), . . . a plaintiff who serves the corporation by mail outside the District is ‘foreclosed from
benefitting from [the statute’s] jurisdictional protection.’” Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp.,
293 F.3d 506, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Everett v. Nissan Motor Corp., 628 A.2d 106, 108
(D.C. 1993)); see also Gowens v. Dyncorp, 132 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2001) (service at
defendant’s Virginia headquarters). Here, it appears that Plaintiff did not serve Defendant in the
District. See ECF No. 5 (Service Affidavit). The Court, consequently, may not exercise general
jurisdiction over it via § 13-334(a).
Plaintiff does not argue that, in the alternative, specific jurisdiction could apply, and he is
right to so abstain. Specific jurisdiction permits a court to adjudicate those “issues deriving
from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear, 564 U.S.
at 919 (citation omitted). In other words, specific jurisdiction exists where a claim arises out of
the non-resident defendant’s contacts with the forum state. There is no allegation here that
Charter’s failure to accommodate arose or had any connection with employees in its D.C. office.
As there is no basis for personal jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court will dismiss the
case and permit Plaintiff to refile in a permissible court – e.g., one in North Carolina.

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IV.

Conclusion
The Court will, accordingly, grant Defendant’s Motion. A separate Order consistent with

this Opinion will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: November 15, 2018

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