SANCHEZ et al v. OFFICE OF THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION denying 15 Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint or to Alter or Amend Judgment: See document for details. Signed by Judge Rudolph Contreras on July 8, 2019. (lcrc2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ALTAGRACIA SANCHEZ, et al.,

:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
v.
:
:
OFFICE OF THE STATE
:
SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, et al., :
:
Defendants.
:

Civil Action No.:

18-975 (RC)

Re Document No.:

15

MEMORANDUM OPINION
DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the D.C. Office of the State Superintendent of Education (“OSSE”) issued
regulations that imposed minimum education requirements for certain childcare providers in
Washington. Plaintiffs in this case promptly filed suit challenging those requirements, but the
Court dismissed their complaint based on an unusual combination of standing, ripeness, and
mootness problems. Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended
complaint. For the reasons provided below, the Court denies this motion, as the new complaint
fails to cure the original’s deficiencies.
II. BACKGROUND
As the Court explained in greater detail in its previous opinion dismissing Plaintiffs’
complaint, OSSE is the state education agency for the District of Columbia and is “authorized to
‘formulate and promulgate rules necessary to carry out its functions.’” Sanchez v. Office of State
Superintendent of Educ. (Sanchez I), Civ. No. 18-975, 2019 WL 935330, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 26,
2019) (quoting D.C. Code § 38-2602(b)(11)); see also D.C. Code § 38-2601.01. That authority

includes the power to regulate “staff qualification[s]” at any “child development facility,” D.C.
Code § 38-2602(b)(11) —defined as a “center, home, or other structure that provides care and
other services, supervision, and guidance for children, infants, and toddlers on a regular basis”
but that is not “a public or private elementary or secondary school engaged in legally required
educational and related functions or a pre-kindergarten education program,” id. § 7-2031(3). See
id. § 7-2036(a)(1)(A) (delegating regulatory power to Mayor); Mayor’s Order 2009-130, 56 D.C.
Reg. 6883 (July 16, 2009) (Mayor delegating power to OSSE).
In December 2016, OSSE issued regulations that set minimum education requirements
for staff at these child development facilities. See generally 63 D.C. Reg. 14,640–14,813 (Dec.
2, 2016). Most of the requirements did not take immediate effect, however. Depending on the
position, the regulations built in a grace period of anywhere between three and six years before
the requirements became binding. See, e.g., 63 D.C. Reg. 14,786, 14,799 (original versions of
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-A1, §§ 164.1(b), (c) and 170.2(a)(1)(2)). The regulations also permitted
OSSE to grant two different kinds of waivers. First, certain types of staff positions—although
not all—would be eligible for experience waivers, available to individuals who had
“continuously served” in the relevant position for ten or more years as of December 2016. E.g.,
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5A-1 §§ 164.3, 165.4. Second, hardship waivers could be granted if (1)
“[t]he demonstrated . . . economic impact or hardship on the Facility or staff member [was]
sufficiently great to make immediate compliance impractical despite diligent efforts;” (2) “[t]he
[f]acility or staff member [was] meeting or exceeding the intent of the regulation for which the
waiver [was] requested;” and (3) “[t]he health and welfare of staff and children [we]re not
jeopardized.” Id. § 106.1.

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Two of the three Plaintiffs in this case hold childcare development facility staff positions
that are covered by the OSSE regulations. Altagracia Sanchez has operated a licensed daycare
out of her house since 2006, which currently cares for nine children. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 161–63,
ECF No. 15-2. According to the regulations, this makes her an “expanded home caregiver,”
required to hold “an associate’s or more advanced degree . . . with a major in early childhood
education, early childhood development, child and family studies or a closely related field.”
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-A1, § 170.2(a). When the regulations first went into effect, expanded
home caregivers had until December 2, 2019 to earn the requisite degree, and they were not
eligible for experience waivers. See 63 D.C. Reg. 14,799 (original version of D.C. Mun. Regs.
tit. 5-A1, § 170.2). But in June 2018, after Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, OSSE
amended the regulations—extending the grace period for expanded home caregivers to
December 2, 2023 and making experience waivers available to those that were otherwise
eligible. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-A1, § 170.2(a), (c); 65 D.C. Reg. 7034–7036 (June 29,
2018).
The second Plaintiff, Dale Sorcher, is what the regulations call a “teacher in a child
development center.” See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5A-1, § 165. She works with children up to age
three at a licensed daycare center associated with a Jewish preschool. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 192–95.
Sorcher already has a bachelor’s degree and two master’s degrees, but none of them are in a field
related to early childhood, and she does not have the requisite experience for an experience
waiver. See id. ¶¶ 192, 201. As a result, the regulations require her to either seek a hardship
waiver or obtain twenty-four college credit hours related to early childhood. D.C. Mun. Regs.
tit. 5-A1, §§ 165.1(b), 165.4. When the regulations were first issued, Sorcher had until
December 2, 2020 to earn the credits, see 63 D.C. Reg. 14,791 (original version of D.C. Mun.

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Regs. tit. 5-A1, § 165.1), but after the June 2018 amendments, she now has until December 2,
2023, see D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-A1, § 165.1.
Unlike Sanchez and Sorcher, the third Plaintiff, Jill Homan, does not work at a child
development facility and is not subject to the OSSE regulations. Instead, Homan and her partner
have two young children and use a daycare center in D.C. where the staff members will need to
meet the new education requirements. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 233–236. She is concerned “that daycare providers who are exhausted, stressed, and overwhelmed by having to attend college, work
full time, and care for their own families” will either “provide worse care than those who do not
have to worry about attending school,” id. ¶ 251, or simply leave their jobs altogether, see id.
¶ 248.
In both their original complaint and their proposed amended one, Plaintiffs raise three
challenges to the OSSE regulations: (1) they allege that the education requirements exceed the
authority lawfully delegated to OSSE; (2) they claim that the requirements violate their Fifth
Amendment substantive due process rights to pursue honest livings and make reasonable
childcare choices; and (3) they say that the regulations draw “arbitrary and irrational”
distinctions between childcare providers, in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of
equal protection. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 264–89. But in dismissing the original complaint, the Court
never reached the merits of these claims. It instead concluded that the claims were not
justiciable as asserted by any of the three Plaintiffs. Homan, the Court held, lacked standing
because the injuries that she alleged were based on conjecture and could not be traced to the
OSSE regulations. See Sanchez I, 2019 WL 935330, at *6. Sanchez’s claims were either moot
or unripe because, in light of the June 2018 amendments, she was eligible for an experience

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waiver but had not yet applied. Id. at *8. And Sorcher’s claims were unripe because she had
until December 2023 to seek a hardship waiver, for which she had not yet applied. Id.
Plaintiffs now argue that their proposed amended complaint solves the problems that the
Court previously identified. The new complaint alleges that Homan’s daycare center has
“become more expensive under the college requirement,” Am. Compl. ¶ 252, and that staff
members have now begun to leave to avoid having to comply with the requirement, see id.
¶¶ 249–50. Sorcher, the proposed amended complaint says, is not interested in seeking a
hardship waiver because, even if one were granted, it would only apply to her current employer;
she wants “the freedom to work anywhere in the child-care field for anyone.” Id. ¶ 218; see also
id. ¶¶ 215–17. Finally, Sanchez, the proposed amended complaint clarifies, has been granted an
experience waiver, meaning she no longer has to comply with the education requirement. Id.
¶¶ 189–91; see also Pls.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Am. Compl. at 5, ECF No. 9. But according to
Plaintiffs, this does not moot Sanchez’s claims because she will have to apply to renew her
waiver in three years, and because she continues to seek nominal damages. Unsurprisingly,
Defendants—OSSE and the District of Columbia itself—oppose Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to
amend. They argue that all of Plaintiffs’ claims remain non-justiciable for the same reasons
provided in the Court’s decision dismissing the original complaint.
III. ANALYSIS
Under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts “should freely give
leave” to amend a complaint “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But that
“[g]enerous standard notwithstanding, courts may deny leave to amend for such reasons as
‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue

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of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment.” Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, 363 F. Supp. 3d 45, 54 (D.D.C. 2019) (second alteration in original) (quoting Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). This case concerns only futility, which is an appropriate basis
to deny leave “if the proposed claim[s] would not survive a motion to dismiss.” James Madison
Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Thus, in reviewing Plaintiffs’ motion, “the Court is required to assume the truth of the
allegations in the amended complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the
movant.” Flaherty v. Pritzker, 322 F.R.D. 44, 46 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Caribbean Broad. Sys. v.
Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). The Court need not, however,
“accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual
allegations.” Gregorio v. Hoover, 238 F. Supp. 3d 37, 44 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Rann v. Chao,
154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001)). And because here the deficiencies with the previous
complaint went to subject matter jurisdiction, the allegations “bear closer scrutiny” than they
would in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Bennett v.
Ridge, 321 F. Supp. 2d 49, 52 (D.D.C. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grand
Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2001)). With
these principles in mind, the Court addresses each of the three Plaintiffs in turn.
A. Homan
The Court begins with Homan, whose claims it previously dismissed for lack of standing.
To establish standing, plaintiffs must “clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating” three elements.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (omission in original) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)). First, “they must have suffered an injury in fact that is
‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” N.B. ex

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rel. Peacock v. District of Columbia, 682 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). Second, that injury must be “fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. And third, “it must be
‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)).
In its prior opinion, the Court concluded that Homan had not satisfied any of these three
elements. With respect to the first, the Court explained that “crediting any one of Homan’s
claims of injury require[d] a great deal of speculation—speculation that her childcare providers
[would] not be able to earn the [required college] credits; speculation that those providers
[would] become tired and stressed and consequently provide worse care; or speculation that her
chosen daycare center [would] choose to raise its prices as a result of the regulations.” Sanchez
I, 2019 WL 935330, at *6. And as for the second and third elements, the Court explained that
“even if Homan’s claimed injuries were to occur,” there would be no way of knowing “whether
they were caused by the OSEE regulations so as to be redressable by injunctive relief.” Id.
The proposed amended complaint now asserts slightly more specific factual allegations,
but it suffers from largely the same problems. As an initial matter, the revisions are limited: on
top of what was already said in the original complaint, the new complaint adds solely the
allegations that Homan’s daycare center has in fact now raised its prices, see Am. Compl. ¶ 240,
and that childcare providers at the center have begun to leave due to the education requirements,
including “two of . . . Homan’s favorite teachers,” see id. ¶ 249; see also id. ¶ 250. These
allegations eliminate some of the speculation necessary with the original complaint, but
significant conjecture remains necessary. Homan still, for instance, has not alleged facts that

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show how the staff departures have resulted in worse care for her children. Thus, even assuming
the staff departures were caused by the OSSE regulations, the Court is unable to conclude that
they have inflicted a particularized injury on Homan that satisfies the first standing element.
The price increase allegation, meanwhile, is more concrete, but Homan has not alleged
specific facts that satisfy the causation or redressability requirements. Proving those latter two
elements is “considerably harder” for Homan than the typical litigant because her injury claims
rely on the “action[s] of unrelated third parties” who are not before the Court. Abdulhawa v.
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 239 F. Supp. 3d 24, 35 (D.D.C. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting
Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Indeed, Homan must present “substantial
evidence of a causal relationship between the government policy and the third-party conduct,
leaving little doubt as to causation and the likelihood of redress.” Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 20
(quoting Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2004));
see also Sanchez I, 2019 WL 935330, at *5 (“In those cases where third-party choices are
central, ‘it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing those choices have been
or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.’”
(quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562)).
Homan has not alleged such facts in the proposed amended complaint. She merely says
that prices have gone up at her daycare center and that she is “worr[ied] that [it] will continue to
become more expensive under the college requirement.” Am. Compl. ¶ 252. She has asserted
no facts, however, on which the Court can infer that the OSSE regulations caused the price
increase. The Court has no way of knowing, then, whether an injunction would lead the daycare
to lower its prices—or even prevent it from raising prices further in the future. Homan therefore

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has not made the requisite showings for causation or redressability. She continues to lack
standing.
B. Sanchez
The Court turns next to Sanchez, whose claims it previously dismissed as either moot or
unripe. Because she subsequently received an experience waiver, her claims are now clearly
moot. As the Court explained in its prior opinion, mootness “occurs when the issues presented in
a case are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”
Sanchez I, 2019 WL 935330, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conservation
Force, Inc. v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). “This occurs when, among other
things, the court can provide no effective remedy because a party has already ‘obtained all the
relief that [it has] sought.’” Conservation Force, 733 F.3d at 1204 (alteration in original)
(quoting Monzillo v. Biller, 735 F.2d 1456, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
Sanchez has obtained all of the relief that she sought here. Having acquired an
experience waiver, she suffered no injury as a result of the OSSE regulations, and an order
enjoining the regulations’ enforcement is unnecessary. See Am. Compl. at 42 (requesting
“permanent injunction enjoining Defendants and their officers, employees, or agents from
implementing, applying, or taking any action whatsoever pursuant” to the regulations). Sanchez
contends that her claims are not moot because her waiver is revocable and will need to be
renewed in three years. But Sanchez has alleged no facts that cast doubt on her ability to renew
her waiver when that time comes. Indeed, if she obtained an experience waiver now, she will
have even more experience when she seeks a renewal. Thus, “it seems a ‘merely hypothetical
possibilit[y]’” that she will ever be “subject to the education requirements.” Sanchez I, 2019 WL
935330, at *7 (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 636 F.3d 641, 644 (D.C.

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Cir. 2011)). “That hypothetical possibility is not enough to preserve a live case or controversy
before this Court.” Id.
Sanchez also argues that her claims are not moot because she has requested an award of
nominal damages in the amount of one dollar. See Pls.’ Reply at 5; Am. Compl. at 42. Circuits
are split on whether such a request, in and of itself, prevents mootness, and neither the Supreme
Court nor the D.C. Circuit has weighed in definitively. Compare Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga.
v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1267 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“[A] prayer for
nominal damages cannot save an otherwise moot case.”), with, e.g., Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch.
Dist., 589 F.3d 740, 748 (5th Cir. 2009) (“This court and others have consistently held that a
claim for nominal damages avoids mootness.”); see also People for Ethical Treatment of
Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 396 F.3d 416, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“We assume, without deciding, that
a district court’s award of nominal damages—$1—prevents a case from becoming moot on
appeal.”).
This Court need not reach the issue here, however, because Sanchez has failed to state a
valid claim for nominal damages. “[N]ominal damages ‘are not compensation for loss or injury,
but rather recognition of a violation of rights.’” Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir.
2003) (quoting Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983)); see also Abrams v.
Commc’ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 23 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (“The term nominal
damages means a trivial sum—usually one cent or one dollar—awarded to a plaintiff whose legal
right has been technically violated but who has proved no real [pecuniary] damage.” (alteration
in original) (quoting Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Clay, 194 F.2d 888, 890 (D.C. Cir.
1952))). In this case, Sanchez’s rights were never violated because she was never subject to the
OSSE regulations. Rather, she brought suit to prevent what she believed was an imminent threat

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to her rights—a violation that would occur when the regulations went into effect and she was
required to possess a college degree. But as Sanchez herself appears to recognize, that violation
never came to pass because of the long grace period and her ability to obtain a waiver years in
advance. Indeed, in arguing that she is entitled to nominal damages, Sanchez says that the
“college requirement has already injured her,” but she never identifies how any legal right was
infringed by the mere issuance of the regulations or by the waiver requirement itself. Pl.’s Reply
at 5 (emphasis omitted). Instead, Sanchez focuses on the “time it took [her] to put together her
application for an experience waiver.” Id. “She seeks,” in her own words, “retrospective relief
in the form of nominal damages to compensate for” the hours that she spent. Id. (quoting Am.
Compl. ¶ 256).
As the Court said above, though, “nominal damages are divorced from any compensatory
purpose.” Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F.3d 853, 872 (9th Cir. 2017). They “are
awarded to vindicate rights” that have been infringed in the past. Id. (quoting Cummings v.
Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2005)). Because Sanchez has drawn no nexus between the
time she purportedly spent on the waiver and any legally protected right, she has not shown that
nominal damages are warranted. Nominal damages thus would not save her claims from
mootness.
C. Sorcher
Finally, the Court turns to Sorcher, whose claims were previously dismissed as unripe.
The ripeness doctrine, the Court explained in its prior opinion, counsels “against ‘premature
adjudication.’” Sanchez I, 2019 WL 935330, at *3 (quoting Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of
Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807 (2003)). It is “meant ‘to prevent the courts . . . from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect . . .

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agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Id. (quoting Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n,
538 U.S. at 807–08).
“[W]hether a case is ripe hinges on a ‘two-pronged test . . . that first considers the “fitness
of the issues” for judicial decision and then looks at any hardship that would befall the parties if
the court withheld consideration.” Id. at *7 (quoting Kaufman v. Nielsen, 896 F.3d 475, 484
(D.C. Cir. 2018)). In its prior opinion, the Court concluded that Sorcher failed both prongs of
that test because the extended December 2023 deadline to meet the requirements gave her a lot
of time to seek a hardship waiver. The availability of hardship waivers, the Court reasoned,
could “have a bearing on the merits of some of Plaintiffs’ claims,” as the merits of those claims
would “depend on who actually, in practice, ha[d] to meet the education requirements.” Id. at
*8. In other words, “absent more information about hardship waivers . . . the issues [were] not
yet fit for judicial decision.” Id. And because a hardship waiver represented another “avenue[]
of relief potentially available to [Sorcher] outside of the judicial process,” any hardship inflicted
on her would be minimal. Id. at *9.
The proposed amended complaint does not change those conclusions. As was the case
with Homan, Sorcher’s revisions are minimal. The new complaint clarifies that “day-care
facility employees cannot apply directly for hardship . . . waivers for themselves.” Am. Compl.
¶ 73. “Instead, day-care facility directors or administrators apply for hardship or experience
waivers that apply to the facilities, not to individual workers.” Id. ¶ 74. According to Sorcher,
she does not wish “to ask her current employer to apply for a hardship waiver on her behalf,
because if she leaves her job, her waiver would not follow her.” Id. ¶ 215. “Sorcher does not
want a hardship waiver that lets her work solely in one position with one employer for the rest of

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her career.” Id. ¶ 217. “Instead, she seeks the freedom to work anywhere in the child-care field
for anyone.” Id. ¶ 218.
Contrary to Sorcher’s assertion, however, a hardship waiver would not impair her
freedom to work elsewhere. Indeed, as the proposed amended complaint acknowledges, if she
wanted to change jobs some time down the road and her new position was subject to the OSSE
regulations, she could have her new employer seek a waiver on her behalf. See id. ¶ 75. And of
course, whether Sorcher would ever need to obtain a second hardship waiver for a new position
is speculative. The premature adjudication of such hypothetical possibilities is exactly what the
ripeness doctrine is intended to prevent.
As for Sorcher’s current employer, the proposed amended complaint suggests that it has
not applied for a hardship waiver yet. Things might be different if Sorcher had requested that her
employer apply and the employer had refused, but Sorcher admits that she has not even asked,
see id. ¶ 215, even though waiver forms are now available online, see id. ¶ 72. Meanwhile,
Sorcher does not claim that she must imminently begin taking classes in order to to meet the
education requirement by December 2023. She merely alleges that she has spent time
researching various program options. See id. ¶¶ 220–24. This effort, she says, “has been
exhausting, and she would like to stop.” Id. ¶ 225.
That is not enough to overcome the ripeness issues that the Court identified in its prior
opinion, though. Without more, the state of the affairs is the same as it was then: “Sorcher [has]
other avenues of relief potentially available . . . outside of the judicial process,” and she has not
alleged that she must “enroll in courses before the waiver applications become available.”
Sanchez I, 2019 WL 935330, at *9. The Court again concludes that “deferring review” until
Sorcher has an opportunity to pursue a waiver “will allow many of the issues raised ‘to take on a

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more definite form.’” Id. at *8 (quoting Kaufman, 896 F.3d at 483). Sorcher’s claims thus
continue to be unripe.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint is DENIED
because amendment would be futile. 1 An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is
separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: July 8, 2019

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge

1

In the alternative, Plaintiffs ask the Court to alter or amend its prior order under Rule
59)(e) “to clarify the status of all claims.” Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Am. Compl. at 7, ECF No. 251. If clarity is all that Plaintiffs seek, the Court would simply point them to its prior opinion.
The conclusion of that opinion said that the “complaint” was dismissed without prejudice.
Sanchez I, 2019 WL 935330, at *9. Because Defendants had sought prejudicial dismissal, the
Court granted their motion to dismiss “in part.” Plaintiffs seem to now argue that their nondelegation claim could remain justiciable, but the Court already rejected that contention in the
prior opinion. The Court explained that “the doctrine of prudential ripeness ensures that Article
III courts make decisions only when they have to, and then, only once.” Id. at *3 (quoting Am.
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). Because “proceeding . . . in a
piecemeal fashion” would undermine that purpose, the Court explained that it was “appropriate
to reserve judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims until it ha[d] more facts.” Id. at *8 (emphasis
added). For the reasons provided above, that conclusion remains true now with respect to the
proposed amended complaint. To the extent that Plaintiffs seek more than clarity under Rule
59(e), they have come nowhere near showing that such “extraordinary relief” is warranted. Slate
v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2013). Indeed, Plaintiffs have failed to
identify “an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need
to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Id. (quoting Messina v. Krakower, 439
F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Thus, Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the judgment is also
DENIED.
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