GOMEZ-CRUZ v. CORNERSTONE CAFE, INC. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 13 Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment. Please see the attached for additional details. Signed by Judge Amit P. Mehta on 05/03/2019. (lcapm3)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
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JULIANA GOMEZ-CRUZ,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
Case No. 18-cv-1145 (APM)
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CORNERSTONE CAFÉ, INC. et al.,
)
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Defendants.
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_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Juliana Gomez-Cruz worked at Cornerstone Café in Washington, D.C. for
13 years before her termination in November 2017. She brought this action against the cafe and
its owners, Dae Woong Kim and Kookhee Park (collectively, “Defendants”), to recover the
statutorily required minimum and overtime wages that she alleges were not paid during her
employment. Defendants were properly served but failed to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint, after
which Plaintiff obtained an entry of default. Plaintiff then moved for default judgment, seeking
the relief requested in her Complaint. For the reasons discussed below, the court grants Plaintiff’s
Motion for Default Judgment.
II.
BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background 1
Plaintiff Juliana Gomez-Cruz worked for Defendants Dae Woong Kim and Kookhee Park
at their buffet and carryout restaurant, Cornerstone Café, from October 2004 through November
Because Defendants have not filed a response, the Court treats the Complaint’s factual allegations as admitted, except
as to the amount of damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. R.W.
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2017. See Compl., ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Compl.] ¶¶ 2–7, 10. Defendants served as joint ownermanagers of the café throughout Plaintiff’s employment and were the “ultimate authorities” as to
Plaintiff’s supervision, work schedule, and conditions of employment. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff’s
responsibilities at the café included food preparation, taking customer orders, washing dishes and
cleaning, and providing customer service. Id. ¶ 21. Each week, Plaintiff typically worked Monday
through Friday between 5:45 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., without taking a break of more than five minutes.
Id. ¶¶ 23–24. In all, Plaintiff “typically and customarily worked at or about forty-six and one-half
hours per week.” Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 13 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.], Aff. of Juliana GomezCruz, ECF No. 13-1 [hereinafter Pl.’s Aff.], ¶ 9.
During Plaintiff’s employment, Defendants maintained no timekeeping system,
Compl. ¶ 22; nor did they provide Plaintiff with a paystub or report reflecting the hours she
worked, id. ¶ 27. Defendants also purportedly withheld a certain portion of Plaintiff’s gross pay
for taxes. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff approximates that she “worked at or about [45 to 48] hours per week.”
See id. ¶¶ 12–13.
For her labor, Defendants paid Plaintiff a flat weekly salary of $400 from October 2004
through June 2008, $420 from July 2008 through September 2015, and $440 from October 2015
through the date of her termination in November 2017. Id. ¶¶ 15–17. At no point during her
employment did Defendants discuss an hourly rate or terms of overtime work and compensation
with Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 18–20. Plaintiff received compensation on a weekly basis by both cash and
check, with no payroll reporting system reflecting the time she worked or any federal or state
deductions. Id. ¶¶ 25–27.
Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51,
63 (2d Cir. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973)).
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B.
Procedural Background
On May 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants alleging that they failed to
pay her overtime and minimum wages during various periods of her employment in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., the D.C. Minimum Wage Act
Revision Act of 1992 (“DCMWA”), D.C. Code §§ 32-1001 et seq., and the D.C. Wage Payment
and Wage Collection Act (“DCWPA”), D.C. Code §§ 32-1301 et seq. See generally Compl. In
support of these claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants misinformed her about her rights under
federal and District of Columbia law and failed to post any notice of employee rights within the
café. Compl. ¶¶ 29–33.
On August 6, 2018, after receiving no proof of service from Plaintiff, the court issued an
Order to Show Cause as to why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) and Local Civil Rule 83.23. See Order to Show Cause,
ECF No. 3; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c). In response, on August 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed three affidavits
showing that she properly served Defendants with a copy of the Complaint and a summons on
August 13, 2018. See Affs. of Service, ECF Nos. 4–6. Despite being served, Defendants did not
answer the Complaint or otherwise appear.
On September 18, 2018, the court issued a second Order to Show Cause, which directed
Plaintiff to seek an entry of default and move for entry of default judgment or risk dismissal of the
case. See Order to Show Cause, ECF No.7. Plaintiff filed an Affidavit for Default on October 11,
2018, see Aff. For Default, ECF No. 8, and the Clerk of the Court entered a default against
Defendants, see Clerk’s Entry of Default, ECF No. 10. Plaintiff, however, failed to move for
default judgment as directed and so the court dismissed the action, without prejudice, for want of
prosecution on November 20, 2018. See Order, ECF No. 11.
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Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for an Extension of Time to
File a Motion for Default Judgment, see Pl.’s Mot. for Reconsideration, ECF No. 12, which the
court granted on December 3, 2018, see Minute Order, Dec. 3, 2018. In her Motion for Default
Judgment, Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment against Defendants in the amount of $16,272.13 in
unpaid wages plus three times that sum in liquidated damages, for a total award of $65,088.52.
Pl.’s Mot. at 4–6.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
A party seeking a default judgment must follow the two-step process set forth in Rule 55
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. A plaintiff must first secure an
entry of default from the Clerk of the Court and then move for entry of a default judgment. Id.
The entry of a “default judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary
process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d
831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing H. F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe,
432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). Although a default judgment establishes liability, the court
is required to “make an independent determination of the sum to be awarded,” “unless the amount
of damages is certain.” Boland v. Yoccabel Const. Co., 293 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing
Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2001)). To determine the appropriate amount of
damages, the court may hold a hearing or it may “rely on detailed affidavits or documentary
evidence.” Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64, 68 (D.D.C. 2011).
A plaintiff must prove damages to a “reasonable certainty.” Id.
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IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Whether Entry of Default Judgment is Warranted
The court must first consider whether entry of a default judgment is warranted. 2
Serv. Employees Int’l Union Nat’l Indus. Pension Fund v. Liberty House Nursing Home of Jersey
City, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 3d 69, 76 (D.D.C. 2017). When there is a complete “absence of any request
to set aside the default or suggestion by the defendant that it has a meritorious defense, it is clear
that the standard for default judgment has been satisfied.” Serv. Employees Int’l Union Nat’l Indus.
Pension Fund v. Artharee, 942 F.Supp.2d 27, 30 (D.D.C. 2013). Here, Defendants have not
answered Plaintiff’s Complaint or otherwise defended themselves in any way. See generally
Docket, Case No. 18-cv-1145. Plaintiff therefore meets the standard for entry of a default
judgment.
Even though a defendant has not appeared, the court may still deny a motion for default
judgment “where the allegations of the complaint, even if true, are legally insufficient to make out
a claim.” Gutierrez v. Berg Contracting Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-3044-TAF, 2000 WL 331721, at *2
(D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2000); see also PT (Persero) Merpati Nusantara Airlines v. Thirdstone Aircraft
Leasing Grp., Inc., 246 F.R.D. 17, 18 (D.D.C. 2007) (“A default judgment establishes the
defaulting party’s liability for every well-plead allegation in the complaint.”) (emphasis added).
The court here has no concern about the sufficiency of the pleading. Plaintiff represents that she
worked over 40 hours per week on average, Compl. ¶ 13, yet Defendants failed to pay her at least
the minimum wage and for the hours she worked overtime, Compl. ¶¶ 13–21. She also details the
The court has assured itself that it has jurisdiction over this action based on the FLSA claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s D.C.-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
See Robinson v. CAS 4000 Kansas LLC, 5 F. Supp. 3d 108, 111 (D.D.C. 2013). Venue is also proper as Plaintiff
alleges the events giving rise to her claims occurred in the District of Columbia. See generally Compl.; see also
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
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wages she received from May 2015 through her termination in November 2017; the average hours
she worked during that date range; and the amount she is believes she is owed during each pay
period. See Pl.’s Mot. at 4. Finally, to establish their responsibility to pay her wages, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants were each an “owner, agent, and/or principal of Cornerstone Café” who
“supervis[ed] and controll[ed] Plaintiff’s work schedules and conditions of employment” during
the tenure of her employment. Compl. ¶¶ 5–6. These allegations are sufficient, if assumed true,
to establish Defendants’ liability under federal and local wage laws.
B.
Minimum Wage and Overtime Violations
Satisfied that the Complaint sets forth plausible wage claims, the court turns to determining
the sum of the award. Plaintiff must provide information “sufficient to establish an amount and
extent of work and wages” owed by Defendants. Arias v. U.S. Serv. Indus., Inc., 80 F.3d 509, 512
(D.C. Cir. 1996). Plaintiff has done so.
1.
Unpaid Wages
Plaintiff’s affidavit contains a table that summarizes the approximate hours she worked
and wages she received from May 2015 through November 2017. Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 17. The table is
reproduced below.
TABLE 1: Total Minimum Wage & Overtime Compensation Due
Date Range
May 2015 –
June 2015
July 2015 –
September
2015
October
2015 – June
2016
July 2016 –
June 2017
July 2017 –
November 7,
2017
Total
Weeks
Weekly
Salary
Average
Hours
Worked
Per
Week
6
$420.00
46.5
$9.50
$10.50
$0.00
$15.75
$102.38
$102.38
$614.25
13
$420.00
46.5
$10.50
$10.50
$0.00
$15.75
$102.38
$102.38
$1,330.88
39
$440.00
46.5
$10.50
$11.00
$0.00
$16.50
$107.25
$107.25
$4,182.75
52
$440.00
46.5
$11.50
$11.00
$20.00
$17.25
$122.13
$132.13
$6,870.50
18
$440.00
46.5
$12.50
$11.00
$60.00
$18.75
$121.88
$181.88
$3,273.75
DC
Minimum
Wage
Regular
Hourly
Rate
6
Min
Wage
Owed
Per
Week
Wage
Owed
Per OT
Hour
Worked
OT
Wages
Owed
Per
Week
Total
Wages
Owed
Per
Week
Total
Wages
Owed for
Work
Period
TOTAL WAGES
OWED
$16,272.13
In the first two rows of the table, Plaintiff represents that from May 2015 through
September 2015, she worked 46.5 hours per week, but was compensated for only the first 40 hours
of each of those weeks at the rate of $10.50 per hour ($420.00/40 hours per week). During this
period, Plaintiff’s hourly pay for the first 40 hours per week complied with both federal and District
of Columbia minimum wage laws. 3 Still, Plaintiff was not paid for any time worked beyond
40 hours. Plaintiff therefore is entitled to overtime compensation at a rate of $15.75 ($10.50 per
hour x 1.5) for the 6.5 extra hours worked per week, for a total of 19 weeks. As calculated below,
the court agrees with Plaintiff that she is owed $1,945.13 for that period. See Table 2; Pl.’s Aff. ¶
17.
TABLE 2: May 2015 to September 2015 Compensation Breakdown
Date Range
May 2015 –
June 2015
July 2015 –
September
2015
Total
Weeks
Average
Hours Worked
Overtime
Min Wage
Owed Per
Week
Wage Owed
Per OT
Worked
OT Wages
Owed Per
Week
Total Wages
Owed Per
Week
6
6.5
$0.00
$15.75
$102.38
$102.38
13
6.5
$0.00
$15.75
$102.38
$102.38
Total Wages Owed
for Work Period
$614.25
TOTAL
$1,330.88
$1,945.13
Plaintiff also represents that from October 2015 through to her termination in November
2017, she was paid $11.00 per hour for the first 40 hours of work each week, but not compensated
at all for overtime work. Id. Calculating unpaid wages for this period is slightly more complex
because the minimum wage in the District of Columbia rose first to $11.50 per hour on July, 1
2016, and rose again to $12.50 as of July 1, 2017, while Plaintiff’s compensation remained
unchanged at $11.00 per hour. Compare Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 17 with D.C. Code Ann. § 321003(a)(5)(A)(i)–(ii). Thus, Plaintiff’s compensation was 50 cents below the District minimum
The federal minimum wage at the time was $7.25 per hour, while D.C. required a minimum wage of $9.50 per hour
until July 1, 2015, when the minimum wage increased to $10.50 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1); D.C. Code Ann.
§ 32-1003(a)(3)–(4).
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wage of $11.50 per hour from July 2016 to June 2017, and $1.50 below the minimum wage of
$12.50 from July 2017 to November 2017. Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 17. When calculating the difference in
Plaintiff’s pay and the prevailing minimum wage, as well as Plaintiff’s uncompensated overtime,
Plaintiff has established that she is entitled to a total of $14,327 for the period from October 2015
to November 2017. See Table 3; Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 17.
TABLE 3: October 2015 to November 2017 Wage Breakdown
Wage
Owed
Per OT
Worked
OT
Wages
Owed
Per
Week
Total
Wages
Owed Per
Week
Total Wages
Owed for Work
Period
$10.50
$11.00
$0.00
$16.50
$107.25
$107.25
$4,182.75
6.5
$11.50
$11.00
$20.00
$17.25
$122.13
$132.13
$6,870.50
6.50
$12.50
$11.00
$60.00
$18.75
$121.88
$181.88
TOTAL
$3,273.75
$14,327.00
*
Date Range
October
2015 – June
2016
July 2016 –
June 2017
July 2017 –
November
7, 2017
Regular
Hourly
Rate
Min
Wage
Owed
Per
Week
*
*
Total
Weeks
Average
Hours
Worked
Overtime
DC
Minimum
Wage
39
6.5
52
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The court therefore finds that, for the period of May 2015 to November 2017, Defendants
owe Plaintiff a total of $16,272.13 in unpaid wages and overtime pay.
2.
Liquidated damages
In addition to unpaid wages, Plaintiff seeks liquidated damages. See Pl.’s Mot. at 4–6.
Both federal and District of Columbia law allow for an award of liquidated damages against an
employer who fails to comply with statutory wage requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); D.C. Code
§ 32-1012(b)(1). The FLSA provides for the “payment of wages lost and an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added). District of Columbia law,
by contrast, contains a more generous liquidated damages provision. Under the DCWPA, a
plaintiff can recover an award of liquidated damages in the amount of either “10 per centum of the
unpaid wages for each working day during which such failure shall continue after the day upon
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which payment is hereunder required, or an amount equal to treble the unpaid wages, whichever
is smaller.” D.C. Code § 32-1303(4) (emphasis added). The court lacks sufficient record evidence
to make the first of these calculations. Absent actual payroll records that reflect the dates of work
and the amounts paid, the court cannot determine the “10 per centum” sum without serious
guesswork. So, the court will apply treble damages, resulting in a liquidated damages award of
$48,816.39 ($16,272.13 x 3). See Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 99, 104
(D.D.C. 2015) (stating that where “[District of Columbia] law is more generous to employees . . .
the Court will first assess [liquidated] damages under D.C. law and will not award a duplicative
amount pursuant to federal law”) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 778.5).
Accordingly, summing the unpaid wages and the liquated damages, the court awards
Plaintiff total damages in the amount of $65,088.52.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is granted. The
court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to $65,088.52 in damages. A separate order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
The court will consider an attorney’s fees and costs award after the court receives more
detailed information supporting the request for fees and costs.
Dated: May 3, 2019
Amit P. Mehta
United States District Judge
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