COLEMAN v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER denying 10 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. See attached for additional details. Signed by Judge Amit P. Mehta on 12/17/2018. (lcapm3)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
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JEFFERY COLEMAN,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Case No. 18-cv-01215 (APM)
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WATER
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AND SEWER AUTHORITY,
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Defendant.
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_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant D.C. Water and Sewer Authority’s Motion to Dismiss rests on a single premise:
Plaintiff Jeffrey Coleman’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Intake
Questionnaire, filed on January 18, 2017, does not constitute a “charge” for purposes of the
limitations period under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”).
See Def.’s Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 10 [hereinafter Def.’s Mem.], at 5–10.
The parties agree that, if the Intake Questionnaire constitutes a “charge” under the ADEA, then
Plaintiff’s suit is timely; if not, the action is untimely.
I.
As applicable here, the ADEA requires that an employee file a “charge” with the EEOC
“within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B). The
ADEA does not define the term “charge,” but the Supreme Court filled that gap in Federal Express
Corp. v. Holowecki.
552 U.S. 389 (2008).
There, the court held that an EEOC Intake
Questionnaire can constitute a “charge” if it contains three elements: (1) an allegation of age
discrimination; (2) the name of the charged party; and, critically, (3) “a request for the agency to
take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the
employer and the employee.” Id. at 402. As to that last element, it must appear to the “objective
observer” that “the filer requests the agency to activate its machinery and remedial processes . . . .”
Id.
Plaintiff’s Intake Questionnaire easily satisfies the standard set forth in Holowecki. Like
the filer in Holowecki, Plaintiff’s Questionnaire—including his two-page statement appended
thereto—contains the following basic factual information: Plaintiff’s name, address, and phone
number, as well as those of his employer; an allegation that he and others were the victims of age
discrimination; the number of persons employed by his employer; and a statement that he had not
sought the assistance of any other government agency regarding the matter. Compare id. at 404
with Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 11, Ex. A., ECF No. 11-2 [hereinafter Intake
Questionnaire], at 2, 4, 6–7.
Additionally, and most importantly, Plaintiff unequivocally requested that the agency
“activate its machinery and remedial processes.” Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 402. Plaintiff checked
“Box 2” on the Intake Questionnaire, which provides: “I want to file a charge of discrimination,
and I authorize the EEOC to look into the discrimination I described above. I understand that the
EEOC must give the employer . . . that I accuse of discrimination information about the charge,
including my name.” Intake Questionnaire at 4. That fact is arguably dispositive. Following
Holowecki, the EEOC revised its intake questionnaire to include “Box 2,” so as “to require
claimants to check a box to request that the EEOC take remedial action.” Hildebrand v. Allegheny
County, 757 F.3d 99, 113 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit in Hildebrand held that “an employee
who completes the Intake Questionnaire and checks Box 2 unquestionably files a charge of
discrimination.” Id. (emphasis added); accord Leftwich v. Gallaudet Univ., 878 F. Supp. 2d 81,
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91–92 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that intake questionnaire qualified as a charge where the employee
had checked a box similar to “Box 2”). Thus, Plaintiff’s unqualified checking of “Box 2” is itself
a request for action.
But there is more. Plaintiff concluded his two-page statement with an express call for the
agency to act:
“I am requesting that the EEOC investigate the claims contained in this
supplement.” Intake Questionnaire at 7. That sentence unambiguously calls on the EEOC to act
on his complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Intake Questionnaire qualifies as a “charge” for the
ADEA’s 300-day limitations period.
II.
The cases Defendant relies upon are all readily distinguishable. See Def.’s Mem. at 6–9;
see also Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 13, at 2–6. Defendant’s heavy reliance on Dyson
v. District of Columbia is misplaced, as Dyson, though decided after Holowecki, does not even
mention that binding authority. See generally 808 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2011). 1 Dyson therefore
carries no persuasive force. Additionally, Marshall v. Honeywell Tech. Solutions, Inc., is wholly
inapt. 598 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2009). There, the intake form suffered from “significant
deficiencies,” such as failing to name the employer; identifying the petitioner as under the age of
40, thereby taking himself outside of the ADEA’s coverage; and missing “any detailed description
of the discriminatory conduct.” Id. at 61. The Intake Questionnaire here does not suffer from
these shortcomings. Finally, Minter v. District of Columbia is readily distinguishable, as the
employee in that case “did not attach a letter or separate document to the questionnaire expressing
her intention to file a claim,” but instead expressly asked only to “consult with a[n] EEO Specialist
The Circuit’s decision in Dyson v. District of Columbia does not help Defendant either, as that decision did not
address whether the employee’s intake questionnaire qualified as a “charge” under Holowecki. See generally 710
F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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regarding the possible filing of charges.” 62 F. Supp. 3d 149, 163 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff, by contrast, expressly asked the EEOC
to “investigate the claims contained in this supplement.”
III.
In summary, Plaintiff’s Intake Questionnaire meets the definition of “charge” as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Holowecki. Accordingly, his claim is timely. Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss is therefore denied.
Dated: December 17, 2018
Amit P. Mehta
United States District Judge
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