KUPPERMAN v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S.A. et al
Filing
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COMPLAINT against All Defendants ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number ADCDC-6481004) filed by CHARLES M KUPPERMAN. (Attachments: #1 Exhibit A, #2 Exhibit B, #3 Civil Cover Sheet, #4 Summons, #5 Summons, #6 Summons, #7 Summons, #8 Summons, #9 Summons, #10 Summons, #11 Summons)(Cooper, Charles)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________________
CHARLES M. KUPPERMAN
9075 Sorreno Ct.
Naples, FL 34119
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
Ford House Office Building Room 217
Washington, D.C. 20515
Defendant,
THE HONORABLE DONALD J. TRUMP,
in his official capacity as President of the
United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500
Defendant.
THE HONORABLE NANCY PELOSI,
in her official capacity as Speaker of the
House of Representatives
1236 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Defendant,
THE HONORABLE ADAM B. SCHIFF,
in his official capacity as Chairman of the
House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
HVC304 Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20515
Defendant,
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Civil Action No. 19-3224
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THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL,
in his official capacity as Chairman of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
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Defendant,
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THE HONORABLE CAROLYN B. MALONEY, )
in her official capacity as Acting Chair of the
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House Committee on Oversight and Reform
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2157 Rayburn House Office Building
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Washington, D.C. 20515
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Defendant,
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__________________________________________)
COMPLAINT
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, Plaintiff Charles M. Kupperman, the former
Deputy National Security Advisor and Acting National Security Advisor to President Donald J.
Trump, files this action in the nature of interpleader against Defendants: the United States House
of Representatives; Representative Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives;
Representative Adam B. Schiff, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence; Representative Eliot L. Engel, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs; Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, Acting Chair of the House Committee on Oversight
and Reform (collectively, the “House Defendants”); and Donald J. Trump, President of the
United States. Plaintiff is faced with irreconcilable commands by the Legislative and Executive
Branches of the Government and, accordingly, seeks a declaratory judgment from this Court as
to whether he is lawfully obliged to comply with a subpoena issued by the House Defendants
demanding his testimony “[p]ursuant to the House of Representatives’ impeachment inquiry,” or
he is lawfully obliged to abide by the assertion of immunity from congressional process made by
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the President in connection with the testimony sought from Plaintiff. Plaintiff hereby alleges as
follows:
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1.
Plaintiff served as the Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the
President from January 9, 2019, to September 20, 2019, and as the Acting National Security
Advisor from September 10, 2019, to September 20, 2019. As part of the House’s impeachment
inquiry, the House Defendants have issued a subpoena requiring Plaintiff to appear and testify
about his official duties in connection with the United States’ relations with Ukraine. The
President, however, acting through the White House Counsel, has asserted that Plaintiff, as a
close personal advisor to the President, is immune from Congressional process, and has
instructed Plaintiff not to appear and testify in response to the House’s subpoena. Plaintiff
obviously cannot satisfy the competing demands of both the Legislative and Executive Branches,
and he is aware of no controlling judicial authority definitively establishing which Branch’s
command should prevail.
2.
Absent a definitive judgment from the Judicial Branch “say[ing] what the law is,”
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), Plaintiff will effectively be forced to
adjudicate the Constitutional dispute himself, and if he judges wrongly, he will inflict grave
Constitutional injury on either the House or the President. On the one hand, an erroneous
judgment to abide by the President’s assertion of testimonial immunity would unlawfully impede
the House from carrying out one of its most important core Constitutional responsibilities, “the
sole Power of Impeachment.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 5. And it would subject Plaintiff to
potential criminal liability for contempt of Congress. See 2 U.S.C. § 192. On the other hand, an
erroneous judgment to appear and testify in obedience to the House Defendants’ subpoena would
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unlawfully impair the President in the exercise of his core national security responsibilities, see
generally U.S. CONST., art. II, §§ 2–3, by revealing confidential communications from “those
who advise and assist [him] in the performance of [his] manifold duties; the importance of this
confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
705 (1974). And it would constitute a violation, albeit in good faith, of the oath Plaintiff took to
uphold the Constitution of the United States. Under our system of Government, it does not fall
to a private citizen, but rather falls to the Judicial Department, “to construe and delineate claims
arising under express powers” granted to the Legislative and Executive Branches, and to resolve
conflicting claims by those two Branches “with respect to powers alleged to derive from
enumerated powers” conferred on them by the Constitution. Id. at 704.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case arises under
Articles I and II of the Constitution of the United States, and implicates Article I, Section 2,
Clause 5, which provides that the House of Representatives shall have “the sole Power of
Impeachment,” and Article II, Section 1, Clause 1, which vests the “executive Power … in a
President of the United States of America.”
4.
This Court has authority to issue a declaratory judgment and order other relief that
is just and proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
5.
Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(e)(1) & (b)(2). All
of the Defendants perform their official duties in this judicial district and a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred in this judicial district.
PARTIES
6.
Plaintiff Charles M. Kupperman is a citizen of Florida.
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7.
Defendant United States House of Representatives is established by Article I,
Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States, and it is vested with “the sole Power of
Impeachment.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
8.
Defendant Nancy Pelosi is the Speaker of the House of Representatives. She is
sued in her official capacity.
9.
Defendant Adam B. Schiff is the Chairman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. He is sued in his official capacity.
10.
Defendant Eliot L. Engel is the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs. He is sued in his official capacity.
11.
Defendant Carolyn B. Maloney is the Acting Chair of the House Committee on
Oversight and Reform. She is sued in her official capacity.
12.
Defendant Donald J. Trump is the President of the United States. He is sued in
his official capacity.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
13.
Plaintiff served as the Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the
President from January 9, 2019, to September 20, 2019, and as the Acting National Security
Advisor from September 10, 2019, to September 20, 2019. In that capacity, Plaintiff served as a
close personal advisor to President Trump. Among Plaintiff’s many duties as Deputy National
Security Advisor and Acting National Security Advisor was advising the President with respect
to national security policy toward Ukraine and coordinating national security policy among the
relevant Executive Branch agencies, including but not limited to the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, and the Office of Management and Budget.
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14.
On October 25, 2019, Defendant Schiff, through Committee counsel, transmitted
to Plaintiff’s counsel an electronic message, “[p]ursuant to the House of Representatives’
impeachment inquiry, … transmitting a subpoena that compels [Plaintiff] to appear” for a
deposition at 9:30 a.m. on October 28, 2019. Although the subpoena was signed by Defendant
Schiff on Monday, October 21, 2019, Committee counsel did not serve the subpoena on
Plaintiff’s counsel until 4:14 p.m. on Friday, October 25, 2019. A copy of the electronic
message and the subpoena is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
15.
Committee counsel’s electronic message explained that the “subpoena is being
issued by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence under the Rules of the House of
Representatives in exercise of its oversight and legislative jurisdiction and after consultation with
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Oversight and Reform.” Exhibit A at 1.
16.
The electronic message described the subject and scope of the investigation as
follows: “The testimony shall be part of the House’s impeachment inquiry and shared among the
Committees, as well as with the Committee on the Judiciary as appropriate.” Id.
17.
Because the subpoena seeks testimony concerning Plaintiff’s service as senior
confidential adviser to the President, Plaintiff’s counsel provided the White House Counsel with
a copy of the subpoena, and requested that the White House Counsel notify him of the
President’s position on the subpoena.
18.
On October 25, 2019, the White House Counsel transmitted a letter to counsel for
Plaintiff, asserting the “constitutional immunity of current and former senior advisors to the
President” and instructing Plaintiff not to appear and testify in response to the subpoena. A copy
of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. The White House Counsel stated that the Office of
Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice had “advised [him] that [Plaintiff] is absolutely
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immune from compelled congressional testimony with respect to matters related to his service as
a senior adviser to the President.” Exhibit B at 1. The White House Counsel enclosed the
opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel, and it is included in Exhibit B hereto.
19.
The White House Counsel informed Plaintiff’s counsel that “in order to protect
the prerogatives of the Office of the President today and in the future, and in response to your
request, the President directs Mr. Kupperman not to appear at the Committee’s scheduled
hearing on Monday, October 28, 2019.” Exhibit B at 2.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
20.
Plaintiff is uncertain whether the subpoena issued to Plaintiff by the House
Defendants validly obligates Plaintiff to appear for two separate reasons: (1) the President’s
assertion of immunity against congressional process may override the House subpoena; and (2)
the House subpoena may not have been validly issued under House Rules. Plaintiff is not aware
of any Supreme Court decision definitively answering either of these questions.
A.
Plaintiff Seeks a Declaratory Judgment on Whether He Is Immune from
Congressional Process.
21.
For nearly a half century, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of
Justice (“OLC”) has consistently opined that “ ‘the President and his immediate advisers are
absolutely immune from testimonial compulsion by a Congressional committee’ on matters
related to their official duties.” Memorandum for the Counsel to the President from Steven A.
Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Testimonial Immunity Before
Congress of Former Counsel to the President, 43 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at *1 (May 20, 2019)
(“Engel Opinion”) (quoting Memorandum for All Heads of Offices, Divisions, Bureaus and
Boards of the Department of Justice, from John M. Harmon, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Executive Privilege at 5 (May 23, 1977)). OLC has reaffirmed this
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position more than a dozen times over the course of the last nine administrations of both political
parties. See Engel Opinion at 3, n.1 (citing OLC opinions from the administrations of every
President since President Nixon).
22.
The Executive Branch has, with few exceptions, refused to permit close White
House advisors to the President to testify before Congress since the 1940s when the Executive
Office of the President was created. See id. at 7. OLC first articulated the legal basis for
testimonial immunity of close Presidential advisors in 1971 in a Memorandum authored by thenAssistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist. See Memorandum for John D. Ehrlichman,
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Power of Congressional Committee to Compel
Appearance or Testimony of “White House Staff” (Feb. 5, 1971). Assistant Attorney General
Rehnquist defined the scope of the immunity as follows:
The President and his immediate advisers — that is, those who customarily meet
with the President on a regular or frequent basis — should be deemed absolutely
immune from testimonial compulsion by a congressional committee. They not
only may not be examined with respect to their official duties, but they may not
even be compelled to appear before a congressional committee.
Id. at 7.
23.
Both in his capacity as Deputy National Security Advisor and Assistant to the
President, and in his capacity as Acting National Security Advisor, Plaintiff met with, and
advised, President Trump directly on a frequent and regular basis.
24.
The Rehnquist Memorandum has been repeatedly, and without exception,
reaffirmed in opinions by heads of OLC from both political parties. See, e.g., Letter to Phillip E.
Areeda, Counsel to the President, from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel (Sept. 25, 1974) (enclosing a Memorandum); Letter Opinion for the Counsel for
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the President from Christopher H. Schroeder, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, Re: Immunity of the Counsel to the President from Compelled Congressional
Testimony, 20 Op. O.L.C. 308 (1996); Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President
from Karl R. Thompson, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re:
Immunity of the Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Political Strategy and
Outreach from Congressional Subpoena, 38 Op. O.L.C., slip op *1 (July 15, 2014) (“Thompson
Memorandum”).
25.
OLC’s rationale for this immunity begins with the premise that “[t]he President is
a separate branch of government. He may not compel congressmen to appear before him. As a
matter of separation of powers, Congress may not compel him to appear before it.” Engel
Opinion at 4 (quoting Memorandum for Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, from
Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel at 2 (July 29, 1982)).
OLC has reasoned that the testimonial immunity enjoyed by the President himself necessarily
must extend to his close confidential advisors whose only function is to advise and assist the
President in carrying out his duties: “For the President’s absolute immunity to be fully
meaningful, and for these separation of powers principles to be adequately protected, the
President’s immediate advisers must likewise have absolute immunity from congressional
compulsion to testify about matters that occur during the course of discharging their official
duties.” Thompson Memorandum, 38 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at *2. Absent testimonial immunity
against Congressional process, according to OLC, the President’s “strong interests in
confidentiality, as well as the President’s ability to obtain sound and candid advice” would be
impaired. Engel Opinion, 43 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at *5.
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26.
On the other hand, the only judicial decision to address the question has
concluded that the President’s close advisors do not enjoy absolute immunity from
Congressional process. In Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C.
2008), the House Committee on the Judiciary brought suit against Counsel to the President
Harriet Miers and White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten to enforce its subpoenas for
testimony and documents relating to the termination of nine United States Attorneys. District
Judge Bates explained that Supreme Court authority on this question “powerfully suggests that
such advisors do not enjoy absolute immunity.” Id. at 99. The district court pointed out, see id.
at 100–03, that in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that senior presidential advisors
do not enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits based on official acts even though the Court had
previously held that the President himself is absolutely immune from civil suits based on official
acts. See 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see also, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982). The
court emphasized the narrow scope of its decision, holding “only that Ms. Miers (and other
senior presidential advisors) do not have absolute immunity from compelled congressional
process in the context of this particular subpoena dispute.” Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 105–06.
27.
The district court in Miers further concluded that the Counsel to the President was
not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity because the inquiry did not “involve the sensitive
topics of national security or foreign affairs.” Id. at 105. National security and foreign affairs
are at the heart of the information that the House Defendants seek from Plaintiff in connection
with the House’s impeachment inquiry.
28.
The district court’s decision in Miers was stayed pending appeal. See Comm. on
the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 910–11 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (per curiam). The case settled, and the appeal was dismissed before any further action was
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taken by the court of appeals. Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives v.
Miers, No. 08-5357, 2009 WL 3568649, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2009). Subsequent OLC
decisions from both the Obama Administration and the Trump Administration have “respectfully
disagree[d] with the district court’s conclusion in Miers and adhere[d] to this Office’s longestablished position that the President’s immediate advisers are absolutely immune from
compelled congressional testimony.” Engel Opinion, 43 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at *14 (citing
Thompson Memorandum, 38 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at *5–9).
29.
In short, there is no definitive judicial authority resolving the question whether
Plaintiff is bound to abide by the President’s assertion of immunity or to comply with the House
Defendants’ subpoena issued “[p]ursuant to the House of Representatives’ impeachment
inquiry.” It is not clear whether OLC’s extension of testimonial immunity to a congressional
subpoena issued in support of an impeachment inquiry – a judicial proceeding – is consistent
with Supreme Court precedent post-dating the Rehnquist Memorandum. See, e.g., United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (President does not have absolute immunity from subpoenas
issued by grand juries in criminal judicial proceedings). On the other hand, it is also not clear
whether the decision in Miers rejecting a close Presidential advisor’s assertion of absolute
testimonial immunity would extend to a subpoena issued to a former Deputy National Security
Advisor seeking testimony relating to confidential national security communications concerning
Ukraine, and in any case, that decision is not binding precedent.
B.
Plaintiff Seeks a Declaratory Judgment on Whether the Subpoena Issued to
Plaintiff Is Authorized under House Rules.
30.
Supreme Court precedent requires courts to determine “whether the committee
was authorized to exact the information which the witness withheld … before … consider[ing]
whether Congress had the power to confer upon the committee the authority which it claimed.”
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United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 42–43 (1953). “ ‘The required authorization from the full
House ... may take the form of a statute, a resolution, or a standing rule of the House.’ ” Trump
v. Mazars USA, LLP, No.19-5142, 2019 WL 5089748, at *22 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2019), pet. for
reh’g en banc filed Oct. 24, 2019 (quoting Morton Rosenberg, When Congress Comes Calling: A
Study on the Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry 33–34 (2017)); see
also Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 407–09 (1961); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 201 (1957); Rumely, 345 U.S. at 42–43.
31.
Since 1975, the Rules of the House have granted committees the power to
subpoena witnesses and materials under Rule XI, clause 2(m). See Elizabeth Rybicki and
Michael Greene, The Impeachment Process in the House of Representatives, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE R45769, at 4 (Updated Oct. 10, 2019), https://bit.ly/2lGH6mI. Prior to this
rule change, House committees lacked subpoena power absent “resolutions providing blanket
investigatory authorities that were agreed to at the start of a Congress or through authorizing
resolutions for [an] impeachment investigation.” Id. The House has not passed a resolution or
statute authorizing the House Defendants’ impeachment inquiry, nor has the House passed a
resolution or statute authorizing the House Defendants to issue subpoenas as part of an
impeachment investigation. Accordingly, the subpoena issued to Plaintiff is valid only if it is
authorized by Rule XI, clause 2(m).
32.
Rule XI, clause 2(m)(1) of the House Rules governing the 116th Congress
authorizes Committee Chairs to issue subpoenas “[f]or the purpose of carrying out any of its
functions and duties under this rule and rule X (including any matters referred to it under clause
2 of rule XII).” But none of the referenced “functions and duties” expressly include
impeachment inquiries.
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33.
Rule X, clause 1 describes the “legislative,” rather than impeachment,
jurisdictions of each standing committee. None of the “[g]eneral oversight responsibilities”
listed in Rule X, clause 2 involve impeachment proceedings. Rather, this subsection also
references only legislative concerns:
The various standing committees shall have general oversight responsibilities as
provided in paragraph (b) in order to assist the House in— (1) its analysis,
appraisal, and evaluation of— (A) the application, administration, execution, and
effectiveness of Federal laws; and (B) conditions and circumstances that may
indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional legislation; and
(2) its formulation, consideration, and enactment of changes in Federal laws, and
of such additional legislation as may be necessary or appropriate.
Rule X, clause (2)(a). And none of the “[s]pecial oversight functions” identified in clause 3 or
the “[a]dditional functions of committees” in clause 4 reference impeachment proceedings either.
34.
Likewise, no provision in Rule XI assigns functions or duties regarding
impeachment proceedings. And while Clause 1(b)(1) does provide that “[e]ach committee may
conduct at any time such investigations and studies as it considers necessary or appropriate in the
exercise of its responsibilities under rule X,” Rule X concerns only legislative responsibilities
and does not mention impeachment.
35.
Nor does Rule XII, clause 2 assign any impeachment functions or duties. It sets
forth procedures for the Speaker to refer bills, resolutions, and other matters to committees. See
Rule XII, clause 2.
36.
The House Defendants appear to acknowledge that they have not been authorized
to issue subpoenas in aid of an impeachment inquiry. Instead, they have stated that the subpoena
to Plaintiff was “issued by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence under the Rules of
the House of Representatives in exercise of its oversight and legislative jurisdiction ….” Exhibit
A at 1 (emphasis added).
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37.
It is unclear whether a House committee has the authority to issue subpoenas to
investigate potentially illegal conduct by an impeachable officer outside the scope of a properly
authorized impeachment inquiry. In Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, Judge Rao observed, in
dissent, that “[i]nvestigations of impeachable offenses simply are not, and never have been,
within Congress’s legislative power.” No.19-5142, 2019 WL 5089748 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2019)
at *26 (Rao, J., dissenting). Judge Rao opined that longstanding principles of separation of
powers preclude the Legislative Branch from investigating, prosecuting, and rendering judgment
on alleged wrongdoing except when exercising its impeachment powers, which are judicial in
nature. See id. at *31–32 (Rao, J., dissenting). And she concluded that historical practice going
back to the Founding has consistently drawn a sharp distinction between congressional
investigations for legislative purposes and investigations into misconduct by impeachable
officials. See id. at *34–41 (Rao, J., dissenting).
38.
Judge Rao advanced these points in dissent. The majority in Mazars disagreed
with her analysis, holding instead that Rule XI, clause 2(m) authorized the House Oversight
Committee to issue a subpoena in furtherance of an investigation into alleged misconduct by the
President. Id. at *22–26. If the majority ruling remains undisturbed (the President has petitioned
for review by the en banc Court of Appeals and indicated his intention to seek Supreme Court
review if his en banc petition is denied), it would be binding here and would require the
conclusion that the subpoena issued to Plaintiff by the House Defendants is authorized by the
House Rules. But Plaintiff raises the issue here to preserve it pending final resolution of the
Mazars case.
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CLAIM FOR RELIEF
COUNT I
Declaratory Judgment
39.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges the preceding paragraphs, as if
set forth fully herein.
40.
Plaintiff is bound by his oath of office to abide by the lawful constitutional
commands of both the President and the House of Representatives.
41.
Plaintiff has a duty to abide by a lawful constitutional assertion of immunity by
the President and a lawful instruction by the President that he decline to testify before Congress
concerning his official duties as a close advisor to the President.
42.
Plaintiff likewise has a duty to comply with a lawful constitutional subpoena
issued to him by a duly authorized committee of the House of Representatives.
43.
The House Defendants assert that Plaintiff is lawfully obligated to comply with
the subpoena they issued to him, and it is a federal criminal offense to willfully fail “to give
testimony or to produce papers” in response to a lawful subpoena issued by “any committee of
either House of Congress, … punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100
and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.”
2 U.S.C. § 192.
44.
President Trump asserts that Plaintiff is lawfully obligated to abide by the
President’s assertion of immunity from Congressional process and his instruction that Plaintiff
not appear and testify in response to the subpoena.
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45.
Plaintiff has reasonable cause to be uncertain whether the subpoena issued to
Plaintiff by the House Defendants was duly authorized by the House and is thus valid and
binding on Plaintiff.
46.
Plaintiff has reasonable cause to be uncertain whether the President’s assertion of
immunity on behalf of Plaintiff is valid and binding on Plaintiff.
47.
It is not possible for Plaintiff to satisfy the commands of both the House
Defendants on the one hand, and President Trump on the other.
48.
Plaintiff is neither authorized nor able to resolve a Constitutional dispute between
the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government; instead, “[i]t is emphatically the
province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
49.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is “an interested party seeking” a declaration of his “rights
and other legal relations” with the House Defendants on the one hand, and the President on the
other. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Plaintiff takes no position on whether the command of the
Legislative Branch or the command of the Executive Branch should prevail; he seeks only to
carry out whichever constitutional obligation the Judicial Branch determines to be lawful and
binding on Plaintiff.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Court:
A.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, enter declaratory relief as follows:
1.
Declare whether the subpoena issued by the House Defendants to Plaintiff
is authorized by, and valid under, House Rules; and
2.
Declare whether the President’s assertion of immunity from Congressional
process on behalf of Plaintiff is valid and binding on Plaintiff.
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B.
Expedite its consideration and resolution of this case in light of the pending
impeachment proceedings.
C.
Grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper under the
circumstances.
October 25, 2019
Respectfully submitted:
/s/ Charles J. Cooper
Charles J. Cooper, Bar No. 248070
Michael W. Kirk, Bar No. 424648
Shelby Baird*
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
1523 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 220-9600
Facsimile: (202) 220-9601
Email: ccooper@cooperkirk.com
Counsel for Plaintiff Charles M. Kupperman
*
D.C. Bar Application Pending; Admitted
in Pennsylvania
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