US INVENTOR, INC. v. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM OPINION re: 15 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and 21 Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Tanya S. Chutkan on 9/25/24. (lce)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
US INVENTOR, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-2893 (TSC)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff US Inventor, Inc.—a nonprofit organization that seeks to educate inventors,
lawmakers, agencies, and courts on matters affecting inventors—filed suit against the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, alleging violations of the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”). Having considered the record and the briefing, the court will DENY Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15, and GRANT Defendant’s Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 21.
I.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns two FOIA requests Plaintiff submitted in April 2021—Requests F-2100100 and F-21-00102. Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 21-2 ¶¶ 1–6.
The first request addressed inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings involving tribal sovereign
immunity, id. ¶ 1, and the second addressed IPR proceedings involving state sovereign
immunity, id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff filed suit on November 2, 2021, after more than six months passed
without any document production from Defendant. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 29. It alleges that
Defendant violated FOIA by failing to produce documents within the statutory time limit yet still
Page 1 of 15

retaining the search fees it assessed against Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 32–39. “Over the next year and a
half, Defendant made a series of productions, with certain redactions under Exemption 5, based
on the deliberative process privilege, attorney-client privilege, and work-product doctrine, as
well as under Exemption 6.” Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 8; see Vaughn
Index, ECF No. 21-12. The parties then reached an impasse regarding the sufficiency of
Defendant’s production and filed cross motions for summary judgment. See Joint Status Report,
ECF No. 13; Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 15; Def.’s Cross Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 21.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), courts “shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” “FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions
for summary judgment.” Georgacarakos v. FBI, 908 F. Supp. 2d 176, 180 (D.D.C. 2012)
(quotation omitted). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment in a FOIA case, the court
must view the facts in the light most favorable to the requester. Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Weisberg II”). Unlike non–FOIA cases, the defendant,
rather than the plaintiff, bears the initial burden. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Once the defendant
meets that burden, “the plaintiff must come forward with ‘specific facts’ demonstrating that there
is a genuine issue with respect to whether the agency has improperly withheld . . . records.”
Span v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 696 F. Supp. 2d 113, 119 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just.
v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 (1989)).

Page 2 of 15

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Reasonably Calculated Search

Plaintiff first contends that Defendant failed to conduct an adequate search for responsive
records. “The fundamental principle animating FOIA is public access to government
documents.” Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted). “The law in this circuit on agency obligations under FOIA” “embraces” this purpose
even though “the number of requests for information may pose burdens on agencies.” Id. To
prevail on summary judgment, an agency must show “that it has conducted a search reasonably
calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 705 F.2d 1344,
1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Weisberg I”). To do so, the “agency must show that it made a good
faith effort,” “using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information
requested.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Oglesby I”).
This reasonableness standard requires an adequate search, not a perfect one—the agency is not
obliged to “search every record system,” id., or “speculate about potential leads,” Kowalczyk v.
Dep’t of Just., 73 F.3d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Moreover, the plaintiff may not prevail by
showing only that “further documents might conceivably exist.” Weisberg I, 705 F.2d at 1351
(quoting Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam)); see Iturralde v.
Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[F]ailure of an agency to turn up
one specific document in its search does not alone render a search inadequate.”).
An agency “may rely upon affidavits to show it has conducted a reasonable search, as
long as they are ‘relatively detailed and nonconclusory and submitted in good faith.’”
Weisberg I, 705 F.2d at 1351 (quoting Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). For
example, the D.C. Circuit in Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 79 F.3d 1172, 1185–86 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (“Oglesby II”), concluded that the FBI’s search for records was adequate despite the
Page 3 of 15

plaintiff’s concern that a “section tickler” noted in a document meant that more responsive
records existed. The court pointed out that the agency did not locate any additional documents
and had informed the plaintiff that the “section tickler” reference “did not indicate that any other
responsive documents existed.” Id. The court refused to “second-guess FBI’s affidavit”
regarding the meaning of this “section tickler” reference. Id. at 1186; accord id. (refusing to
second-guess State Department’s affiant regarding how a given repository could be searched).
By contrast, the D.C. Circuit found the affidavit in Oglesby I, 920 F.2d at 68, inadequate
because it merely stated: “Based upon the information contained in Mr. Oglesby’s letter, and
consistent with customary practice and established procedure, a search was initiated of the
Department record system most likely to contain the information which had been requested.”
Among other flaws, that conclusory affidavit did not “identify the terms searched or explain how
the search was conducted.” Id.; accord Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 23 F.3d 548, 551–52
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (agency affidavits that do not “describe in any detail what records were
searched, by whom, and through what process” are inadequate at summary judgment).
A court should deny summary judgment “if a review of the record raises substantial
doubt” regarding the reasonableness of the search, “particularly in view of ‘well defined requests
and positive indications of overlooked materials.’” Valencia-Lucena, 180 F.3d at 326 (quoting
Founding Church of Scientology v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). Accordingly, in
Valencia-Lucena, the D.C. Circuit concluded that summary judgment for the agency was
inappropriate where the defendant had told the plaintiff that the records requested “may be
located at the federal records center in Georgia,” but then declined to search that office. Id.
at 327. The court held that “[i]t is well-settled that if an agency has reason to know that certain
places may contain responsive documents, it is obligated under FOIA to search” those locations

Page 4 of 15

“barring an undue burden.” Id. This principle, however, requires proof in the record; “mere
speculation that as yet uncovered documents may exist does not undermine the finding that the
agency conducted a reasonable search for them.” Iturralde, 315 F.3d at 316 (quoting SafeCard
Servs. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); accord Steinberg, 23 F.3d at 552 (“[M]ere
reference to other files does not establish the existence of documents that are relevant to [the
plaintiff’s] FOIA request.”).
“Once an agency has made a prima facie showing” of an adequate search, “the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to provide countervailing evidence sufficient to raise substantial doubt
concerning the adequacy of the agency’s search.” Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Defense, 236
F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D.D.C. 2017) (quotation omitted). Thus, under this burden-shifting
framework, once the agency shows the search was adequate, the court will grant it summary
judgment unless the plaintiff can provide evidence to the contrary.
Defendant’s declaration demonstrates that it conducted an adequate search as to both of
Plaintiff’s FOIA requests. Regarding Plaintiff’s first request, Defendant circulated it to
Administrative Patent Judge (“APJ”) Scott Moore, who initiated the collection of responsive
records within the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). Decl. of Kathryn Siehndel, ECF
No. 21-13 ¶¶ 17, 20 (“Siehndel Decl.”). Judge Moore sent the request to almost all the
individuals named in the request along with a Patent Quality Review Assurance Specialist and
additional APJs who were not named in the request but “would likely have been involved in any
policy determinations concerning sovereign immunity.” Id. ¶ 20. The only individual named in
the request who was not initially contacted no longer worked at the PTAB. Id. Defendant’s
declarant, however, later confirmed with that individual that he had no responsive records. Id.
These individuals searched their files by searching for the inter partes review numbers

Page 5 of 15

enumerated in the request and/or using keywords that correlated with the request, depending on
the individual and the type of files. Id. ¶ 21. Of all the records these searches produced,
Defendant determined that only 63 pages were responsive. Id. ¶¶ 21, 24, 26.
The second request proceeded much like the first. Defendant sent it to APJ Moore, id.
¶ 40, who circulated it to the listed APJs who still worked at PTAB, the Patent Quality Review
Assurance Specialist, and two additional APJs likely to have been involved, id. ¶ 44. These
individuals searched their files, and Defendant eventually determined that it had 428 pages of
responsive records. Id. ¶¶ 45, 48.
This declaration suffices to make a prima facie showing of an adequate search. See
Rodriguez, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 35. Unlike in Ogelsby I, 920 F.2d at 68, the declaration explains
the steps Defendant took to recover responsive records, including specific terms searched by the
identified individuals. E.g., Siehndel Decl. ¶ 21 (individuals searched the terms “sovereign
immunity,” “Mohawk,” or “tribe” along with reviewing their files for the proceedings
enumerated). Moreover, nothing in the declaration indicates that Defendant identified sources of
potentially responsive documents yet failed to search them. See Valencia-Lucena, 180 F.3d
at 326–27.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to conduct an adequate search because it did not
release records related to the dates APJs were assigned to panels for the proceedings. Mem. in
Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 16 at 15–16 (“Pl.’s Mot.”). Defendant declares that it
did not know that this information was embedded in its case management system until Plaintiff
filed its motion. Siehndel Decl. ¶ 29. Defendant has since provided Plaintiff with this data for
the first request, and “explained in detail the reason it doesn’t exist” for the second request, id.
¶ 57: the enumerated APJ was added for a narrow purpose, and therefore was not entered into the

Page 6 of 15

paneling database, id. ¶ 50. Plaintiff does not contend in its reply that Defendant’s explanation
for why that record did not exist was inadequate or unpersuasive. Consequently, the court will
grant Defendant summary judgment as to the adequacy of its search.
B.

Exemption 5

Plaintiff next claims that Defendant incorrectly withheld records under Exemption 5,
which provides agencies need not disclose “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). This “deliberative process privilege shields documents that debate and
discuss proposed agency decisions before they are finalized.” Campaign Legal Ctr v. U.S. Dep’t
of Just., 34 F.4th 14, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2022). “Ultimately, the privilege is designed to improve
governmental decisionmaking by encouraging public servants to speak candidly with one
another and to fully flesh out the reasons for and against potential agency actions before they are
taken.” Id. at 23. To fall under this exemption, “a document must be both predecisional”—
meaning it was “generated before the agency’s final decision”—and “deliberative,” meaning it
“reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process.” Id. (quotations omitted).
i.

Communications between agency officials and panel-member APJs

First, Plaintiff argues that Defendant incorrectly withheld records reflecting discussion
between APJs and agency officials regarding the proceedings at issue in its FOIA requests. The
parties do not dispute that these communications were both generated before the agency’s
decision and reflect the consultative process. See id. at 23. Plaintiff argues, however, that these
records may not be withheld because they reflected improper ex parte communications. Pl.’s
Mot. at 17–21. The court agrees with the parties that, “where there is reason to believe the
documents sought may shed light on government misconduct,” the deliberative process privilege

Page 7 of 15

“is routinely denied.” In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quotation
omitted). But see Notice of Supplemental Authority: Malone v. U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, ECF No. 32-1 at 5 (concluding that deciding the “legality and constitutionality of these
communications” is unnecessary to decide whether they were properly withheld under FOIA).
The court disagrees, however, with Plaintiff’s contention that these communications were
improper.
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides that an APJ may not “consult a
person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.”
5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1). In construing this provision, the Supreme Court has explained that an
administrative law judge may not “consult any person or party, including other agency officials,
concerning a fact at issue in the hearing, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to
participate.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978). The Federal Circuit has also
considered this concept in the due process context, holding that “[t]he introduction of new and
material information by means of ex parte communications to the deciding official undermines
the public employee’s constitutional due process guarantee of notice . . . and the opportunity to
respond.” Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
This doctrine does not prohibit the communications at issue here. For one thing, the D.C.
Circuit has held that Stone is “confined” to “instances where the decider received ‘new and
material’ information” to consider in its decision, Sw. Airlines Co. v. TSA, 554 F.3d 1065, 1074
(D.C. Cir. 2009), and Defendant’s declarant stated that the withheld communications involve
“[a]t most” “legal and policy issues across cases”—not “new factual information” about any
“specific” proceeding, Siehndel Decl. ¶ 67. For another, the APA definition of the “persons” an
APJ may not consult “on a fact at issue” categorically excludes agency officials. Section 551

Page 8 of 15

defines “person” to include “an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or
private organization other than an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (emphasis added). The agency
officials here are members of “Agency leadership and/or management,” who speak on behalf of
the agency. Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ J. & in Supp. of Cross
Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 21-1 at 12 (“Def.’s Cross Mot.”); accord Siehndel Decl. ¶ 67
(communications involved Defendant’s “officials”). Consequently, another court in this district
has held that communication between a deciding official and an agency official was not improper
because it merely “presented the evidence to which [plaintiff] already had the opportunity to
respond during prior steps of the [administrative] process and offered the agency’s rebuttal to
[plaintiff’s] arguments,” and the communication was not “the type likely to result in undue
pressure upon the deciding official to rule in a particular manner.” Trinka v. McDonough,
No. 21-2904 (RC), 2023 WL 6160053, at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2023) (quoting Stone, 179 F.3d
at 1377). So too here.
Plaintiff also argues that these communications are prohibited by regulation. Pl.’s Mot.
at 20; Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. & Resp. to Def.’s Cross Mot. for Summ. J., ECF
No. 26 at 12 (“Pl.’s Reply”). The regulation provides: “Communication regarding a specific
proceeding with a Board member defined in 35 U.S.C. 6(a) is not permitted unless both parties
have an opportunity to be involved in the communication.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(d). Section 6(a)
defines the “Board” as including the Director, Deputy Director, Commissioner for Patents,
Commissioner for Trademarks, “and the administrative patent judges.” This regulation does not
support Plaintiff’s position because it is best read to prohibit to communications between parties
and Board members; not among Board members. Defendant’s guide for practitioners implies as
much, explaining that this regulation captures “[a]ll substantive communications with the Board

Page 9 of 15

regarding a proceeding,” but does not extend to “[m]inisterial communications with support
staff,” “conference calls or hearings in which opposing counsel declines to participate,” or
“informing the Board in one proceeding of the existence or status of a related Board proceeding.”
Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,758 (Aug. 14, 2012). Each scenario
contemplates a party communicating with a Board member—not Board members
communicating with each other. Construing the regulation the way Plaintiff does would render it
absurd by prohibiting, for example, the Director and the Deputy Director—both Board
members—from discussing any ongoing proceeding without involving both of the parties. See,
e.g., Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[S]tatutes are to be
read to avoid absurd results.”).
ii.

Communication from counsel and parties to Defendant

Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly withheld communications sent from
counsel representing patent owners involved in the proceedings as well as Plaintiff’s President to
the [e-mail] email address. Pl.’s Mot. at 22–24. After Plaintiff filed its motion,
Defendant agreed with Plaintiff’s assessment and released the unredacted versions of those
emails. Siehndel Decl ¶¶ 71–72. “[T]he release of requested documents to a plaintiff renders its
FOIA suit moot ‘with respect to those documents.’” Newport Aeronautical Sales v. Dep’t of Air
Force, 684 F.3d 160, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Consequently, this claim is moot.
iii.

Email subject lines

Third, Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly withheld email subject lines. See Pl.’s
Mot. at 23–26. According to its declarant, Defendant “unredacted approximately two dozen
subject lines in its revised redactions,” after Plaintiff filed its motion, and the subject lines that
remain redacted “reflect the content of specific deliberations.” Siehndel Decl. ¶ 75.

Page 10 of 15

The “agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears
‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’” Shapiro v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 893 F.3d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(citation omitted). Here, it is both logical and plausible that the remaining email subject lines
reflect the deliberative process. Email senders typically place the topic or bottom-line
conclusion of an email in the subject line. Consequently, when discussing an ongoing
proceeding, the subject line may reveal a participant’s thought process or how they are inclined
to rule. Indeed, other courts in this district have similarly held that the Government complied
with FOIA in withholding email subject lines where disclosure would reveal exempt
information. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 3d 29, 42 (D.D.C.
2019); Khatchadourian v. DIA, 597 F. Supp. 3d 96, 110–11 (D.D.C. 2022).
iv.

Communication between APJs

Fourth, Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly withheld an email in which APJ Bisk
forwarded APJ Bonilla an article that was published online. See Pl.’s Reply at 24. According to
the Vaughn Index, “[t]he redacted comments relate the email to issues raised in a pending IPR
decision,” and “reflect[] the views of APJ Bisk on issues presented” in that proceeding. Vaughn
Index at 18. This suffices to establish that the redacted information is protected under the
deliberative process privilege because it both clarifies that the comments related to a pending
proceeding, and were therefore predecisional, and provides that the comments expressed one
APJ telling another APJ their “view” on the “issues presented” in a proceeding before them,
making it part of the “consultative process,” Campaign Legal Ctr, 34 F.4th at 23 (quotation
omitted).
Plaintiff contends that Defendant “has not met its burden of establishing . . . that the email contents were pre-decisional (much less deliberative).” Pl.’s Reply at 24. But that

Page 11 of 15

“burden” is not onerous; the agency’s justification must only appear “‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’”
Shapiro, 893 F.3d at 799 (citation omitted). Plaintiff fails to explain why Defendant’s
representations that the redacted comments pertained to a pending proceeding and expressed an
APJ’s view on that proceeding were not “logical” or “plausible.”
v.

Communications between agency officials and agency attorneys; attorney
work product

Finally, Plaintiff argues that records reflecting communications between agency officials
and the agency’s general counsel as well as work product regarding the IPRs were improperly
withheld. Defendant claims it withheld this information under the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrines. Def.’s Cross Mot. at 18–21. Exemption 5 encompasses both. Nat’l Sec.
Archive v. CIA, 752 F.3d 460, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2014), superseded by statute on other grounds
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). Plaintiff represents in its Reply that it “does not object” to the withholding
of this information on attorney-client privilege or work product grounds, but maintains that it
does object “on the basis of the deliberative process exemption.” Pl.’s Reply at 23 n.12. That
position makes no sense. In conceding that the information was properly withheld under the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, Plaintiff has conceded that withholding
under Exemption 5 was proper.
B.

Internal Credit Forms

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant incorrectly withheld two forms that APJs submitted
to claim production credit for work on cases under Exemption 6, which covers “personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). In its Vaughn Index, Defendant explained
that it withheld these forms pursuant to both Exemptions 5 and 6 because they both “reflect the
pre-decisional meeting notes for a specific IPR” and constitute an “internal personnel matter.”
Page 12 of 15

Vaughn Index at 6, 49. In its Reply, Plaintiff conceded that, so long as “the APJ was not
soliciting advice on the IPR beyond [the] panel,” it “has no objection to” withholding under
Exemption 5. Pl.’s Reply at 26. Nothing in the Vaughn Index or elsewhere in the record
indicates the forms included “soliciting advice on the IPR beyond [the] panel.” Consequently,
the court will accept Plaintiff’s concession that these forms were properly withheld under
Exemption 5.
D.

Segregation of Nonexempt Information

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to “take reasonable steps necessary to
segregate and release nonexempt information” under FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(ii)(II).
“Producing segregable information is an essential ingredient for agencies’ FOIA compliance.”
Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 436 F. Supp. 3d 90, 114
(D.D.C. 2019). “Even if an exemption covers an entire agency record, the agency still must
release any reasonably segregable information within the record that could be disclosed without
causing reasonably foreseeable harm to an interest that the exemption protects.” Leopold v. U.S.
Dep’t of Just., 94 F.4th 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
“Agencies are entitled to a presumption that they complied with the obligation to disclose
reasonably segregable material.” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). To “demonstrate that all reasonably segregable material has been
released, the agency must provide a ‘detailed justification’ for its non-segregability.” Johnson v.
Exec. Off. for U.S. Atty’s, 310 F.3d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). An agency may
satisfy this requirement by describing the documents withheld and why in its Vaughn index and
providing affidavits explaining the process used to determine that no further information could
be released. See id.

Page 13 of 15

Defendant has done so here. In its Vaughn index, it enumerated each record that was
redacted in whole or in part and explains why it chose to do so. See, e.g., Vaughn Index at 13
(providing that the document “is a case from the Federal Circuit,” was withheld “in its entirety
because it elucidates legal arguments of importance to APJ Bisk as she considered and discussed
the legal issue addressed in Document 5 relevant to a then-pending IPR,” and explaining the
“specific harm from releasing the information,” including “chilling future discussions between
APJ’s”). Moreover, Defendant’s declaration provides that its “FOIA Office reviewed each page
and each line of each responsive record to identify reasonably segregable, non-exempt
information, and released all such information.” Siehndel Decl. ¶ 87. “The material being
withheld has been limited to the minimum necessary,” and “is so inextricably intertwined with
any disclosable information that it could not be meaningfully segregated for release without
destroying the integrity of the document or disclosing the substance of the records.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s blocks of full-page redactions and redactions of title
lines, senders, and recipients of emails demonstrate that it has not fully segregated nonexempt
portions of responsive records. Pl.’s Mot. at 27–28. Defendant, however, declared that it
reviewed “each line” and determined that it was withholding the minimum information necessary
to avoid disclosing exempt information. Siehndel Decl ¶ 87. And it makes sense that title lines
along with senders and recipients of emails might confer exempt information in some situations,
see supra at 10–11; the mere fact that they were redacted does not undermine Defendant’s
declaration.

Page 14 of 15

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, ECF No. 15, and GRANT Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF
No. 21. An Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: September 25, 2024

Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge

Page 15 of 15