STAGWELL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. OH

Filing 55

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 41 [43-1] Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims: See document for details. Signed by Judge Jia M. Cobb on November 22, 2024. (lcjmc2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STAGWELL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 22-cv-3495 (JMC)

v.
RICHARD OH,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Stagwell Technologies, Inc. (Stagwell) filed this suit against
pro se Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Richard Oh in 2022. See ECF 1.1 Stagwell alleged that Oh
“defrauded [Stagwell] into assuming a multimillion-dollar liability” by falsely inducing the
company to pay rent on a lease that Oh was in fact liable for. See id. ¶¶ 5–30. Since then, Oh has
filed several motions—including a motion to dismiss, ECF 24—which the Court denied on the
record. See May 28, 2024 Minute Entry; Sept. 18, 2024 Minute Entry. Oh filed an answer and
asserted three counterclaims against Stagwell: malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). ECF 35 at 6–10. Stagwell moves to dismiss
Oh’s counterclaims. ECF 43-1. For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Stagwell’s
motion. The Court’s resolution of this motion has no bearing on the merits of Stagwell’s
allegations against Oh or Oh’s defenses to those allegations.
In resolving Stagwell’s motion to dismiss, the Court assumes that Oh’s factual allegations
are true, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and construes his filings liberally in light

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Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by
omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to
documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the
top of each page.

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of his pro se status, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
First, Oh claims that Stagwell engaged in malicious prosecution by filing this civil suit
against him. ECF 35 ¶¶ 46–47. “One of the prima facie elements of the claim under D.C. law,
however, is that the underlying suit must have been first terminated in favor of the claimant.” U.S.
ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146, 156 (D.D.C. 2009); see Shulman v. Miskell, 626
F.2d 173, 174–75 (D.C. Cir. 1980).2 Here, the underlying suit (the allegedly malicious
prosecution) is the instant civil suit filed by Stagwell. Because this lawsuit has not yet been
resolved on the merits, Oh’s claim is premature. The Court will therefore dismiss Oh’s
counterclaim for malicious prosecution. Oh is free to refile his suit at the appropriate time.
Oh’s IIED claim turns on his malicious prosecution claim. He alleges that, “[a]s a direct
consequence of Stagwell’s malicious prosecution of civil case by abusing the legal process,
Defendant has incurred both economic and non-economic expenses in challenging the underlying
action,” including “pain and suffering [and] emotional distress.” ECF 35 ¶¶ 52–53. The Court
therefore dismisses Oh’s IIED counterclaim as premature because it is premised entirely on his
malicious prosecution claim.
Even if Oh’s IIED claim were properly before the Court, he has failed to state a claim. “To
establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show
‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendants, which (2) intentionally or
recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.’” Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Mann,
150 A.3d 1213, 1260 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Williams v. District of Columbia, 9 A.3d 484, 493–94

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Neither of the parties has raised a choice-of-law question: Stagwell assumes that District of Columbia law applies,
see ECF 43-1 at 7–10, and Oh does not argue otherwise, see generally ECF 46. The Court need not challenge the
parties’ assumption that D.C. law applies. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 82 F.3d 478, 482–83 (D.C.
Cir. 1996); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Unlike
jurisdictional issues, courts need not address choice of law questions sua sponte.”).

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(D.C. 2010)). Severe emotional distress “requires a showing beyond mere mental anguish and
stress and must be of so acute a nature that harmful physical consequences are likely to result.” Id.
at 1261. Oh alleges only that he seeks compensation for “pain and suffering including emotional
distress.” ECF 35 ¶ 53. This is not sufficient to plausibly allege the severe emotional distress
necessary to sustain an IIED claim. See, e.g., Kurd v. Republic of Turkey, 374 F. Supp. 3d 37, 55
(D.D.C. 2019) (applying D.C. law, and concluding plaintiff did not plausibly allege severe
emotional distress where he “made only the conclusory allegation that he ‘has also experienced
emotional distress’”); Brown v. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., 773 F. Supp. 2d 125, 138
(D.D.C. 2011) (applying D.C. law, and explaining “[t]hat plaintiff ‘was under a great deal of
intentional pressure,’ . . . does not adequately allege that she suffered severe emotional distress.”);
Thompson v. Trump, 590 F. Supp. 3d 46, 122 (D.D.C. 2022), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.
Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F.4th 1 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (under D.C. law, plaintiff’s “largely
conclusory” allegations that “Defendants’ actions caused severe emotional distress” and “plaintiff
suffered severe emotional distress” did not “meet the high bar for . . . an IIED claim”).
Finally, Oh alleges that Stagwell engaged in abuse of process by filing this suit against
him. ECF 35 ¶¶ 49–50; see id. ¶ 45 (alleging that Stagwell is “attempting to use . . . ridiculous,
knowingly false statements in another attempt to escape payment with a different court to rehash
claims.”). But “simply filing a lawsuit is not actionable, regardless of the motive that may have
prompted the suit.” Kopff v. World Rsch. Grp., LLC, 519 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D.D.C. 2007); see
Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 198 (D.C. 1980). The Court will therefore dismiss Oh’s
counterclaim for abuse of process for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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For the foregoing reasons, Stagwell’s motion to dismiss Oh’s counterclaims, ECF 43-1, is
GRANTED. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
SO ORDERED.

__________________________
JIA M. COBB
United States District Judge
Date: November 22, 2024

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