FLORES v. SUN PRARIE POLICE DEPT. et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Rudolph Contreras on 02/05/2024. (zljn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
VALERIE FLORES,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUN PRAIRIE POLICE DEPT., et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-03757 (UNA)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint
(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court
grants plaintiff’s IFP application and, for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses the complaint,
and this matter, without prejudice.
Plaintiff, who appears to be domiciled in New York, sues (1) Sun Prairie Police
Department, located in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, (2) named and unnamed employees of Sun Prairie
Police Department, also located in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, and (3) “Esrey Cohen specific tenants
to include Unit 415,” with an address that plaintiff describes as “undisclosed/confidential,”
somewhere in Dane County, Wisconsin. See Compl. at 2, 7–10. Because plaintiff fails to provide
names and addresses for some of the defendants, her complaint contravenes D.C. Local Civil Rule
5.1(c).
Furthermore, the complaint is not a model of clarity. Indeed, plaintiff confusingly attaches
two separate form complaints together, without explanation. Compare Compl. at 1–6, with id. at
7–12. Where it can be understood, plaintiff quite broadly alleges that the Esrey Cohen-related
defendants have harassed her, stalked her, and defamed her, and discriminated against her, by

waging false police reports against her with the Sun Prairie Police Department, causing her to be
escorted from an apartment building. See id. at 3–5, 10–11. She also vaguely alleges that her
interactions with the Sun Prairie Police Department have resulted in her general mistreatment. See
id. at 11. She contends that defendants’ alleged actions are violative of several federal civil and
criminal statutes, and she demands an injunction, in addition to $2 to $3 million in damages. See
id. at 3, 5, 9–11.
First, Federal Rule 8(a) requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of
the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 67879 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures
that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive
answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown
v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a “complaint [] contains an untidy
assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished
from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments[,]” it does not fulfill the
requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom.
Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). “A confused and
rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule
8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). The instant complaint falls squarely within this category.
Furthermore, the complaint paragraphs are conflated and are not limited “to a single set of
circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

Second, even if plaintiff’s intended claims were more coherent, and she had otherwise
complied with the applicable Rules of Procedure, she has not established venue in the District of
Columbia. Venue in a civil action is proper only in (1) the district where any defendant resides, if
all defendants reside in the same state in which the district is located, (2) in a district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred (or a substantial part
of the property that is the subject of the action is situated), or (3) in a district in which any defendant
may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (providing dismissal for improper venue). Here, as
pleaded, none of the parties are located in the District of Columbia, and there is absolutely no
connection between plaintiff’s allegations and this District.
For all of these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order
accompanies this memorandum opinion.
Date: February 5, 2024

___________/s/____________
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge