WILLIAMS v. APPLE INC.

Filing 17

ORDER: For the reasons explained herein, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss, Dkt. 12, is GRANTED. Should Williams like the Court to transfer her case to another federal judicial district where venue is proper, she should move for reconsideration of this order and a motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406 on or before June 11, 2024. See document for details. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 5/27/2024. (lcrdm1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MORGAN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 23-3901 (RDM)

v.
APPLE INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER

Plaintiff Morgan Williams brings this suit against her former employer, Apple, Inc., for
its alleged failure to accommodate her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2112 et seq. Dkt. 1 at 4–5 (Compl.), and the D.C. Human Rights Act
(“DCHRA”). She alleges that on June 1, 2015, Apple hired her for a remote chat support
position. Id. at 5 (Compl.); Dkt. 12-3 at 2 (EEOC Compl.) (describing Williams as being
employed as a “Chat/Customer Service Representative and Chat/Mentor Content Strategist”).
But in January 2022, she “was informed by [a] direct manager and Corporate Employee
Relations representative (CES) that the chat Senior Advisor role [had] changed to a phone Senior
Advisor role,” that her “accommodation request for a demotion to a lower level chat or nonphone portion of the[] role was denied,” and that “if [she] was unable to perform the phone
functions in this new role,” she “could choose a severance package or start an internal 30-day job
search program.” Dkt. 1 at 5 (Compl.). Williams alleges that she was subsequently terminated
(or placed on leave) on March 28, 2022, id. at 4. 1

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Plaintiff’s complaint states that she was terminated and that the alleged discriminatory act
occurred on March 28, 2022. Dkt. 1 at 4. In her EEOC complaint, however, Plaintiff stated that
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Apple has moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that this Court does not have personal
jurisdiction over the Company under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(2), that
venue is improper under Rule 12(b)(3), and that Williams has failed to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). See generally Dkt. 12-1. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with Apple that
Williams has not shown that venue is proper in the District of Columbia. Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Apple’s motion to dismiss, but if Williams would like the Court to transfer this case
to a federal court where jurisdiction is proper, she should file a motion for reconsideration
requesting that relief on or before June 11, 2024.
Federal law requires that plaintiffs bring suit “in the proper venue” to “ensure[ ] that a
district with some interest in the dispute or nexus to the parties adjudicates the plaintiff’s
claims.” Hamilton v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 118 F. Supp. 3d 328, 333 (D.D.C. 2015).
Generally, venue is proper in a district (1) where any defendant resides (if all defendants are
residents of the same state); (2) where the events giving rise to the suit occurred; or (3) if “there
is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought,” in any district in which a defendant
is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). But Title VII has its own venue
provision—which the ADA incorporates, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)—that states that
an action may be brought [1] in any judicial district in the State in which the
unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, [2] in the
judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are
maintained and administered, or [3] in the judicial district in which the aggrieved
an HR employee told her that she “would be placed on a 30-day job search and end [her]
employment with [Apple].” Dkt. 12-3 at 2 (EEOC Compl.). And in her opposition to
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff stated that she struggled to return Apple equipment
“after she started short-term disability leave between March 2022 to her phone call termination
on May 30, 2023.” Dkt. 16 at 4. Because the complaint is what is controlling and a Plaintiff
cannot amend their complaint through their opposition briefs, the Court treats the March 2022
date as controlling. See Pappas v. District of Columbia, 513 F. Supp. 3d 64, 81 n.5 (D.D.C.
2021) (“[A] party cannot amend his or her complaint by the briefs in opposition to a motion to
dismiss.”).
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person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice,
[4] but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action
may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his
principal office.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Where a case involves more than one cause of action,” as is true
here, “venue must be proper as to each claim,” Relf v. Gasch, 511 F.2d 804, 807 n.12 (D.C. Cir.
1975); see also 14D Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3807 (4th ed. 2018). “Because it is the plaintiff’s obligation to institute the action in a
permissible forum, the plaintiff usually bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper.”
Freeman v. Fallin, 254 F. Supp. 2d 52, 56 (D.D.C. 2003). Here, Williams has not met her
burden of showing that venue is proper.
To begin with her ADA claim, Williams has not demonstrated that the events relevant to
her suit—that is the denial of her accommodation request and subsequent termination—occurred
when she resided in the District of Columbia (rather than North Carolina). When Williams filed
a complaint with the EEOC regarding Apple’s alleged ADA violations on June 23, 2022, the
address that Williams used for her EEOC Complaint was a North Carolina address, Dkt. 12-3 at
2 (EEOC Compl.), and the address she used for her employer was an address in Austin, Texas,
id. Moreover, in her opposition to Apple’s motion to dismiss, Williams represented that she did
not move to the District of Columbia until March 2022—after she was placed on leave. Dkt. 16
at 2. From what has been presented, the Court has no basis from which to infer that the alleged
“unlawful employment practice” occurred in the District of Columbia. Nor has Williams alleged
that she would have worked in the District of Columbia but for the “alleged unlawful
employment practice.” Although Williams represents that she moved to the District shortly after
being placed on leave, it is unclear whether she would have made that move if her request for an
accommodation had been granted and she hadn’t been placed on leave.
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Likewise, there is no reason to believe that the “employment records relevant to” the
alleged unlawful employment practice are in the District of Columbia. As mentioned, Williams
listed the relevant Apple address for her EEOC complaint as one in Austin, Texas. Dkt. 12-3 at
2. And Apple’s principal place of business is Cupertino, California, and the company is
incorporated in California, Dkt. 12-2 at 1 (Whittington Decl. ¶¶ 5–6); it is not the District of
Columbia. Therefore, Williams fails to demonstrate that venue is proper under the fourth prong
of the ADA’s special venue provision as well.
In addition to failing to show that venue is proper for her ADA claim, Williams also fails
to show that venue is proper with respect to her DCHRA claim. As has been explained,
Williams has failed to allege that the events giving rise to this suit occurred in the District of
Columbia, as the relevant events appear to have occurred prior to her move. For the same
reason, Williams has also not shown that Apple “resides” in the District of Columbia, such that
venue is proper. Although a corporate defendant is deemed to “reside” in a particular district if
“such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in
question,” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2), Williams has not alleged sufficient facts from which the
Court could find that it has personal jurisdiction over Apple. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological
Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual
basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”).
A plaintiff may establish personal jurisdiction by asserting either general jurisdiction—
which “extends to any and all claims brought against a defendant”—or specific jurisdiction—
which requires that “[t]he plaintiff's claims . . . arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024–25
(2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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General personal jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s connections with the forum are
“so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Pilkin v. Sony
Interactive Ent., LLC, No. 17-cv-2501, 2019 WL 224145, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2019)
(explaining that for a foreign corporation (i.e., one not organized under the law of the District of
Columbia), “the Court must look to D.C. Code § 13–334(a), which authorizes general
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only if it is ‘doing business in the District’ and the
exercise of general jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process;” the due process clause
in turn, requires that “the company’s affiliations with the District of Columbia [be] so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home” (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at
919)). For corporations, the “paradigm all-purpose forums” are their principal place of business
and state of incorporation. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). Apple’s
principal place of business is Cupertino, California, and the company is incorporated in
California, Dkt. 12-2 at 1 (Whittington Decl. ¶¶ 5–6). In addition, Williams’s contention that
Apple is rendered “at home” in the District because it maintains a store here falls far short of the
“continuous and systematic” ties necessary to establish general jurisdiction. See BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 414 (2017) (“A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be
deemed at home in all of them.”).
“When general jurisdiction is unavailable, a court might still exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.” Adler v. Loyd, 496 F. Supp. 3d 269, 276 (D.D.C. 2020). Specific
personal jurisdiction is “confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the
very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564 U.S. at
919. As with general personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show specific personal jurisdiction is

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proper under the forum's long-arm statute and due process. See FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts.,
Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1094–95 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The District of Columbia’s long-arm statute is
quite broad, see D.C. Code § 13-423, so the limiting principle is the due process clause: “Under
the due process clause, specific personal jurisdiction exists if the plaintiff shows ‘minimum
contacts between the defendant and the forum establishing that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Adler, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 276
(quoting GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
Here, the only contacts that Williams alleges that Apple has with the District of Columbia is the
fact that Apple has stores in the District. See Dkt. 16 at 2–3. But Williams does not explain how
the existence of Apple stores in D.C. relates to her own ADA claim, the events of which appear
to have occurred prior to her move to the District and do not appear to pertain to any of Apple’s
business activities in D.C.
For these reasons, Williams has not shown that venue is proper for either one of her
claims: her ADA claim or her DCHRA claim. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 12, is GRANTED. That said, should Williams like the
Court to transfer her case to another federal judicial district where venue is proper, she should
move for reconsideration of this order and a motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406 on
or before June 11, 2024.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: May 27, 2024
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