ALTER v. TRUMP

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION: For the reasons explained in the accompanying memorandum opinion, the Court will sua sponte dismiss Plaintiff's complaints in their entirety pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See document for details. Signed by Judge Randolph D. Moss on 5/9/2024. (lcrdm3)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOE ALTER,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 24-478 (RDM)

v.
DONALD J. TRUMP,
Defendant.
JOE ALTER,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 24-512 (RDM)

v.
DONALD J. TRUMP,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Joe Alter filed the first of these pro se actions against former President Donald J.
Trump on February 16, 2024. See Alter v. Trump, Civ. No. 24-478, Dkt. 1 at 1 (Compl.).
Several days later, he filed the second action, which asserts the same claims. See Alter v. Trump,
Civ. No. 24-512, Dkt. 1 (Compl.). Given this overlap, the Court will address both cases in a
single opinion.
Plaintiff’s complaints do not enumerate counts, but instead present several “legal
questions,” namely: (1) “Should the question of whether an insurrection has occurred be resolved
in the Federal Court system, and Ultimately the Supreme Court?”; (2) “Were events on January
6, an attempted insurrection?”; and (3) “Did Donald Trump engage in or at least encourage and

aid such acts?” Alter v. Trump, Civ. No. 24-478, Dkt. 1 at 5 (Compl. ¶¶ 14–16); Alter v. Trump,
Civ. No. 24-512, Dkt. 1 at 5 (Compl. ¶¶ 14–16). The complaints ask the Court to declare: (1)
that January 6, 2021 constituted an attempted insurrection; (2) that Donald Trump gave “aid and
support to” that attempted insurrection; (3) that “Donald Trump may never again hold any office
in and under the United States of America;” and (4) that “under the disqualification of 14sec3,
Donald Trump is no longer protected from liability under the 1st Amendment’s immunities
regarding political speech, and may be held accountable for lies he tells in furtherance of his
ambitions to re-attain such an office.” Alter v. Trump, Civ. No. 24-512, Dkt. 1 at 8 (Compl. ¶¶
26–29); Alter v. Trump, Civ. No. 24-478, Dkt. 1 at 7–8 (Compl. ¶¶ 26–29).
The D.C. Circuit has recognized that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) where “it is patently obvious” that the plaintiff cannot “prevail[] on the facts
alleged in his complaint.” Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir.
1990). That rule applies, moreover, “[e]ven under a liberal pro se standard.” Strunk v. Obama,
880 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Perry v. Discover Bank, 514 F. Supp. 2d 94, 95
(D.D.C. 2007). Here, even construing the complaints liberally, the Court concludes that “it is
patently obvious” that they fail as a matter of law.
Plaintiff seemingly filed these actions in anticipation of what the Supreme Court might
hold in Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100 (2024) (per curiam), which had been argued but not yet
decided at that time. Compare id. (decided March 4, 2024), with Alter v. Trump, Civ. No. 24512, Dkt. 1 (Compl.) (filed February 20, 2024), and Alter v. Trump, Civ. No. 24-478, Dkt. 1
(Compl.) (filed February 16, 2024). The Supreme Court has since issued its decision and has
held that enforcement of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that Congress first
enact implementing legislation pursuant to Section 5. Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. at 108–10,

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117. That decision is binding on this Court, and it forecloses Plaintiff’s claims as a matter of
law.
Although the concurring Justices posited that the Court’s decision went further than
necessary to resolve the question before it, which concerned only whether the States have
independent authority to enforce Section 3, see id. at 117–18 (Barrett, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id. at 118–19 (Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., concurring in
the judgment), five Justices took the more sweeping path and held that “Section 5 vests in
Congress the power to enforce” Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 117 (per curiam)
(emphasis in original). As the Court explained, the only legislative provisions that Congress has
passed to enforce Section 3 are the now-repealed provisions of the Enforcement Act of 1870,
which “authorized federal district attorneys to bring civil actions in federal court,” and a criminal
provision codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2383, which makes engaging in insurrection or rebellion,
among other acts, a federal crime punishable by disqualification from holding office under the
United States. Id. at 114–15. Plaintiff neither asserts nor has a private right of action under
§ 2383. Thus, in light of the Court’s decision in Trump v. Anderson, it is “patently obvious” that
Plaintiff cannot prevail.
The Court will, accordingly, DISMISS Plaintiff’s complaints in their entirety. Separate
orders will issue in both cases.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: May 9, 2024

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