RASHIE v. UNITED STATES

Filing 59

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 58 Order. Signed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan on 03/10/2025. (lcegs3)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TAQUAN RASHIE GULLET-EL,
Pro Se
Plaintiff,
Civ. Action No. 24-00521
(EGS)

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Taquan Rashie, also known as Taquan Rashie
Gullet-el and gullet-el:taquan-rashe (“Mr. Rashie”) initiated
this action, pro se, on February 12, 2024. Pl.’s Compl., ECF No.
1.1 Since then, he has flooded this Court’s docket with thousands
of pages of briefs and motions based on theories that courts
have resoundingly rejected. See Dkt. in Civil No. 24-00521
(D.D.C.). This includes Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint, see Am.
Compl., ECF No. 30, which Defendants (the “government”) now seek
to dismiss, see Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38. Mr. Rashie opposes
the Motion to Dismiss. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 43.
Upon consideration of the motion, the response thereto, the

When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page
number of the filed document. Citations reference docket entries
in this case, 24-cv-00521, unless otherwise specified.
1

1

applicable law, and the entire record, the government’s Motion
to Dismiss is GRANTED.
I.

Background
The Court recently described the background of this case

when it denied Mr. Rashie’s Motion for Recusal. See Mem. Op.,
ECF No. 29. It will briefly summarize the key facts again here.
A. Moorish Sovereign Citizens
Mr. Rashie claims that he is a
Moorish American National[] under the consular
jurisdiction of the Moorish Science Temple of
America Consular Court (a Theocratic state)
for the protection and enforcement of our and
our people’s treaty birthrights secured under
the Treaty of Peace with Morocco of 1787/1836
(signed at Meccanez; copy at Tangiers) between
the United States of North America and
Moroccan Empire, which is in full force and
effect under Article 25 of the Treaty of Peace
and Friendship of 1836, and the Constitution
for the United States of North America.
Am. Compl., ECF No. 30 at 5; see also id. at 9 (“General
Executor has declared and continues to declare that he is a
Moorish American National . . . .”). His proclaimed status as a
“Moorish American National,” who appears to align himself with
sovereign citizen beliefs, is the basis of his claims in this
Court, and those that have previously led to criminal and civil
actions against him.
Other courts have described the general beliefs of Moorish
Sovereign Citizens when considering cases based on similar legal

2

theories to Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint. See, e.g., Bey v.
Stumpf, 825 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (D.N.J. 2011). For example, the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
described the foundations of Moorish Sovereign Citizenship and
related ideologies:
Two concepts, which may or may not operate as
interrelated . . . [o]ne of these concepts
underlies
ethnic/religious
identification
movement of certain groups of individuals who
refer to themselves as “Moors,” while the
other concept provides the basis for another
movement of certain groups of individuals
which frequently produces these individuals’
denouncement of United States citizenship,
self-declaration
of
other,
imaginary
“citizenship”
and
accompanying
selfdeclaration of equally imaginary “diplomatic
immunity.”
Id. at 539. Although Moorish ethnic or religious convictions do
not necessarily come with adherence to the sovereign citizenship
movement,
certain groups of individuals began merging
these concepts by building on their alleged
ancestry in ancient Moors . . . for the
purposes of committing criminal offenses
and/or initiating frivolous legal actions on
the grounds of their self-granted ‘diplomatic
immunity,’ which these individuals deduced
either from their self-granted ‘Moorish
citizenship’ and from their correspondinglyproduced homemade ‘Moorish’ documents . . . or
from a multitude of other, equally noncognizable under the law, bases, which these
individuals keep creating in order to support
their allegations of ‘diplomatic immunity.’
Id. at 542.

3

Additionally, the government cites to information from the
Southern Poverty Law Center that classifies Moorish Sovereign
Citizens to be an “extremist group” that “espouse an antigovernment doctrine” and use “their status as members of a
sovereign nation” to “justify refusing to pay taxes, buy auto
insurance, register their vehicles and to defraud banks and
other lending institutions.” Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38 at 3
(quoting Southern Poverty Law Center, Moorish Sovereign
Citizens, available at https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/group/moorish-sovereign-citizens (May 20,
2024)).
Some of the actions that Sovereign Citizens, including
Moorish Sovereign Citizens, have taken are based on the
‘Redemptionist’ theory, which propounds that
a person has a split personality: a real
person and a fictional person called the
‘strawman.’ . . . Redemptionists claim that
the government has power only over the
strawman and not over the live person, who
remains free [and, thus,] individuals can free
themselves by filing UCC financing statements,
thereby acquiring an interest in their
strawman. Thereafter, [pursuant to this
‘theory,’] the real person can demand that
government officials pay enormous sums of
money to use the strawman’s name or, in the
case of prisoners, keep him in custody.
Bey, 825 F. Supp. at 541 (quoting Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198,
203 & nn. 3 & 4 (3d Cir. 2008)) (alterations in original). Mr.
Rashie’s claims in this case are based on his perceived status

4

as a Moorish American National, or Moorish Sovereign Citizen,
and the Redemptionist theory.
B. Mr. Rashie’s Claims
As this Court previously explained, Mr. Rashie filed a
series of false liens against government officials that led to
both his criminal prosecution and a civil action to nullify
those false liens and enjoin him from filing more false
documents. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 29. Mr. Rashie’s criminal
conviction was affirmed on appeal and the court granted summary
judgment against him in the civil case, a decision which is
pending on appeal. See Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 30 in 15-cv00652 (D.D.C.) at 2–3;2 J. & Sentencing, ECF No. 187 in 2:14-cr00725 (C.D. Cal.);3 Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38 at 4. Mr. Rashie

On April 2, 2024, Mr. Rashie filed both a Motion for Relief
from Judgment in 15-cv-00652 (D.D.C.) and a Notice of Appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”). Mot. for Relief from J., ECF No. 33 in
15-cv-00652 (D.D.C.); Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 34 in 15-cv00652 (D.D.C.). The D.C. Circuit held the appeal in abeyance
pending resolution of the Motion for Relief from Judgment and
directed the parties to file motions to govern future
proceedings within 30 days of the district court’s resolution of
the Motion for Relief from Judgment. D.C. Cir. Order, ECF No. 36
in 15-cv-00652 (D.D.C.). On August 6, 2024, the Court denied Mr.
Rashie’s Motion for Relief from Judgment. Mem. Op., ECF No. 40
in 15-cv-00652 (D.D.C.). The D.C. Circuit denied some of Mr.
Rashie’s pending motions in his appeal but has not yet fully
resolved it. See Order, ECF No. 2098959 in Case #24-5080 (D.C.
Cir.); see generally 24-5080 (D.C. Cir.).
3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
affirmed Mr. Rashie’s conviction and sentence. Mem. & Order, ECF
No. 241 in 2:14-cr-00725 (C.D. Cal.). Mr. Rashie has filed
numerous other motions in this criminal case, including a
2

5

ostensibly brought this case as a “compulsory counterclaim” to
the civil action brought against him in this Court. See Am.
Compl., ECF No. 30 at 1 (styling his Amended Complaint as a
“Compulsory Counterclaim for Constructive Trust, Equitable
Accounting, Tracing, Disgorgement of Unjust Gains, Criminal
Contempt by Military Commission, and for Damages Against Public
Official Bond (in Defendants’/Respondents’ Individual
Capacity(ies)) and for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief
(in Defendants’/Respondents’ Official Capacity(ies)),” which he
also claims to be an “Intervention Application Under Article 52
Geneva (IV) Convention of 1949 Under the Trading With The Enemy
Act (TWEA) (50 U.S.C. §§ 4301 to 4341).”). Mr. Rashie’s Amended
Complaint is more than 500 pages, alleges 30 counts, and
includes 19 exhibits. See id. All of his claims allege
violations of the Trading With the Enemy Act (“TWEA”), 50 U.S.C.
§ 4301, and depend on his apparent Moorish Sovereign Citizenship
and Redemptionist beliefs. See id. at 11.
Defendants filed their first Motion to Dismiss on May 30,
2024. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 20. In response, Mr. Rashie
opposed the motion and sought to amend his Complaint. See Resp.
to Mot. to Dismiss & Notice & Mot. to Amend Compl., ECF No. 22.

purported “Judicial Notice of Joinder to D.D.C. # 1:24-cv-00521EGS for Criminal Contempt Proceedings for Abuse of Process and
Violation of Discharge Injunction” on March 22, 2024. Def.’s
Mot., ECF No. 332 in 2:14-cr-00725 (C.D. Cal.).
6

On November 13, 2024, the Court granted Mr. Rashie’s Motion to
Amend and denied Defendants’ first Motion to Dismiss without
prejudice. See Minute Order (Nov. 13, 2024). In its Order, the
Court deemed the Amended Complaint to be filed as of November
13, 2024. See id.4 But despite this order, Mr. Rashie proceeded
to file what he refers to as his Amended Complaint on December
12, 2024. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 30.
The government did not file a renewed motion to dismiss or
answer the Amended Complaint within the time permitted under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. On January 7, 2025, however,
the government filed a Motion to Extend Time to File Answer or
Otherwise Respond to the Amended Complaint. See Mot. to Extend
Time to File Answer or Otherwise Respond to Am. Compl., ECF No.
37. Within that motion, the government requested an extension of
time, up to and including January 9, 2025, to respond to Mr.
Rashie’s Amended Complaint. See id. It argued that the
“enlargement the United States seeks here can be granted under
the excusable neglect standard.” See id. at 2. The government
also pointed out that a challenge to the Court’s jurisdiction,
which is one of the grounds for its Motion to Dismiss, cannot be

Local Civil Rule 7(i) provides: “A motion for leave to file an
amended pleading shall be accompanied by an original of the
proposed pleading as amended. The amended pleading shall be
deemed to have been filed and served by mail on the date on
which the order granting the motion is entered.” LCvR 7(i).
4

7

waived and can be made at any time. See id. at 1-2. The
government filed its Motion to Dismiss on the same day. See Mot.
to Dismiss, ECF No. 38. Mr. Rashie filed an opposition on
February 5, 2025. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 43.5
II.

Standards of Review
A. Excusable Neglect

“When an act may or must be done within a specified time,
the court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . on motion
made after the time has expired if the party failed to act
because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B).
“Excusable neglect is an equitable concept that considers ‘all
relevant circumstances’ surrounding the failure to act.” Cohen
v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 819
F.3d 476, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co.
v. Brunswick Assoc., Ltd. P’ship (“Pioneer”), 507 U.S. 380, 395
(1993)). Under this analysis, counsel need not be faultless, but
there generally must be “some reasonable basis” for the delay.
See id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has articulated
four factors relevant to this analysis: “(1) the risk of
prejudice to the other side; (2) the length of the delay and the
potential for impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for
the delay and whether it was within counsel’s reasonable

5

The government has not filed a Reply.
8

control; and (4) whether counsel acted in good faith.” Id.
(citing Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395) (add’l citations omitted).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . .
[and it] is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this
limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Akinseye v. District of Columbia,
339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The plaintiff has the burden
to demonstrate that a court has subject matter jurisdiction. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Am. Farm Bureau v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000) (plaintiff bears the burden
of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence); see also Phoenix Herpetological Soc’y, Inc. v. United
States Fish & Wildlife Servs., Civ. No. 20-01459, 2021 WL
620193, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2021). ‘“It is axiomatic that
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and that courts
may raise the issue sua sponte.” NetworkIP, LLC v. Fed.
Commc’n’s Comm’n, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting
Athens Cmty. Hosp. Inc. v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C.
Cir. 1982))); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines
at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action.”).

9

Courts may dismiss a complaint “on jurisdictional grounds
when

‘it

is

‘patently

insubstantial,’

presenting

no

federal

question suitable for decision.’” Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d
1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328,
330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see also Williams v. Davis, Civ. No. 2202178, 2022 WL 3585650, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2022) (quoting
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974)) (alteration in
original) (“It is well-settled that ‘federal courts are without
power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if
they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid
of merit, wholly insubstantial, [or] obviously frivolous.’”).
“Claims

are

patently

insubstantial

if

they

are

‘essentially

fictitious,’ for example, advancing ‘bizarre conspiracy theories,’
‘fantastic government manipulations of [one's] will or mind,’ or
some

type

of

‘supernatural

intervention.”’

Williams,

2022

WL

3585650, at *1 (quoting Best, 39 F.3d at 330) (alteration in
original).
C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning
v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). To survive a
12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (“Iqbal”), 556 U.S.
10

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (“Twombly”),
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard does not amount to a
“probability requirement,” but it does require more than a
“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “may consider
only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either
attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of
which [courts] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, the court “must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v. D.C. Off.
of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations omitted). The court must also give the plaintiff the
“benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged.” Id. at 677 (internal quotations omitted). However, the
court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986). And “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not

11

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.
D. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . .
. a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
“Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(d)(1). “Enforcing these rules is largely a matter for
the trial court’s discretion . . . Rule 41(b) authorizes the
court to dismiss either a claim or an action because of the
plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Federal Rules ‘or any
order of the court,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).” Ciralsky v. Central
Intel. Agency, 355 F.3d 661, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing 5
WRIGHT & MILLER § 1217, at 175 & n.8 (2d ed. 1990)).
III. Analysis
There are numerous reasons why Mr. Rashie’s Amended
Complaint must be dismissed. As explained below, excusable
neglect exists for the government’s delay in filing its renewed
Motion to Dismiss, and the government’s grounds for dismissal
therein are meritorious. Even if there were no excusable neglect
for the untimely Motion to Dismiss, the Court would still
dismiss Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
a determination it could make sua sponte. The reasons why the
Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr. Rashie’s claims overlap
12

with the other grounds for dismissal. Therefore, after
explaining why it finds that the government has shown excusable
neglect, the Court will address both the jurisdictional and
other reasons why it will dismiss this case.
A. Excusable Neglect for Delay
The government’s delay in filing its second Motion to
Dismiss, which is now before the Court, was due to excusable
neglect. Because Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint was deemed filed
on November 13, 2024, the government’s response was due on
November 27, 2024. As noted, the government did not file its
current Motion to Dismiss until January 7, 2025, which is
approximately 41 days late. During that delay, however, Mr.
Rashie filed an Amended Complaint on December 12, 2024, despite
the Court’s November 13, 2024 Minute Order. See Am. Compl., ECF
No. 30. Mr. Rashie also filed a Motion for Entry of Default on
December 27, 2024, see Mot. for Entry of Default, ECF No. 33, to
which the government filed an opposition on December 31, 2024,
see Resp. to Mot. for Entry of Default, ECF No. 34. Mr. Rashie
continued to file Motions to Take Judicial Notice during this
time. See Mot. to Take Judicial Notice, ECF No. 31; Mot. to Take
Judicial Notice, ECF No. 32.
In support of its excusable neglect argument, the
government contends that the risk of prejudice from the
extension to Mr. Rashie is low; the length of delay is slight;
13

the delay was reasonable under the circumstances; and counsel
did not act in bad faith. See Mot. for Extension, ECF No. 37 at
2-3. Even though Mr. Rashie submitted a supposedly combined
response to the government’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Extension, it is difficult to decipher what if any parts of his
response address whether there was excusable neglect for the
government’s delay. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 43.
Regardless of Mr. Rashie’s apparent failure to dispute the
government’s argument, the Court agrees that the government has
shown excusable neglect. The length of time for the government’s
delay, less than six weeks, was minimal and did not stop Mr.
Rashie from continuing to vigorously litigate his case,
something he has continued to do even after the government filed
its Motion to Dismiss. See, Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 39; Mot. to
Strike, ECF No. 41; Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 42; Mot. to Strike,
ECF No. 45; Mot. for Sanctions, ECF No. 46; Mot. to Strike, ECF
No. 48; Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 50; Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 52.
Nor did the delay inflict prejudice on Mr. Rashie. One of
the reasons the government cites for its delay is that Mr.
Rashie’s “pleadings and motions are highly confusing, which led
to the undersigned counsel’s failure to realize if or when a
responsive motion was due.” Mot. for Extension, ECF No. 37. Even
though this does not address the government’s failure to comply
with this Court’s Minute Order, the Court finds compelling the
14

argument that the number, contents, and frequency of Mr.
Rashie’s briefs and motions make it difficult to decipher and
address all his filings in a timely and thorough matter. The
Court also agrees that nothing in this record indicates that the
government has acted in bad faith in this case. Therefore, the
government’s Motion for Extension is GRANTED nunc pro tunc and
the Motion to Dismiss is deemed timely filed.
B. Failure to Allege Jurisdiction
Mr. Rashie has failed to plausibly allege that this Court
has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims.
First, Mr. Rashie’s assertion of diversity jurisdiction is
unsupported. Mr. Rashie invokes the ‘“Diversity of
Nationality/Citizenship’ under Article III Section 2,” but his
only basis for diversity of jurisdiction appears to be his
assertion of Moorish Sovereign Citizenship. See Am. Compl., ECF
No. 30 at 11. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) allows federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction over cases in which the parties’
citizenship is diverse and the matter in controversy exceeds
$75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). As the government points out,
courts have repeatedly rejected Moorish Sovereign Citizen claims
as “frivolous” and therefore this theory is no basis for
diversity of citizenship. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 38 at 7
(citing, e.g., Bey v. Mun. Court, Nos. 11-7343, 11-4351, 2012 WL
714575 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2012); Bey v. White, No. 17-cv-76, 2017
15

WL 934728, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2017)). Mr. Rashie cites no
cases in which courts have recognized this a basis for
diversity. His diversity jurisdiction argument fails.
Second, Mr. Rashie has not sufficiently pleaded federal
question jurisdiction. The only conceivable basis for federal
question jurisdiction is violations of the TWEA.6 Congress passed
the TWEA to permit allied individuals and non-enemies to recover
property vested within the United States during World War I and
World War II. See Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 671-74
(1960); Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494, 500 (“The
United States had expressly consented in Section 9(a) of the
Trading with the Enemy Act that suits might be brought by a nonenemy claimant to have his claim against an enemy debtor
satisfied out of the latter's property held by the Alien
Property Custodian.”). The only support for TWEA violations in
Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint are his own far-fetched
assertions. See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 30.
Although difficult to decipher and conclusory, Mr. Rashie
appears to claim that the government violated the TWEA by
holding him accountable in criminal and civil proceedings for

Mr. Rashie also invokes international agreements including the
Geneva Convention, but these do not appear to be the basis for
the claims in his Amended Complaint, nor does he provide any
comprehensible allegations for violations of these agreements.
See Am. Compl., ECF No. 30.
6

16

filing false liens against government officials and enjoining
him from committing similar actions. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 30
at 13. For example, Mr. Rashie asserts:
General Executor’s[,] and General Executor’s
associates’ constitutionally protected Treaty
Birthright
secured
copyright/trademark/
tradename/sign
(signal)
have
been
used
continuously by General Executor and General
Executor’s associates and General Executor’s
ancestors
since
time
immemorial,
in
intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.
Id.; see also Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 43 at 12
(claiming that Mr. Rashie “did aver and does aver that
Defendants’ / Respondents’ willful, wrongful, and wanton cause
of injury to General Executor by Unlawful 14th Amendment Forced
Conscription Fraud, Unlawful Annexation, Unlawful Taxation, and
Unlawful Monetization in violation of the Law of War UCMJ
Article 18 (18 U.S.C. § 2441)”). These assertions are based on
Moorish Sovereign Citizen and Redemptionist theories that courts
have repeatedly rejected in general, see, e.g., Bey, 825 F.
Supp. 2d at 545-56; and specifically as relates to Mr. Rashie,
see, e.g., Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 30 in 15-cv-00652 (D.D.C.);
J. & Sentencing, ECF No. 187 in 2:14-cr-00725 (C.D. Cal.); Mot.
to Dismiss, ECF No. 38 at 2 (discussing the federal court
jurisdictions in which Mr. Rashie has been enjoined from
bringing suits without obtaining prior approval from the court).
And Mr. Rashie points to no cases in which any court has held

17

that these arguments were meritorious. See Opp’n to Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 43. Even taking the facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to Mr. Rashie, his claims are “patently
insubstantial” and present “no federal question suitable for
decision.” See Tooley, 586 F.3d at 1009. Mr. Rashie has not
plausibly alleged federal question jurisdiction for his claims.
Because Mr. Rashie failed to plausibly allege any basis for
subject matter jurisdiction, his Amended Complaint is dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
C. Failure to State a Claim
Even if Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint presented any basis
for jurisdiction, which it does not, he fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint is riddled with nonsensical
recitals and devoid of any specific facts to support his claims.
See Am. Compl., ECF No. 30. Indeed, there are hardly any ‘facts’
to construe in the light most favorable to him, even considering
the less stringent standard to which he is held as a pro se
plaintiff. See id. The few ‘facts’ that Mr. Rashie alleges to
support his claims under the TWEA depend entirely on his Moorish
Sovereign Citizen and Redemptionist assertions, which, as
discussed above, see infra Part III.B; are meritless.7 Moreover,

To be clear, the Court does not fault Mr. Rashie for holding
whatever beliefs he has. The issue here is that Mr. Rashie
7

18

Mr. Rashie does not even provide the elements for a TWEA
violation, let alone explain why he meets them, and relies only
on his self-proclaimed bases for egregious unlawful conduct.
Contra Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because Mr. Rashie’s Amended
Complaint only consists of conclusory, implausible, and widely
rejected allegations, he fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and his Amended Complaint is also
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
D. Failure to Plead a Short and Plain Statement
Finally, Mr. Rashie fails to plead a short and plain
statement of his entitlement to relief. As noted, Mr. Rashie’s
Amended Complaint is neither short nor plain at over 500 pages
in total, including a nearly 100-page single-spaced Amended
Complaint with over 400 pages of exhibits. See Am. Compl., ECF
No. 30. In addition to the length, Mr. Rashie’s Amended
Complaint repeats the same confusingly worded assertions
throughout that are conclusory and based on nothing more than
his debunked theories. See id. Mr. Rashie fails to effectively
provide notice of his claims. See id. Therefore, dismissal is
also warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for

previously and in this current action has asserted these beliefs
in an attempt to gain vast amounts of money from the government
that he was not owed and seek relief under an alternative and
fantastical system of law that does not exist.
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failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See
Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 669; Spence v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
109 F.4th 531, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (holding that “[t]he
district court did not abuse its discretion” in dismissing a
count of a complaint that was “neither short nor plain”).
IV.

Other Motions

Mr. Rashie has filed dozens of other motions, totaling
thousands of pages, which are largely based on the same
unfounded Moorish Sovereign Citizenship and Redemptionist
theories that comprise his Amended Complaint. These include
mostly motions to take judicial notice, to strike documents that
the government has filed, for default, sanctions, and discovery.
See e.g., Dkt. in Case 24-cv-521. Because the Court dismisses
Mr. Rashie’s Amended Complaint, these pending motions are denied
as moot. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S.
381, 385-86 (2018) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.
85, 81 (2013) (“A case that becomes moot at any point during the
proceedings is ‘no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes
of Article III,’ and is outside the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.”).

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V.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the government’s Motion for

Extension, ECF No. 37, is GRANTED; its Motion to Dismiss, ECF
No. 38, is GRANTED; and all other pending motions filed by Mr.
Rashie are DENIED AS MOOT. An Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed:

Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 10, 2025

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