KEERIKKATTIL v. PETERS et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION re Respondent's 16 Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Transfer Case. See attached Opinion for details. Signed by Judge Trevor N. McFadden on 7/3/2024. (lctnm2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RANJITH KEERIKKATTIL,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00574 (TNM)

COLETTE S. PETERS, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Ranjith Keerikkattil, proceeding pro se, filed this petition for a writ of habeas
corpus directed at Colette S. Peters, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and Kelly
Vick, Deputy Warden of the D.C. Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF). See Petition (Pet.) at
1–8, ECF No. 1. When he filed, Keerikkattil was located at CTF in the District of Columbia.
But he has since been moved elsewhere. The Director argues that the Court must dismiss this
case because it lacks personal jurisdiction over Keerikkattil’s immediate custodian. Not so.
Although jurisdiction in habeas normally travels with the petitioner, a district court retains
jurisdiction following a petitioner’s transfer so long as there remains a respondent within the
jurisdiction who can secure the petitioner’s release. Here, that respondent is the Director herself.
So the Court will deny the Director’s motion to dismiss and grant Keerikkattil’s petition in part.
I.
In 2018, following a jury trial in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia,
Keerikkattil was convicted of criminal stalking under D.C. Code § 22-3133. Keerikkattil v.
United States, 313 A.3d 591, 596 (D.C. 2024). But rather than appear for sentencing,
Keerikkattil fled abroad and was a fugitive for over four years. In October 2022, Keerikkattil

was finally arrested and was held without bond. See Pet. at 26 (Commitment Order). Then, in
2023, he was convicted in Superior Court of violating the Bail Reform Act for his failures to
appear for sentencing. See United States v. Keerikkattil, 2018 CF2 010309 (D.C. Sup. Ct.),
Docket Entry for Nov. 13, 2023. The Superior Court sentenced Keerikkattil to twelve months’
imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. Id., Docket Entry for Jan. 17, 2024.
Keerikkattil filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking
re-computation of his sentence, the application of good-time credits, the ability to apply for
placement in a residential reentry center, and transfer to a facility that can provide adequate
medical care. See Pet. at 1–8. When he filed, Keerikkattil was detained at CTF in the District of
Columbia. Id. at 1. The next month, Keerikkattil was transferred to FDC Philadelphia. Supp. to
Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 20. Now he is incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix in New
Jersey. Id.
The Court ordered Respondents to show cause as to why the Petition should not be
granted. Order to Show Cause (OSC), ECF No. 6. The Director responded by moving to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to transfer this matter to the District
of New Jersey, where Keerikkattil’s current custodian is located. 1 See Resp. to OSC and Mot. to
Dismiss or Transfer (Mot.) at 1, ECF No. 15. This motion is now ripe.

1

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia initially entered an appearance on
behalf of both the Director and Deputy Warden Vick. But the USAO later informed the Court
that it mistakenly entered an appearance for Deputy Warden Vick and is only representing the
Director. See Errata to Defendant’s Notice of Appearance, ECF No. 21. Though the docket
reflects that the show cause order has been served on Deputy Warden Vick, the D.C. Attorney
General’s Office never entered an appearance on her behalf. In any case, because Deputy
Warden Vick is no longer Keerikkattil’s custodian and cannot order his release, the Petition is
moot as to her and so will be dismissed.
2

II.
The Court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, keeping in mind that complaints
filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But like all plaintiffs, pro
se plaintiffs must plead facts that establish jurisdiction. See Theus v. Ally Fin., Inc., 98 F. Supp.
3d 41, 44 (D.D.C. 2015).
To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
that the Court has jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Chow v. WMATA, 391 F.
Supp. 3d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2019). Similarly, on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a factual basis for the Court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant. Bailey v. Fulwood, 780 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2011).
III.
BOP argues that dismissal is appropriate on two grounds: (A) the Court lacks jurisdiction
over Keerikkattil’s immediate custodian, and (B) Superior Court has exclusive jurisdiction over
challenges to Superior Court convictions. The Court addresses each in turn.
A.
Normally, the only proper respondent in a habeas case is the petitioner’s “immediate
custodian”—that is, the warden of the facility in which the petitioner is incarcerated when he
files the habeas petition. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004); see also Chatman–Bey
v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“[T]he proper defendant in federal
habeas cases is the warden.”). For cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court
evaluates its jurisdiction based on whether the “respondent custodian is within its territorial
jurisdiction.” Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also

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Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442 (“[T]he traditional rule has always been that the Great Writ is issuable
only in the district of confinement.”).
When Keerikkattil petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, he was confined as a D.C.
prisoner at CTF, in the immediate custody of Deputy Warden Vick. Pet. at 1. There is no
question that, at the time of filing, the Court had territorial jurisdiction to consider his petition.
See Crawford v. Jackson, 323 F.3d 123, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Deputy Warden Vick was
Keerikkattil’s immediate custodian, and she was subject to this Court’s jurisdiction. So
Keerikkattil was right to file his petition here. Simple enough.
Now, what happens when a prisoner files a petition against his immediate custodian but
then is transferred out of that court’s territorial jurisdiction? The general rule is that “[w]hen the
Government moves a habeas petitioner after []he properly files a petition naming h[is] immediate
custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within
its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at
441. In short, “the transfer of a prisoner from one correctional facility to another would not
ordinarily deprive the court of jurisdiction over the habeas petition.” Crawford, 323 F.3d at 125.
The Supreme Court recognized this exception to the immediate custodian rule in Ex parte
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). There, a Japanese American citizen detained in a California
internment camp sought habeas relief in the Northern District of California, naming her
immediate custodian as a respondent. Id. at 285. Then after she petitioned, the Government
moved her to Utah. Id. So her “immediate physical custodian was no longer within the
jurisdiction of the District Court.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 440. But even though Endo’s immediate
custodian was not subject to personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court concluded that “assistant
director of the [War Relocation Authority], who resided in the Northern District, would be an

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‘appropriate respondent’ to whom the District Court could direct the writ.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at
440; see also Endo, 323 U.S. at 304–05.
The facts here fit Endo like a glove. When Keerikkattil petitioned, this Court had
jurisdiction over his immediate custodian, Deputy Warden Vick. As in Endo, jurisdiction
initially was proper. But due to Keerikkattil’s transfer, the Court does not have personal
jurisdiction over Keerikkattil’s current immediate custodian—the warden of FCI Fort Dix. The
Court, however, does have personal jurisdiction over BOP Director Peters. And like the assistant
director of the War Relocation Authority in Endo, the Director—while not Keerikkattil’s
“immediate custodian”—has the “legal authority to effectuate [Keerikkattil’s] release.” Padilla,
542 U.S. at 441; see also Lyons v. CCA/Corr. Treatment Facility, No. 06-cv-2008 (GK), 2007
WL 2007501, *1 n.1 (D.D.C. July 10, 2007) (retaining jurisdiction and substituting BOP
custodian for CTF warden); Ash v. Reilly, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2004), vacated on other
grounds, 431 F.3d 826 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same). Director Peters, after all, supervises BOP’s
wardens, see 28 C.F.R. § 0.95, and has authority over the “the commitment, control, or
treatment” of prisoners, id. § 0.96. So the Court retains jurisdiction over Keerikkattil’s petition.
For her part, the Director brushes Endo aside, arguing that she cannot be the subject of
this Court’s continuing jurisdiction because she was not a proper respondent when Keerikkattil
filed his petition. Indeed, when Keerikkattil filed his petition, he was not even in BOP custody,
so no BOP official could have provided relief. And even though Keerikkattil is now in BOP
custody, the Director argues that she is not a proper respondent because she is not his immediate
custodian. To obtain relief, she says, Keerikkattil must file his petition against his current
immediate custodian: the warden of FCI Fort Dix.

5

The unusual facts here cannot help the Director skirt the clear holding in Endo—a case
which also had unusual facts. While the Director is correct that, at the time Keerikkattil filed this
petition, she was not his immediate custodian, the same was true of the assistant director of the
War Relocation Authority. Yet the Supreme Court still concluded he was an “appropriate
respondent.” Endo, 323 U.S. at 304. Of course, if the Director had moved to dismiss before
Keerikkattil had been transferred, dismissal may have been appropriate. But once Keerikkattil
was transferred into BOP custody, the Director became an “appropriate respondent,” per Endo,
because she has the authority to release Keerikkattil upon the execution of the writ. This justifies
the Court’s continuing jurisdiction. See Fletcher v. Reilly, 433 F.3d 867, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(“[B]ecause [petitioner] named his immediate custodian when he filed his petition for habeas,
and the [Parole] Commission is within the jurisdiction of the District Court and has authority to
effectuate [petitioner’s] release on reparole, the District Court has jurisdiction to consider [his]
habeas petition.”).
The Director also argues that, because jurisdiction is proper in the District of New Jersey,
the Court should transfer the case. But under the transfer statutes, the Court only has the
authority to transfer a case to a district “in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1404(a), 1406(a), 1631; see Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1960) (“[T]he power of
a District Court under § 1404(a) to transfer an action to another district . . . [depends] upon
whether the transferee district was one in which the action ‘might have been brought’ by the
plaintiff.”). When Keerikkattil petitioned, this district was the only district in which his action
could be brought, since it is where his immediate custodian resided. He could not have filed his
petition in the District of New Jersey. So transfer is not an option.

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At bottom, if the Director were correct that jurisdiction is not proper in this Court now—
even though it was when the petition was filed—D.C. prisoners would be stuck in a quandary. A
petition against their D.C. custodian is likely to have a short shelf life since transfer to BOP
custody would vitiate personal jurisdiction. So absent prophetic insight into the logistics of BOP
transfers, petitioners would have to wait until they are in federal custody to determine the proper
jurisdiction for filing. And even that assumes the petitioner is not then moved between BOP
facilities, as happened here. This situation might not be so frustrating if this Court could simply
transfer the petition to whichever district has jurisdiction over the petitioner’s custodian. But the
transfer of venue statutes prohibit this. More, since D.C. prisoners’ initial custodian is a local
official rather than a federal one, courts’ normal procedure of automatically substituting one
BOP warden with another would not work either. In short, D.C. prisoners face the prospect of
no effective access to federal courts. That is unacceptable.
The Government often resolves this issue by waiving personal jurisdiction. See Fletcher,
433 F.3d at 875. Not this time though. And prisoners need not rely on the Government to do so.
As courts have long held as to federal inmates moved within the system, transfer after a court’s
jurisdiction attaches does not defeat jurisdiction so long as there remains a respondent in the
district who can carry out the court’s order. See, e.g., In re Hall, 988 F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir.
2021); Johnson v. Gill, 883 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2018). The same principle applies here.
B.
As a separate basis for dismissal, the Director argues Keerikkattil’s petition is not a
§ 2241 petition. Instead, she asserts it is properly a § 2254 petition, which, under D.C. Code
§ 23–110, must be brought in Superior Court unless such action would be “inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” D.C. Code § 23–110(g).

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This argument is wrong from the start. Because Keerikkattil’s petition does not challenge
the underlying Superior Court “conviction or sentence,” it could not be brought under § 23–110.
Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Rather, his challenge to “the
computation of [his] sentence” must be raised in a habeas corpus petition—either in Superior
Court, under D.C. Code § 16–1901(a), or federal court, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See id. (“We
find that section 16–1901 does not bar the federal courts from entertaining habeas corpus
petitions filed by D.C. prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”); Herndon v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,
961 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the
exclusive [federal] avenue available to a District of Columbia prisoner challenging the manner of
execution of a sentence, rather than the sentence itself.”). Because Keerikkattil challenges the
application of good-time credits and other conditions of confinement, the Court has jurisdiction
over his petition under § 2241. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (holding that
§ 2241 provided proper remedy for petitioner seeking application of good-time credits). So the
habeas jurisdiction funneling provisions in the D.C. Code do not apply.
III.
Because the Court has jurisdiction over Keerikkattil’s habeas petition, it will deny the
Director’s Motion to Dismiss. The Director makes no arguments on the merits that would
undermine Keerikkattil’s petition. So, in accordance with its Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 6,
the Court will grant Keerikkattil’s petition in part. The Director shall re-compute Keerikkattil’s
sentence and permit him to apply for placement in a residential reentry center. In light of

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Keerikkattil’s transfer from CTF, the Court will deny as moot his request seeking designation to
a new facility. 2 A separate Order will follow.

2024.07.03
12:01:07 -04'00'
Dated: July 3, 2024

TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

2

Keerikkattil has filed several other motions regarding his Petition. See Motion for Injunction,
ECF No. 4; Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 5; Motion for Discovery, Motion to
Appoint Counsel, ECF No. 7; Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply, ECF No, 23; Motion for
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 24; Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 25. Given the
Court’s accompanying Order, the Court will deny these motions as moot.
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