NOROUZI v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting Defendants' 8 Motion to Dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff's 1 Complaint and this case without prejudice, and directing the Clerk of Court to close this case. See Memorandum Opinion and Order for details. Signed by Judge Ana C. Reyes on 03/06/2025. (lcacr2)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AIDEN NOROUZI,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:24-cv-1282 (ACR)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
Plaintiff Aiden Norouzi is an American citizen. Dkt. 1 ¶ 1. His wife, Mina Dianaty, is an
Iranian citizen and resident. Id. ¶ 2. In May 2021, Plaintiff filed an I-130 visa petition with
USCIS on Dianaty’s behalf. Id. ¶ 13. USCIS “purportedly” approved the petition in April 2022
and later sent the case to the State Department’s National Visa Center (NVC). Id. ¶¶ 15, 16. The
NVC then completed its processing of the case and sent the case to the U.S. Embassy in Armenia
to conduct interviews. Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. Dianaty interviewed at the Embassy in December 2022 and
has yet to receive a decision on the visa application, which remains in administrative processing.
Id. ¶¶ 18, 32. In the meantime, Plaintiff has “made repeated attempts” to receive a determination
in this matter, including contacting the Embassy and his Senator’s office, “all to no avail.”
Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.
Plaintiff filed this case on May 1, 2024, against the U.S. Department of State, the U.S.
Embassy in Armenia, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and U.S. Ambassador to Armenia

The Court takes the facts from Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 1. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009).
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Kristina Kvien.2 Dkt. 1. Citing the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706, and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the Complaint asserts that
the delay in adjudicating Plaintiff’s application is unreasonable and requests an order requiring
prompt adjudication. Id. ¶¶ 21–39. The Complaint contends that this delay was caused by the
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Controlled Application Review and Resolution
Program (CARRP), an internal policy that intentionally delays the applications of individuals
from Muslim-majority countries, such as Plaintiff’s wife, by deeming them potential “national
security concerns.” Id. ¶¶ 26–31. As such, the Complaint also requests this Court to find
CARRP unlawful, enjoin Defendants from applying it to Plaintiff’s application, and order its
rescission. Id. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint on July 23, 2024. Dkt. 8.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A U.S. citizen who wants to help a noncitizen spouse obtain lawful permanent resident
status may file an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), a subagency of DHS. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1152(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154; 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.1(a)(1). If USCIS approves the petition and the beneficiary spouse is outside the United
States, the agency forwards the case to the NVC for processing. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(3). The
beneficiary spouse must then submit additional paperwork, including a visa application form,
and pay any fees. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.62–63; 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(b),
https://fam.state.gov/FAM/09FAM/09FAM050401.html. Once the applicant (that is, the
beneficiary spouse) meets those requirements, the NVC designates the case “documentarily

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Secretary of State Marco Rubio “is
automatically substituted” for his predecessor, Anthony Blinken. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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complete” and coordinates with the appropriate consulate or embassy to schedule the applicant
for a required consular interview. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.62; 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(b)–
(d). “Appointments are generally scheduled in the chronological order of the documentarily
complete applicants.” 9 Foreign Affs. Manual § 504.1-2(d). Following the interview, the
consular officer “must” generally either “issue the visa” or “refuse the visa.” 22 C.F.R.
§ 42.81(a). If the consular officer needs additional information to determine the applicant’s
eligibility, she may, “in accordance with [State] Department procedures,” refuse the visa pending
“further administrative processing.” Administrative Processing Information, U.S. Dep’t of State,
https://travel.state.gov/content/ travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/administrativeprocessing-information.html.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants’ Motion seeks dismissal both under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. When
a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
jurisdiction. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Where, as here, “the
defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations,”
Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the Court
“assume[s] the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and construe[s] the
complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged,” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned
up).
To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

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678 (cleaned up). To meet that standard, a plaintiff’s allegations must support a “reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard “is not akin
to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. (cleaned up).
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff Has Standing to Sue
Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue because his injury flows from the
rights of a third party—in this case, the delayed re-adjudication of his wife’s visa application.3
See Dkt. 8 at 14. To establish standing, Plaintiff must allege an “actual or imminent” injury that
is “concrete” and “particularized,” “fairly traceable” to Defendants’ actions, and “likely” to be
“redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Defendants point to the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, which held that the harm suffered from the
denial of a spouse’s visa application does not give a plaintiff a “constitutional right to participate
in [the spouse’s] consular proceeding,” Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 917 (2024), to bolster their
argument that Plaintiff has no standing here. See Dkt. 8 at 14–15. But the Supreme Court was
not making a sweeping statement about the standing of spouses in immigration cases. Rather, it
merely found that the plaintiff “had no procedural due process right to an explanation ‘for why
someone else’s visa was denied.’” Janay v. Blinken, 743 F. Supp. 3d 96, 111 (D.D.C. 2024)
(quoting Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 918). Additionally, the Muñoz Court looked at the government’s

Defendants also argue that the consular nonreviewability doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims and
that Defendants do not have any clear, nondiscretionary duty to act, as is necessary for a
mandamus claim. Dkt. 8 at 7–21. Neither argument implicates the Court’s Article III
jurisdiction, and so the Court need not address them before dismissing this case on other
grounds. See Rashidian v. Garland, No. 23-cv-1187, 2024 WL 1076810, at *5 & n.5 (D.D.C.
Mar. 8, 2024) (explaining why the Court may bypass these arguments).
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discretion to deny a visa application, whereas Plaintiff here “merely seek[s] a decision—one way
or the other—and Muñoz does not speak to the Court’s authority to grant that relief.” Id. at 112.
Muñoz thus does not apply to this case, and Plaintiff therefore has standing.
B. Plaintiff Has Not Stated Plausible Unreasonable Delay Claims
The Court turns next to Plaintiff’s unreasonable-delay claims under the APA and the
Mandamus Act. “[T]he central question” under both statutes is “whether the agency’s delay is so
egregious as to warrant mandamus.” Barazandeh v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 23-cv-1581, 2024
WL 341166, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2024) (quoting In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849,
855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
To answer that question, courts in this Circuit consider the six TRAC factors, drawn from
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Telecomm. Rsch. & Action Ctr. (TRAC) v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C.
Cir. 1984): (1) “[T]he time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of
reason”; (2) “where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with
which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply
content for this rule of reason”; (3) “delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic
regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake”; (4) “the court should
consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing
priority”; (5) “the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests
prejudiced by delay”; and (6) “the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency
lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.” Id. at 80 (cleaned up).
These factors are often grouped into four inquiries:
First, is there any rhyme or reason—congressionally prescribed or
otherwise—for an agency’s delay (factors one and two)? Second,
what are the consequences of delay if the Court does not compel the
agency to act (factors three and five)? Third, how might forcing the

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agency to act thwart its ability to address other priorities (factor
four)? Finally, is the delay intentional or due to any impropriety on
the part of the agency (factor six)?
Khazaei v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1419, 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023) (cleaned
up).
Taking these inquires in turn, the Court finds that the TRAC factors weigh against
Plaintiff and that dismissal is appropriate. See Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off., 80 F.4th
330, 340–46 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal of visa-delay case for failure to state a claim
based on TRAC factors).
1. TRAC factors one and two
The first two factors, which consider whether the agency is following a “rule of reason,”
“congressionally prescribed or otherwise,” Khazaei, 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (cleaned up),
support dismissal. Plaintiff does not dispute that Congress has not prescribed a timeline for the
adjudication of visa applications. Dkt. 9 at 14–15. In the absence of such congressional
guidance, “courts typically turn to [case law] as a guideline.” Barazandeh, 2024 WL 341166, at
*8 (cleaned up). Plaintiff points to decisions from the Northern District of California to highlight
the unreasonableness of what he views as the more than three-year delay at issue here.4 Dkt. 9 at
14. The law of this jurisdiction, however, does not find that the delay as properly calculated—
twenty-six months since the interview at the Embassy—is unreasonable. See, e.g., Dastagir v.

Courts disagree as to how to calculate delay in cases like this one—for example, whether the
relevant end date is the day of the case’s filing or the day of the decision. See, e.g., Dehkordi v.
Bitter, No. 22-cv-2470, 2023 WL 5651845, at *4 n.4 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2023). Plaintiff measures
the delay from the date he filed the I-130 petition in May 2021. See, e.g., Dkt. 9 at 14. Courts in
this Circuit have rejected this argument. See, e.g., Rohmeena v. Bitter, No. 1:23-cv-2754, 2024
WL 3898549, at *3, n. 3 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2024). Consistent with prior decisions involving
administrative processing, the Court treats the December 2022 interview date as the starting
point and assumes, favorably to Plaintiff, that the delay runs through today. See Amerifar v. U.S.
Dep’t of State, No. 1:23-CV-3182, 2024 WL 3898541, at *3, n. 4 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2024).
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Blinken, 557 F. Supp. 3d 160, 165 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding twenty-nine-month delay reasonable);
Zandieh v. Pompeo, 2020 WL 4346915, at *7 (D.D.C. July 29, 2020) (same). The cases cited by
Plaintiff thus fail to move the needle in his favor, and the first two factors favor dismissal.
2. TRAC factor four
The fourth factor, “the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher
or competing priority,” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80, “carries significant weight,” Barazandeh, 2024
WL 341166, at *9, and strongly favors Defendants. The D.C. Circuit has “refused to grant relief,
even though all the other factors considered in TRAC favored it, where a judicial order putting [a
party] at the head of the queue would simply move all others back one space and produce no net
gain.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (cleaned up). Plaintiff requests exactly this type of relief. Since “[c]onsular processing
capacity is . . . a zero-sum game,” an order expediting processing of Plaintiff’s application
“would necessarily mean additional delays for other applicants—many of whom undoubtedly
face hardships of their own,” Ahmadi v. Scharpf, No. 23-cv-953, 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (D.D.C.
Feb. 12, 2024) (cleaned up); accord Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 343–44. This factor weighs strongly
against relief.
3. TRAC factors three and five
TRAC factors three and five, which examine “the interests prejudiced by the delay,”
including the effect on “human health and welfare,” Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344 (quoting TRAC,
750 F.2d at 80), lean in Plaintiff’s favor, but not enough to outweigh the other factors. Plaintiff
alleges that the delay has caused him emotional hardship stemming from the separation from his
family. Dkt. 1 ¶ 39. Courts in this District have concluded that similar allegations swayed these
factors in other plaintiffs’ favor, if only narrowly, see, e.g., Siddiqui v. Blinken, 646 F. Supp. 3d

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69, 77 (D.D.C. 2022) (finding that the third and fifth TRAC factors “slightly” favored a visadelay plaintiff based on an allegation that the delay “had a profound and negative impact on his
life”) (cleaned up). But see Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344–45 (concluding that these factors did not
favor visa-delay plaintiffs absent harms beyond “the uncertainty that results any time an
individual must continue to wait to secure a benefit”). Although the Court understands
Plaintiff’s distress, “many others facing similar circumstances” are experiencing the same harm.
Siddiqui, 646 F. Supp. 3d at 77 (cleaned up); accord Bahrami, 2024 WL 3638200, at *7
(“[D]elays in visa processing separate . . . many families.”). Without more pressing or unusual
injuries, TRAC factors three and five do not warrant the Court interfering with the agency’s
priorities to place Plaintiff at the front of the line. See Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344–45.
4. TRAC factor six
The sixth TRAC factor—whether “any impropriety lurk[s] behind agency lassitude,”
TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80 (cleaned up)—remains neutral. Plaintiff himself states that he does not
allege “Defendants’ delay was caused by bad faith.” Dkt. 9 at 16. But because the Court “need
not find any [impropriety] in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed,” this
factor does not move the needle. Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 345–46 (cleaned up).
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The TRAC factors do not plausibly point Plaintiff’s way, and his unreasonable-delay
claims therefore fail. The Court must dismiss his unreasonable delay claims under Rule
12(b)(6).
C. Plaintiff’s CARRP Claims Are Speculative
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used CARRP to intentionally delay the applications of
his wife and other individuals from Muslim-majority countries by deeming them potential

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“national security concerns.” Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 26–31. Plaintiff bases these claims “upon information
and belief” and little else. Id. ¶ 27. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s allegations regarding CARRP do not meet this
threshold, and Defendants point to several cases in this District and others rejecting claims like
Plaintiff’s. Dkt. 8 at 38–39. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s CARRP claim under
Rule 12(b)(6).
D. Plaintiff Fails to State a Due Process Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights by
failing “to provide a reasonable and just framework of adjudication in accordance with
applicable law.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 39. As Defendants have noted, see Dkt. 8 at 39–40, this argument is at
odds with the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Dep’t of State v. Muñoz that a citizen “does not
have a fundamental liberty interest in [their] noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country.”
Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 909. Plaintiff counters that his interest lies in having his wife’s application
adjudicated in a timely fashion, rather than in her being admitted to the country. See Dkt. 9 at
20. But this does not allow Plaintiff to escape the Muñoz Court’s holding that a spouse in his
shoes lacks a constitutional right to participate in his wife’s “consular process” and “visa
proceedings.” Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 917. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim. The
Court must dismiss his due process claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s situation, but his Complaint does not state
plausible unreasonable-delay, CARRP, or due process claims. The Court therefore dismisses this
case.

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For these reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 8;
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 1, and this case without prejudice; and DIRECTS the
Clerk of Court to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
This is a final appealable Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

Date: March 6, 2025

_________________________
ANA C. REYES
United States District Judge

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