BEGUM v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Ana C. Reyes on 11/22/2024. (znmw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NZINGA BEGUM,
Plaintiff,
v.
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON
TRUST COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02586 (UNA)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on its initial review of the purported pro se notice of removal
(“Not.”), ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP App.”), ECF
No. 2, filed by Nzinga Begum, who also lists several pseudonyms, see Not. at 1–2, 4–6. For the
reasons explained below, the Court hereby denies Begum’s IFP application and dismisses this
matter.
Both of Begum’s submissions are quite difficult to follow. In her IFP application, Begum
merely asserts that she is exempt from federal taxation. See IFP App. at 1. Even assuming
arguendo that statement is true, it does not exempt her from complying with the requirements to
provide the Court with her relevant financial information in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1), or to alternatively submit the filing fee attributable to civil actions in this District. As
it stands, the Court is without any information regarding Plaintiff’s financial circumstances, and
she has thus failed to establish that she qualifies for IFP status.
Begum’s “notice” fares no better. She has supplied only a P.O. Box address, see Not. at
1, which is only allowed upon leave of court, see D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1); see also Mail Returned as

Undeliverable to Begum, ECF No. 3. The charges that follow are nebulous, at best. As far as it
can be discerned, Begum takes issue with (1) civil and criminal proceedings in the 21st Judicial
Circuit of Missouri, located in St. Louis, and (2) bankruptcy proceedings in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. See Not. at 1–5. She seeks to remove those
cases, in which she named as a defendant, to this District, see id., but she faces insurmountable
hurdles.
First, although Begum has presented this matter as a removal, there is absolutely no
indication that the state matters were actually removed from the 21st Judicial Circuit of Missouri,
or any other local court. In essence, Begum has attempted to open a civil matter without a
complaint, which she may not do. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d
1059, 1069 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3); see also Adair v. England, 193 F. Supp.
2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2002) (“A party commences a civil action by filing a complaint . . . [and]
[w]hen no complaint is filed, the court lacks jurisdiction[.]”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3).
Second, a defendant is required to file for removal in the district court for the district and
division within which such action is pending. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1455(a), 1446(a). None of these
cited state actions were ever pending in a District of Columbia local court; therefore, they may not
be removed to this federal District.
Third, to the extent that Begum attempts to “remove” a case from the Eastern District of
Missouri to this district, she may not do so. She cites to no authority under which a defendant may
“remove” a case from one district to another, nor is the Court of aware of any. Indeed, this Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of other federal district courts. See In re
Marin, 956 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Panko v. Rodak, 606 F. 2d 168, 171 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979)
(finding it “axiomatic” that a federal court may order judges or officers of another federal court

“to take an action.”), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d
79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that federal district courts “generally lack[] appellate jurisdiction
over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts”) (citing
Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)); Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp.
170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) (applying District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 482 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416 (1923)).
In short, Begum is asking a federal court in Washington, D.C. to intervene in civil and
criminal matters that were filed in state and federal courts in Missouri, but this Court cannot do so.
Accordingly, this case is dismissed. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: November 22, 2024

/s/_________________________
ANA C. REYES
United States District Judge