LYALL v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al
Filing
9
MEMORANDUM OPINION dismissing Plaintiff's 1 Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, denying as moot Plaintiff's 2 Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and denying as moot Plaintiff's 4 Emergency Motion to Transfer Case. See the attached Memorandum Opinion for additional details. SO ORDERED. Signed by Judge Trevor N. McFadden on March 11, 2025. (lctnm2).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARTA LYALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, et al.,
Case No. 1:25-cv-00644-TNM
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Marta Lyall alleges that she has been a victim of harassment and retaliation for decades
from unidentified operatives angry about her late father’s 1975 investigative reporting on
“military-CIA mercenary schemes involving underage boys.” Compl. at 8. She says that he died
suspiciously at 51, and that the unidentified harassers have followed her ever since. Id. Lyall
states that they followed her to work at a university in the late 1990s. Id. at 9–10. At various
points, her Complaint connects the harassers to Mark Cuban and Jeffrey Epstein. Id. at 11–12.
She alleges that after she “resumed her father’s research” in 2014, she “uncover[ed] deeper links
between military intelligence agencies and child mercenary operations.” Id. Afterward, the
harassment got worse. Id. She credits them with engineering a car dealership’s doublesubmission of a hard credit inquiry in 2019 and with poisoning her dog in 2024. Id. at 12. She
fingers the Justice Department, a federal judge, and multiple unnamed defendants as perpetrators
in this scheme.
“A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A
complaint that lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact” is not plausible. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Courts cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over such
a complaint. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (cleaned up). So a court must
dismiss a complaint “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly
incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). And the Court must do so promptly.
“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must
dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). That is true even at very early stages of the
litigation, as here when only the Complaint and a Temporary Restraining Order motion have
been filed. ECF Nos. 1, 2.
Lyall’s Complaint meets the standard for dismissal for lack of Article III jurisdiction.
The D.C. Circuit approved dismissing a complaint on jurisdictional grounds when it similarly
alleged that the Government had launched a “massive surveillance program” over the plaintiff,
including using “tracking devices” on his car. See Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009
(D.C. Cir. 2009). That panel also approved of dismissing a complaint for lack of jurisdiction
when it alleged government harassment “from uncertain origins” that may have included a “long
past employment by the FBI.” Id.
The Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. Lyall’s situation may merit
sympathy, but it does not present a federal question for this Court. 1
A separate Order will issue.
2025.03.11
12:12:20 -04'00'
______________________
DATE: March 11, 2025
1
TREVOR N. McFADDEN
United States District Judge
Dismissal renders Lyall’s [4] Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order moot.
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