AGREDANO et al v. USA

Filing 116

ORDER denying 107 Motion for Reconsideration - Rule 59(a) ; denying 107 Motion for Relief from Judgment ; denying 107 Motion to Alter Judgment Signed by Judge Emily C. Hewitt. (nag)

AGREDANO et al v. USA

Do c. 116

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
N o . 05-608 C (E -F ile d : July 30, 2008) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) M o tio n for Reconsideration D e n ied ; No Change in C o n tro llin g Law, No A v a ilab ility of Previously U n a v a ila b le Evidence, and No M a n if e st Error of Law or M i s ta k e of Fact in Court's O p in io n of June 24, 2008

FRANCISCO JAVIER RIVERA AGREDANO, P l a in tif f , v. T H E UNITED STATES, Defendant.

T e re s a Trucchi, San Diego, CA, for plaintiff. Devin A. Wolak, Washington, DC, with whom were Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant A tto rn e y General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant D ire c to r, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Department of Justice, W a sh in g to n , DC, for defendant. ORDER I. B a c k g ro u n d

F o llo w in g trial in this case, the court issued its opinion under seal on June 24, 2 0 0 8 , Opinion of June 24, 2008, and, pursuant to a request by defendant, see Motion to R e d a ct Final Order, filed and published a redacted version of that opinion on July 22, 2 0 0 8 , Opinion of July 22, 2008 (Slip Opinion). The court's filings on June 24, 2008 and J u ly 22, 2008 are (except for the redactions) identical in all relevant respects. References in this Order are to the page numbers in the Slip Opinion. In the Slip Opinion, the court held that defendant had breached its implied-in-fact w a rra n ty with plaintiff when defendant sold to plaintiff a vehicle containing seventeen k ilo g ra m s of marijuana. Agredano v. United States, 2008 WL 2854131, at *25 (Fed. Cl. J u n e 24, 2008). The court directed defendant "to pay to plaintiff $10,000 for the medical b ills plaintiff incurred from the injuries and illnesses resulting from his imprisonment;

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$ 8 0 ,0 0 0 for the medical expenses it is reasonably foreseeable that plaintiff will incur in th e future as a result of the injuries and illnesses he suffered resulting [from] his im p ris o n m e n t; $12,500 for the psychiatric bills plaintiff has incurred as a result of the p syc h iatric ailments that his imprisonment caused; and $46,500 for psychiatric expenses it is reasonably foreseeable that plaintiff will incur as a result of his imprisonment; $2,600 f o r the fair market value of the Pathfinder; $350,000 for attorneys fees incurred by p l a in t if f during his criminal proceedings in Mexico; $48,000 for the income plaintiff lost d u rin g his imprisonment; and $1,254 for the costs and expenses incurred by plaintiff's fa m ily in bringing supplies to plaintiff while he was imprisoned." Id. at *39. The court d ire c te d the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $550,854. Id. T h e categories of damages and the monetary amounts that the court awarded to p la in tif f represented exactly what plaintiff had requested from the court. Id. at *38-39. In support of those damages, plaintiff had provided extensive testimony at trial, and p lain tiff and defendant had stipulated to the amounts. Id. at *38. However, in its posttria l briefing, plaintiff had also requested "emotional distress damages in an amount w h ic h the Court deems reasonable compensation for the arrest and imprisonment of [ p la in tif f ] for a period of 351 days." Id. (citation omitted). The court denied plaintiff any a d d itio n a l damages for emotional distress, stating: [ T ] h e court does not believe it is in a position to determine from scratch, as it were, a "reasonable compensation" for "emotional distress" as requested b y plaintiff. The court is awarding plaintiff damages intended to address, as s u p p o rte d by testimony and the parties' stipulations, the costs of remedying th e physical, psychiatric, and financial injuries plaintiff suffered as a p ro x im a te result of defendant's breach. The court does not find that an a d d itio n a l award has been supported by plaintiff. Id. O n July 2, 2008, plaintiff filed Plaintiff Francisco Javier Rivera Agredano's Motion for Reconsideration [Rule 52(b); 59(a)(1) and 60(b)] Points and Authorities in Support T hereof (plaintiff's Motion or Pl.'s Mot.). In its Motion, plaintiff requests that the court reconsider its "denial of reasonable compensation to [plaintiff] for the emotional distress damages he sustained as a result of his arrest and imprisonment." Pl.'s Mot. 1. The Motion w as timely filed within ten days of entry of judgment. See id. at 1. Pursuant to the court's orde r, see Order of July 10, 2008, defendant filed Defendant's Response to Plaintiff Francisco Javier Rivera Agredano's Motion for Reconsideration [Rule 52(b); 59(a)(1) and

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60(b)] Points and Authorities in Support Thereof (defendant's Response or Def.'s Resp.) on July 18, 2008. For the following reasons, plaintiff's Motion is DENIED. II. D is c u s s io n A. S ta n d a rd of Review for Motion for Reconsideration

P u rs u a n t to Rule 59 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (R C F C ), "rehearing or reconsideration may be granted to all or any of the parties and on a ll or part of the issues, for any of the reasons established by the rules of common law or e q u ity applicable as between private parties in the courts of the United States." RCFC 5 9 (a )(1 ). The court is afforded a certain amount of discretion in determining whether to g ra n t reconsideration. Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (F e d . Cir. 1990); Matthews v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 524, 525 (2006). "A motion for re c o n sid e ra tio n is not intended, however, to give an `unhappy litigant an additional c h a n ce to sway' the court." Matthews, 73 Fed. Cl. at 525 (quoting Froudi v. United S ta te s, 22 Cl. Ct. 290, 300 (1991)). A party may not prevail on a motion for re c o n sid e ra tio n "by raising an issue for the first time on reconsideration when the issue w a s available to be litigated at the time the complaint was filed." Id. at 526 (citing Lamle v . Mattel, Inc., 394 F.3d 1355, 1359 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Abbott Labs. v. Syntron B io re se a rc h , Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Corrigan v. United States, 70 F e d . Cl. 665, 668 (2006); Seldovia Native Ass'n. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 593, 594 (19 9 6 )). "Motions for reconsideration must be supported `by a showing of extraordinary c irc u m s ta n c es which justify relief.'" Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1235 (F e d . Cir. 2004) (quoting Fru-Con Constr. Corp. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 298, 300 (1 9 9 9 ), aff'd, 250 F.3d 762 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (table)). "To prevail on a motion for re c o n sid e ra tio n , the movant must point to a manifest error of law or mistake of fact." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 1, 2 (2003) (citation omitted). "Specifically, the moving party must show: (1) the occurrence of an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of previously unavailable evidence; or (3) the n e c es s ity of allowing the motion to prevent manifest injustice." Matthews, 73 Fed. Cl. at 5 2 6 (citing Griswold v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 458, 460-61 (2004)). The court now e x a m in e s whether any of these three criteria is applicable to this case. B. W h eth er an Intervening Change in the Controlling Law Occurred

Plain tiff does not allege, and the court does not know of any, occurrence of an intervening change in the controlling law in this case. See Pl.'s Mot. passim. Thus, the court determines that it may not reconsider the judgment rendered in its Slip Opinion on this basis. 3

C.

W h ether Previously Unavailable Evidence is Now Available

Plain tiff does not allege the existence of any previously unavailable evidence, nor does he claim that such evidence is now available for review by the court. See Pl.'s Mot. passim. Indeed, plaintiff points the court only to the evidence contained within "the existing factual record from trial." Id. at 2. Because plaintiff does not assert that previously unavailable evidence is now available, the court determines that plaintiff is not en titled to relief under the second prong of the court's inquiry for granting reconsideration. D. W h eth er It is Necessary to Grant Plaintiff's Motion in Order to Prevent M an ifest Injustice

In order to prevail on the third criterion of a reconsideration inquiry, plaintiff must show that not granting its Motion would result in a manifest injustice. Matthews, 73 Fed. C l. at 526 (citing Griswold, 61 Fed. Cl. at 460-61). The definition of "manifest" is "[ c]leary apparent to the sight or understanding; obvious." American Heritage Dictionary a t 1064 (4th ed. 2000). Case law follows this definition. Ammex, Inc.v. United States, 5 2 Fed. Cl. 555, 557 (2002) (defining "manifest" as "clearly apparent or obvious"). "`Manifest injustice' thus refers to injustice that is apparent to the point of being almost in d is p u ta b le ." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States (PG&E), 74 Fed. Cl. 779, 785 (20 0 6 ). P lain tiff does not allege that it is necessary to grant its Motion in order to prevent a m a n if e st injustice. See Pl.'s Mot. passim. Although plaintiff's request "for an additional m o n e ta ry award that is at least equal to (on a per diem basis), or greater than, . . . $ 1 3 ,0 9 5 .0 0 per day for the 351 days of plaintiff's imprisonment and the emotional d is tre ss he suffered thereafter," id. at 11-12, would give plaintiff a significantly larger s u m of damages than the court awarded in its Slip Opinion, see Agredano, 2008 WL 2 8 5 4 1 3 1 , at *39, not awarding those additional damages to plaintiff would not, in the c o u rt's considered opinion, result in an "injustice that is apparent to the point of being a lm o s t indisputable," see PG&E, 74 Fed. Cl. at 785. E. W h ethe r RCFC 60(b) Supports Relief to Plaintiff

P la in t if f also seeks relief under RCFC 60(b). Pl.'s Mot. 2-3. RCFC 60(b) states: O n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding f o r the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable n e g le c t; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 4

h a v e been discovered in time to move for a new trial under RCFC 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic); (4) the ju d g m e n t is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or d is c h a rg e d , or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or o th e rw is e vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have p ro s p e c tiv e application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the o p e ra tio n of the judgment. R C F C 60(b). In its Motion, plaintiff does not make any arguments, and the court does not k n o w of any, that would make relief under RCFC 60(b) available in this case. See Pl.'s M o t. passim. Plaintiff merely states that "[g]ranting relief under RCFC 60(b) would be su p p o rte d by the existing factual record from trial and would not be prejudicial to d e f e n d a n t USA but would promote substantial justice and result in fair compensation to p lain tiff for the injuries he sustained." Id. at 2. Plaintiff does not assert, and the court d o e s not know of any, "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) n e w ly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in tim e to move for a new trial under RCFC 59(b); [or] (3) fraud (whether heretofore d e n o m in a te d intrinsic or extrinsic)." See RCFC 60(b). Furthermore, the judgment is not v o id , the judgment has not "been satisfied, released, or discharged," nor has "a prior ju d g m e n t upon which it is based . . . been reversed or otherwise vacated," and nor is it " n o longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." See id. Finally, the court sees no "other reason justifying relief from the operation of the ju d g m e n t." See id. Because plaintiff does not meet any of the criteria of RCFC 60(b) for re lie f from the judgment issued by the court in its Slip Opinion, see Agredano, 2008 WL 2 8 5 4 1 3 1 , at *39, the court does not grant emotional distress damages to plaintiff. III. C o n c lu s i o n F o r the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's Motion is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Emily C. Hewitt EMILY C. HEWITT Judge

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