MOORER v. USA

Filing 9

UNPUBLISHED OPINION and ORDER granting 6 Motion to Dismiss. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. No costs. Signed by Judge Charles F. Lettow. (dls) Copy to parties.

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No.

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13-67C

(Filed: June 19,2013)

(NOT TO BE PUBLISHED)

FITED
JUN 1 I2013

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STEPHAN M, MOORER.

Plaintiff,

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U.S. COURT OF
FEDERAL CLAIMS

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UNITED STATES,

Defendant.
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Stephan M. Moorcr, pro se, Florence, Colorado.

Kenneth D. Woodrow, Trial Attomey, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant. With him on the brief
were Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attomey General, and Jeanne E. Davidson, Director,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.

OPINION AND ORDER
LETTOW, Judge.

Plaintifl

Stephan M. Moorer, requests monetary damages in the amount of
$199,999,998.00 for alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the United States Department of the
Treasury. Compl. at 7. Pending before the court is the govemment's motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(bX6) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims ('RCFC').

BACKGROUND'
Mr. Moorer's compiaint arises from criminal proleedings against him in the Superior
Court for the District of Columbia in 1999. Compl. fl 1.' He alleges that a bond was set for
$99,999,999 in connection with those proceedings and he was to serve a prison term, or
altematively, pay this amount. Id. Mr. Moorer bases his allegation on a case sunmary from his
criminal proceedings indicating "Bond: DK" and "Amt: 99,999,999." See id.,Ex. 1, Part A
(D.C. Superior Court Case Summary).3 Because Mr. Moorer remained in custody, no bond was
ever issued and no bond fee was ever assessed. Compl., Ex. 2 at 3 (Aug. 1, 201 1 Response to
Administrative Remedy Request). Mr. Moorer nonetheless asserts his belief that he owed the
United States $99,999,999 as an altemative to incarceration. Compl. fl 1 . To discharge the
purported obligation, he alleges that in March 2011, he deposited with the Treasury a "6 year
secured bond" for double the amount of the so-called obligation. Compl. tf 2. He also claims
that this money was to be considered gross income and to become his property "subsequent to
the formal discharge." 1d. fl 1 . Mr. Moorer now requests $ 199,999,998.00 in compensation for
the "secured bond" he allegedly deposited with the Treasury to discharge his obligation or, in the
altemative, an "equitable adjustment of accounts." Id. at 7 -8.
The govemment contends that the court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction
because Mr. Moorer has failed to establish a basis for his claim in a money-mandating source of
law, such as a conhact, statute, or constitutional provision. Def 's Mot. at 6. The government
also argues that Mr. Moorer has failed to state a claim because the documents Mr. Moorer
references in his complaint indicate that he never owed the govemment money as a result ofhis

prior criminal proceedings. Id. at 8-9.

ANALYSIS
Standard for Decision
Before a court may proceed to the merits ofa case, it "must satisfy itselfthat it has
jurisdiction to hear and decide" the case. Hardie v. United Stortes,367 F.3d 1288, 1290 (Fed.
Cir.2004) (qluoting PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co.,304 F.3d t235, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(intemal quotation marks omitted)). In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
rThis

statement of the circumstances relating to Mr. Moorer's claim is taken from the
complaint and the parties' briefs related to the govemment's motion to dismiss.
2Records

appended to Mr. Moorer's complaint indicate that he was convicted in Supenor
Court for carrying a pistol without a license and for unarmed manslaughter, and that he is serving
a sentence of eight to thirty years imprisonment. Compl. Ex. l, Part B (Sentence Monitoring

Computation Data).

r"DK" indicates "Dock (Lock
up)"

as bond status,.ree Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (,,Def.'s
Mot."), App. at 2 (Motion Summary), meaning the defendant remained in custody and was not

released on bond.

jurisdiction under RCFC l2(bx1), the court will ordinarily construe the allegations ofthe
complaint favorably to the pleader. See Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F .2d
746,747 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing Scfteuer v. Rhodes,4l6 U.S. 232,236 (1974); Air Prod. &
Chems., Inc. v. Reichhold Chems., lnc.,755 F.2d 1559, 1562 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Nonetheless,
the burden ofestablishing the court's jurisdiction rests with the party seeing to invoke it, McNutt
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind.,298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936), and this burden must be
satisfied by a preponderance ofthe evidence, Reynolds,846 F.2d at748.a
Subj e c t Mat te r Juris dict ion

Under the Tucker Act, this court has 'Jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act ofCongress or any
regulation ofan executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C.
$ la91(a)(1). The Tucker Act is ajurisdictional statute and does not create a substantive right to
relief. See United States v. Testan,424 U.S.392,398 (1976). To bring suit under the Tucker
Act, a plaintiffmust find a substantive right in another source of law. See United States v.
Mitchell,463 U.S. 206,216 (1983). Generally, the Tucker Act waives the govemment's
sovereign immunity only with respect to claims derived from a money-mandating source of law.
1d. Therefore, to establish that this court has subject matter jurisdiction under the Tucker Act,
Mr. Moorer must identifu and allege facts supporting a claim under an independent, substantive
source of law that "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the [flederal
[g]ovemment for the damages sustained." Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Federal Aviation
Admin., 525 F.3d, 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Mitchell, 463 U.S. at217).

A contract with the United States can constitute a money-mandating source of law. See
Holmes v. United States,657 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir.2011). To make a claim based upon
contract, the plaintiff must plead the requirements of a valid contract, providing non-frivolous
allegations of "mutual intent to contract[,] including an offer and acceptance, consideration, and
a [g]ovemment representative who had actual authority to bind the [g]ovemment.,' California
Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 245 F .3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Massie v.
United States, 166 F.3d 1184, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also Aboo v. United States,86 Fed. Cl.
618,626 (2009), aff'd,347 Fed. Appx. 581 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A claiming plaintiff ,,must proffer
objective evidence demonstrating the existence ofan offer and a reciprocal acceptance."
American Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 62Fed. Cl. 185. 194 (2004).

"The submissions of pro se litigants, such as Mr. Moorer, are held to ,,less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyersj' Estelle v. Gamble,429 U.S. 97, 106 (197 6\
(quoting Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam)). However, this relaxed
standard "does not relieve a pro se plaintiff from meeting jurisdictional requirements." Bernard
v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499, aff'd, 98 Fed. Appx. 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Like all
plaintiffs, a pro se plaintiff must establish the court's jurisdiction "by a preponderance of the
evidence." Riles v. United States,93Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Taylor v. United States,
303 F.3d 1357,1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

Mr. Moorer does not adequately allege mutual intent to contract in his complaint. He
claims he deposited a $199,999,998 bond with the Treasury as a consequence ofproceedings
related to criminal charges against him. Compl. fl 2. Putting aside the plausibility of this
allegation, at most this averment constitutes an offer, but it does not demonsftate acceptance by
the govemment. Mr. Moorer does not contend that a governmental officer received such a
deposit with intent to accept it for the purpose ofreleasing Mr. Moorer from any obligation he
had to the govemment. Indeed, exhibits that Mr. Moorer includes with his complaint indicate
that he did not in fact deposit money or a bond with the Treasury. See Compl., Ex. 6 (lRS
conespondence). Rather, these exhibits reflect routine acknowledgements by the IRS of
taxpayer communications. 1d. In short, Mr. Moorer fails to point to any contract or other
money-mandating source of law that might support a claim by him, and this court consequently
does not have jurisdiction to consider his complaint.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the govemment's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. This court
does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Moorer's claim. The clerk shall enter

judgment in accord with this decision.
No costs.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge