MARTINEZ v. USA

Filing 8

UNPUBLISHED OPINION and ORDER granting 5 Motion to Dismiss. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Each party shall bear its own costs. Signed by Judge Lynn J. Bush. (dls) Copy to parties.

ORIOINAL
l|ntbo @nftrD $ltutes @ourt of felorul
No. 13-107 T
(Filed July 25,2013)

UNPUBLISHED
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Pro Se Plaintiff,

T}M UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
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Tax; Refund Claim; 26 U.S.C.
$ 65 I 1(a) (2006);26 U.S.C.
$ 65ll(bX2)(A) (2006); Suspension
of Statute of Limitations Due to
Financial Disability under 26 U.S.C.
$ 6511(h) (2006); Revenue
Procedure 99-21,1999-l C.B. 960;
RCFC 12(bXl); Whether Plaintiff
Followed Required Procedure to
Prove She Was Financiallv Disabled.

OLGA E. MARTINEZ,

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Olga E. Martinez, Cicero, IL,pro

se.

Gregory S. Knapp, United States Department of Justice, with whom were
Kathyn Keneally, Assistant Attorney General, and. David I. pincus, Chief, Court
Federal Claims Section, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION

Bush,, Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss brousht
primarily under Rule l2(bX I ) of the Rules of the United States courr of Fe<t1ral

of

Claims (RCFC).' Defendant asserts that plaintiff s tax refund claim is time-barred
by 26 U.S.C. $ 6511 (2006). Ms. Olga E. Martinez, proceedingpro se,has offered
no legal authority that would counter defendant's challenge to her claim. On the
facts before the court, defendant's motion is granted and plaintiff s complaint must
be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. The court notes, however, that dismissal for
lack ofjurisdiction under RCFC 12(bX1) is without prejudice.

BACKGROUND,
For the "2005 tax year, plaintiffhad an assessed tax liability of$7,298 and
withholding payments totaling $10,536, resulting in a tax overpayment of $3,238."
Def.'s Mot. at2 (citing Def.'s Mot. Ex. I at A-2.) Ms. Martinez did not file a 2005
tax year return with the Intemal Revenue Service (IRS) until March 20, 2011,
claiming that she was due a refund of $4457. Id.; see also id. Ex.2 at A-5.
According to defendant, plaintiff made an error in calculating her 2005 taxes
(substituting $6079 for $7298 for the amount oftaxes owed for tax year 2005),
resulting in the discrepancy between the IRS's calculation of a $3238 tax
overpayment and the $4457 amount requested as a refund by Ms. Martinez. In any
case, plaintiff seeks a $3238 judgment in her suit in this court, see Compl. at 1,
although her subsequent communications with defendant's counsel appear to have
convinced her, incongruously, that the "actual refund" she is owed is $4457. Pl.'s
r/ Defendant originally

argued that dismissal should be under RCFC l2(b)(6). See Def.'s
Mot. at 1. After further consideration of precedent, defendant states that there is a split in
authority in this court as to the proper rule under which dismissal should occur in this tlpe of
timeliness challenge to a tax refund claim. Del's Reply at 1 n.l. Defendant concludes that
dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(1) is supported by the greater weight of authority. 1d Thus,
defendant challenges the complaint under RCFC 12(bX1), but believes that dismissal under
either RCFC l2(b)(l)orRCFC l2(b)(6) is wananted inrhis case. 1d The court will briefly
address the split in authority highlighted by defendant in this opinion.

2/ The facts recited here are
taken largely from defendant's motion to dismiss, because
the three-paragraph complaint presents a bare legal claim without supporting factual background.
Defendant notes that "[t]he complaint does not include the information generally required for tax
refund claims in this court, including 'a copy of the claim for refund' or a statement identifiing
the tax year(s) at issue." Def.'s Mot. at 2 (citing RCFC 9(m)(1)-(2)). The courr also relies on the
complaint and plaintiffs response "brief," a letter sent only to defendant and attached to
defendant's reply brief as Exhibit 1 (a document of seven pages which are largely unnumbered).
To reduce confusion, page references in this opinion to plaintiff s response brief will use the
format of "Pl.'s Resp. at 1," not "Def.'s Reply Ex. I at 1."

I ("Mr. [K]napp

states that the actual refund should be for $4457.00. I
filed fsuit] for $3,238.00 because this is the amount the IRS quoted me."), 3 ("Per
Mr. Knapp, actual refund should be for $4457.00 rather than $3238.00."). The
court need not resolve this apparent discrepancy, but notes that the govemment's
position, and the position of defendant's counsel Mr. Gregory Knapp, is that
plaintiff s tax overpayment for tax year 2005 was $3238, not $4457. Def.'s Mot. at
2,Ex. 1 at A-2; Def.'s Reply at 3 n.3.

Resp. at

The court reserves its review of the statutory framework for determining
whether a tax refund claim is filed too late for the analysis section of this opinion.
As a factual matter, the complaint asserts that Ms. Martinez did not file her tax
refund claim earlier than 201 I because of illness. .See Compl. at 1 ('My reason for
[ate] filing was due to illness."). In her response brief, plaintiffnotes the
following health problems that occurred either in 2005 or in the years preceding or
following 2005: severe depression, suicidal ideation, alcoholism, a diagnosis of
lupus, mental and physical illness, pneumonia and pleurisy. Pl.'s Resp. at l.
Plaintiff also notes that with the aid of a free clinic she was later able to tum her
life around, get her lupus under control and get social security disability benefits.
Id. Ms. Martinez also states that she seeks a tax refund for the 2005 tax year
because she "needs this money to help pay medical bills." Compl. at L

After Ms. Martinez filed for a tax refund for the 2005 tax year, the IRS
disallowed her claim as untimely, in either June or July of 2011. Def.'s Mot. Ex. I
at A-2,Ex.3 at A-10. Ms. Martinez appealed the disallowance of her refund claim
to an IRS Appeals office; no documentation as to the grounds ofher appeal have
been provided by the parties. It appears that the excuse ofillness was presented by
Ms. Martinez and that the appeals officer requested a physician's statement as
proof of disabling illness. Id. Ex.3 at A-10. There is no evidence that Ms.
Martinez provided a physician's statement to the IRS; the appeals officer denied
the appeal on February 8,2012, closed her case and notified Ms. Martinez of her
right to file suit in this court. 1d
Ms. Martinez filed her refund suit in this court on February 7 , z0l3 and paid
a $350 filing fee which, she states, has caused her financial hardship. see pl.'s
Resp. at 2 ("1really had to do without in order to pay the $350.00 filing fee.',;.
Defendant has moved to dismiss this case for lack ofjurisdiction. Ms. Martinez
was offered the opportunity to present a formal response briefto replace the letter

she sent to defendant's counsel. Order of May 13, 2013. Having received no
fuither filings from plaintiff, defendant's motion is ripe for a ruling by the court.

DISCUSSION
Pro Se Litigants
The court acknowledges that Ms. Martinez is proceeding pro se and is "not
expected to frame issues with the precision of a common law pleading." Roche y.
U.S. Postal 9en.,828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Pro se plaintiffs are
entitled to a liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972) (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held
to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers").
Accordingly, the court has examined the complaint and response brief thoroughly
and has attempted to discern all of plaintiff s arguments.

II.

JurisdictionalFramework
A.

Tucker Act

Pursuant to the Tucker Act, the United States court of Federal claims has
jurisdiction "to renderjudgment upon any claim against the united States founded
either upon the constitution, or any Act of congress or any regulation ofan
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the united
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 2g
U.S.C. $ 1a9l(a)(l) (2006). The Tucker Act, however, ,.does not create any
substantive right enforceable against the united states for money damag.r. Th"
court of claims has recognized that the Act merely confers jurisdiction upon it
whenever the substantive right exists." united states v. Testan, 424 lJ.s. 392, 3gg
( I 976) (citation omitted). A plaintiff coming before the united
States court of
Federal claims, therefore, must identifr a separate provision of law conferring a
substantive right for money damages against the united states. Todd v. Llnited
States,386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Ctr.2004)(citingTestan,424U.S. at 39g).

B.

Refund Suit Jurisdiction

In the present case, plaintiff seeks

a

tax refund for overpavment in the

amount of

8 for the 2005 tax year. The Court of Federal Claims has
jurisdiction over tax refund claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. g 13a6(a)(1) (2006) and
28 U.S.C. $ la91(a)(l). Foreman v. United States, 60 F.3d 1559, 1562 (Fed. Cir.
1995). However, certain prerequisites must be met before a plaintiff may properly
invoke this court's iurisdiction over tax refund claims.

C.

$3 23

Sections 7422 and 6511(a)

First, a plaintiff must have satisfied 26 U.S.C. 5 7422 (2006) which provides
that: "No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of
any intemal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of
any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected,
until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary . . . ." 26
U.S.C. $ 7a22@). Second, a plaintiff must comply with26 U.S.C. $ 65l l(a) which
requires that a tax refund be filed within either: ( I ) three years from the date on
which the return giving rise to the refund claim was filed; or (2) two years from the
date on which the tax was paid, whichever is later. Together, $ 7422(a) and,
$ 651 1(a) dictate that before a plaintiff may pursue a tax refund suit, he or she must
file a claim for a refund from the IRS within the window of time prescribed by g
65 11(a). See united states v. Dalm,494 u.s. 596,602 (1990) (stating that "unless
a claim for refund of a tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by
$ 65 I I (a), a suit for refund, regardless of whether the tax is alleged to have been
'erroneously,' 'illegally,' or'wrongfully collected,' $g l3a6(a)(l),7422(a),may
not be maintained in any court").

It is well-settled that satisfaction of these filing requirements is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in the court of Federal claims. sun Chem.
corp.
v, united states, 698 F,2d 1203, 1206 (Fed. cir. l9g3) C'It is a well-established
rule that a timely, sufficient claim for refund is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a
refund suit.") (citations omitted); stelco Holding co. v. united states, 42 Fed. Cl.
101' 104 (1998) ("It is firmly settled that a properly filed administrative claim for
refund is the indispensable prerequisite to this court's exercise ofjurisdiction over
a taxpayer's suit for refund.") (citations omitted). strict compliance with
$ 65 I 1(a)'s limitations period is essential because "fu]nder settled principles of
sovereign immunity, the united States, as sovereign, is immune from suit, save as it
consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define

that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." Stelco Holding,42Fed. Cl. at 104
n.5 (citing Dalm,494 U.S. at 608) (internal quotations omitted). As explained
below, Ms. Martinez's refund claim is timely under $ 65 11(a).

Ms. Martinez filed her 2005 tax retum, which also included her claim for
refund, with the IRS on March 20, 2011. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. 1 at A-2 (showing a
filing date of March 20,2011),Ex.2 at A-5 (showing a signature date on the tax
return of February 20,2011). The tax return represented that Ms. Martinez was
entitled to a refund. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. 2 at A-5. Plaintiff s taxes for 2005 had
been timely paid on April 15, 2006 because her employer had withheld federal
income taxes from her paychecks in 2005 and had submitted the payment to the
IRS on her behalf. Def.'s Mot. aI2 (citing 26 U.S.C. $ 6513(bX1) (2006), Ex. 1 at
A-2.
As previously discussed, $ 65 I 1(a) allows a taxpayer to file a claim for
refund "within 3 years from the time the retum was filed or 2 years from the time
the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later." 26 U.S.C.
g 65 1 1(a). Here, although the two-year window for filing a refund claim expired
on April 15, 2008 (two years after her withholding tax was paid to the IRS), the
three-year window for filing a refund claim will not expire until March 20,2014
(three years after the 2011 filing of her 2005 tax year return). Thus, because Ms.
Martinez filed her claim for refund simultaneously with her 2005 tax retum, her
claim for refund is timely under $ 65 I 1(a) because it was filed within three years of
the filing of her tax return, /.e., her refund claim was filed well before the closing of
the later window on March 20,2014. See Def.'s Mot. at 4 (stating that "plaintiff
necessarily complied with the requirement of $ 65 I 1(a) to file her refund claim
'within 3 years from the time the return was filed"'); see also VanCanagan v.
United States,23 I F.3d 1349, I35I (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the timeliness
requirement in $ 651 1(a) was satisfied in that case because "the [refund] claim . . .
was filed within three years of (actually, on the same date as) the filing of the
retum").

D.

Section 6511(bX2XA)

1.

Plaintiffs Suit is Barred by Section 6511(bX2XA), Unless a
Statutory Tolling Provision Applies

Unfortunately for plaintiff, there is another timeliness requirement in $ 651 I
to be overcome before she can proceed with her refund suit, and this requirement,
too, according to defendant and to the greater weight of authority, is jurisdictional.
The relevant provision states, in part, that
the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the
portion of the tax paid within the period, immediately
preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years[.]
26 U.S.C. $ 6511(bX2XA). Often described as a "look-back" provision,
$ 65 1 1(bX2XA) precludes monetary recovery in a refund suit such as the one
brought by Ms. Martinez if no tax has been paid within the three years preceding
the date the refund claim was submitted to the IRS.3 See, e.g., Doyle v. Llnited
States,88 Fed. Cl. 314,321-22 (2009) (noting that even when a plaintiff has
satisfied the timeliness requirement in $ 65 I 1(a), no recovery is possible unless
that plaintiffhas also paid taxes during the relevant "look-back period"). Here,
there is no dispute that Ms. Martinez's taxes for 2005 were paid on April 15, 2006.
However, her look-back period, running backward from a March 20,201I filing
date, only extended to March 20,2008. Because all of the relevant taxes were fully
paid in 2006, and none were paid after March 20, 2008, g 65 I 1(bX2XA) bars any
recovery in this lawsuit, unless statutory tolling of the limitations period is
applicable to plaintiff s circumstances.

2.

The Limitation in Section 6511(bX2XA) is Jurisdictional

There is, as defendant has noted, a split in authority as to whether the lookback period limitation set forth in g 651 1(bX2XA) is jurisdictional. Several
decisions ofthis court have held that a plaintiffwhose recovery is baned by
$ 65 I 1 (bX2XA) has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction for his or her suit.
E.9., Plati v. united states, 99 Fed. cL.634,641 (2011) (citing united states v.
Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. I (2008)); Doyle, 88 Fed. Cl. at 322
(citing Dumont v. United States,345 F. App'x 586 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Other
decisions ofthis court suggest that when recovery is barred by $ 65 I l(bX2XA), the
complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. E.g., Murdockv. United

3/ In circumstances not relevant
here, the look-back period may be lengthened by
extensions received for filing a tax retum. 26 U.S.C. $ 6511(bX2XA).

States,103 Fed. Cl. 389,392-94 (2012); Rinaldiv. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 164,
166 n.2 (1993) (citing McGregor v. United States,225 Ct. Cl. 566 (1980);
craiglow v. united states, 212 ct. cl. 542 (197 6)).
The strongest authority, in the court's view, that the limitation in
$ 65 I I (bX2XA) is rot jurisdictional, is the fact that the Court of Claims treated this
bar to recovery as a complaint's failure to state a claim. E.g., McGregor,225 Ct.
Cl. at 567. McGregor and similar decisions, however, pre-date United States v.
Brockamp,5l9 U.S. 347 (1997), which specifically addressed the limitations
imposed by various provisions in $ 65 1 7 . Brockamp described $ 65 1 1(b)(2)(A) as
a "substantive limitation[]," 519 U.S. at 351, and stated that the time limitations in
$ 651i are "unusually emphatic," id. at35Q. The Court of Claims decisions
referenced supra also pre-date Commissionerv, Lundy,5l6 U.S' 235'238-40,245
( 1996), which considered a look-back period similar to the one in $ 65 I 1(bX2XA)
to be jurisdictional for cases brought in the United States Tax Court. In light of
this Supreme Court precedent, the court must look at more recent authority to
determine whether the look-back period limitation in $ 65 11(bX2XA) is indeed

jurisdictional.
The court has found no precedential decision from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit that is directly on point. There is a sentence in a
non-precedential opinion from the Federal Circuit that states that $ 6511(bX2XA)
rs jurisdictional. See Dumont,345 F. App'x at 590 ("Under this statutory scheme,
the provisions in issue in this case - $$ 6511(a), 65 1 l(bX2), and 6532(a)(1) - are
all jurisdictional in nature, and a suit that fails to satisf, any ofthese provisions
must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.") (citing Lundy, 516U.5.
at240; In re Long-Distance Tel. Sen. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig.,539 F. Supp.
2d281,296 (D.D.C.2008). The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
precedential opinions, have both held that the limitation in $ 65 I 1(b)(2XA) is
jurisdictional, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a
precedential opinion, has affirmed a dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction based on this
limitation. See Dickow v. United States, 654 F.3d 144, 149 (lst Cir. 201 1)
(specifically relying on Lundy,5 16 U.S. at 240, 241-53, for its jurisdictional
analysis); Zeier v. United States,80 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Following
the Supreme Court in Lundy, we hold that $ 65 I 1(bX2XA) is jurisdictional;'); Blatt
v. United States, 34 F.3d 252,257 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming the dismissal of a

claim time-barred by $ 65 1 1(bX2)(A) for lack ofjurisdiction). Together these
decisions indicate that the limitations period in $ 65 I 1(bX2XA) is jurisdictional.
The court views the following authorities as controlling as to the
jurisdictional nature of the limitations period set forth in g 651 1(bX2XA). The
Court of Claims recognized that $ 65 11(bX2XA) functions as a statute of
limitations. See Harvey v. United States,226 Ct. Cl. 605, 607 (1981) ("Plaintiff
herein has failed to satisf the applicable statute of limitations fin g 6511(bX2XA)]
by a wide margin."). The Supreme Court in Brockamp held that the version of
$ 651 1 then in force contained limitations periods that could not be equitably
tolled. 519 U.S. at 354 ("Congress did not intend the 'equitable tolling' doctrine to
apply to $ 65 1 1 's time limitations."). The Supreme Court in Lundy considered the
look-back period in $ 65 1 1(bX2XB), which is indistinguishable in nature from the
look-back period in $ 6511(bX2XA), to be jurisdictional. 516 U.S. at240,245.
The Federal Circuit has recognized that "[i]n the context oftax refund suits, the
United States sovereign immunity is construed narrowly and jurisdiction of the
Court of Federal Claims is limited by the Internal Revenue Code, including 26
U.S.C. $ 7422 land its requirement that a claim be duly filedl." Walner v. United
States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir.2012) (citing Clinnuood Elkhorn,553 U.S.
at 8-9). Based on the authorities cited herein. the court concludes that the
limitations period posed by g 6511(bX2XA) is jurisdictional for cases brought in
this court.

ilI.

Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Jurisdiction

In considering the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, this court must
presume all undisputed factual allegations in the complaint to be true and construe
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v, Rhodes,416U.S.232,
236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald,45T U.S. 800,
814-15 (1982); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. 9en.,846F.2d746,747 (Fed,.
Cir. 1988). However, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction, Alder Terrace, Inc. v. (Jnited States, 161 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (citing McNuttv. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Lnd.,298 U.S. 178, 189
( 1 936)), and must do so by a preponderance of the evidence, Reynolds, 846 F.2d at
748 (citations omitted). The court may inquire into evidence outside the pleadings
to establishjurisdictional facts. Id. at747; Rogers v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl.
5 13, 5 14- I 5 (201 0) (citations omitted). Ifjurisdiction is found to be lacking, this

court must dismiss the action. RCFC 12(h)(3).

IV.

Analysis

A.

Statutory Framework for Tolling of the Limitations Period

The primary question before the court is whether Ms. Martinez qualifies for
statutory tolling of the look-back period established by $ 65 I l(bX2XA). The
relevant statutory tolling provision, $ 65 I 1(h), provides, in relevant part, that

[i]n the case ofan individual, the running ofthe periods
specified in subsections [6511](a), (b), and (c) shall be
suspended during any period ofsuch individual's life that
such individual is financially disabled.
26 U.S.C. $ 6511(hXl).4 The statute further provides that
an individual is financially disabled ifsuch individual is
unable to manage his financial affairs by reason ofa
medically determinable physical or mental impairment of
the individual which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months. An
individual shall not be considered to have such an
impairment unless proof of the existence thereof is
fumished in such form and manner as the Secretary may

require.
$ 65 I l(hX2XA). The exception does not apply, however, in the
circumstances:

1d

following

An individual shall not be treated as financially disabled
during any period that such individual's spouse or any

4/ The United States Tax Court has explained that 6511(h)'s disability tolling provision
$
was added to the Intemal Revenue Code as a responseto Brockamp, which held that $ 651I was
not subject to equitable tolling. Brosi v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 5, 12 n.6 (2003) (citations omitted).

l0

other person is authorized to act on behalfofsuch
individual in financial matters.

Id. S 65ll(hX2XB). Thus, in a case such as the one now before the court, the term
"financially disabled" refers to the existence of physical or mental health problems
that lasted at least twelve months and which were severe enough to have rendered
the taxpayer unable to manage her financial affairs, but does not apply to a
taxpayer for whom someone was authorized during that period of impairment to
manage the taxpayer's financial affairs.5

B.

Procedure for Proving that the Taxpayer Was Financially
Disabled

A taxpayer who wishes to toll the look-back period of g 65 I I (b)(2)(A) by
invoking $ 65 I I (h) must fumish proof "in such form and manner as the Secretary
may require." 26 u.s.c. $ 651r(hx2xA). The proper "form and manner"
for such
proof are set forth in Revenue procedure 99-21. Rev. proc.99-21,1999-l
c.B.
960. In general, the two "statements" required by Revenue procedure 99-21 shoutd
be provided with the refund claim itself, although it is not unusual
for the
statements to be supplied later upon request from the IRS. see
Rev. proc. 99-21
4 ("Unless otherwise provided in IRS forms and instructions, the followine
$
statements are to be submitted with a claim for credit or refund
of tax to clai"m

financialdisabilityforpurposesofg65rr(h)."); seealsoDef.'sMot.Ex.3atA-r0
(noting a request from an IRS Appeals office, once her refund
claim had been

disallowed, that Ms. Martinez provide
Revenue Procedure 99-21 1

a

physician's statement as required by

The first statement required of the taxpayer is a detailed
statement from a
physician, which must include four specific ieiresentations
offact as to the
taxpayer's financial disability, as well as the physician,s certification
that the
5/

?laintiff s response briefindicates that she may have misunderstood the term
"financially disabled"; she has provided evidence to the
court ofl nancial need due to limited

mcome, outstanding debt related to medical treatments,
and the projected costs of futher medical
procedures. see Pl.'s Resp. at 2 ("Mr. Knapp_ is r"qu"riing
lproor oq nr.""i"i air"iirry.
Enclosed, please find bills that l owe . . . foi dentat
wort< tiai l needtll"... some are estiiJates tor
work needed that I cannot afford'"), 5 (enclosing documentation
orrri so.iuis""u.lty Disaulity
Insurance benefi t amount).
1t

('true,
representations are
correct and complete." Rev. Proc. 99-21 $ a(1Xa)-(e).
The statement from the physician must: (l) name and describe the disabling
condition(s); (2) provide the physician's opinion that the condition (or conditions)
rendered the taxpayer unable to manage her financial affairs; (3) provide the
physician's opinion that the impairment lasted at least twelve months; and, (4) to
the best of the physician's knowledge, identifu the period of time that the financial
disability lasted. Id. $ +( 1)(a)-(d). The court notes that only certain types of
medical professionals qualifu as "physician" forthe purposes ofproviding such a
statement. See id. $ 4(1) (referencing 42 U.S.C. $ 1395x(r) (2006) and its
definition of physician, including, generally, "a doctor of medicine or osteopathy[,]
. . . a doctor of dental surgery or of dental medicinef,] . . . a doctor of podiatric
medicine[,] . . . a doctor ofoptometry, . . . or. . . a chiropractor"). The second
statement required of the taxpayer is a certification by the signatory of the refund
claim that the taxpayer had no one authorized to act on her behalf in financial
matters at the relevant time period of disability, or, if someone was authorized to
act on her behalf for some portion of the relevant period of disability, a statement
as to the start and end dates said person was authorized to act on the taxpayer's
behalf in financial matters. Id. 5 4(2).

C.

No Tolling Where Revenue Procedure 99-21 Has Not Been
Followed

According to defendant, failure to submit the materials required by Revenue
Procedure 99-21 to the IRS denies a plaintiff recourse to the tolling mechanism set
forth in $ 65 I 1(h). Def.'s Mot. at 5-6; Def.'s Reply at 2-3. The strongest authority
for defendant's argument is found in Abston v, Commissioner,6gl F.3d 992 (8th

cir.2012). ThefactsinAbstonareindistinguishablefromthefactsinthiscase.
Furthermore, the reasoning in Abston is compelling.

At the outset ofits discussion ofthe significance ofa taxpayer's failure to
comply with Revenue Procedure 99-2l,the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth circuit noted that failure to provide the requested information had denied
tolling of limitations periods to a number of tax refund plaintiffs:
Abston failed to comply with Revenue Procedure 99-21
when she did not submit a physician statement with her
initial refund claim, or during her administrative appeal of
12

the claim denial, despite explicit warnings by the IRS of
the need to do so. Although no circuit court has
considered this issue, numerous district courts have
dismissed taxpayer refund suits as time-barred by $ 651 I
because the taxpayer's claim offinancial disability was
not supported by a physician's statement complying with
Revenue Procedure 99-2 1.
Abston.,691 F.3d at 995 (citing cases). Ms. Abston suggested that failure to
comply with Revenue Procedure 99-21 was not fatal to her claim, but the Eighth
Circuit disaereed:

Abston argues that the failure to comply with Revenue
Procedure 99-21 should not be dispositive - that the
district court should have made an independent
determination that she was "financially disabled" for
purposes of g 65 1 I (h) after she submitted an affidavit and
137 pages ofmedical records that chronicled her medical
conditions. We rej ect this contention for multiple reasons.

Id.

The court then gave three reasons why failure to comply with Revenue
Procedure 99-21 was dispositive of the claim in that case.
The Eighth Circuit began with an analysis of the plain meaning of the
statute:

First, [appellant's] contention is contrary to the plain
meaning ofthe statute. Federal coufts have no
jurisdiction over a tax refund suit "until a claim for refund
or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according
to the provisions of law in that regard." 26 U.S.C.
$ 7422(a); see Lundy,516 U.S. at239-40,116 S. Ct. 647.
Sectionf] 65 I 1(h)(2XA) expressly provides that a
taxpayer "shall not be considered [financially disabled]
unless proof of [a disabling impairment] is furnished in
such form and manner as the Secretary may require."
Thus, Abston's refund claim was not "duly filed.,' The
IJ

limited waiver of sovereign immunity in $ 65 I 1(h) does
not grant district courts power to decide de novo that a
taxpayer was financially disabled.

1d

Next, the court discussed Brockamp and the distinction between explicit
instructions in a statutory tolling provision and more general equitable tolling
principles:
Second, the independent judicial determination of
financial disability Abston seeks would be the kind of
nonstatutory tolling the Supreme Court barred in
Brockamp. The administrative burden of responding to
late claims, the Court explained, "tells us that Congress
would likely have wanted to decide explicitly whether, or
just where and when, to expand the statute's limitations
periods, rather than delegate to the courts a generalized
powerto do so whenever a couft concludes that equity so
requires." 519 U.S. at 353, 117 S. Ct. 849. Thejudicial
remedy Abston urges is contrary to that principle and
therefore beyond the power ofthe lower federal courts.

Id. at995-96. Finally, the court considered Ms. Abston's challenge to Revenue
Procedure 99-21,, and found that the IRS had not exceeded the authority given it by
Congress. In this regard, the Eighth Circuit stated:
Congress dehned "financial disability" as meaning that an
individual "is unable to manage his financial affairs by
reason of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment." $ 6511(hX2XA). Knowing that the IRS
would need to fairly and efficiently process a potentially
large number of such claims, Congress instructed the
Secretary to prescribe the method by which an individual
could prove such an impairment. In Revenue procedure
99-21, the Secretary logically prescribed, ,,Bring a
doctor's note." Under any standard ofjudicial review of
executive agency action, we must uphold this threshold
requirement as an appropriate exercise ofthe authorify
t4

Congress delegated to the Secretary. . . . Because Abston
failed to submit a physician's statement altogether, we
agree with the district court that she did not provide the
IRS with probative evidence of financial disability, and
therefore her claim was properly denied as time-barred by
$ 6511(bX2XA).

Id. at996.
This court agrees with the reasoning presented inAbston. Failure to provide
the IRS with a physician's statement that substantially complies with Revenue
Procedure 99-21 denies a taxpayer recourse to the tolling provision in $ 65 I 1(h).
This court cannot conduct a de novo proceeding to determine whether or not a
taxpayer was financially disabled; a necessary predicate to a refund suit
challenging the IRS's refusal to apply tolling under g 65 l1(h) is the provision to
the IRS of the materials required by Revenue Procedure 99-21 in support of the
taxpayer's refund claim.

D.

Plaintiff Cannot Toll the Limitations period in Section
65ll(b)(2XA), Her Suit Fails for Lack of Jurisdiction
Because

Here, Ms. Marttnez has not alleged that she provided a physician's statement
to the IRS, despite a request that she do so. plaintiff has not met her burden to
show that she complied with Revenue Procedure 99-21 or that she is entitled to
statutory tolling through $ 65 I 1(h). Because statutory tolling does not apply, her
suit is time-barred by g 6511(bX2XA). The complaint must be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.6

E.

IRS Taxpayer Advocates and Volunteer Lawyers

while this court

has held that it cannot hear this case under the provisions
the Intemal Revenue code, in recognition of plaintiff spro re status the court

of

6/ The court
notes that if it has ened in its analysis and the limitations period in
651l(b)(2XA) is not jurisdictional, the court finds, in the altemative, that plaintiffs suit is
$
time-baned by $ 651 I (bX2)(A) and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
reliefmay be granted. Thus, in the event plaintiffs claim is not precluded by RCFC l2(bXl), it
still fails under RCFC l2(bX6).

l5

directs her attention to resources that might provide her with assistance. According
to the IRS website, "[i]f you have an ongoing issue with the IRS that has not been
resolved through normal processes, or you have suffered, or are about to suffer a
significant hardship/economic burden as a result of the administration of the tax
Iaws, contact the Taxpayer Advocate Service." Internal Revenue Service Help &
Resources, at http://www.irs.gov/Help-&-Resources (last visited July 24,2013).
The IRS website lists the phone number for the Local Taxpayer Advocate in
Chicago, Illinois as 312-292-3800, and national number for taxpayer advocates as
r-877 -777 -4778.

In addition, many attorneys provide voluntary legal services for persons who
cannot afford legal counsel. Such attomeys may offer their services through free
legal clinics, pro bono (volunteer) programs at law firms, or non-profit groups
dedicated to promoting access to justice. Ms. Martinez, if she wishes to continue to
pursue a tax refund for tax year 2005, could attempt to obtain representation from a
volunteer lawyer.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff s claim must be dismissed. Although the
court has sympathy for Ms. Martinez and her situation, the tax laws do not provide
her with a remedy from this court. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

(1)

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, filed April 3, 2013, is

GRANTED;

()\

The Clerk's Office is directed to ENTER final judgment in favor
defendant DISMISSING the complaint, without prejudice; and

(3)

Each party shall bear its own costs.

L

16

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