CASH v. USA
Filing
18
UNREPORTED OPINION granting 6 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis for purposes of filing the complaint; and granting 10 Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. The parties shall bear their own costs. Signed by Judge Nancy B. Firestone. (dls) Copy to parties.
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No. 14-510C
(Filed: January 13, 2015)
UNREPORTED
FILED
JAN
| 3 20t5
U.S. COURT OF
FEDERAL CLAIMS
MICHAEL LYNN CASH,
Plaintiff,
Pro se plaintiff; Third-party
beneficiary; 28 U.S.C. $ l49l
THE TINITED STATES,
Defendant.
OPINION GRANTING MOTIONTO DISMISS
Firestone, htdge.
Plaintiff Michael Lynn Cash ("Mr. Cash"), appearing
prS-Se,
filed
a
complaint and
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on June 16,2014. On August
lI,2014'
Mr. Cash amended his complaint. In his amended complaint, Mr. Cash claims to be
a
third-party beneficiary to an agreement between the United States Marshals Service
("Marshals Service") and the Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority ("County
Authority"). Under the agreement, the County Authority provides
space for the detention
of individuals charged with federal claims. The agreement sets minimum standards for
the conditions of confinement, including (1) trained
jail staffto supervise prisoners and
(2) full coverage of security posts and surveillance of inmates. Def.'s Mot., App. 6-7. To
ensure that these standards are met, the agreement provides for inspections ofthe County
Authority facility by the Marshals Service and authorizes the Marshals Service to share
the results of those inspections with the County Authority in order to improve facility
operations, the conditions of confinement, and levels of service.
Id. Mr.
Cash claims that
the United States breached the agreement by failing to "inspect the [County] facility" or
"investigate various inmate assaults" at the County facility. According to Mr. Cash, these
breaches resulted in Mr, Cash being assaulted by several violent inmates using
unsupervised tools while he was incarcerated at the County
facility. Mr. Cash further
alleges that the County facility was 300% over capacity. Mr. Cash seeks
"penalties/damages" for the alleged breach of contract.
On September 2,2014, the United States ("the govemment") moved to dismiss the
amended complaint. In its motion, the government argues pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l)
of
the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC") that the complaint filed
by Mr. Cash must be dismissed because this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
the claims made therein. In the alternative, the govemment argues pursuant to RCFC
12(bX6) that the complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. The government argues that Mr. Cash's claims relating to his
assault sound in tort and must be dismissed because, under 28 U.S.C. $ 1491(a)(1), this
court lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort. The govemment further argues that
this court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Cash's third-party beneficiary contract claim
because Mr. Cash has not alleged any facts to show that he was an intended, rather than
incidental, beneficiary of the Marshals Service agreement with the County Authority. In
the alternative, the govemment argues that the complaint fails to state a claim for breach
of contract. According to the government, the agreement did not provide rights for
inmates to sue in the event that the Marshals Service failed to inspect the Countv
facilities.
In response to the govemment's motion, Mr. Cash argues that he is not seeking
damages for a tort, but instead for a breach of contract. Further, plaintiff argues that he is
a
third-party beneficiary of the agreement at issue because the "care and safekeeping"
of
federal prisoners was among the stated purposes of the agreement. Mr. cash contends
that he has also stated a claim because the United States was required to assure
compliance with the minimum standards set in the contract. In the altemative, he argues
that the United States is authorized by the contract to hold the local government
accountable for any debt incurred pursuant to the contract. plaintiff argues that this
clause allows him to compel the federal govemment to collect damages for the breach
that he alleees.
DISCUSSION
a.
Standards of Review
without
States
a
waiver of sovereign immunity, no suit may be brought in the united
court of Federal claims. united states v. Mitchell,445 u.s. 535, 53g (19g0);
unitedstatesv.Testan,424u.s.392,39g(1976). SuchawaiverismadeintheTucker
Act, which grants this court jurisdiction over "any claim against the united states
founded either upon the constitution, or any Act ofcongress or any regulation ofan
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States. or
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
lagl(aXl).
tort'"
28 U.S'C. $
One requirement of such jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act is privity
of
contract between the plaintiff and the United States. Cieneea Gardens v. United States,
l94F.3d \231,1239 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Whetherthecourtpossesses jurisdictiontodecide
the merits of a case is a threshold matter, see PODS. Inc. v. Porta Stor. Inc., 484 F.3d
1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,
94-95 (1998), as a case cannot proceed if a cou( lacks jurisdiction to hear it, see
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) ("[W]hen a federal court concludes
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its
entirety." (citation omitted)). See generally John R. Sand & Gravel v. United States, 552
U.S. 130 (2008), affg 4s7 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matterjurisdiction, Alder
Tenace. Inc. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1372, 137'7 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing McNutt v.
Gen. Motors, 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936), and must do so by a preponderance of the
evidence, Reynolds v.
Arm!& Air Force
Exch. Serv. , 846
F
.2d 7 46, 748 (Fed. Cir.
1988). In ruling on such a motion, the court will "consider the facts alleged in the
complaint to be true and correct." Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d j95,797 (Fed. Cir.
1
995); Reynolds, 846 F.2d at 7 47 . In addition, the court may consider materials outside
of the pleadings to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim.
Aviation Software. Inc. v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 656,661 (2011) (citing Rocovich
v. United States,933F.2d99l,993 (Fed. Cir.
A
l99l)).
In addition, when considering the dismissal of
a Eq_qE
complaint, the court holds
"the pleading'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."'
Johnson v. United States,
4l I F. App'x 303, 305 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v.
Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (\972)). Despite this permissive standard,
a prcSE
plaintiff
must still satis$' the court's jurisdictional requirements. Bemard v. United States, 59
Fed.
cl.
497
, 499 (200a) ("This latitude, however, does not relieve a pro
se
plaintiff from
meeting jurisdictional requirements."), aff d 98 F. App'x 860 (Fed. Cir.2004).
b. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over plaintifps Claim
Because the plaintiff acknowledges that his case may be heard only if he is a third
party beneficiary of the agreement between the Marshals Service and the county, the
court
will focus on that question.r After considering
the arguments in the parties' brief-s,
the court finds that it must agree with the govemment that plaintiff is not an intended
third-party beneficiary and, therefore, that there is no waiver of sovereign immunity
and
this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. It is well-settled that
"before a stranger can avail himself of the exceptional privilege of suing for a breach
of
an agreement to which he is not a party, he must, at least, show that it was
intended for
' The govemment is correct that, to the extent plaintifPs claim sounds in tort, it cannot be heard
in this court. 28 u.s.c. $ lagl(a)(l). Moreovir, to the extent that Mr.
cash argue, tt ut t"
sue the united states to compel the_govemment to seek payment from the
courity Authority fbr a
t^oJtr
cout lacks equitable jurisdiction to sue on his behalf. united states v. iohono
ll-tis
o'odham Nation,
u.s.
131 s.ct. 1723, r72g (2011) 1,,unlit" tn" airt.i"t
however, the [court of Federal.claims] has no general power to provide equitable "ourtr,
reliefagainst
the Govemrnent or its officers." (citations omitted)); Visconi v. United staies, 455
F. App,x 9g6,
988 (Fed. Cir.2012) ("The Tucker Act does not provide irxlep"ndent j*isdi"tion
over ciaims for
equitable relief." (citing Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (ied. cir.
1997), rch'e
denied (1997))).
"-
-
-,
his direct benefit." German Alliance,226U.S.220,230 (1912); see also Sullivan v.
United States, 625F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir.2010) (quoting Montanav. United
States, 124 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). In other words, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the contract at issue was specifically intended to provide him with
protection from any harm while he was incarcerated in the County facility.
A review of the agreement between the Marshals Service and the County
Authority demonstrates that it was entered into to provide housing to federal prisoners
and did not give prisoners any special rights. In particular, the agreement states that its
purpose is to provide for the "detention ofpersons charged with or convicted
of
violations of federal law or held as material witnesses (federal prisoners) at the [county
Authority] facility." Def.'s Mot., App. 2. In exchange for payment and subject to certain
restrictions, the county Authority agreed to "accept and provide for the secure custody,
care and safekeeping offederal [sic] prisoners in accordance with federal, state, and local
law, standards, policies, procedures, or coufi orders applicable to the operations of the
facility." Id. The next
sentence of the agreement states that "[t]he [Marshals Service]
considers all federal prisoners medimn/maximum Isic] securitytype prisoners that are
housed within the confines of the facility, at a level appropriate for prisoners considered a
risk of flight, a danger to the community, or wanted by other jurisdictions.',
Id.
Thus,
while the agreement does provide certain minimum standards for the confinement of the
prisoners-which do not include protection of prisoners from other prisoners-it is clear
that the principal intent of the agreement is to house the prisoners in a way that keeps the
public safe and that the minimum standards are designed for this purpose. Nothing in the
agreement suggests that it was intended to give prisoners the right to enforce the
agreement or sue the United States in the event the United States Marshals Service failed
to inspect the County facility or protect individual inmates from other inmates.2 The
court therefore finds that plaintiff is not an intended third-party beneficiary of the
agreement but rather, at best, an incidental beneficiary. As a result, a waiver of sovereign
immunity, which is necessary for this court to have jurisdiction, does not exist.
II,
CONCLUSION
Because the
plaintiff is not a third-party beneficiary to the agreement between the
Marshals Service and the County, sovereign immunity is not waived and the court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the case. Accordingly, the government's motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED.3 The Clerk is directed to enter judgment
accordingly. The parties shall bear their own costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Judge
2
Indeed, where the parties intended to do so, the agreement does specifically discuss third-party
liability. First, when transporting prisoners for medical treatment or to a federal courthouse, the
County Authority "agrees to hold harmless and indemnify the [Marshals Service] from any
liability, including third-party liability or workers' compensation, arising from the conduct of
localjail employees . . . ." Def.'s Mot., App 7-8. In both cases, it is clear that the third-pa(ies
considered are members of the public. Even so, the agreement does not grant any additional
rights to those third-parties, but rather confirms the liable party.
3
Plaintiff additionally moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Docket No. 6. That motion
is GRANTED for purposes of filing the complaint.
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