OLAJIDE v. USA

Filing 11

Order of Dismissal.. granting 4 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; granting 6 Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)(1) and (6); finding as moot 9 Motion ; finding as moot 10 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Judge Lydia Kay Griggsby. (ew) Service on parties made. Tracking #7012 3460 0001 7791 8644.

RIGINAL
3Jn tbe Wniteb ~tates (lCourt of jfeberal (lClaitns

FILED

No. 17-1363C
Filed March 6, 2018

MAR - 6 2018

OLADAPO AD OLAJIDE,
Plaintiff,
V.

THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.

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U.S. COURT OF
FEDERAL CLAIMS

Pro Se; RCfC l 2(b)( 1), Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction; RCFC 12(b)(6), Failure to
State a Claim; Money-Mandating Source
of Law; Implied-in-Fact Contract;
Takings.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ )
Oladapo ad Olajide, Oakland, CA, plaintiff pro se.
Devin A. Wolack, Trial Attorney, Elizabeth M Ho~ford, Assistant Director, Robert E.
Kirschman, Jr., Director, Chad A. Readier, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division. United States Department of Justice, Washington.
DC, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM O PINION AND ORDER
GRIGGSBY, Judge

I.

INTR ODUCTION
PJajntiffpro se, Oladapo ad Olajide, brings this breach of contract and takings action

against the United States seeking certain monetary damages and injunctive relief. See generally
Com pl. The government has moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to Rules
12(b)(l) and (b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Comi of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). See
generally Def. Mot. Plaintiff has also filed a motion to proceed in this matter in forma pauperis
and a motion requesting that the Court take judicial notice of adjudicative facts. Pl. Mot. for
Leave to Proceed Jn Forma Pauperis; Pl. Mot. for Judicial Notice.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) GRANTS the government's motion to
dismiss; (2) GRANTS plaintiffs motion to proceed in.forma pauperis; (3) DENIES as moot

7012 3460 0001 7791 8644

plaintiff's motion requesting that the Court take judicial notice of adjudicative facts; DENIES as
moot the government's motion for an extension of time to respond to plaintiff's motion
requesting that the Court take judicial notice of adjudicative facts; and (4) DISMISSES the
complaint.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff prose, Oladapo ad Olajide, commenced this action on September 27, 2017. See

generally Comp!. Plaintiff's complaint is difficult to follow. But, it appears that plaintiff asserts

breach of contract, "breach of the implied covenant of trust," and a Fifth Amendment takings
claims in the complaint. Id. at Counts I, II and III.
In this regard, plaintiff alleges that, after his arrest in 1985, the United States maintained
possession of certain of his property rights-including his fingerprints and family namethereby depriving plaintiff of the use of this property. See Comp!. at ir 10. Specifically, plaintiff
alleges that, on or about April 20, 1985, "unknown men [acting on behalf of the United States,]
... physically took possession" of his person by capturing his "likeness, fingerprints, given
names and family name." Id. at Ex. A at 2; see also id. at ii I O(B). Plaintiff also alleges that he
became aware more recently that "the United States has executed and used [its] civil legislative
powers to regulate the value of [m]oney and commerce as described in the [United States]
Constitution to physically take occupancy and possession of his Title of Ownership to his
Natural Liberty." Id. at ii 5. And so, plaintiff claims that the United States has maintained
possession of his private property, by keeping and using it "within the United States' debt
security instruments, databases, documents and records." Id. at iJ IO(C).
In addition, plaintiff alleges that, on August 22, 2017, he presented "a private bill of
exchange" to United States Representative Barbara Lee, "who has the authority to bind the
United States in contract." Id. at ii 7, Ex. A. Plaintiff further alleges that he mailed a "certified
agreement" to Representative Lee, specifying the government's failure to respond to plaintiff's

1

The facts recounted in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are taken from plaintiff's complaint
("Compl."), defendant's motion to dismiss ("Def. Mot."), and plaintiff's response and opposition to
defendant's motion to dismiss ("Pl. Resp."). Unless otherwise noted herein, the facts recited are
undisputed.

2

private bill of exchange and requesting payment under the government's obligations in the
private bill of exchange. Id.

at~

9, Ex. B.

In this regard, plaintiff contends that Representative Lee failed to rebut any of the claims
or facts presented in his private bill of exchange and in his certified agreement. Id.

at~

9. And

so, plaintiff maintains that, by failing to do so, "the United States has agreed and stipulated" to
certain facts and that the United States owes him "full payment of his fee for [its] public taking
and usage of his exclusive property interest." Id.

at~

10. As relief, plaintiff seeks, among other

things, monetary damages "in the amount of one trillion dollars" and "a writ of mandamus
commanding the United States to return to plaintiff his occupancy and possession of his title of
ownership to his natural liberty." Id. at Prayer for Relief.

B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this matter and a motion to proceed in forma pauper is on
September 27, 2017. See generally Comp!.; Pl. Mot. for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.
On November 27, 2017, the government filed a motion for summary dismissal of the complaint,
pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l) and (b)(6). See generally Def. Mot. On December 11, 2017,
plaintiff filed a response and opposition to the government's motion to dismiss. See generally
Pl. Resp. On February 13, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the Court take judicial
notice of adjudicative facts. See generally Pl. Mot. for Judicial Notice.
The Court resolves the pending motions.

III.

JURISDICTION AND LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Pro Se Litigants
Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter prose. The Court recognizes that parties proceeding

pro se are granted greater leeway than litigants represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding that prose complaints are held to "less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"). Nonetheless, "[w]hile a court should be receptive to

prose plaintiffs and assist them, justice is ill-served when a jurist crosses the line from finder of
fact to advocate." Demes v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 369 (2002). And so, the Court may
excuse ambiguities in plaintiff's complaint, but the Court does not excuse the complaint's
failures. See Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

3

In addition, this Court has long recognized that "the leniency afforded to a prose litigant
with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements."
Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007). For this reason, a prose plaintiff-like
any other plaintiff-must establish the Court's jurisdiction to consider a claim by a
preponderance of the evidence. Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010).

B. RCFC 12(b)(l)
When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court must
assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable
inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197,
167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1325, 1327-28 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); see also RCFC l 2(b)(I). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter
jurisdiction, and he must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air
Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). And so, should the Court determine that
"it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, it must dismiss the claim." Matthews v. United
States, 72 Fed. Cl. 274, 278 (2006); see also RCFC 12(h)(3).
In this regard, the United States Court of Federal Claims is a court oflimited jurisdiction
and "possess[es] only that power authorized by Constitution and statute .... " Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Specifically, the Tucker Act grants the
Court jurisdiction over:
[A]ny claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or
any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l). The Tucker Act is, however, "a jurisdictional statute; it does not
create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages .... [T]he
Act merely confers jurisdiction upon [the United States Court of Federal Claims] whenever the
substantive right exists." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). And so, to come
within the jurisdictional reach and waiver of the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify and plead a
money-mandating constitutional provision, statute or regulation; an express or implied contract
with the United States; or an illegal exaction of money by the United States that creates the right
to money damages. Cabral v. United States, 317 F. App'x 979, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing

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Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also Martinez v. United
States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2003). "[A] statute or regulation is money-mandating for

jurisdictional purposes if it 'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages
sustained as a result of the breach of the duties [it] imposes."' Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1173 (quoting
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983)) (brackets in original). If the Court finds that

the source oflaw alleged is not money-mandating, the Court must dismiss the case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Id; see also RCFC 12(b)(l).

C. RCFC 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6), the government may move for dismissal of the complaint if
the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." RCFC 12(b)(6). To
survive a motion to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Pleadings must establish "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
"A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements
ofa cause of action will not do."' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). And so, "a prose
plaintiff still must establish the requisite elements of his claim." See Sahagun-Pelayo v. United
States, 602 F. App'x 822, 824 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Humphrey v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl.

593, 595 (2002)) (rejecting a prose plaintiffs contract claim under Rule !2(b)(6) where plaintiff
failed to allege the actual authority of an individual, specific agents with whom he contracted and
where the complaint made legal conclusions not entitled to favorable factual inferences).

D. Contracts With The United States
Under the Tucker Act, the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to consider express
or implied-in-fact contract claims against the United States. See Aboo v. United States, 86 Fed.
Cl. 618, 626-27 (2009). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of a contract with the
United States and he must demonstrate that there is "something more than a cloud of evidence

5

that could be consistent with a contract to prove a contract and enforceable contract rights." D &

N Bank v. United States, 331F.3d1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
To pursue a breach of contract claim against the United States under the Tucker Act,
plaintiff must have privity of contract with the United States. Flex/ab, L.L.C. v. United States,
424 F.3d 1254, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The "government consents to be sued only by those with
whom it has privity of contract.") (citations omitted). Plaintiff must also support his contract
claim with well-pleaded allegations going to each element of a contract. See Crewzers Fire

Crew Transp. Inc. v. United States, 741F.3d1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that to invoke
the jurisdiction of this Court under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must present a well-pleaded
allegation that its claims arose out of a valid contract with the United States); see also RCFC
9(k) ("In pleading a claim founded on a contract or treaty, a party must identify the substantive
provisions of the contract or treaty on which the party relies."); Gonzalez-McCaullaey Inv. Grp.,

Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 710, 715 (2010).
The requirements for establishing a contract with the United States are identical for
express and implied-in-fact contracts. See Night Vision Corp. v. United States, 469 F.3d 1369,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Huntington Promotional & Supply, LLC v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl.
760, 767 (2014) ("The elements are the same for an express or implied-in-fact contract .... ").
Specifically, a plaintiff must show: (1) mutuality of intent; (2) consideration; (3) lack of
ambiguity in the offer and acceptance; and (4) actual authority to bind the government in
contract on the part of the government official whose conduct is relied upon. Kam-Almaz v.

United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United
States, 104F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir.1997).
A government official's authority to bind the United States must be express or implied.

Roy v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 184, 188-89, dismissed, 124 F.3d 224 (Fed. Cir. 1997). And so,
"the [g]overnment, unlike private parties, cannot be bound by the apparent authority of its
agents." Id. at 187. In this regard, a government official possesses express actual authority to
bind the United States in contract "only when the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation grants it
to that agent in unambiguous terms." Jumah v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 603, 612 (2009), ajf'd,
385 F. App'x 987 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see also City ofEl Centro v. United

States, 922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). On the other hand, a government

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official possesses implied actual authority to bind the United States in contract "when the
employee cannot perform his assigned tasks without such authority and when the relevant
agency's regulations do not grant the authority to other agency employees." SGS-92-XOOJ v.

United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 637, 652 (2006) (citations omitted); see also Aboo, 86 Fed. Cl. at 627
(stating that implied actual authority "is restricted to situations where 'such authority is
considered to be an integral part of the duties assigned to a [g]overnment employee."') (brackets
in original) (quoting H Landau & Co. v. United States, 886 F.2d 322, 324 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). In
addition, when a government agent does not possess express or implied actual authority to bind
the United States in contract, the government can still be bound by contract if the contract was
ratified by an official with the necessary authority. Janowsky v. United States, 133 F.3d 888,
891-92 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 2

E. Fifth Amendment Takings
The United States Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over Fifth
Amendment takings claims in excess of$10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a); see also Acceptance Ins.

Cos. Inc. v. United States, 503 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment guarantees just compensation whenever private property is taken for public
use. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to prevent the
"[g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Penn Central Tramp. Co. v. City ofNew

York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (l 978)(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960));
see also Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
To have a cause of action for a Fifth Amendment takings, a plaintiff must point to a
protectable property interest that is asserted to be the subject of the takings. See Phillips v.

Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) ("Because the Constitution protects rather than

2

Ratification may take place at the individual or institutional level. SGS-92-XOOJ, 74 Fed. Cl. at 653-54.
Individual ratification occurs when a supervisor: (I) possesses the actual authority to contract; (2) fully
knew the material facts surrounding the unauthorized action of his or her subordinate; and (3) knowingly
confirmed, adopted, or acquiesced to the unauthorized action of the subordinate. Id. at 654 (quoting
Leonardo v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 552, 560 (2005)). In contrast, institutional ratification occurs
when the government "seeks and receives the benefits from an otherwise unauthorized contract." Id. at
654; see alsoJanowsky, 133 F.3d at 891-92.

7

creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by reference to
'existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law."')
(citation omitted). Under the Takings Clause, "property" is defined as a "legally-recognized
property interest such as one in real estate, personal property, or intellectual property." Adams v.

United States, 391F.3d1212, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (clarifying that an ordinary obligation to pay
money does not constitute "property" under the Takings Clause). Contract rights can also be the
subject ofa takings action. See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) ("Valid
contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the
United States.").
In addition, courts have traditionally divided the analysis of Fifth Amendment takings
into two categories-regulatory takings and physical takings. In this regard, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recognized that "[g]overnment action that does not
directly appropriate or invade, physically destroy, or oust an owner from property but is overly
burdensome may be a regulatory taking." A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d
1142, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In assessing whether a regulatory takings has occurred, courts
generally employ the balancing test set forth in Penn Central, weighing the character of the
government action, the economic impact of that action, and the reasonableness of the property
owner's investment-backed expectations. Penn Central Tramp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124-25. "The
general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking." Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922);

see also Lingle v. Chevron US.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (holding a regulation is a
takings if it is "so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster").
In contrast, physical or per se takings occur when the government's action amounts to a
physical occupation or invasion of the property, including the functional equivalent of "a
practical ouster of [the property owner's] possession." Tramportation Co. v. Chic., 99 U.S. 635,
642 (1879); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-28
(l 982). When an owner has suffered a physical invasion of his property, the United States
Supreme Court has noted that "no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty
the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505U.S.1003, 1015, 112S.Ct.2886, 120L.Ed.2d798(1992). Thedistinctionbetweena
physical invasion and a governmental activity that merely impairs the use of that property turns

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on whether the intrusion is "so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full
enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation ofit." United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 265, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206 (1946).
IV.

DISCUSSION
The government has moved to dismiss this action upon three grounds: First, the

government argues that the Court should dismiss this matter for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, because plaintiff does not allege a violation of a money-mandating federal statute or
regulation in the complaint. Def. Mot. at 4; see also RCFC 12(b)(l). Second, the government
argues that dismissal of the complaint is also warranted, because the complaint does not
plausibly establish the existence of either an express or implied-in-fact contract between plaintiff
and the government. Def. Mot. at 5; see also RCFC 12(b)(6). Lastly, the government argues
that the Court should also dismiss this matter because plaintiff fails to allege a plausible takings
claim. Def. Mot. at 6; see also RCFC 12(b)(6).
For the reasons set forth below, a careful reading of the complaint shows that plaintiff has
not established the existence of an express or implied-in-fact contract with the government.
Plaintiff also fails to identify a government action that resulted in the alleged taking of his
property in the complaint. In addition, plaintiff fails to identify a money-mandating source of
law that would otherwise permit him to bring this action under the Tucker Act. And so, the
Court GRANTS the government's motion to dismiss and dismisses this matter pursuant to
RCFC 12(b)(l) and (b)(6).
A. The Court May Not Consider Plaintifrs Breach Of Contract Claim
As an initial matter, the Court must dismiss plaintiff's breach of contract claim for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. RCFC 12(b)(l). A careful reading of the complaint shows that
plaintiff has not established that he has entered into either an express or an implied-in-fact
contract with the United States. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216-17.
In this regard, it is well-established that plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
existence of an express or implied contract with the United States. See D & N Bank, 331 F.3d at
1376. To do so, plaintiff must allege facts in the complaint that plausibly demonstrate: (!)
mutuality of intent; (2) consideration; (3) lack of ambiguity in the offer and acceptance; and (4)

9

actual authority to bind the government in contract on the part of the government official whose
conduct is relied upon. Kam-Almaz, 682 F.3d at 1368; see also Trauma Serv. Grp., 104 F.3d at
1325. In addition, plaintiff must demonstrate that there is "something more than a cloud of
evidence that could be consistent with a contract to prove a contract and enforceable contract
rights." D & N Bank, 331 F.3d at 1376.
Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege facts in the complaint to establish that he has entered
into either an express or implied-in-fact contract with the government in this case. In the
complaint, plaintiff alleges that he entered into a binding contract with the government because
he mailed a private bill of exchange and a certified agreement to Representative Barbara Lee.
Comp!.

at~

10. But, even ifthe Court accepts that plaintiffs mailings constitute a valid offer to

enter into a contract, plaintiff alleges no facts to establish that a government representative with
the authority to bind the government in contract actually accepted this offer. Def. Mot. at 2, 5-6;
Comp!.

at~~

7, 21; see also Kam-Almaz, 682 F .3d at 1368; Jumah, 90 Fed. Cl. at 612.

Indeed, while plaintiff maintains that Representative Lee accepted his offer by simply
failing to respond to his mailings, such silence is not sufficient to contractually bind the
government. See Northrop v. United States, No. 06-294 C, 2006 WL 5649845, at* I (Fed. Cl.
July 19, 2006) (quoting Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States, 142 F.3d 1429,
1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Bedell v. United States, No. 15-522C, 2015 WL 4481266, at *2
(Fed. Cl. July 22, 2015) (holding that "[a]ctive acceptance, however, not silence, is required for
the government to be bound by a contract"). Given this, plaintiff has not established the
existence of a valid contract with the United States in the complaint. And so, plaintiff fails to
establish that the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to consider his breach of contract
claim. RCFC l 2(b)(I). 3

B. Plaintiff Fails To State A Plausible Takings Claim
The Court must also dismiss plaintiffs takings claim. Even the most generous reading of
the complaint makes clear that plaintiff fails to state a plausible takings claim. RCFC 12(b)(6).

3

Because plaintiffs "breach of implied covenant of trust" claim appears to be based upon his breach of
contract claim, the Court also dismisses this claim pursuant to RCFC I 2(b )(I).

IO

It is well-established that, to allege a plausible takings claim, plaintiff must identify a
cognizable property interest and a government action that resulted in the taking of his property.
A & D Auto Sales, Inc., 748 F .3d at 1151; Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 13 70,
1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In the complaint, plaintiff appears to allege an unconstitutional
takings resulted from his arrest in 1985. Comp!. at iii! 5, I O(B). But, to the extent that plaintiff is
challenging his arrest, he asserts either a habeas corpus or due process claim that falls outside of
the Court's limited jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. See LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d
I 025, I 028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction under the Tucker Act because it does not mandate payment of
money by the government); Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(finding that the Court of Federal Claims is not empowered to grant a writ of habeas corpus); see
also Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997); cf United States v.
Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding that the Court of Federal Claims has no
jurisdiction based on the First Amendment).
In addition, to the extent that plaintiff identifies a cognizable property interest in the
complaint, he fails to allege any facts regarding the government action that resulted in the alleged
taking of this property. Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that the United States maintained
possession of his private property "by keeping and using [it] within the United States' debt
security instruments, databases, documents and records." Comp!. at iJ IO(C). But, plaintiff does
not identify a particular federal law or regulation that caused this alleged taking to occur. See
generally Comp!. Because the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations to identify the
government action that resulted in the alleged taking of plaintiffs property, the Court must
dismiss plaintiffs takings claim. RCFC !2(b)(6).
C. Plaintiff Fails To Identify A Money-Mandating Source Of Law
Lastly, to the extent that the complaint can be reasonably construed to allege a claim
based upon a violation of a federal statue or regulation, plaintiff fails to identify a moneymandating source oflaw upon which to base his claims. Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1172. Plaintiff fails
to point to a money-mandating federal statute on regulation that could form the legal basis of his
claims in the complaint. See generally Comp!. Given this, plaintiff has simply not established
that the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to consider these claims. RCFC 12(b)(l).

II

D. The Court Grants Plaintiff's Motion To Proceed In Forma Pauperis
And Denies Plaintiff's Motion To Take Judicial Notice Of Adjudicative Facts
As a final matter, plaintiff has filed a motion to proceed in this litigation without paying
the Court's filing fee and a motion requesting that the Court take judicial notice of certain
adjudicative facts. Pl. Mot. for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis; Pl. Mot. for Judicial
Notice. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this Court may authorize commencement ofa suit without
prepayment of fees when a plaintiff is "unable to pay such fees or give security therefor." Moore
v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 411, 413 (2010); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l). The decision to
allow a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauper is "is left to the discretion of the presiding judge,
based on the information submitted by the plaintiff." Moore, 93 Fed. Cl. at 413. In addition,
courts have interpreted inability to pay to mean that "paying such fees would constitute a serious
hardship on the plaintiff, not that such payment would render plaintiff destitute." Id. at 414
(citing Fiebelkorn v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, plaintiff states that he is currently unemployed and unable to pay the Court's
filing fee. Pl. Mot. for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Because plaintiff has demonstrated
that the requirement to pay the Court's filing fee would constitute a serious financial hardship,
the Court GRANTS plaintiffs motion to proceed informa pauperis for the limited purpose of
resolving jurisdictional issues raised in the government's motion to dismiss. In addition, because
the Court concludes that it does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs
contract claims-and that plaintiff fails to allege a plausible takings claim-the Court denies as
moot plaintiffs motion requesting that the Court take judicial notice of adjudicative facts.

V.

CONCLUSION
In sum, when read in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the complaint makes clear that

plaintiff has not established the existence of an express or implied-in-fact contract with the
government to establish that the Court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction to consider his
breach of contract and "breach of the implied covenant of trust" claims. Dismissal of plaintiffs
takings claim is also warranted, because plaintiff fails to identify any government action that
could have resulted in the alleged taking of his property. Plaintiff also fails to identify a moneymandating source of law that would otherwise permit him to bring his claims under the Tucker
Act.

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Because the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs
contract claims-and that plaintiff fails to allege a plausible takings claim-plaintiffs motion
requesting that the Court take notice of certain adjudicative facts is moot. Lastly, plaintiff has
demonstrated that he is entitled to a waiver of the Court's filing fee.
And so, for the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(I) GRANTS the goverrunent's motion to dismiss;

(2) GRANTS plaintiffs motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis;
(3) DENIES as moot plaintiffs motion requesting that the Court to take judicial notice
of adjudicative facts;
(4) DENIES as moot the government's motion for an extension of time to respond to
plaintiffs motion requesting that the court take judicial notice of adjudicative facts;
and
(5) DISMISSES the complaint.
The Clerk's Office is directed to ENTER judgment accordingly.
Lastly, plaintiff has filed three cases before this Court-including this matter-since
November 2015 that have been dismissed upon jurisdictional grounds. See Olajide v. United
States, Case No. 16-1594C, 2017 WL 3225048 (Fed. Cl. July 31, 2017); see also Olajide v.
United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 196 (2015). 4 Given this, it is further ORDERED that, the Clerk is
directed to accept no further filings by Oladapo ad Olajide without an Order granting leave to file
such filings from the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims. In seeking leave
to file any future actions, Mr. Olajide shall explain how his complaint raises new matters
properly before this Court. See RCFC 11 (b) and (c) (barring the filing of unwarranted or
frivolous claims that have no evidentiary support).

4

In earlier cases, Mr. Olajide represented that his name was "Olanapo." A comparison of the complaints
and pleadings of all three cases demonstrates that the plaintiff in all three cases is Mr. Olajide.

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No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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