BROWN v. USA

Filing 6

Order of Dismissal. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Judge Thomas C. Wheeler. (dls) Copy to parties. (Plaintiff served via certified mail; Article No. 7017 1450 0000 1346 0874)

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No. 17-1605C

(Filed: November 14, 2017)
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KAWANA BROWN,

FILED
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U.S. COURT OF
FEDERAL CLAIMS

Ptaintiff,

TI.IE UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
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DISMISSAL ORDER
WHEELER, Judge.

Plaintiff Kawana Brown filed a pro se complaint in this Court, alleging that the
United States entered into adhesion and maritime contracts with her. Pursuant to its
inhcrent authority, the Court sua sponte DIMISSES Ms. Brown's complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction because she has neither alleged sufficient facts to support the
claim that she has a contract with the government nor identified a separate source of
substantive law creating a right to monetary damages.
Background
On October 25, 201'7 , Ms. Brown filed a complaint in this Court, alleging that the
United States coerced her into "express, implied, adhesion, and quasi contracts" related to
her criminal conviction in Florida. Compl. at 4. Ms. Brown also claims that the United
States entered into a maritime contract with her but does not provide any further
information about these alleeations. Id. at 1.

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Discussion
Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time by the court sua sponte.
See. e.e., Toohe), v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl.9'1 ,98 (2012). When deciding whether
there is subject-matter jurisdiction, the court "accepts as true all uncontroverted factual
allegations in the complaint, and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."
Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689,692 (Fed. Cir.2014). Althoughpro se
litigants are generally held to a lower standard in their pleadings, a pro se plaintiff must
still prove subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Lensen v.
United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (201 I ).

Under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate that a contract
exists either between herself and the United States, or a plaintiff must allege that she is
entitled to monetary relief under a separate, money-mandating source of law. 28 U.S.C. $
1491;seealsoFisherv.UnitedStates,402F.3d1167.,ll72(Fed.Cir.2005). Theseparate
source of substantive law is considered money-mandating if it "can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of the breach of the duties [it]
impose[s]." Fisher at 1173 (quoting United States v. Mitchell,463 U.S. 206,21'7 (1983)).
To establish a valid contract with the government, a plaintiff must show: (1) mutual
intent; (2) consideration; (3) an unambiguous offer and acceptance; and (4) actuai authority
on the part of the government's representative to bind the government in contract. See
Kam-Almaz v. United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In her complaint, Ms.
Brown makes a claim about entering into adhesion contracts but does not give any
explanation that would allow the Court to conclude that a contract actually exists between
her and the government. As such, this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
complaint. Additionally, while Ms. Brown asks the Court for relief, she fails to identify a
separate source of substantive law creating a right to monetary damages. Therefore, this
Court lacks jurisdiction over Ms. Brown's claim.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Ms. Brown's complaint without
prejudice for lack of subj ect-matter j urisdiction. The Clerk ofthe Court is directed to enter
judgment accordingly. No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
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THOMAS C. WHEELER
Judge