GRANT v. USA

Filing 5

Order of Dismissal and denying 4 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Tracking #7017 1450 0000 1346 0799. Signed by Senior Judge Loren A. Smith. (ew) Copy to parties.

OtdGINAL
Wniteb $tates QCourt of jfeberal QCiaims
No. 17-1 785 C
Filed: November 21, 20 17

FILED
NOV 2 1 2017

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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THE UNITED STATES,
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Defendant.
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U.S. COURT OF
FEDERAL CLAIMS

WILLIAM LEE GRANT, II,

Pro Se; Sua Sponte Dismissal; Lack of
Subject Matter of Jurisdiction; In Forma
Pauperis Application

OPINION AND ORDER

SMITH, Senior Judge
On November 13, 2017, plaintiff, proceedingpro se, filed a complaint in this Comt and
concunently filed an in forma pauperis application seeking leave to proceed without paying the
Court filing fee . Plaintiffs Complaint alleges, inter alia, that the government failed to
investigate and prosecute wrongdoing on the part of state and federal officials in connection with
various alleged conspiracies. Plaintiff is seeking a review of a federal district court case and $30
trillion in damages.
Upon sua sponte review, this Court finds plaintiffs allegations do not give rise to any
cause of action over which this Court has subj ect-matter jurisdiction. The Court has no authority
to decide plaintiffs case, and therefore must dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of
the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC").

I.

Background

Plaintiff, Mr. Grant, has filed numerous, nearly identical complaints in federal courts
across the country over the last several years, including a previous filing in this Court. See Grant
v. Kabaker, 17-CV-3257 (C.D. Ill., Nov. 7, 2017) (denying plaintiffs informa pauperis motion
and dismissing his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 19 15(e)(2)(B)); Grant v. Schmidt, 17-CV-3215
(C.D. Ill., Oct. 2, 2017) (denying plaintiffs informa pauperis motion and dismissing his
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Grantv. US. Department ofJustice, 17-CV-1434
(D.C., Aug. 4, 2017) (granting plaintiffs in for ma pauper is motion and dismissing with
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Grant v. United States, 16-CV-1 621 (Fed. Cl., Jan.
17, 2017); Grant v. Kabaker et al., No. 16-CV-3245 (C.D. Ill., Oct. 12, 2016) (granting
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim); Grant v.

7017 14 50 ODDO 1346 0799

Kabaker et al., No. 16-CV-3239 (C.D. Ill., Sept. 6, 2016) (dismissing plaintiffs claims as
frivolous and denying plaintiffs motion to proceed informa pauperis); Grant v. Kabaker et al.,
No. l 6-CV-3132 (C.D. Ill., June 20, 2016) (dismissing plaintiffs claims as frivolous and
denying plaintiff's motion to proceed informa pauperis).
In Grant v. United States, this Court dismissed plaintiff's Complaint as frivolous, in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
RCFC 12(h)(3). See Grant v. United States, 16-CV-1621, ECF No. 6. Further, Mr. Grant's in
forma pauperis application was denied due to his history of duplicative and vexatious litigation.
Id. at 4.
In this Complaint, Mr. Grant repeats the allegations from his previous filings and
includes details on the aforementioned dismissals of his many cases. See generally Complaint
(hereinafter "Comp!."). The repeated allegations include claims of conspiracy against several
government figures and entities, including former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, Illinois
Gov. Bruce Rauner, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, fotmer U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, former Cook County District Attorney Anita Alvarez, and former Chicago Mayor
Richard M. Daley. Comp!. at 1-2. Mr. Grant also states that he was planted in the State of
Illinois government to become an informant for the U.S. Depatiment of Justice. Id. at 8.
While it is difficult to discern the true nature of Mr. Grant's grievances, he states that he
has been denied access "to [a]ppeal in the Seventh Circuit of Federal Appeals, and asks this [sic]
Supreme Court of the United States to review the record of the matter docketed as 16-CV-3245,
and award Petitioner []requested compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $30
[t]rillion." Id. at 15.

II.

Standard of Review

This Comi's jurisdictional grant is primarily defined by the Tucker Act, which provides
this Court the power "to render any judgment upon any claim against the United States founded
either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States ... in cases not
sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l). Although the Tucker Act expressly waives the
sovereign immunity of the United States against such claims, it "does not create any substantive
right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Rather, in order to fall within the scope of the Tucker Act, "a plaintiff
must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages."
Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane in relevant part).
"Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists .... " Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). If the Court lacks jurisdiction, it
cannot proceed with the action and must dismiss the case. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
514 (2006). RCFC 12(h)(3) provides: "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, the comi must dismiss the action."

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In determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, the Court will treat factual
allegations in the complaint as true and will construe them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis
added). Further, pleadings from pro se plaintiffs are held to more lenient standards than
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); see also Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This leniency, however, does not extend to saving a complaint
that lies outside of this Court's jurisdiction. "Despite this permissive standard, a pro se plaintiff
must still satisfy the comi'sjurisdictional requirements." Trevino v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl.
204, 208 (2013), ajj'd, 557 F. App'x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Prose or not, the
plaintiff still has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that this Court
has jurisdiction over its claims. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 511 U.S. 375,
377 (1994).

III.

Discussion
A.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Mr. Grant fails to establish any claim over which this Court has jurisdiction. While the
Complaint includes extreme and outrageous allegations of government cmTuption and
conspiracy, the plaintiffs only real request for relief appears to be a collateral attack on the
decision of the district court in Illinois. See Comp!. at 15 ("to review the record of the matter
docketed as 16-CV-3245, and award Petitioner[] requested compensatory and punitive
damages").
The Tucker Act does not provide this Court with jurisdiction to entertain collateral
attacks on decisions of state or federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a); see, e.g., Shinnecock
Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Binding precedent
establishes that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a decision
rendered by a federal district court."). Therefore, Mr. Grant's request to review the other court's
decision is outside of this Court's jurisdiction and must be dismissed.
Dismissal is also required upon a determination that a complaint is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (defining when an action lacks an arguable basis in law or in
fact). Frivolous complaints are "those in which the factual allegations are so unbelievable that
there is no need for an evidentiary hearing to determine their veracity." Taylor v. United States,
568 F. App'x 890, 891 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (frivolous claims include
those that describe "fantastic or delusional scenarios"). A comi is required to dismiss a frivolous
complaint from a litigant who is proceeding informa pauperis. 1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It
is clear Mr. Grant has a history of filing frivolous complaints, and this case is no exception. In

1

While the Comi of Federal Claims is not generally considered to be a "comi of the
United States" within the meaning of Title 28 of the United States Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2503(d)
deems the Court of Federal Claims to be a "court of the United States" for purposes of28 U.S.C.
§ 1915.

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the case at bar, the plaintiff again repeats the same unbelievable allegations, in the hopes that this
Court might believe them.
B.

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

As noted above, Mr. Grant filed an application to proceed informa pauperis. Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915, federal courts are permitted to waive filing fees under ce1iain circumstances.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l); see also Waltner v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 139, 141 (2010). The
statute requires that an applicant be "unable to pay such fees." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l). To be
'"unable to pay such fees ' means that paying such fees would constitute a serious hardship on the
plaintiff." Fiebelkorn v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007); see also Moore v. United
States, 93 Fed. Cl. 411, 414-15 (2010).
Although it is possible that the fees could prove to be a hardship for Mr. Grant, the
plaintiffs repeated filings of frivolous complaints and his history of vexatious litigation leads the
Court to find that the plaintiff is not entitled to a waiver of the filing fee.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, plaintiff's Complaint is, sua sponte,
DISMISSED pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3) for lack of jurisdiction, and plaintiffs informa
pauperis application is DENIED. The Clerk is hereby directed to enter judgment consistent with
this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

«orellASmith, Senior Judge

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