HENDRICKS v. USA

Filing 8

Order denying, as moot, 7 Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)(1) and (6); and dismissing plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. No costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Eric G. Bruggink. (dls) Service on parties made. (Plaintiff served via certified mail; Article No. 7016 3010 0000 4308 4713)

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No. 18-500C
(Filed:July 18,2018)

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FILED
JUL 1 I 2018
U.S. COURT OF
FEDERAL CLAIMS

CRAIG ANDREW I{ENDRICKS,

Plaintffi

THE I.J"NITED STATES,
Defendant.

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ORDER

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed his complaint on April 4,2018,
alleging that the Federal Bureau ofPrisons' policy "restricting pomographic
images" has harmed inmates and violates their Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment. Compl. fl 1. Plaintiffseeks a change in
prison policy to allow him to supply each inmate with an image-only
publication. Defendant has moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff has not
responded to the motion. We need not wait for a response, however, because
it is clear from the face of the complaint that plaintiffhas not alleged a claim
over which this court has jurisdiction.

While pro se plaintiffs are afforded latitude in their pleadings, we
cannot excuse jurisdictional failings. See Henke v. United States,60F .3d795,
799 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv.,846 F.2d
'746,748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Jurisdiction is a threshold matter that the court may
raise sua sponte at any time. Folden v. United States,379 F.3d 1344, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2004); RCFC l2(hX3).
Our primary grant ofjurisdiction is the Tucker Act, which authorizes
us to "render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded

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either upon the constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."
28 U.S.C. $ la91(a)(1) (2012). The complaint "must contain a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" and "identifu any basis
for jurisdiction in this court" or it will be dismissed. Brooker v. (lnited States,
107 Fed. Cl. 52, 57 (2012) (qtoting Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv. ,
846 F.2d 746,748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See a/so RCFC 8(a)(1). Because the
Tucker Act does not create any substantive right that a plaintiff may enforce
against the United States for money damages, plaintiff must identifu a separate
source of authority that mandates that he be paid money by the United States.
United States v. Testan, 424 U .5. 392, 398 (197 6).

Plaintiffs complaint failed to identifu a substantive source of law or
confiact mandating that the federal govemment pay plaintiff a sum of money.
Instead, plaintiffoffered an argument against current federal prison policy and
requested a change in that policy. Plaintiff s request for "sexual relief' for all
prisoners is not based on an action for money damages against the United
States. Compl. Ul 2.
It is also well established that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain
plaintiff s claim based upon an alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition ofcruel and unusual punishment. Se e, e.g., Trafny v. United States,
503 F.3d 1339, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("the Court ofFederal Claims does not
have jurisdiction over claims arising under the Eighth Amendment, as the
Eighth Amendment is not a money-mandating provision.") (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). As such, the complaint does not meet the Tucker
Act's requirement to establish jurisdiction in this court.
Further, we note that under the court's Rule 83 .1(a)(3), apro se plaintiff
may not represent any other plaintiff outside of his own family. Here plaintiff
seeks to represent an incarcerated friend and all federal prisoners who desire
access to pornographic material. Compl. fl 2. Plaintiff must be a member of
this court's bar to prosecute cases belbre the court. RCFC 83.1(a)(1)(B); see
also Fast Horse v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl.544,548 (2011). Because he is
not a member of this court's bar, he is unable to bring claims on behalf of any
other party. Additionally, because plaintiff is not an inmate and his complaint
alleges no injury to himself, his interests are not implicated beyond his offer
to supply said material. It follows that plaintiff has failed to allege any facts
that could provide him with standing to bring his claim. .See Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490,498-99 (1975) (plaintiff lacks standing where he has not
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome ofthe controversy as to warrant
his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction[.]").
In sum, plaintiff has not alleged any claims over which this court has
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction.
Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied as moot. The Clerk of Court is
directed to enterjudgment accordingly, No costs.

Senior Judge