NALTNER et al

Filing 46

ORDER granting 43 Defendant's Motion to Stay. Defendant's response to 41 Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class is due within 14 days after this Court's ruling on 40 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Eleni M. Roumel. (smh) Service on parties made.

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
RICHARD NALTNER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

No. 21-cv-1064

v.

Filed: March 8, 2023

THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
ORDER
There are three motions currently pending before this Court. The first is Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, which contends that Plaintiffs Richard Naltner and David Deetz
are not entitled to overtime back pay as a matter of law. See Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgement (ECF No. 40) (Summary Judgment Motion) at 1. The second is Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Class Certification (Class Motion), filed on March 1, 2023. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification (ECF No. 41). In the Class Motion, Plaintiffs move this Court under Rule 23 to
certify a class of United States Secret Service investigators and officers who were denied overtime
pay under certain situations. Id. at 5. The current Scheduling Order in place did not set a date for
the filing of the Class Motion. See Scheduling Order (ECF No. 34); Order Granting in Part
Defendant’s Motion to Amend Schedule (ECF No. 39). Plaintiffs filed the Class Motion “[i]n
anticipation of this court potentially denying the pending Government summary judgment.” Class
Motion at 1.
The third motion — and the one at issue in this Order — is Defendant’s Motion to Stay Its
Duty to File a Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (Stay Motion), filed on March
3, 2023, shortly after Plaintiffs had filed their Class Motion. See Defendant’s Motion to Stay (ECF
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No. 43). In the Stay Motion, Defendant moves this Court to stay briefing on the Class Motion
until after the Court rules on Defendant’s pending Summary Judgment Motion. Id. at 1. Defendant
argues a stay is appropriate because “the merits of class certification may well depend on the
outcome of the Government’s motion for summary judgment.” Stay Motion at 2. Defendant notes
that should this Court grant Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, the Class Motion will
become moot. Id. Alternatively, Defendant contends that even if this Court were to deny
Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, the opinion may inform whether Plaintiffs’ claims “meet
the class action requirements — including commonality, typicality, and adequacy.” Id. at 2–3.
Plaintiffs oppose Defendant’s Stay Motion, arguing the motion is “the Government’s latest delay
tactic in the instant litigation.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition (Opp.) (ECF No. 44) at 2.
After considering the parties’ arguments, this Court concludes there is good cause to stay
briefing on the Class Motion. Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Stay,
ECF No. 43.
“The power of a federal trial court to stay its proceedings . . . is beyond question.”
Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “When and how
to stay proceedings is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. Judicial and litigant
economy is central to a court’s decision to stay all or part of a proceeding. See Landis v. North
Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
As a preliminary matter, granting the Stay Motion is consistent with the sequence of this
case thus far. The parties’ Joint Preliminary Status Report (JPSR) (ECF No. 22) contemplated an
initial, “limited discovery period” related to Plaintiffs’ capacity to serve as class representatives.
See JPSR at 4. Only after this limited discovery, and “dependent upon the outcome of any potential
Motions for Summary Judgment,” did “the parties anticipate that plaintiffs will move for class

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certification.” Id. Based on this understanding and agreement by the parties, as reflected in the
JPSR, it is premature to adjudicate the Class Motion. Although the Class Motion was not
procedurally improper, it upset the agreed-upon sequence that Plaintiffs’ capacity to be class
representatives should be decided first, followed by class certification.

Indeed, Plaintiffs

previously acknowledged that deciding Plaintiffs’ eligibility to be class representatives is
“preliminary to ultimately moving for class certification.” Transcript of Nov. 4, 2022 Status
Conference (ECF No. 32) at 13:15–21. The Class Motion also acknowledges this point, stating it
was filed “[i]n anticipation of this court potentially denying the pending Government summary
judgment, and concluding that plaintiffs Naltner and Deetz are adequate class representatives.”
Class Motion at 1. With briefing on Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion nearly complete and
oral argument set, there is no reason to discard the agreed-upon scheduling sequence in this case.
See Order (ECF No. 39) (ordering completion of briefing by March 13, 2023); Minute Order, dated
March 3, 2023 (scheduling oral argument for April 26, 2023).
Even setting aside the parties’ representations regarding the case schedule, a stay of the
Class Motion would still be appropriate. It would be inefficient to forge ahead on the class
certification question when Plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief is not yet decided, especially where, as
here, the Summary Judgment Motion will be ripe for adjudication shortly. It is well-established
that a plaintiff who “suffered no injury” is “not eligible to represent a class of persons who did
allegedly suffer injury.” East Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403–04
(1977). Should this Court grant Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion, the Class Motion will
be moot. Accordingly, deferring briefing and consideration of the Class Motion will further
judicial and litigant economy.

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Additionally, even if this Court were to ultimately deny summary judgment, the Court’s
ruling may impact whether Plaintiffs are sufficient class representatives under Rule 23(a). See
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011) (“Frequently [the] rigorous analysis
[of whether Rule 23(a) is satisfied] will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s
underlying claim. That cannot be helped.”) (internal citations omitted). That is what occurred in
a prior, analogous case, Horvath v. United States, Case No. 16-688, in which the court deferred
ruling on the plaintiff’s motion to certify a class in similar circumstances. See Horvath v. United
States, 149 Fed. Cl. 735, 741–43 (2020) (explaining, as background, that the court “[denied]
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and [deferred] the plaintiff’s motion for class
certification”). Indeed, Plaintiffs acknowledge that Horvath involved the same “claim set forth in
this [case].” See Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 18), ¶ 28 (“The claim set forth in
this complaint [was] also brought forth by the plaintiff Michael Horvath in Horvath v. United
States.”). This Court agrees with the approach taken in Horvath — deferral of class certification
consideration until adjudication of summary judgment — as an appropriate and efficient course in
this proceeding. As consideration of Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion may impact the
merits of class certification, it is prudent to stay briefing on the Class Motion.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Stay Its Duty to File a Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Class Certification (ECF No. 43) is GRANTED. Defendant shall FILE its response to
Plaintiffs’ Class Motion (ECF No. 41) within 14 days of this Court’s ruling on Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 40).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Eleni M. Roumel
ELENI M. ROUMEL
Judge

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