QURESHI v. USA

Filing 10

UNREPORTED OPINION DISMISSING CASE on 7 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) filed by USA, 2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis filed by NAILA M. QURESHI. Granting 7 Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)(1); Granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Judge Thompson M. Dietz. (amd) Service on parties made.

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 24-81
(Filed: August 30, 2024)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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NAILA M. QURESHI,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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THE UNITED STATES,
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Defendant.
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Naila M. Qureshi, Cicero, NY, proceeding pro se.
Matney E. Rolfe, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, counsel for
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
DIETZ, Judge.
On January 17, 2024, Naila M. Qureshi, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint seeking a
refund of payments that she made in connection with her student loans under the Federal Perkins
Loan Program. The government filed a motion to dismiss her complaint, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), asserting that the
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, or, alternatively, that her claims are time-barred. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ms.
Qureshi’s complaint because she fails to identify a money-mandating source of law that entitles
her to a refund. Accordingly, the Government’s motion is GRANTED, and Ms. Qureshi’s
complaint is DISMISSED.
I.

BACKGROUND

From 1987 to 1990, Ms. Qureshi received Federal Perkins loans through the Federal
Perkins Loan Program. [ECF 1] ¶ 4; [ECF 1-2] at 11-12. 1 Ms. Qureshi began employment as a
mathematics teacher in 1991, and she taught until September 3, 2002. [ECF 1-2] at 9. Ms.
Qureshi states that she repaid her Perkins loans in 1996, [ECF 1] ¶ 1, and that she fulfilled the
service requirements to qualify for loan forgiveness, id. ¶¶ 1, 4. Therefore, she claims that she is

1

All page numbers in the parties’ filings refer to the page number generated by the CM/ECF system.

entitled to a refund of her loan payments in the amount of $3,806 plus interest, and that the
government has failed to provide a refund. Id. ¶ 5.
The government filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Qureshi’s complaint on March 19, 2024.
[ECF 7]. In its motion, the government argues that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
over Ms. Qureshi’s complaint because she did not identify a money-mandating source of law. Id.
at 3. The government contends that, while her complaint claims that she is entitled to a refund of
her student loan payments, Ms. Qureshi “fails to identify a substantive source of law that would
entitle her to a refund.” Id. at 4. The government further argues that, even if the Court determines
that Ms. Qureshi has identified a money-mandating source of law, Ms. Qureshi’s claims are
time-barred. Id. at 5. The government contends that, while the allegations in Ms. Qureshi’s
complaint are unclear, “it is clear that her claims accrued, at the very latest, in 2002, when she
allegedly met the qualifications for repayment but did not receive reimbursement for her Perkins
Loan.” Id. The government’s motion to dismiss is fully briefed, see [ECFs 8, 9], and the Court
determined that oral argument is not necessary.
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

When considering a RCFC 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, “a court must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff's complaint
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United
States, 569 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797
(Fed. Cir.1995)). The plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also O. Ahlborg & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 74 Fed.
Cl. 178, 188 (2006), appeal dismissed, 219 F. App’x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2007). When the defendant
controverts the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations, “the court may consider evidence outside the
pleadings to resolve the issue.” Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (citing Reynolds, 846 F.2d at 747).
Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs, ‘“however inartfully pleaded’ are held ‘to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9
(1980) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Nevertheless, pro se plaintiffs are
not excused or exempt from meeting the Court’s jurisdictional requirements. See Henke, 60 F.3d
at 799; see also Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Jurisdiction is a threshold issue the court must address before proceeding to the merits of the
case. See Remote Diagnostic Techs. LLC v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 198, 202 (2017) (citing
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)).
III.

DISCUSSION

The Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ms. Qureshi’s complaint
because she does not identify a money-mandating source of law that entitles her to a refund of

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her loan payments. 2 The United States Court of Federal Claims has limited jurisdiction. Massie
v. United States, 226 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Tucker Act limits this court’s
jurisdiction to “any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2011). The Tucker Act “does not create a substantive cause of
action” but rather requires the plaintiff to “identify a substantive source of law that creates the
right to recover money damages against the United States.” Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v.
United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “[W]hen a claim is brought under the
Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims must first consider whether the statute or regulation is
money-mandating.” Greenlee Cnty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). “A statute is moneymandating for jurisdictional purposes if it ‘can fairly be read as mandating compensation for
damages sustained as a result of the breach of the duties [it] impose[s].’” Fisher, 402 F.3d at
1173 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983)). “It is enough that a statute
creating a Tucker Act right be reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a right of
recovery in damages.” United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473 (2003)
(citing Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 218-19). “If the statute is not money-mandating, the Court of
Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction, and the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Greenlee, 487 F.3d at 876 (citing Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1175).
Ms. Qureshi identifies the following statutes in her complaint: 20 U.S.C. § 3412, 20
U.S.C. § 3472, 20 U.S.C. § 1018(b)(4), and 20 U.S.C. § 1018(b)(6)(A). [ECF 1] at 1. However,
none of these statutes can fairly be interpreted as mandating monetary compensation in the form
of a loan refund. 3 Section 3412 establishes the principal officers of the Department of Education.
20 U.S.C. § 3412. Section 3472 provides that the Secretary of Education may delegate certain
functions to such officers. 20 U.S.C. § 3472. Section 1018(b)(4) provides that the Department of
Education establish Performance-Based Organizations (“PBOs”) for the delivery of Federal
student financial assistance and that these PBOs have independent control over certain
administrative and management functions. 20 U.S.C. § 1018(b)(4). Section 1018(b)(6)(A)
provides that the Secretary of Education and Chief Operating Officer of the PBOs shall consult
on the effects of policy, market, and other changes on such organizations. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1018(b)(6)(A).
In response to the government’s motion to dismiss, Ms. Qureshi states that she “is
invoking the exclusive mandate of the United States Court of Federal Claims for Non
Contractual Claims for Money under the Tucker Act” to “seek[] the return of money paid to
Because the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ms. Qureshi’s complaint on the ground that
she has not identified a money-mandating source of law, the Court does not address the government’s argument that
her claim is time-barred. [ECF 7] at 5.
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In addition to citing these statutes, Ms. Qureshi asserts that “[the] Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over the
Office of the Undersecretary of the [United States] Department of Education,” [ECF 1] ¶ 1, and that she “is
questioning the policy of the Undersecretary that Perkins is not refunded if paid in full,” id. ¶ 4. These vague
assertions are insufficient to establish jurisdiction in this Court, which requires a substantive source of law that
creates the right to recover money damages from the United States. See Rick’s Mushroom, 521 F.3d at 1343.

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the government under the Federal Perkins Loan Program.” [ECF 8] at 7 (emphasis in original).
She argues that “[j]ustification of this claim stems from 87 FR 61512.” Id. Yet, this rule cannot
fairly be interpreted to mandate the payment of a refund of student loan payments or otherwise to
mandate the payment of money damages. This rule extends the suspension of student loan
payments under Section 3513 of the CARES Act 4 and provides for the discharge of eligible
student loans. Federal Student Aid Programs, 87 Fed. Reg. 61,512, 61,514 (Oct. 12, 2022) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 674, 682, 685). With respect to discharging student loan debt, the rule
states that the Department of Education “will discharge the balance of a borrower’s eligible
loans” and that eligible loans include “Perkins Loans held by the Department.” Id. While the rule
speaks to the suspension of student loan payments and discharge of outstanding student loan
balances, there is nothing in this rule that provides for a refund of previously made student loan
payments. Furthermore, a statute or regulation that provides for the discharge of a loan is not
considered money-mandating. See Johnson v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 85, 92 (2012) (stating
that the Higher Education Act, which provides that “the Secretary of Education shall discharge
the borrower’s liability on the loan . . . by repaying the amount owed on the loan,” cannot fairly
be read as conferring upon a borrower “a substantive right to recover money damages against the
United States”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Faison v. United States,
102 Fed. Cl. 637, 641-42 (2012) (interpreting “discharge” in 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a)(1) as not
conferring upon a borrower a substantive right to money damages”) (citing Spehr v. United
States, 51 Fed. Cl. 69, 81, 93 (2001)). “[D]ischarg[ing] the borrower’s debt . . . is not the same as
paying him.” Id. (citing Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds & Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 490 F.3d 940, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Thus, Ms. Qureshi’s reliance on 87 Fed. Reg. 61,512
as a money-mandating source of law is unavailing. 5
Ms. Qureshi also contends that the promise of loan forgiveness under 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee
was unfulfilled and that this statute “does not say that . . . full repayment [of the loan] deletes the
option of a refund.” See [ECF 8] at 10, 18. Section 1087ee provides for the cancellation of
student loan debt based on years of qualifying service, which includes years of service as an
educator. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee (2016). Although the statute does not explicitly address the
circumstances of a borrower having completed their loan repayment, it explicitly states that
“[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize refunding of any repayment of a
Section 3513 of the CARES Act mandates that the Secretary of Education “shall suspend all payments due for
loans,” that “interest shall not accrue on a loan,” that “the Secretary shall deem each month for which a loan
payment was suspended . . . as if the borrower of the loan had made a payment for the purpose of any loan
forgiveness program or loan rehabilitation program,” that “the Secretary shall ensure that[] . . . any payment that has
been suspended is treated as if it were a regularly scheduled payment made by a borrower for the purpose of any
loan forgiveness program or loan rehabilitation program,” and that “the Secretary shall suspend all involuntary
collection related to the loan.” CARES Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 3513, 134 Stat. 281, 404-05 (2020).

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Ms. Qureshi also states that she is “seeking a review of 20 U.S.C. 1098[]bb(a)(2)(A) . . . as an affected individual
who was a recipient of student financial assistance and did not want to engage in default, yet is prevented from
receiving a refund while others are allowed either loan forgiveness or cancellation under the same program.” [ECF
8] at 7. This section provides, among other things, that the Secretary of Education is authorized to waive or modify
certain student financial assistance program provisions in the event of a war, military operation, or national
emergency as necessary to ensure that “recipients of student financial assistance . . . who are affected individuals are
not placed in a worse position financially in relation to that financial assistance because of their status as affected
individuals.” This statute cannot fairly be interpreted to mandate the payment of money damages or a refund of loan
payments.

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loan.” 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee(a)(3)(C) (2016); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1087ee(a)(3)(C) (1998) (same).
Thus, it cannot fairly be interpreted to mandate a refund of loan payments.
Lastly, as a pro se plaintiff, the Court liberally construes Ms. Qureshi’s complaint. In this
regard, the Court considered whether Ms. Qureshi’s complaint could be liberally construed as
alleging an illegal exaction claim, over which this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction even in
the absence of a money-mandating source of law. See Gulley v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 405,
418-19 (2020). “An illegal exaction ‘involves money that was improperly paid, exacted, or taken
from the claimant in contravention of the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation.’” Flander v.
United States, 737 F. App’x 530, 532 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Norman v. United States, 429
F.3d 1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). “To allege an illegal exaction within this Court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction, a complaint must contain nonfrivolous factual allegations that the plaintiff is
entitled to recover money for the government’s purported illegal action.” Gulley, 150 Fed. Cl. at
418 (emphasis in original) (citing Harris v. United States, 2014 WL 10936253, at *1 (Fed. Cl.
Apr. 16, 2014)). Here, Ms. Qureshi does not allege that her student loan payments were
improperly paid, exacted, or taken from her. See generally [ECF 1]; [ECF 8]. Instead, she alleges
that she is entitled to a refund of her properly collected loan payments. See [ECF 8] at 7 (stating
that “[s]he seeks the return of money paid to the government under the Federal Perkins Loan
Program”). Therefore, her complaint is not properly viewed as asserting an illegal exaction claim
over which this Court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction. See Aerolineas Argentinas v.
United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1572 (stating that “Tucker Act claims may be made for recovery of
monies that the government has required to be paid contrary to law”). In sum, because Ms.
Qureshi has not identified a money-mandating source of law that entitles her to a refund of her
student loan payments, her complaint must be dismissed. Greenlee Cnty., 487 F.3d at 876 (citing
Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1175). 6
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the government’s motion to dismiss, [ECF 7], is GRANTED.
Ms. Qureshi’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. 7 The Clerk is
DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thompson M. Dietz
THOMPSON M. DIETZ, Judge

Ms. Qureshi lists several statutes and regulations in her response to the government’s motion to dismiss. See [ECF
8] at 11. None of them can fairly be read as mandating monetary compensation by the United States.

6

A plaintiff is eligible to proceed in forma pauperis if she is “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.”
Moore v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 411, 413 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)). “[T]he threshold for a motion
to proceed in forma pauperis is not high.” Id. at 414. “Unable to pay such fees” means that “paying such fees would
constitute a serious hardship on the plaintiff, not that such payment would render plaintiff destitute.” Fiebelkorn v.
United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007) (citation omitted). The Court considered Ms. Qureshi’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis, [ECF 2], and determined that she sufficiently demonstrated that she would experience
financial hardship if required to pay the Court’s filing fees.

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