MARTIN v. USA

Filing 5

ORDER: Plaintiff's 1 Complaint is DISMISSED sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with RCFC 12(h)(3), and plaintiff's 2 motion for equitable tolling is DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court is directed to ENTER final Judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Signed by Judge Armando O. Bonilla. (ead) Service on parties made.

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
FOR PUBLICATION
No. 24-144C
(Filed: February 5, 2024)

DONALD L. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.

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ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff pro se Donald L. Martin is currently incarcerated at Regional Reentry
Management (RRM) Detroit, a privately-operated federal halfway house located in
Milan, Michigan. He is scheduled to be released from custody on April 29, 2025. In
his complaint, Mr. Martin alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)–acting
by and through officials and agents employed at the Federal Correctional Institution
(FCI) Ashland, located in Ashland, Kentucky, and RRM Detroit–incorrectly
calculated his earned time credits under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3631 et seq.), and failed to timely
file his residential reentry center or home confinement referrals.1 According to
Mr. Martin, these actions delayed his transfer from FCI Ashland to custodial
prerelease. He seeks monetary damages in excess of $100 million. Accompanying
the complaint is Mr. Martin’s motion for equitable tolling (ECF 2).
According to the complaint, appended documents, and public court filings, on
October 18, 2017, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of Kentucky

In support of his claims, Mr. Martin further cites BOP Program Statement 5410.01, First Step Act
of 2018 – Time Credits: Procedures for Implementation of 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4) (Nov. 18, 2022),
as amended (Mar. 10, 2023), available at https://perma.cc/Y57N-E5UJ (last visited Feb. 5, 2024).
In short, the policy statement outlines BOP’s criteria and procedures for awarding earned time credits
under the First Step Act.
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returned a true bill charging Mr. Martin with using interstate commerce to entice a
minor to engage in sexual activity and, thereafter, traveling from Indiana to
Kentucky with the intent to engage in illicit sexual contact in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2422(b) and 2423(b). See United States v. Martin, No. 17-141 (W.D. Ky.) (ECF 1).
Following a three-day trial, on April 20, 2018, a jury found Mr. Martin guilty on both
counts. Mr. Martin was subsequently sentenced to ten years in federal prison,
followed by ten years of supervised release conditioned upon, inter alia, his
submission of DNA evidence and compliance with the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq. He was also fined $5,000 and
ordered to pay a $200 special assessment. See Martin, No. 17-141 (W.D. Ky.)
(ECF 113). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Mr.
Martin’s conviction. United States v. Martin, 780 F. App’x 248 (6th Cir. 2019). His
requests for post-conviction relief were denied. United States v. Martin, No. 19-905,
2022 WL 1599708 (W.D. Ky. May 20, 2022), appeal dismissed, No. 22-5584 (6th Cir.
Oct. 14, 2022).
Prior to filing suit in this Court, Mr. Martin sought administrative relief under
the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2672 et seq., and implementing
regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 0.172. Citing the alleged failure by FCI Ashland officials to
properly apply his earned time credits, Mr. Martin sought monetary damages of
approximately $1.5 million. On June 21, 2023, the BOP denied Mr. Martin’s
administrative tort claim, explaining that his claim is not recognized under the
FTCA. ECF 2-1 at 6. In closing, the BOP noted: “If you are not satisfied with our
determination in this matter, you may file suit in the appropriate U.S. District Court
no later than six months from the date of this letter.” Id. On October 25, 2023, BOP
summarily rejected Mr. Martin’s renewed requests for relief as duplicative. Id. at 19.
To demonstrate this Court has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§1491, a plaintiff must establish his claim falls under a “money-mandating” statute.
Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976)).
“[A] statute or regulation is money-mandating for jurisdictional purposes if it ‘can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result
of the breach of the duties [it] impose[s].’” Id. at 1173 (quoting Mitchell, 463 U.S. at
217). In other words, the statute must “be reasonably amenable to the reading that
it mandates a right of recovery in damages.” United States v. White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473 (2003).
Mr. Martin contends that prison officials improperly calculated his earned time
credits under the First Step Act, resulting in his delayed transfer from federal prison
to custodial prerelease by seventy-six days (i.e., June 1, 2023 to August 16, 2023).
Relevant here, Section 3632(d)(4) of the First Step Act provides:

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(A) In general.--A prisoner . . . who successfully completes evidencebased recidivism reduction programming or productive activities, shall
earn time credits as follows:
(i) A prisoner shall earn 10 days of time credits for every 30 days
of successful participation in evidence-based recidivism reduction
programming or productive activities.
(ii) A prisoner determined by the Bureau of Prisons to be at a
minimum or low risk for recidivating, who, over 2 consecutive
assessments, has not increased their risk of recidivism, shall
earn an additional 5 days of time credits for every 30 days of
successful participation in evidence-based recidivism reduction
programming or productive activities.
...
(C) Application of time credits toward prerelease custody or
supervised release.--Time credits earned under this paragraph by
prisoners who successfully participate in recidivism reduction programs
or productive activities shall be applied toward time in prerelease
custody or supervised release. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons
shall transfer eligible prisoners, as determined under section 3624(g),
into prerelease custody or supervised release.
18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). In turn, Section 3624(g) further defines prisoners eligible to
participate in the earned time credits program and the types of prerelease custody
available. See id. § 3624(g).
A plain reading of this statutory scheme reveals Congress passed the First Step
Act to reduce recidivism by offering specified sentence reductions to identified
inmates who successfully complete evidence-based educational and rehabilitation
programs. There is no corresponding provision mandating monetary awards or relief
in exchange for an inmate’s participation in the designated programs or the BOP’s
claimed failure to properly calculate and apply earned time credits. Indeed, the sole
potentially cognizable claim for monetary damages under the First Step Act falls
under the FTCA. See, e.g., Ealey v. United States, No. 22-69, 2022 WL 4607512, at
*2 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2022) (discussed below). However, it is well settled that this
Court “lacks jurisdiction to hear . . . FTCA claim[s] for allegedly tortious conduct by
the United States or its agents because it is specifically barred from hearing
tort cases.” Canuto v. United States, 615 F. App’x 951, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)). As explained in the BOP’s June 21, 2023 denial of
Mr. Martin’s administrative tort claim, quoted above, any potential claim for relief
lies exclusively in federal district court. See id. (“District courts, not the [Court of

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Federal Claims], have jurisdiction over FTCA claims ‘against the United States, for
money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)).
For these reasons, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Mr. Martin’s claims.
Prior to dismissing this action sua sponte pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the
Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC),2 the Court considers
whether transfer to a court with jurisdiction is in the interest of justice. Title 28,
United States Code, Section 1631, provides:
Whenever a civil action is filed in [this] court . . . and [this] court finds
that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest
of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court . . . in
which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was
filed or noticed . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1631. Transfer under this section is appropriate when (1) the transferring
court lacks jurisdiction, (2) jurisdiction lies in another court, and (3) transfer is in the
interest of justice. Zoltek v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1631).
As to the first requirement, as explained above, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain Mr. Martin’s complaint. The final two requirements are not so easily
satisfied.
Mr. Martin is currently incarcerated in Milan, Michigan, located within the
jurisdictional boundaries of the Eastern District of Michigan. The alleged tortious
behavior committed by BOP officials and agents occurred during Mr. Martin’s
incarceration at FCI Ashland, located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the
Eastern District of Kentucky. Additionally, Mr. Martin’s administrative tort claim
was processed out of the BOP Consolidated Legal Center in Lexington, Kentucky,
located in the same district. As such, the likely venue for Mr. Martin’s FTCA claim
is the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2). For the reasons that follow, however, the Court need not conclusively
resolve these jurisdictional and venue questions.

RCFC 12(h)(3) provides: “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must dismiss the action.” Id.; see Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time by the parties or by the court
sua sponte.”) (citing Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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Regarding the final requirement, the Court finds that transferring this case
would not serve the interests of justice. As recently explained by this Court:
“The phrase ‘if it is in the interest of justice’ relates to claims which are
nonfrivolous and as such should be decided on the merits.” Galloway
Farms, Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing
Zinger Constr. Co. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1053, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
1985)). The decision to transfer “rests within the sound discretion of the
transferor court, and the court may decline to transfer the case ‘[i]f such
transfer would nevertheless be futile given the weakness of plaintiff’s
case on the merits.’” Spencer v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 349, 359 (2011)
(quoting Faulkner v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 54, 56 (1999)).
Willis v. United States, No. 21-2170, 2022 WL 54443, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 6, 2022),
reconsideration denied, 2022 WL 2289083 (Fed. Cl. June 24, 2022). As summarized
above, Mr. Martin seeks monetary damages because prison officials allegedly failed
to properly calculate and apply his earned time credits. Several issues highlight the
weakness of Mr. Martin’s claims.
As an initial matter, contrary to the instructions included in the BOP’s decision
letter of June 21, 2023, Mr. Martin did not commence this action within six months
of the agency’s decision as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Mr. Martin instead
waited until January 29, 2024, to file his complaint.3 On this point, the Court takes
into account the holding of the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Wong, “that the FTCA’s time bars are nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable
tolling.” 575 U.S. 402, 420 (2015). Although Mr. Martin filed a motion for equitable
tolling contemporaneous with his complaint, it would be improvident for the Court to
address his motion premised upon the interpretation of and relief from a statute
(i.e., the FTCA) over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Further, as noted supra, there are serious questions surrounding whether
alleged miscalculations and applications of earned time credits under the First Step
Act create an actionable claim for monetary damages.4 See, e.g., Ealey, 2022 WL
3 Application of the prisoner mailbox rule does not salvage Mr. Martin’s claim as his complaint is dated
January 22, 2024, which is similarly past the December 21, 2023 filing deadline. See Clark v. United
States, 126 Fed. Cl. 451, 458 n.5 (2016). For the reasons explained infra, the Court does not address
whether Mr. Martin’s post-June 21, 2023 renewed requests for administrative relief–summarily
rejected by the BOP on October 25, 2023–tolled or otherwise extended the filing deadline.

Mr. Martin’s claims of false imprisonment and abuse of process similarly fall outside this Court’s
jurisdictional authority and exclusively within the ambit of the FTCA, thereby subject to the same
analysis and outcome. See Jackson v. United States, 612 F. App’x 997, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The Court
of Federal Claims . . . had no authority to adjudicate [plaintiff’s] claim seeking damages for false
imprisonment.”); McKenzie v. United States, 524 F. App’x 636, 638 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Plaintiff’s claims,
including abuse of process, “are all textbook examples of causes of action that sound in tort” and thus
outside the Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.).
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4607512, at *1–3 (plaintiff’s FTCA claim for money damages based on allegation BOP
failed to timely award earned time credits under the First Step Act fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted). Accordingly, this Court finds transfer under
28 U.S.C. § 1631 is not appropriate.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s complaint (ECF 1) is DISMISSED
sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with RCFC 12(h)(3), and plaintiff’s
motion for equitable tolling (ECF 2) is DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court is
directed to ENTER final Judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.
It is so ORDERED.
___________________
Armando O. Bonilla
Judge

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