KELLETT et al v. USA

Filing 11

UNREPORTED OPINION denying 8 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Zachary N. Somers. (mss) Service on parties made.

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 24-455
(Filed: June 4, 2024)

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ASHLEY KELLETT, ET AL.,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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THE UNITED STATES,
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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
On April 8, 2024, Plaintiffs moved for the Court to reconsider its March 29, 2024,
memorandum opinion and order dismissing their case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See
ECF No. 8. As explained in the Court’s dismissal order, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ case
because it “can hear only claims against the United States,” and the face of Plaintiffs’ complaint
and attached exhibit did not describe any claims against the United States within the Court’s
jurisdiction. ECF No. 6 at 1; see also ECF No. 1-1 at 1 (listing “the [Louisiana] Department of
Children and Family Services, Terri Ricks, individually, while operating in her official capacity,
Governor John Bel Edwards, individually and operating in his official capacity, Livingston
Parish School Board,” but notably not the United States, as defendants). The Court’s dismissal
order listed the United States as the defendant only because the Clerk of the Court changed the
defendant’s name to the United States to comply with the Court’s rules. 1 See ECF No. 3 at 1 n.2
(stating that, as “the complaint in this action . . . named as the defendant(s) a party (parties) other
than the United States, the case caption has been modified to identify the United States as the
sole defendant. This modification has been made to conform the caption to the Rules of the
United States Court of Federal Claims, which make clear that in this court only the United States
can be named as the party defendant. See [Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims
4(a) and 10(a).”); ECF No. 6 at 2 n.1 (explaining the same).
Federal courts do not often grant motions for reconsideration because the moving party
must make a “showing of extraordinary circumstances” to justify doing so. Fru-Con Constr.
Corp. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 298, 300 (1999). Even if a party makes such a showing,
however, “[t]he decision whether to grant reconsideration lies largely within the discretion” of
Though the Court’s original order listed Plaintiffs’ original defendants, the Court corrected it
subsequently to list the United States as the sole defendant despite the obvious thrust of Plaintiffs’
complaint.
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the Court. Yuba Nat. Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The
Court must exercise its discretion based upon the principle that “[r]econsideration of a judgment
is not intended to permit a party to retry the allegations included in plaintiff's complaint when it
previously was afforded a full and fair opportunity to do so.” Hymas v. United States, 141 Fed.
Cl. 735, 738 (2019) (citing cases). For this reason, the Court “will not grant a motion for
reconsideration if the movant ‘merely reasserts . . . arguments previously made[,] . . . all of
which were carefully considered by the court.’” Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 555,
557 (2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl.
157, 164 (1993), aff’d, 50 F.3d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
Rules 59 and 60 of Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”)
describe the circumstances under which reconsideration of a judgment is permitted. RCFC 59
states that this Court may grant reconsideration “for any reason for which a new trial has
heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court[,] for any reason for which a
rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal court[,] [or] upon the showing
of satisfactory evidence, cumulative or otherwise, that any fraud, wrong, or injustice has been
done to the United States.” RCFC 59(a)(1)(A–C). Similarly, the Court may relieve a party from
a final judgment under RCFC 60(b) because of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under RCFC 59(b); fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; [if] the judgment
is void; the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
or any other reason that justifies relief.” RCFC 60(b)(1–6).
RCFC 59 and 60 reflect the broad discretion afforded the trial judge in choosing to grant
a motion for reconsideration. Summarizing these provisions and the case law interpreting them,
the Federal Circuit has observed that the “three primary grounds that justify reconsideration are:
(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the
need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Delaware Valley Floral Grp., Inc. v.
Shaw Rose Nets, LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted); see
also Parsons ex rel. Linmar Prop. Mgmt. Tr. v. United States, 174 F. App’x 561, 563 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (listing the same grounds for reconsideration under RCFC 59). While these examples do
not exhaust the situations in which the Court may reconsider a judgment, movant parties must
cite extraordinary reasons to justify such a departure from past practice.
Plaintiffs’ sixty-seven page motion for reconsideration does not meet this high standard
and further illustrates why the Court acted swiftly to dismiss their case. Plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration incorrectly describes their case as alleging “claim[s] for damages and injunctive
relief against the defendant, the United States of America, for violating [their] constitutional
rights.” ECF No. 8 at 1. The motion states later that the constitutional rights at issue involved
“due process violations,” id. at 65, related to the “First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth amendments,” id.
at 57. Even if the Court ignored all the sections of the Plaintiffs’ complaint that clearly sought
damages and injunctive relief against parties other than the federal government, the Court would
still lack jurisdiction over the case because this Court has no jurisdiction over claims for either
injunctive or monetary relief based on the constitutional provisions they cite. Crocker v. United
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States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded
that it does not have jurisdiction to hear Crocker’s due process or seizure claims under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”) (citations omitted); Hood v. United States, 127
Fed. Cl. 192, 210, aff’d, 659 F. App’x 655 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, standing alone or otherwise, cannot be interpreted to require the payment of
money for an alleged violation, and, therefore, does not provide an independent basis for
jurisdiction in this court.”) (citations omitted); Smith v. United States, 36 F. App’x 444, 446
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that the plaintiff “alleges violations of his Sixth . . . Amendment rights,”
and that “[t]he Court of Federal Claims similarly lacks jurisdiction for these claims”) (citations
omitted). As the dismissal order explained, however, these claims were obviously not the basis
of Plaintiffs’ complaint: “they premise liability upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ECF No. 1 at 1, which
authorizes suit against ‘[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia’ deprives a citizen of his
or her rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Section 1983, like the allegations of the
complaint, does not apply to the federal government or its officials.” ECF No. 6 at 2. Merely
changing the defendant’s name to the United States does not alter the state-based nature of
Plaintiffs’ claims.
Plaintiffs argue further in their motion that this Court has jurisdiction over their claims
because they “alleged a valid implied-in-fact contract with the United States, based on the
defendant’s promise to respect [their] constitutional rights in exchange for [Plaintiff Ashley
Kellett’s] cooperation as a witness in a criminal case.” ECF No. 8 at 62. This allegation does
not appear in their complaint; the “Statement of the Claim” describes only charges against
Louisiana and its officials for conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. ECF No. 1 at
2. Even after combing through the complaint’s one hundred and eight-page exhibit, the Court
could not find any obvious reference to the alleged implied-in-fact contract Plaintiffs describe.
The exhibit is, instead, consistent with the complaint’s statement of the case because it is a longwinded list of grievances against Louisiana officials and perceived inadequacies in state court
procedure. See generally ECF No. 1-1. If Plaintiffs did allege the existence of such a contract in
their complaint and attached exhibit, they should have cited to the location of this allegation in
their motion for reconsideration. See Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“The petitioner . . . bears the burden of proving that the Court of Federal Claims
possessed jurisdiction over his complaint.”).
Plaintiffs suggest that they should be permitted to amend their complaint to remedy this
error. They contend that they have “[e]vidence that . . . [they were] not given the opportunity to
submit at the time of the motion to dismiss which supports [their] claim for damages, monetary,
punitive, compensatory, and injunctive relief,” including a “copy of a letter from the Department
of Justice to the Plaintiff[s]” which indicates the existence of the implied-in-fact contract they
describe. ECF No. 8 at 64–65. If they had such evidence, however, they should have included it
in their initial complaint. This alleged evidence is not “previously unavailable evidence” that
justifies reconsideration of a previously closed case because it has nothing to do with the
allegations in the original complaint, which focus exclusively on state-level officials in Louisiana
despite the Clerk of the Court’s decision to change the defendant to the United States. Parsons
ex rel. Linmar Prop. Mgmt. Tr., 174 F. App’x at 563. If this evidence is truly available, the

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proper action is to refile the case with the proper claims against the United States. As the Court
dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice, they can do just that without penalty.
Finally, Plaintiffs take umbrage in their motion at the swiftness with which the Court
dismissed their complaint. They argue the fact that the Court “pulled [Plaintiffs’] case after the
case had only been accepted a few days prior” indicates that it did so “to falsely support the
judgment.” ECF No. 8 at 24. Not so. This Court’s rules state that “[i]f [it] determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” RCFC 12(h)(3).
The Court did just that when it first read Plaintiffs’ complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
Plaintiffs’ complaint and the exhibit attached thereto are obviously not tied to claims against the
United States and are, therefore, not within this Court’s jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ attempts to state
a claim within the Court’s jurisdiction in their motion for reconsideration are too little, too late.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Zachary N. Somers
ZACHARY N. SOMERS
Judge

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