GARDNER v. USA
Filing
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UNREPORTED OPINION DISMISSING CASE and granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. The Clerk shall reject any future submissions in this case unless they comply with this Court's rules regarding post-dismissal submissions. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Judge David A. Tapp. (emc) Service on parties made.
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 25-20
Filed: January 28, 2025
MICHELLE A. GARDNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
TAPP, Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff, Michelle Artice Gardner, seeks “over billions of dollars” or $660,000 in
recovery from actions of the United States. 1 (See Compl. Ex. A (Civil Cover Sheet), ECF No. 11). Plaintiff also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”). 2 (IFP App., ECF No.
2). In the interest of judicial efficiency, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP application; however, it
dismisses the Complaint, (Compl., ECF No. 1), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See RCFC
12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action.”).
In every case, determining whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold
issue. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1988). The United States
Court of Federal Claims is a specialty court existing to provide an avenue for compensation for
some claims against the United States. See Terran ex rel. Terran v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Tucker Act grants this Court jurisdiction over
claims (1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States; (2) seeking a refund
for a payment made to the government; and (3) arising from federal constitutional, statutory, or
1
Plaintiff purports to bring this action as an assignee and trustee of the “Vincente Cantua Family
Trust.” (Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1).
2
The Court notes that the IFP application is incomplete. Plaintiff lists that she is currently
employed but fails to report the amount of wages or salary earned pursuant to Question 2(a),
(IFP App. at 1). Further, some answers on this application differ from those on the same form in
a different case before the undersigned. Gardner v. United States, No. 25-81 (ECF No. 2).
However, the Court takes notice that Plaintiff’s IFP Application was granted in Case Number 2588. Given that, and because this case is dismissed on other grounds, the Court authorizes Plaintiff
to proceed without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914, 1915.
regulatory law mandating payment of money damages by the government. 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a)(1); Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under
RCFC 12(h)(3), this Court must dismiss an action if it “determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction.” As such, the Court “may and should” review the question of its
subject-matter jurisdiction on its own “at any time it appears in doubt.” Arctic Corner, Inc. v.
United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
Under RCFC 12(b)(1), the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction rests with
the plaintiff, who must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir.
1988). Although the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff are generally held to “less stringent standards”
than those of a lawyer, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), leniency cannot be
extended to relieve a pro se plaintiff of the jurisdictional burden. Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Lab., 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987). While the Court acknowledges that pro se plaintiffs
are not expected to frame issues with the precision of attorneys, Roche v. U.S.Postal Serv., 828
F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987), even pro se plaintiffs “must persuade the Court that
jurisdictional requirements have been met.” Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499
(2004), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Zulueta v. United States, 553 F. App’x
983, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he leniency afforded to a pro se litigant with respect to mere
formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements.” (quotation and
citation omitted)).
On the first page of her Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege that the federal government
failed to remit a settlement to the family of Vincente Cantua for lands and property confiscated
in 1848:
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(Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1). This claim is outside the Court’s statute of limitations. “To properly
invoke this Court’s jurisdictional authority to entertain a cause of action, a claim must be ‘filed
within six years after [it] first accrues.’” Nolan v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 669, 673 (2024)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2501); see John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (six-year statute of limitations codified in § 2501 is “a jurisdictional
requirement”), aff’d, 552 U.S. 130 (2008)). Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on January 3, 2025.
(See Compl.). The exact date of the remittance of fees is unclear from the pleading. However,
given that President Lincoln was assassinated on April 15, 1865, Plaintiff’s claims are at least
154 years too late.
The remainder of the Complaint cites the statutory schemes for “(18 U.S.C. 1503),
WITNESS TAMPERING[,]” (Compl. at 3–4), and “(18 U.S.C. 1512), WITNESS
RETALIATION[,]” (id. at 4–9), as well as the language from a 2017 Executive Order relating to
human rights violations, (id. at 11–12). As courts have repeatedly held, merely reciting the
elements of a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Even when affording Plaintiff the requisite liberal
construction of her claims, she still fails to establish the Court’s jurisdiction.
The first two schemes are derived from Title 18 of the United States Code, the primary
legislative source for federal criminal law. See 18 U.S.C. (titled “Crimes and Criminal
Procedure”). It is well settled that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over claims
based on criminal statutes. Snowton v. United States, 216 F. App’x 981, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“Additionally, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over suits based upon criminal
statutes.”). Thus, the Court need not further address the allegations of witness tampering or
witness retaliation.
Further, the recited portions of Executive Order 13,818 explicitly disavow the existence
of a private right of action, thereby barring Plaintiff’s claim. Exec. Order No. 13,818, 82 Fed.
Reg. 60,839 (Dec. 26, 2017) (“This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United
States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.”); (Compl. at 12 (reciting this specific provision)). Even with the most generous
interpretation, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear claims of human rights violations not
premised on a money-mandating provision of law. Sanders v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 75, 80
(1995) (“This court does not have jurisdiction to entertain general civil rights claims that are not
based upon an appropriate money-mandating provision.”); see also Marlin v. United States, 63
Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005) (“[This] [c]ourt does not have jurisdiction to consider civil rights claims
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, or 1985.”). As Plaintiff has failed to cite any
statutory provisions that would support a monetary award for the alleged rights violations, the
Court is unable to entertain this claim.
For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint, (ECF No. 1), is DISMISSED for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction under RCFC 12(h)(3), and her Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma
pauperis, (ECF No. 2), is GRANTED. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment accordingly. The
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Clerk is directed to REJECT any future submissions in this case unless they comply with this
Court’s rules regarding post-dismissal submissions. 3
IT IS SO ORDERED.
David A. Tapp
DAVID A. TAPP, Judge
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This provision does not act as an anti-filing injunction or a sanction. Allen v. United States, 88
F.4th 983, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding that courts must provide pro se plaintiffs with notice
and opportunity to be heard before issuing an anti-filing injunction). Plaintiff is not enjoined
from proper post-dismissal filings in this case, nor is Plaintiff required to seek leave before filing
future actions in this Court. See id. This provision is a mechanism to reject non-compliant filings
in the above-captioned action once it is dismissed. That said, the Court notes that within two
weeks of this filing, Plaintiff filed a variety of suits before this Court. Gardner v. United States,
No. 25-20 (Fed. Cl. filed Jan. 3, 2025); Gardner v. United States, No. 25-81 (Fed. Cl. filed Jan.
3, 2025); Gardner v. United States, No. 25-85 (Fed. Cl. filed Jan. 3, 2025); Gardner v. United
States, No. 25-87 (Fed. Cl. filed Jan. 3, 2025); Gardner v. United States, No. 25-88 (Fed. Cl.
filed Jan. 3, 2025); Gardner v. United States, No. 25-90 (Fed. Cl. filed Jan. 15, 2025); Gardner
v. United States, No. 25-92 (Fed. Cl. filed Jan. 15, 2025); Gardner v. United States, No. 25-94
(Fed. Cl. filed Jan. 15, 2025); Gardner v. United States, No. 25-96 (Fed. Cl. filed Jan. 15, 2025);
Gardner v. United States, No. 25-97 (Fed. Cl. filed Jan. 15, 2025).
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