Yerk v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
Filing
179
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 135 Motion for summary judgment; denying 139 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Count VII is dismissed with prejudice and defendant's motion is granted as to Counts VI and VIII. The Clerk shall withhold entry of judgment. See Opinion and Order for details. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 11/4/2011. (GEL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
ROBERT E. TARDIF, JR., as Trustee
for Jason Yerk,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No.
2:09-cv-537-FtM-29SPC
PEOPLE for the ETHICAL TREATMENT of
ANIMALS, a Virginia not-for-profit
corporation,
Defendant.
______________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the parties’ cross
motions for summary judgment.
Defendant filed its Dispositive
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #135) on June 19, 2011 and
plaintiff filed his Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #139)
on June 20, 2011.
Both parties filed their respective responses
(Docs. ##145, 146) on July 5, 2011.
The Court heard oral argument
on some of the issues at the final pretrial conference on October
24, 2011.
I.
Summary
judgment
Summary Judgment Standard
is
appropriate
only
when
the
Court
is
satisfied that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
An issue is “genuine” if there is
sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for either party.
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
A fact is “material” if it may affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law.
Id.
However, “the mere
existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment
unless the factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the
outcome o f the case.”
McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333
F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003).
In ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the Court is required to consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Booker
T. Washington Broad. Servs., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir.
2000); Jaques v. Kendrick, 43 F.3d 628, 630 (11th Cir. 1995).
The
Court does not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility
determinations. Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d at
1225.
II.
Complaint
Plaintiff’s eight-count Complaint (Doc. #1) in essence asserts
that People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (defendant or
PETA) made an oral promise of confidentiality to Jason Yerk (Yerk)
in exchange for information; that Yerk provided the information in
reliance upon the promise of confidentiality, but PETA breached the
confidentiality promise by disclosing information to his employer,
the Lee County Sheriff’s Office (LCSO); as a result of PETA’s
disclosure, Yerk was forced to resign from his employment; and
because of the forced resignation PETA is liable for the resulting
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employment-related
counsel
for
damages.
plaintiff
At
the
clarified
confidentiality agreement.
final
the
status
terms
of
conference,
the
alleged
Counsel stated that PETA and Yerk
agreed that Yerk would reveal his knowledge of animal abuse to PETA
and, in exchange, PETA would not reveal Yerk’s identity as the
source of that information; disclosure of the substance of the
animal abuse reported by Yerk and disclosure of Yerk’s identity as
a witness to the abuse were not precluded by the confidentiality
agreement.
Only Yerk’s identity as the source of the information
was to be confidential.
With this refinement, the Complaint alleges the following
causes of action:
Count I alleges a breach of fiduciary duty,
asserting that PETA and Yerk had a fiduciary relationship in which
Yerk confided information to PETA in exchange for PETA’s promise of
confidentiality, that PETA’s disclosure to the LCSO of Yerk’s
identity
as
a
source
of
information
breached
relationship, and the breach caused damages.
that
fiduciary
Count II alleges
constructive fraud, asserting that PETA and Yerk had the fiduciary
relationship described above, that PETA abused this confidential
relationship
by
disclosing
Yerk’s
identity
information and the abuse caused damages.
as
a
source
of
Count III alleges
fraudulent misrepresentation, asserting that PETA misrepresented to
Yerk that his identity as a source of information would be kept
confidential, that PETA should have known the confidentiality
-3-
statement was false, that Yerk relied upon the misrepresentation,
and that damages resulted to Yerk.
contract,
asserting that
PETA
Count IV alleges breach of oral
and
Yerk
entered into
an
oral
contract in which Yerk agreed to provide information to PETA in
exchange for PETA’s promise that it would not disclose to the LCSO
that Yerk was a source of information, that PETA breached this
contract, and that damages resulted.
Count V alleges negligent
misrepresentation, asserting that PETA misrepresented to Yerk that
his identity as a source of information would be kept confidential,
that PETA should have known the confidentiality statement was
false, that PETA intended Yerk to rely upon the statement and Yerk
reasonably and justifiably did so, and that damages resulted.
Count
VI
alleges
negligence,
asserting
that
PETA
voluntarily
assumed a duty to not reveal Yerk’s identity as a source of
information to the LCSO, that PETA breached the duty by revealing
Yerk’s identity, and that as a proximate cause Yerk sustained
damages.
Count
VIII1
alleges
tortious
advantageous business relationship,
interference
with
an
asserting that Yerk and the
LCSO had an advantageous business relationship under which Yerk had
the right to receive compensation in return for services, that PETA
knew of this business relationship, and that PETA’s disclosure of
Yerk’s identity as a source of information was an intentional and
1
At the final pretrial conference, plaintiff’s counsel
withdrew Count VII, intentional interference with a contract
relationship. Therefore this count will be dismissed.
-4-
unjustified
interference
with the
business
relationship which
resulted in damages. The damages asserted as to all counts include
lost wages and benefits, lost future earning capacity, and mental
anguish and suffering.
III.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #139)
As permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), plaintiff moves for
summary judgment on “parts” of his claims. Plaintiff seeks summary
judgment that “PETA entered into a confidentiality agreement with
Jason Yerk whereby PETA, in exchange for information Yerk had
regarding suspected animal abuse being committed by Deputy Jelly,
agreed to maintain Yerk’s identity completely anonymous as a
witness that had contacted PETA to report suspected animal abuse”
(Doc.
#139,
p.
23);
that
PETA
intentionally
breached
the
confidentiality agreement by disclosing Yerk’s identity to his
employer, and that PETA knew Yerk would be subject to reprisals.
(Id. at 23-24).
In October 2008, Guillermo Quintana (Quintana), a former
deputy for the LCSO, reported to PETA that Lee County Sheriff’s
Deputy Travis Jelly (Deputy Jelly) was engaging in animal abuse of
his canine partner.
(Doc. #146-5, p. 64.)
Quintana provided
Deputy Jason Yerk’s (plaintiff or Yerk) contact information to PETA
as a corroborating witness.
LCSO at the time.
Yerk worked with Deputy Jelly at the
(Id., p. 82.)
This much seems undisputed in the
record.
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From plaintiff’s perspective, it is undisputed that on October
21, 2008, he entered into an oral agreement with PETA through
Christina
Wheeless
(Wheeless)
in
which
he
agreed
to
provide
information to PETA regarding animal abuse committed by Deputy
Jelly in exchange for PETA’s promise to maintain his identity as a
source of information confidential. After entering this agreement,
Yerk described for Wheeless the abuse he had witnessed Deputy Jelly
committing
to
his
K-9
dog.
Thereafter,
Kristen
Dejournett
(Dejournett), the PETA caseworker assigned to this case, disclosed
not only the substance of the alleged animal abuse witnessed by
Yerk but also revealed that Yerk was one of the sources who
reported the abuse to PETA.
“An oral contract, such as the one in this case, is subject to
the basic requirements of contract law such as offer, acceptance,
consideration and sufficient specification of essential terms.”
St. Joe Corp. v. McIver, 875 So. 2d 375, 381 (Fla. 2004).
Fact
issues have been raised by PETA as to the existence of such an
agreement, its precise terms if it exists, and the authorization of
Wheeless to enter into an agreement binding PETA.
these
matters
is
conflicting,
and
because
The evidence on
the
evidence
on
plaintiff’s summary judgment motion must be viewed in the light
most favorable to PETA, summary judgment is precluded.
Therefore,
plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment must be denied.
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IV.
PETA’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #135)
PETA seeks summary judgment as to all counts for various
reasons.
As to this motion, any disputed evidence must be viewed
in favor of plaintiff.
Therefore, for purposes of PETA’s motion,
the Court construes the facts to have established that on October
21, 2009, PETA entered into a confidentiality agreement with Yerk
whereby PETA agreed to maintain as confidential Yerk’s identity as
a source of information who reported suspected animal abuse.
With
this established for summary judgment purposes, the basics of what
followed seem to be undisputed.
On November 4, 2008, PETA sent a letter to the LCSO which
stated that it had received complaints alleging that Deputy Jelly
had on multiple occasions abused his K-9 partner.
(Doc. #139-7.)
The letter also stated that the callers feared reprisal and had
asked to remain anonymous, however the letter listed a series of
witnesses to the alleged abuse and requested that the LCSO conduct
an investigation.
The letter identified Yerk as one of the
witnesses to the abuse, but not as one of the callers who reported
it.
(Id.)
Yerk does not assert that this disclosure violated his
confidentiality agreement with PETA.
On November 13, 2008, Lieutenant Kathy Rairden (Lt. Rairden)
of the LCSO initiated an internal affairs investigation of Deputy
Jelly.
(Doc.
investigation,
#136-2,
Lt.
p.
Rairden
19.)
In
contacted
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connection
with
that
Dejournett,
the
PETA
investigator assigned to the case.
Lt. Rairden requested that
DeJournett reveal the callers’ identities, and told her that the
name of an active duty deputy could not be confidential.
In
response, Dejournett orally identified Yerk as one of the callers.
(Doc. #146-9, pp. 144-145.)
This, Yerk asserts, was in violation
of his confidentiality agreement with PETA.
Later, Dejournett indicated to Lt. Rairden that identifying
Yerk was a mistake, and that PETA had a confidentiality agreement
with the caller.
(Doc. #146-11, p.
requested notes of the calls to PETA.
22.)
Lt. Rairden then
Initially, Dejournett
provided Lt. Rairden with redacted notes and explained in an email
that the identity of the caller was confidential.
(Doc. #139-3.)
On November 18, 2009, Lt. Rairden responded by email and
stated that “once the deputies make a statement to you as an
employee of the Sheriff’s Office the confidentiality should not
extend to them.”
(Doc. #139-4.)
Dejournett responded that PETA’s
“confidentiality agreement extends to everyone, whether they be a
citizen, law enforcement officer, whistle-blower, etc.”
#139-5.)
(Doc.
Later that day, however, Dejournett stated in an email
that she had consulted with her supervisors and agreed to provide
Lt. Rairden with the un-redacted notes.
Yerk as one of the callers.
These notes identified
(Doc. #136-1, p. 18.)
On or about November 19, 2008, Lt. Rairden interviewed several
K-9 officers, including Yerk, in connection with the investigation
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of Deputy Jelly.
Yerk gave Lt. Rairden information regarding
animal abuse he observed.
the
During the interview, Lt. Rairden asked
Yerk whether he had spoken to anyone outside the LCSO about the
incidents involving Deputy Jelly, and specifically whether he had
spoken to PETA.
questions.
(Doc. #136-2, p. 65.)
Yerk responded “no” to both
(Id.)
On November 20, 2008, Lt. Rairden conducted a follow-up
interview of Yerk.
speaking to PETA.
In the follow-up interview, Yerk admitted
Lt. Rairden then initiated an internal affairs
investigation into Yerk’s untruthfulness.
(Doc. #163-3, p. 7.)
On November 26, 2008, Lieutenant Jeffrey Trusal (Lt. Trusal)
was scheduled to conduct an interview of Yerk.
was represented by counsel.
Yerk appeared and
After reviewing the file, Lt. Trusal
advised Yerk of the complaint against him.
Yerk discussed the
matter with his attorney and decided to resign.2
his resignation letter that day.
Yerk submitted
(Doc. #163-3, p. 1.)
Although
Yerk was no longer employed with the LCSO, on December 11, 2008,
Lt.
Trusal
issued
his
determination
that
untruthfulness against Yerk was substantiated.
the
charge
of
(Doc. #163-3, pp.
3-6.)
2
Yerk contends that there was a culture of reprisal at LCSO
and the investigation of Deputy Jelly was a pretext to discover
“the rat” who would eventually be terminated. Yerk also contends
that the LCSO was politically corrupt. (Doc. #146, p. 2.)
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A.
Estoppel Based on Untruthfulness
PETA first argues that plaintiff is estopped from maintaining
any civil
action
because of
Yerk’s own
wrongful
and
illegal
conduct, i.e., perjury to Lt. Rairden in violation of Fla. Stat. §§
837.02, 837.012 and 837.05.
(Doc. #135, pp. 8-10.) PETA relies on
Kaminer v. Eckerd Corp., Inc., 966 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
In Kaminer, a young man died from his voluntary ingestion of
Oxycontin.
Id. at 453.
He had obtained the Oxycontin from his
fraternity brother, who in turn had obtained the drug from his
roommate, a pharmacy technician.
The young man’s estate sued the
pharmacy for failure to safeguard the drug.
The court applied the
common law rule that a party cannot maintain an action based on the
party’s own illegal conduct, and granted summary judgment for the
pharmacy.
Id. at 454-55.
The Court finds that Kaminer is inapplicable to the present
case.
Yerk’s untruthfulness does not constitute “illegal” conduct
under any of the statutes cited by defendant.
Florida Statutes §
837.02 makes it illegal to make a false statement, under oath, in
any official proceeding in regard to any material matter.
Section
837.012 makes it illegal to make a false statement, under oath, not
in an official proceeding in regard to a material matter.
Both
statutory sections require that the false statement relate to a
matter material to the underlying case. Whether Yerk spoke to PETA
was not “material” to the underlying case – Deputy Jelly’s alleged
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abuse of his K-9 partner.
See State v. Diaz, 785 So. 2d 744, 745-
46 (2001)(To constitute perjury “it is insufficient that the
statements are untrue or incorrect; the statements must have a
bearing on a determination in the underlying case.”).3
Finally, §
837.05 makes it illegal to give false information to any law
enforcement officer concerning the alleged commission of any crime.
Whether Yerk spoke to PETA does not “concern the commission” of
Deputy Jelly’s alleged crime.
Therefore, § 837.05 simply does not
apply. Additionally, while it may be “frustrating and annoying” to
an officer, a person is not compelled to answer an officer’s
questions during the course of an investigation.
R.S. v. State,
531 So. 2d 1026, 1026-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Sommer v. State, 465
So. 2d 1339, 1343 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)(“Police officers and other
citizens, too, can ask questions of anyone on the street. Anyone
questioned can refuse to answer.”).
Based upon the foregoing, and
under the facts of this case as viewed in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, plaintiff is not estopped from maintaining this
action.
3
Lt. Rairden’s interview of Yerk was not an “official
proceeding”, so Fla. Stat. § 837.02 would not apply in any case.
See Schramm v. State, 374 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979)(finding
statement under oath to police is not “official proceeding”); see
also Fla. Stat. § 837.011.
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B.
Contract As Violation of Public Policy
Plaintiff brings one contract claim and six4 tort claims
arising from the same operative facts.
The Court first discusses
whether the breach of contract claim is barred as a matter of
public policy, as PETA asserts.
(Doc. #135, pp. 14-17.)
Under Florida law, a cause of action for breach of contract
requires (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) a material
breach of the contract; and (3) damages. Brooks Tropicals, Inc. v.
Acosta, 959 So. 2d 288, 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Barbara G. Banks,
P.A. v. Thomas D. Lardin, P.A., 938 So. 2d 571, 575 (Fla. 4th DCA
2006).
Count IV alleges breach of an oral contract formed on
October 21, 2009, between Yerk and PETA, acting through Wheeless.
As stated above, for purposes of PETA’s motion, PETA entered into
a confidentiality agreement in which it agreed to maintain as
confidential Yerk’s identity as a source who had contacted PETA to
report suspected animal abuse. PETA argues that such a contract is
not a “valid” contract because it is unenforceable and void as
against public policy.
Florida courts recognize that a contract which is unlawful
because
it
violates
public
policy
will
not
be
enforced.
“Illegality is a compelling reason not to enforce a contract.”
Jupiter Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Fla., Inc.,
4
Count VII was withdrawn by plaintiff at the final pretrial
hearing.
-12-
So. 3d
, 2011 WL 4056293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
Florida courts,
however, use care when determining that a contract is contrary to
public policy.
When determining whether a contract violates public
policy, it is necessary to carefully balance the public
interest with the right to freely contract. When a
contract is not prohibited under [a] constitutional or
statutory provision, or prior judicial decision, it
should not be struck down on the ground that it is
contrary to public policy, except it be clearly injurious
to the public good or contravene some established
interest of society. Therefore, courts should be guided
by the rule of extreme caution when called upon to
declare transactions void as contrary to public policy
and should refuse to strike down contracts involving
private relationships on this ground, unless it be made
clearly to appear that there has been some great
prejudice to the dominant public interest sufficient to
overthrow the fundamental public policy of the right to
freedom of contract....
Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, LLP v. Forier, 67 So. 3d 315,
318 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)(citations and quotation marks omitted).
As a general matter, a private corporation such as PETA may be
able to enter into an enforceable agreement not to disclose the
identity of a source of information to the source’s employer.
After all, the law routinely recognizes the general validity of
private confidentiality agreements in various contexts. The nuance
in this case, however, is that the employer is the Sheriff and the
information being reported to PETA relates to the commission of a
crime.
There are several instances recognized by Florida law which
allow
the
identity
of
a
person
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reporting
abuse
to
remain
confidential. Fla. Stat. §§ 39.201(b), 39.205(3) (reports of child
abuse or neglect); Fla. Stat. § 415.107(3), (6), 415.111(2)(reports
of
vulnerable
adult
abuse);
Fla.
Stat.
§
17.0401
complaint regarding financial investigations).
(consumer
None of these
relate to animal abuse, and in any case, the confidentiality
allowed by these statutes does not create an absolute privilege
against disclosure. A court, for example, can compel disclosure of
the source’s identity and can order that it become public record.
Fla. Stat. § 39.202(f) (reporter of child abuse).
Additionally,
even where a private confidentiality agreement is otherwise proper,
it will not be enforced where its effect becomes obstructive of the
rights of non-parties.
See, e.g., Nestor v. Posner-Gerstenhaber,
857 So. 2d 953, 955 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2003); Scott v. Nelson, 697 So.
2d 1300, 1301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
In this case, the confidentiality agreement allowed PETA to
disclose the substance of the alleged abuse and the identity of the
witnesses to it.
The agreement only precluded the disclosure of
the identity of PETA’s source.
While it seems clear that the
confidentiality agreement did not and could not create an absolute
privilege, and would eventually give way to lawful procedures which
could compel disclosure of the source’s identity, that stage had
not arrived in this case.
At the time of the disclosure in this
case, PETA was not legally required to answer questions from the
LCSO.
Given the “extreme caution” the Court must use before
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declaring a transaction void as contrary to public policy, the
Court cannot find that the agreement in this case clearly affected
“some great prejudice to the dominant public interest sufficient to
overthrow the fundamental public policy of the right to freedom of
contract”.
Forier, 67 So. 3d at 318.
Accordingly, the Court finds
that the agreement is not unenforceable as a violation of Florida
public policy.
C.
Florida Economic Loss Doctrine
PETA argues that all the tort claims must be dismissed because
they are derivative of the oral contract claim and therefore
violate Florida’s economic loss doctrine. (Doc. #135, pp. 17-20.)
The Court disagrees.
“[T]he economic loss rule in Florida is applicable in only two
situations: (1) where the parties are in contractual privity and
one party seeks to recover damages in tort for matters arising out
of the contract, or (2) where the defendant is a manufacturer or
distributor of a defective product which damages itself but does
not cause personal injury or damage to any other property.”
Curd
v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216, 1223 (Fla. 2010)(citing
Indem. Ins. Co. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004)).
“[E]ven in these two situations, the economic loss rules would not
prevent the bringing of an action and recovery for intentional
torts, such as, fraud, conversion, intentional interference, civil
theft, abuse
of
process,
and
other
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torts
requiring
proof of
intent.”
Id. at 1223 n.4; see also HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas
Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996); Moransais
v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 981, 983 (Fla. 1999) (recognizing that
claims of fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation
were not barred by economic loss rule where they were independent
from underlying contract); Hallock v. Holiday Isle Resort & Marina,
Inc., 4 So. 3d 17, 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)(finding that economic loss
rule did not abolish cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
even if there was underlying oral or written contract).
PETA denies the existence of a confidentiality agreement, and
the Court has found sufficient disputed facts to allow the breach
of contract claim to go to the jury.
A jury verdict finding a
breach of contract may indeed impact the viability of the tort
claims, but this possibility does not justify summary judgment.
Even when inconsistent remedies are asserted, Florida law does not
require a plaintiff to elect between counts prior to judgment.
Monco of Orlando, Inc. v. ITT Indus. Credit Corp., 458 So. 2d 332,
334 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
Additionally, plaintiff is allowed to
plead counts in the alternative, regardless of consistency, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(d)(2), (3).
Therefore, the motion for summary judgment
on this ground is denied.
D.
Fiduciary Relationship, Counts I and II
PETA seeks summary judgment as to Counts I and II for three
additional reasons.
The Court will address the first two now and
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the third later on in the opinion5. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion for summary judgment will be denied on the first
two grounds.
First, PETA asserts that the facts are “nowhere near the
situations where a fiduciary duty exists”. (Doc. #135, pp. 20-21).
“Fiduciary relationships implied in law are premised upon the
specific factual situation surrounding the transaction and the
relationship
of
the
parties.
Courts
have
found
a
fiduciary
relation implied in law when confidence is reposed by one party and
a trust accepted by the other.”
Capital Bank v. MVB, Inc., 644 So.
2d 515, 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)(citations omitted). The totality of
the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Yerk, would allow
a reasonable jury to find a fiduciary relationship and a resulting
fiduciary duty.
Summary judgment on this ground is denied.
Second, PETA asserts that there was no breach of any duty of
confidentiality because PETA had a superior duty to truthfully
respond to the demands of law enforcement.
(Doc. #135, p. 21.)
As
discussed above, PETA had no legally enforceable duty to answer the
questions of the LCSO when it did.
Sommer, 465 So. 2d at 1342.
Assuming, however, that PETA had a duty to truthfully respond to
the demands of the investigating law enforcement officer, this
5
PETA’s third argument is that there was no proximately caused
damages as to Counts I and II because its identification of Yerk as
the source of PETA’s information was not believed by the LCSO and
Yerk lied and was caught by his admission to the lie. (Doc. #135,
p. 21.)
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competing and conflicting duty would not justify summary judgment.
The
Florida
Supreme
Court
has
held
that
the
conflicting duties are to be weighed by the jury.
existence
of
Barnett Bank of
W. Fla. v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1986).
E.
Negligence Claim- Florida Impact Rule and Legal Duty
PETA seeks summary judgment as to Count VI, the negligence
claim, on the grounds that a negligence claim will not lie because
(1) there was no bodily injury or property damage, and (2) PETA had
no legal duty to conceal information from the police.
(Doc. #135,
pp. 21-22.)
Florida has a long history of disallowing either a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress or recovery
of damages for emotional distress in a negligence action, unless
the emotional distress flows from physical injuries sustained in an
impact. “The impact rule, which is well established in this state,
requires that ‘before a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional
distress
caused
by
the
negligence
of
another,
the
emotional
distress suffered must flow from physical injuries the plaintiff
sustained in an impact.’”
S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v.
Welker, 908 So. 2d 317, 320 (Fla. 2005)(quoting R.J. v. Humana of
Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995)).
The impact rule has been traditionally applied
as a limitation to assure a tangible validity
for
emotional
or
psychological
harm.
jurisprudence has generally reasoned that such
is necessary because, unlike physical injury,
harm may not readily align with traditional
-18-
primarily
of claims
Florida
assurance
emotional
tort law
damage principles. Our courts have explained that the
existence of emotional harm is difficult to prove,
resultant damages are not easily quantified, and the
precise cause of such injury can be elusive. This Court
has also theorized that without the impact rule, Florida
courts may be inundated with litigation based solely on
psychological injury.
Rowell v. Holt, 850 So. 2d 474, 477-78 (Fla. 2003)(citations
omitted).
“Exceptions to the rule have been narrowly created and
defined in a certain very narrow class of cases in which the
foreseeability and gravity of the emotional injury involved, and
lack of countervailing policy concerns, have surmounted the policy
rationale undergirding application of the impact rule.”
478.
Id. at
“The impact rule does not apply to recognized intentional
torts that result in predominantly emotional damages . . .”
Id.
n.1.
The negligence claim in this case alleges that PETA breached
a duty of confidentiality when it disclosed Yerk’s identity as a
source of information to the LCSO, and seeks damages including
mental anguish and suffering.
physical impact in this case.
(Doc. #1, ¶38.)
There is no
The circumstances in this case are
a far cry from the breach of confidentiality in Gracey v. Eaker,
837 So. 2d at 356, (where “one's psychotherapist reveal[ed] without
authorization or justification the most confidential details of
one's life”), or Fla. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Abril, 969 So. 2d 201
(Fla.
2007)(where
clinical
laboratory
with
statutory
duty
of
confidentiality disclosed HIV test information) which the Florida
-19-
Supreme Court found were not within the impact rule.
PETA is
therefore entitled to summary judgment, precluding damages for
mental anguish and suffering as to the negligence count.
PETA’s argument goes further, however, because it seeks not
only to preclude damages but to bar the entire negligence claim due
to lack of physical impact.
PETA relies upon Monroe v. Sarasota
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 746 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), which
states that “as a general rule, [] bodily injury or property damage
is an essential element of a cause of action in negligence.
will expand
the
common
law
tort
of
negligence,
waiving
We
that
essential element only under extraordinary circumstances which
clearly justify judicial interference to protect a plaintiff's
economic expectations.”
An even clearer statement of Florida law
followed:
The final judgment recognizes that, as a general rule, a
party cannot recover damages for emotional distress in
the absence of physical injury or illness. However, this
“impact doctrine” or “impact rule,” which is explained in
a long line of cases including Rowell v. Holt, 850 So. 2d
474 (Fla. 2003)] and R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 652
So.2d 360 (Fla. 1995), does not merely prevent an award
of monetary damages representing a party's “emotional
distress” while permitting recovery for other types of
damages. Rather, this doctrine generally requires proof
of a physical injury or illness before a plaintiff is
permitted to recover any type of damages awardable under
a negligence theory.
Greenacre Props., Inc. v. Rao, 933 So. 2d 19, 25 (Fla. 2d DCA
2006).
Because it is undisputed that Yerk suffered no physical
injury or illness, he is not “permitted to recover any type of
-20-
damages awardable under a negligence theory.”
Id.
Therefore,
summary judgment as to Count VI will be granted in favor of PETA.
F.
Tortious Interference
Among other things, PETA argues that the tortious interference
claim cannot survive because “there is no evidence that it was done
to interfere with Yerk’s employment”. (Doc. #135, p. 24.) Because
such an intent is required, and is absent in this case even when
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
summary judgment will be granted on this count.
The elements of tortious interference are “(1) the existence
of a business relationship; (2) knowledge of the relationship on
the part of the defendant; (3) an intentional and unjustified
interference with the relationship by the defendant; and (4) damage
to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the relationship.”
Gossard v. Adia Servs., Inc., 723 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1998).
“Imbedded
within
these
elements
is
the
requirement
that
the
plaintiff establish that the defendant’s conduct caused or induced
the breach that resulted in the plaintiff's damages.”
Chicago
Title Ins. Co. v. Alday-Donalson Title Co. of Fla., Inc., 832 So.
2d 810, 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)(citing St. John's River Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Fernberg Geological Servs., Inc., 784 So. 2d 500, 504
(Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). “A cause of action for tortious interference
requires a showing of both an intent to damage the business
relationship and a lack of justification to take the action which
-21-
caused the damage.”
Networkip, LLC v. Spread Enters., Inc., 922
So. 2d 355, 358 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
“Proof of the requisite intent
is necessary as ‘[t]here is no such thing as a cause of action for
interference
effected.’”
which
is
only
negligently
or
consequentially
Maxi-Taxi of Fla., Inc. v. Lee Cnty. Port Auth., 301
F. App’x 881, 885-86 (11th Cir. 2008)(quoting Ethyl Corp. v.
Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220, 1223–24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)).
There is no evidence which would support an inference that
PETA’s disclosure of Yerk’s identity as a source of information was
done with an intent to interfere with or damage the employment
relationship between Yerk and the LCSO.
Even if the initial
disclosure was not accidental, it is undisputed that the disclosure
was only made at the insistence of the LCSO and even then was
resisted by PETA.
G.
Fraudulent and Negligent Misrepresentation
In addition to the proximate cause issue, discussed below,
PETA argues that Counts III and V must fail because (1) “a false
statement amounting to a promise to perform an act in the future
does not constitute actionable fraud”, and (2) PETA made no promise
without the intent of performing it because it was not disclosed
until demanded by law enforcement.
(Doc. #135, p. 23.)
As a general rule, “a false statement of fact, to be a ground
for fraud, must be of a past or existing fact, not a promise to do
something in the future.”
Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding
-22-
Club, Ltd., 403 So. 2d 1367, 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
An
exception to this general rule exists “where the promise to perform
a material matter in the future is made without any intention of
performing or made with the positive intention not to perform.”
See Wadington v. Cont’l Med. Servs., Inc., 907 So. 2d 631, 631
(Fla. 4th DCA 2005)(citations omitted); see also Gemini Investors
III, L.P. v. Nunez,
So. 3d
, 2011 WL 4578015 (Fla. 3d DCA
2011). However, projections, opinions or representations regarding
future results can constitute fraud when made by a party with
superior or exclusive knowledge of the underlying facts and that
party “knew or should have known, that the facts in his possession
invalidated the opinion which he expressed.”
See Varnum v. Nu-Car
Carriers, Inc., 804 F.2d 638, 642 (11th Cir. 1986)(applying Florida
law);
Mejia
v.
Jurich,
781
So.
2d
1175,
1177
(Fla.
3d
DCA
2001)(collecting cases).
Here, the evidence in the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, is sufficient to create a jury issue with
respect to PETA’s promise of confidentiality.
anonymity
on
a
regular
basis
(doc.
Since PETA promised
#146-3,
pp.
61-62)
and
maintained in-house counsel (doc. # 146-9, p. 154), a jury could
find that PETA had superior knowledge regarding the scope of its
confidentiality agreement and knew or should have known that
promising absolute anonymity was a false promise. Accordingly, the
-23-
motion for summary judgment will be denied as to these two counts.
H.
Proximate Causation of Yerk’s Damages
As noted above, the damages plaintiff seeks on all counts are
the same - lost wages and benefits, lost future earning capacity,
and mental anguish and suffering.
PETA essentially argues that it
is entitled to summary judgment on all counts because its conduct
was not the proximate cause of these damages.
PETA argues that it
was not foreseeable that Yerk would lie to the LCSO and then
voluntarily resign from the LCSO when confronted with his lie.
PETA also argues that because Yerk has not shown constructive
termination, plaintiff cannot show that PETA’s actions caused the
loss of Yerk’s job, wages, benefits, and other consequential
damages.
(1)
Causation as Required Element
The Court starts from the position that all the remaining
counts6 require plaintiff to establish that PETA’s misconduct was
the legal cause of damages.
Count I, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: see
Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 2002)(“The elements of
a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty are: the existence of a
fiduciary duty, and the breach of that duty such that it is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. . . . Further, one in
such a fiduciary relationship is subject to legal responsibility
6
The Court has granted summary judgment on Counts VI and VIII
and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Count VII. Thus, Counts I-V
remain.
-24-
for harm flowing from a breach of fiduciary duty imposed by the
relationship.”); Bernstein v. True, 636 So. 2d 1364, 1367 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1994)(“Even assuming a breach of fiduciary duty, appellant
cannot recover without proof of causation.”); Crusselle v. Mong, 59
So. 3d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)(“The elements of a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty are (1) the existence of a
duty, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) damages flowing from the
breach.”). Count II, Constructive Fraud: see Taylor v. Kenco Chem.
& Mfg. Corp., 465 So. 2d 581, 589 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)(Claim for
constructive fraud, like actual fraud, requires causation).
Count
III, Fraudulent Misrepresentation: see Butler v. Yusem, 44 So. 3d
102, 106 (Fla. 2010)(Elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are
“(1)
a
false
statement
concerning
a
material
fact;
(2)
the
representor's knowledge that the representation is false; (3) an
intention that the representation induce another to act on it; and
(4) consequent injury by the party acting in reliance on the
representation.”). Count IV, Breach of Oral Contract: see Rollins,
Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860, 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)(“The
elements of an action for breach of contract are: (1) the existence
of a contract, (2) a breach of the contract, and (3) damages
resulting from the breach.”); Chipman v. Chonin, 597 So. 2d 363,
364 (3rd DCA 1992)(“In breach of contract actions, a plaintiff may
recover
only
if
the
damages
were
a
proximate
result
of
the
breach.”); Capitol Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Earth Tech, Inc., 25 So.
-25-
3d 593, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)(“The injured party is entitled to
recover all damages that are causally related to the breach so long
as the damages were reasonably foreseeable at the time the parties
entered
into
the
contract.”).
Count
V,
Negligent
Misrepresentation: see Specialty Marine & Indus. Supplies, Inc. v.
Venus, 66 So. 3d 306, 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)(Elements of negligent
misrepresentation are “(1) the defendant made a misrepresentation
of material fact that he believed to be true but which was in fact
false; (2) the defendant was negligent in making the statement
because he should have known the representation was false; (3) the
defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to rely and [sic] on the
misrepresentation; and (4) injury resulted to the plaintiff acting
in justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”).
(2)
Principles of Proximate Cause and Intervening Cause
The
Florida
Supreme
Court
has
summarized
the
relevant
proximate causation principles as follows:
The issue of proximate cause is generally a question
of fact concerned with whether and to what extent the
defendant's conduct foreseeably and substantially caused
the specific injury that actually occurred. This Court
has stated that harm is ‘proximate’ in a legal sense if
prudent human foresight would lead one to expect that
similar harm is likely to be substantially caused by the
specific act or omission in question.
The proper
question is whether the individual's conduct is so
unusual,
extraordinary
or
bizarre
(i.e.,
so
‘unforeseeable’) that the policy of the law will relieve
the [defendant] of any liability for negligently creating
this dangerous situation. In this Court's words, [t]he
law does not impose liability for freak injuries that
were utterly unpredictable in light of common human
experience. Where reasonable persons could differ as to
-26-
whether the facts establish proximate causation, the
issue must be left to the fact finder.
A negligent actor . . . is not liable for damages
suffered by an injured party when some separate force or
action is the active and efficient intervening cause of
the injury. Such an intervening cause supersedes the
prior wrong as the proximate cause of the injury by
breaking the sequence between the prior wrong and the
injury. However, if an intervening cause is foreseeable
the original negligent actor may still be held liable.
The question of whether an intervening cause is
foreseeable is for the trier of fact. In reaching this
determination, the question is whether the harm that
occurred was within the scope of the danger attributable
to the defendant's negligent conduct.
Goldberg v. Fla. Power & Light, Co., 899 So. 2d 1105, 1116 (Fla.
2005)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Although the above standard refers only to negligence claims,
these principles are also applicable to breach of contract claims
and, while not as stringently, to intentional torts.
See, e.g.,
Mnemonics, Inc. v. Max Davis Assocs., Inc., 808 So. 2d 1278, 1280
(Fla. 5th DCA 2002)(“Damages recoverable by a party injured by a
breach of contract are those that naturally flow from the breach
and can reasonably be said to have been contemplated by the parties
at the time the contract was entered into.”); Stensby v. Effjohn Oy
Ab, 806 So. 2d 542, 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(“It is of course
established that a breach-of-contract-plaintiff must show that the
defendants’ breach was a ‘substantial factor’ in causing damage.”);
United Food & Commercial Workers Unions, Emp’rs Health & Welfare
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 223 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir.
2000)(finding “the usual common law rule seems to be that the
-27-
strictures
intentional
of
proximate
tort
cases”
cause
but
are
that
applied
more
proximate cause
loosely
is
still
in
a
requirement); see also Himes v. Brown & Co. Secs. Corp., 518 So. 2d
937, 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)(dismissing various causes of action
because plaintiff could not show that damages were proximately
caused by defendant’s actions).
Defendant is not liable when a separate force or action is the
active and efficient intervening cause, the sole proximate cause or
an independent cause of the plaintiff’s damages.
See Dep’t of
Transp. v. Anglin, 502 So. 2d 896, 898 (Fla. 1987)(citing Gibson v.
Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1980)).
However,
when an intervening cause is foreseeable to the defendant, he may
still be held liable.
Anglin, 502 So. 2d at 898.
The question of proximate cause is “generally for juries to
decide using their common sense upon appropriate instructions,
although occasionally, when reasonable people cannot differ, the
issue has been said to be one of law for the court.”
Stahl v.
Metro. Dade Cnty., 438 So. 2d 14, 21 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
(3) Application to the Present Case
Here,
Yerk
has
suffered
damages
(i.e.,
his
lost
wages,
benefits, and other consequential damages) as a result of his
unemployment.
The legal cause of his unemployment, actual and
proximate, is the critical issue. The question is whether Yerk was
compelled to resign as a result of PETA disclosing his identity as
-28-
a source of information and whether his forced resignation was
reasonably
foreseeable
to
PETA
at
the
time
it
promised
him
anonymity.
(a) Yerk’s Lie as an Intervening Cause
Although PETA maintains that Yerk was not compelled to resign,
PETA argues that even if he were compelled, he did so because of
his untruthfulness.
When Lt. Rairden asked Yerk if he had spoken
to PETA, he replied “no” - which was a lie.
Once confronted with
his lie, he confessed and ultimately resigned.
PETA contends that
it was not foreseeable that Yerk would lie to the LCSO and,
therefore, the lie was an independent intervening cause of his
unemployment.
The Court disagrees.
PETA promised Yerk anonymity and was on notice that he feared
reprisal.
A reasonable jury could find that it was reasonably
foreseeable to PETA that Yerk would lie because he felt privileged
not to disclose a discussion which he believed was confidential.
Because such an intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable, it
would
not
liability.
break
the
chain
of
causation
and
absolve
PETA
of
Anglin, 502 So. 2d at 898.
(b) Whether PETA’s Conduct Was Proximate Cause of Resignation
PETA asserts that its conduct was not the proximate cause of
Yerk’s resignation, and therefore not the proximate cause of the
damages plaintiff claims.
to
resign
and
that
he
PETA argues that Yerk was not compelled
could
-29-
have
waited
for
the
LCSO’s
determination of discipline regarding his untruthfulness; if the
discipline included termination, Yerk could have appealed the
decision.
PETA urges
To determine whether Yerk was “compelled” to resign,
the
court
to
adopt
the
standard
termination utilized in Title VII cases.
for
constructive
Under this standard, it
is unlikely that any evidence in the record would support a finding
of constructive termination by the LCSO.
See
Hargray v. City of
Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1995); Morgan v. Ford, 6
F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 1993); Ross v. City of Perry, 396 F. App’x
668, 671 (11th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff responds that the above
standard should not be applied in Yerk’s case because, unlike the
plaintiffs
in
Hargray,
Morgan
and
Ross,
he
is
not
alleging
constitutional or statutory causes of action, but rather various
common law causes of action which simply require a showing of legal
causation.
(Doc. #146, ¶¶44, 45.)
The relevant issue is whether the resignation was reasonably
foreseeable to PETA, not whether the LCSO’s subsequent treatment of
Yerk constituted a constructive termination.
This indeed is a
troublesome issue, and much of the evidence plaintiff puts forward
concerning the LCSO and its culture is simply irrelevant because
the majority of it was not known to PETA at the time it promised
Yerk anonymity.
There is, however, sufficient evidence as to the
information actually communicated to PETA which creates a jury
-30-
question as to proximate cause and to keep this case within the
normal rule - the jury gets to decide.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
Count VII is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, plaintiff having
announced he will not pursue that count.
2.
Defendant’s Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
#135) is GRANTED as to Counts VI and VIII, and judgment on these
counts will be entered in favor of defendant.
The Motion is
otherwise DENIED.
3.
Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
#139) is DENIED.
4.
The Clerk of the Court shall withhold entry of judgment
pending completion of the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
November, 2011.
Copies: Counsel of record
-31-
4th
day of
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