Burke v. Haynes et al
Filing
63
OPINION AND ORDER granting 48 Motion to dismiss and the Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to defendants Budz and Dixon; denying 49 Motion to dismiss and defendant Emanoilidis shall file an amended answer to include the Second Cl aim within 10 days. Defendants Jane Doe, Quick and Spissinger are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Clerk shall enter judgment and correct the caption of the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 9/20/2012. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
ROBERT BURKE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No.
2:09-cv-635-FtM-29SPC
NATASHA HAYNES; TST, Therapeutic
Security
Technician,
FCCC,
TIMOTHY BUDZ, Executive Director,
FCCC, DR. GEORGE EMANOILIDIS,
Assistant
Clinical
Director,
FCCC,
FNU
SPISSINGER,
GEO
Captain, FCCC, DAVID DIXON, GEO
Investigator, OFFICER QUICK, GEO
Officer, FCCC and JANE DOE, GEO
Officer, FCCC,
Defendants.1
_________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
I.
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint filed on behalf of Defendants Budz and
Dixon (Doc. #48, Budz/Dixon Motion).
Defendants Budz and Dixon
seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule
of
Civil
1
Procedure
12(b)(6).
Despite
being
afforded
As of the date of this Order, service has not been effectuated
upon Defendants Spissinger, Quick and Jane Doe. See Docs. ##26-28,
##32-34 and ##42-43. These unserved Defendants are subject to
dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Nonetheless, because
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court sua sponte
reviews the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as to
these unserved Defendants.
additional time,2 Plaintiff has not filed a response in opposition
to Defendants Budz and Dixon’s Motion and the time for doing so has
expired.
Also pending before the Court is Defendant Emanoilidis’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim in Paragraph 2 of
His
“Statement
of
Claims”
(Doc.
#49,
Emanoilidis
Motion).3
Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant Emanoilidis’ Motion (Doc.
#56, Pl. Response to Emanoilidis Motion).
These matters are ripe
for review.
II.
Plaintiff, who is civilly committed to the Florida Civil
Commitment Center (“FCCC”) pursuant to Florida’s Involuntary Civil
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, §§ 916.31-916.49,
Florida Statutes, has pending before the Court a Civil Rights
Complaint (Doc. #1, Complaint). Liberally construed, the Complaint
alleges three claims: (1) a First Amendment retaliation claim and
Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant Haynes stemming from
Plaintiff
filing
grievances
concerning
other
FCCC
residents’
smoking; (2) a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim
against Defendants Quick, Jane Doe, Emanoilidis, Budz, Spissinger,
and Dixon stemming from Plaintiff’s placement in segregation; and
2
On November 29, 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff a sixty (60)
day extension of time to file a response to the Motion. See Doc.
#52. On February 2, 2012, the Court again granted Plaintiff an
additional twenty-one (21) day extension of time. See Doc. #60.
3
Defendant Emanoilidis filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses
“as to Paragraph 3 Statement of Claims.” See Doc. #46.
-2-
(3) a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against
Defendants Emanoilidis, Budz, Spissinger, Quick, Jane Doe and Dixon
stemming from Plaintiff’s placement in segregation.
Complaint at
3-4.
The following pertinent facts, which are accepted as true at
this
stage
of
the
proceedings,
are
alleged
in
support
August
13,
of
Plaintiff’s claims.
Plaintiff
spoke
with
Defendant
Budz
on
2009
complaining that “staff was doing a lousy job” enforcing the nonsmoking rule implemented at the FCCC.
Id. at 5, ¶1.
Plaintiff
filed numerous grievances with FCCC staff concerning the smoking
issue.
Id., ¶2-3.
On August 14, 2009, Plaintiff verbally advised
Defendant Haynes that residents were smoking in the dormitory.
Id., ¶4.
Plaintiff showed Haynes a copy of a grievance in which
Defendant Budz wrote “I agree that the non-smoking rule must be
enforced. Please inform staff if you observe anyone smoking.” Id.
After exchanging words
with Plaintiff, Defendant Haynes “yelled
out
forty
into
a
dorm
of
sexually
violent
predators
[Plaintiff] was snitching on residents smoking in the dorm.”
Immediately
thereafter,
several
residents
called
that
Id.
Plaintiff
a
“snitch” and made threatening remarks to and gestures at Plaintiff.
Id. at 6, ¶¶5-6.
Plaintiff
went
to
Dr.
Emanoilidis’
office,
reported
the
incident, expressed his concerns over being labeled a “snitch,” and
requested that Haynes be “terminated.”
-3-
Id. at 6-7, ¶8.
Dr.
Emanoilidis
“listened”
to
Plaintiff’s
complaint
about Haynes’
conduct, stated that he needed to report the allegations to Haynes’
supervisor, would request that the incident be investigated, and
agreed to speak to Plaintiff about his findings the following week.
Id.
In response to Defendant Emanoilidis’ questioning as to
whether Plaintiff was “comfortable” going back to his dorm and
having Haynes supervise the dorm, Plaintiff stated “I’ll stay where
I am at for the time being.”
Id.
Defendant Emanoilidis also
placed Plaintiff’s name on the list “to get a room in the honor
dorm Gulf.”
Id.
Plaintiff
“believe[s]”
Defendant
Emanoilidis
immediately
contacted Haynes’ supervisor, because when he returned to his dorm
Haynes was “assigned to a different dorm.”
Id. at 8, ¶¶ 9-10.
Nonetheless, Haynes left her post and returned to Plaintiff’s dorm,
inciting
the
residents
and
telling
them
Plaintiff removed from her assigned dorm.
that
she
would
get
Id.
On August 17, 2009, after eating and watching television,
Plaintiff returned back to his dorm room.
Id., ¶11. Plaintiff was
lying on his bed reading when Defendants Quick and Jane Doe came
into the dorm.
Id.
A resident yelled to them to “get that snitch
out of here.”
Id.
Defendant Jane Doe told Plaintiff that they
were there to “shake down #343,” and Plaintiff told her that they
were in room “#323.”
Id.
Defendant Jane Doe “corrected herself”
-4-
and Plaintiff consented to the two officers searching his room.
Id.
After patting Plaintiff down, Defendant Quick went over to
Plaintiff’s bed, lifted up the mattress, and pulled out “a plastic
imitation of a knife that someone sharpened.” Id., ¶12. Plaintiff
denied any knowledge of the knife and told the officers he believed
the knife had been planted by one of the residents against whom he
had filed a grievance about smoking.
Officer Jane Doe advised
Plaintiff that they received a tip from another resident about the
knife and where it was located.
Id., ¶13.
As Plaintiff was
pointing out that he had “locked containers” in his room, which was
a more likely place to hide the knife if it was his, residents in
the dorm started “chanting ‘get that snitch outa’ here.’”
Id.
As
Plaintiff left with the officers, a resident nicknamed “Spider”
stated “get the f**k out of here or I’ll put the f***king knife in
your back and twist it myself.”
Id.
being in possession of a weapon.
Id. at 9, n. 1.
Plaintiff
was
taken
Officers Quick and Doe.
to
Plaintiff was charged with
Defendant
Captain
Id. at 10, ¶14.
Spissinger
by
The two officers
confirmed the chanting about Plaintiff being called a “snitch” and
the threat made to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff
be
segregation.”
taken
to
medical
Id.
-5-
Id.
and
Spissinger ordered that
then
placed
in
“punitive
At
midnight
that
night,
Defendant
Dixon,
the
security
investigator, came to see Plaintiff and presented Plaintiff with “a
behavior management form.”
Id. at 11, ¶18.
Plaintiff was advised
that the infraction “was a major rule violation and required secure
management.”
Id.
Dixon asked Plaintiff the following questions:
(1) whether he wanted to waive his due process rights to a hearing;
(2) whether he wanted to be present for the hearing; (3) whether he
wanted staff assistance; (4) whether he had any witnesses; (5)
whether he had any documentation or evidence; and, (6) whether he
wanted to sign the form.
Plaintiff answered in the affirmative to
questions 2, 3, 4 and 5 and negative to questions 1 and 6.
Id.
On August 18, 2009, Plaintiff wrote several communication
forms to Mr. Reynolds, the clinical team leader for Saturn Dorm;
Ms.
Schau,
Emanoilidis,
confinement.
“assigned
clinical
requesting
that
personnel”;
they
Id. at 12, ¶20.
come
to
and,
see
Defendant
Plaintiff
in
Plaintiff also asked Defendant
Snyder to review the camera evidence and vestibule of the Saturn
dorm from August 17th, to determine if anyone entered Plaintiff’s
dorm room.
Id., ¶21. Plaintiff remained in confinement until
August 26, 2009, during which time no hearing was held.
Id., ¶22.
Plaintiff was placed on wing restriction4 for two weeks after his
release from confinement.
Id., ¶22, ¶26.
4
It appears that Plaintiff was required to be handcuffed while
on wing restriction, if he left the housing wing, such as when
receiving therapy. See id., ¶22.
-6-
On September 11, 2009, Plaintiff was given the option of going
back
to
secure
population.
management
confinement
Id. at 13, ¶25.
or
returning
to
open
On September 11, 2009, Plaintiff
elected to return to open population and was moved to the Paris
dorm.
Id.
On
September
15,
2009,
a
non-Paris
resident
pointed
Plaintiff and stated “they moved the snitch next to you.”
to
Id.
Plaintiff then went to see Defendant Emanoilidis to inquire about
the status of the Haynes incident.
Id.
Defendant Emanoilidis
denied any knowledge of the Haynes’ investigation or its status.
Id.
Plaintiff complained that due to Haynes labeling Plaintiff a
snitch there was no where he could go in the facility and be safe.
Id.
Defendant
Emanoilidis
advised
Plaintiff
which
available and asked him if he wanted to be moved.
dorms
were
Id.
In October 2009, Plaintiff met with various FCCC officials,
who are not named as defendants in the instant action, concerning
the Haynes’ incident and his improper placement in disciplinary
management.
Id. at 15-16.
The officials advised Plaintiff that
his allegations were deemed to be unfounded.
Id. at 15, ¶29.
On
November 9, 2009, Defendant Budz “denied” Plaintiff’s grievance
with
“no further comment.”
continued
to
appeal
Corporation officials.
the
Id. at 16-17, ¶¶35-36.
denial
of
his
Id. at 17, ¶¶37-39.
-7-
grievance
Plaintiff
with
GEO
On February 23, 2010, FCCC Officers Polk, Taylor, and Hamilton
who are not named as Defendants, “shook Plaintiff’s property down
and wrote out an incident report for Plaintiff being in possession
of broken wires and an altered CD player.”
Id., ¶40.
grieved the
retaliation
incident
claiming
it
was in
reporting the Haynes’ incident. Id., ¶41.
Plaintiff
for
him
On February 24, 2010,
Plaintiff received formal Notice of the disciplinary infraction and
was then asked his “due process questions” and “instructed” to sign
the form.
Id. at 18, ¶42.
Plaintiff’s hearing on the rule infraction, concerning the
items seized in the February 23, 2010 shake down, was held on March
2, 2010.
Id., ¶44.
Defendant Emanoilidis was one of the FCCC
officials who presided over the hearing. Id.
The hearing became
heated with Plaintiff insisting that having “small electrical
components around was simply a hobby to keep him occupied.”
Id.
Plaintiff argued that prohibiting him from doing his hobby was not
therapeutic.
Id.
Defendant Emanoilidis “then yelled at Plaintiff
what’s not very therapeutic is that you are not following the
rules.”
Id.
Plaintiff
told
Emanoilidis
“bullsh*t.”
Id.
Plaintiff was reprimanded by Captain Hall and told not “to speak
and shut up and listen.”
Id.
Plaintiff maintained he had due
process rights and insisted he had a right to talk.
Defendant
Emanoilidis told Plaintiff “look this is only a minor violation[,]
three minor violations and your level drops down.”
-8-
Id.
The
hearing became more heated, and Defendant Emanoilidis got up and
stated “in a threatening manner ‘this hearing is over’” and left.
Id.
Plaintiff was found guilty of the rule infraction.
Id.
On March 4, 2010, Plaintiff appealed the finding and asked
that various FCCC Officials be given “a formal reprimand.”
19, ¶45.
Id. at
Defendant Emanoilidis “affirmed his decision again
without providing any written documentary evidence of how he
arrived at this decision.”
denied
Plaintiff’s
appeal
Id.
On March 16, 2010, Defendant Budz
saying
“the
relief
you
request
to
reprimand staff involved is denied. All procedures were followed.”
Id., ¶46.
In Plaintiff’s annual review dated March 30, 2010, the shank
incident was noted.
Id. at 20, ¶48.
However, “FCCC records” note
that the charges related to this incident were “dismissed.”
Id.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks “$10,500.00 as to each Defendant”
in
compensatory
damages.
Id.
at
20.
punitive damages and declaratory relief.
Plaintiff
also
seeks
Id.
III.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must
accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint as true
and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.
403, 406 (2002); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir.
2011).
Additionally, pro se pleadings are liberally construed by
-9-
the Court. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
“To survive dismissal, the complaint’s allegations must plausibly
suggest that the [plaintiff] has a right to relief, raising that
possibility
above
a
speculative
level;
if
plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed.”
they
do
not,
the
James River Ins. Co.
v. Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008)
(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).
See also Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir.
2010).
Thus, a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to
state a claim if the facts as plead do not state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
A claim
is plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”
662, 668
(2009).
In other
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
words,
the
plausibility
standard
requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts “to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that
supports
the
plaintiff’s
claim.
Twombly,
550
U.S.
at
556.
However, although a complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’
of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.”
Id. at 555 (citations omitted).
“[T]he
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
-10-
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S.
at 678.
Thus, “the-defendant-unlawfully harmed me accusation” is
insufficient.
Id.
“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”
Id.
Additionally, there is no longer a heightened pleading requirement.
Randall, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2010).
a
case
when
the
allegations
in
the
The Court may dismiss
complaint
on
their
face
demonstrate that an affirmative defense bars recovery of the claim.
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003); Douglas v.
Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008).
IV.
Based upon applicable law and liberally construing the facts
alleged
in
the
Amended
Complaint
as
true
in
the
light
most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety as to Defendants Budz
and Dixon.
However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately
stated a due process claim at this stage of the proceedings as to
Defendant Emanoilidis.
Defendant Budz
Liberally reading Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the only
allegations against Budz is that he was the Director of the FCCC,
he spoke with Plaintiff in the FCCC library on one occasion
-11-
concerning
Plaintiff’s
objections
that
FCCC
staff
were
not
enforcing the no-smoking policy, and he reviewed and/or responded
to Plaintiff’s communications and grievances.
Here, there are no allegations that Budz knew of, sanctioned,
participated in, or was otherwise causally connection to the
constitutional violations of which Plaintiff complains.
Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 917-18 (11th Cir. 1995).
Harris v.
Further, liability
cannot be predicated upon Budz’ supervisory position because there
is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.
Monell v. Dep’t
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978). Finally, insofar as
Plaintiff claims that Budz’ review and denial of his grievances
subjects Budz to liability under § 1983, the Eleventh Circuit
agrees
with
other
circuits
that
an
institution’s
grievance
procedure does not create a constitutionally-protected liberty
interest.
Dunn v. Martin, 178 F. App’x 876, 878 (11th Cir. 2006);
accord Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994)(stating that
the Constitution creates no entitlement to voluntarily established
grievance procedure); Flick v. Alba, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (8th Cir.
1991)(same).
“‘The simple fact that state law prescribed certain
procedures does not mean that the procedures thereby acquire a
federal constitutional dimension.’” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d
494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)(quoting Vruno v. Schwarzwalder, 600 F.2d
124, 130-131 (8th Cir. 1979)(quoting Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560
F.2d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978));
-12-
see Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)(finding
that
prison
officials
who
were
not
involved
in
an
inmate's
termination from his commissary job, and whose only roles involved
the denial of administrative grievances or the failure to act, were
not liable under § 1983 on a theory that the failure to act
constituted an acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct), cert.
denied,
530
U.S.
1264
(2000).
Consequently,
the
Court
finds
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against
Defendant Budz and must be dismissed.
Defendant Dixon
According
to
the
Amended
Complaint,
Dixon
was
the
“AFA
investigator” who met with Plaintiff after he was in confinement,
presented
him
with
the
behavior
management
form,
and
asked
Plaintiff a series of questions before asking Plaintiff to sign the
form.
major
Dixon also told Plaintiff that the shank incident was a
rule
violation
and
required
secure
management.
Despite
Plaintiff’s express acknowledgment that Dixon appraised him of his
rights
in
connection
with
the
shank
incident,
Plaintiff
contradictorily claims that Dixon did not tell him why he was in
confinement, did not bring him any paper work, did not serve notice
of the charges, and did not tell him when the hearing would be
held, or when he could leave segregation.
While
residents
at
the
FCCC
are
subject
to
internal
regulations, the Court recognizes that they are afforded a higher
-13-
standard of care than those who are criminally committed.
Supreme
Court
has
concluded
detainees
are
“entitled
to
conditions
of
confinement
that,
as
more
considerate
than
a
criminals
confinement are designed to punish.”
general
whose
rule,
The
civil
treatment
conditions
and
of
Youngblood v. Romero, 457
U.S. 307, 322 (1982). Indeed, the involuntarily civilly committed
have
liberty
interests
under
the
due
process
clause
of
the
Fourteenth Amendment to reasonably safe conditions of confinement,
freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such minimally
adequate training as might be required to ensure safety and freedom
from restraint. Id.
“Youngberg
The Eleventh Circuit similarly has held that
establishes
that
the
due
process
rights
of
the
involuntarily civilly committed are ‘at least as extensive’ as the
Eighth Amendment ‘rights of the criminally institutionalized,’ and
therefore, ‘relevant case law in the Eighth Amendment context also
serves to set forth the contours of the due process rights of the
civilly committed.” Lavender v. Kearney, 206 F. App’x 860 *2 (11th
Cir. 2006)(footnote omitted)(quoting Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d
1027, 1041 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Regardless of the ambiguity in the Amended Complaint, it is
clear that Dixon did not see Plaintiff until after he was placed in
confinement.
It appears that Dixon’s only involvement in this
matter was to apprise Plaintiff of the charges against him and
advise him of his due process rights.
-14-
Plaintiff does not allege
that Dixon was charged with investigating the incident.
Nor does
Plaintiff allege that Dixon had authority to convene the behavior
management
conference
or
recommend
Plaintiff’s
release
from
confinement. Although unclear as to why Plaintiff was not afforded
a behavior management conference prior to being released from his
ten-day confinement and fourteen-day wing restriction, Plaintiff
acknowledges that his record at the FCCC reflects that the charge
that he was in possession of a homemade weapon was ultimately
Amended Complaint at 20, ¶48.5
“dismissed.”
Complaint,
the
Court
cannot
conceive
of
Based on the Amended
any
constitutional
deprivation stemming from the actions or inactions of Defendant
Dixon.
Consequently, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint
against Dixon.
Defendant Emanoilidis
Defendant Emanoilidis
seeks
dismissal
of
Plaintiff’s
due
process claim set forth in paragraph two of the Statement of Claims
in Amended Complaint.
In support, Emanoilidis cites to this
Court’s holding in Douse v. Butterworth, 2009 WL 2496459 *5 (M.D.
Fla.
2009),
wherein
the
Court
found
that
Douse’s
“temporary
confinement was not for punitive purposes or otherwise the type of
atypical
and
significant
deprivation
5
to
trigger
Plaintiff’s
It appears that at no time was Plaintiff afforded a hearing
to defend against the charges.
-15-
constitutional due process rights.” Id. at *6 (citing Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481 (1995)).6
The
Court
finds
the
facts
of
the
distinguishable from the facts in Douse.
instant
action
are
Here, Plaintiff alleges
that he advised Defendant Emanoilidis, the Assistant Clinical
Director, a few days prior to the shank being planted under his
mattress that Defendant Haynes had labeled Plaintiff a “snitch” and
residents were making threatening remarks to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff
further avers that Defendant Emanoilidis agreed to report and
investigate the Haynes’ incident.
Additionally, Plaintiff states
that soon after his placement in secure management confinement he
wrote a resident communication to Defendant Emanoilidis requesting
Emanoilidis to come and see him.
Defendant Emanoilidis did not
contact Plaintiff at anytime during his ten-day confinement or
fourteen-day wing restriction.
Indeed, it appears that Plaintiff
never received a hearing during which he could have defended
against the charge.
The Court also takes judicial notice of its
files and notes that, in addition to his placement on the committee
that
determines
whether
disciplinary
infractions
are
valid,
Defendant Emanoilidis is also vested with authority to recommend in
his professional judgment that a resident be removed from secure
management
confinement.
See
Case
6
No.
2:10-cv-528-FtM-SPC,
Defendant Emanoilidis appears to read the Douse opinion as
deeming a resident’s ten-day confinement as constitutional per se.
The Court disagrees to such a liberal reading of Douse.
-16-
Deposition
Excerpt
of
Dr.
Emanoilidis
(Doc.
#83-1
at
4-6)
(testifying to his responsibilities as Chairperson of the Behavior
Management Committee and as Program Services Committee).
The
Fourteenth
Amendment
requires
that
civilly
committed
persons not be subjected to conditions that amount to punishment,
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979), within the bounds of
professional discretion.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–22.
“Due
process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement
[for civilly committed persons] bear some reasonable relation to
the purpose for which persons are committed.” Seling v. Young, 531
U.S. 250, 265 (2001).
Consequently, the Court finds that the Complaint alleges
sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence” that supports Plaintiff’s claim his placement
in secure management and wing restriction was done for punitive
purposes.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Thus, the Court will deny
Defendant Emanoilidis’ Motion.
Defendants Jane Doe, Quick, and Spissinger
Plaintiff’s allegations against the above-named Defendants are
insufficient to subject them to liability in a § 1983 action.
The
only involvement Defendants Quick and Doe had was to “shake down”
Plaintiff’s room, during which they located the homemade weapon.
After
locating
the
weapon,
Defendants
-17-
Quick
and
Doe
brought
Plaintiff to the “OIC,”7 Defendant Spissinger.
Defendants Quick
and Doe told Spissinger that they thought the shank was a set up to
get Plaintiff out of the dorm. Amended Complaint at 10, ¶14.
They
also advised Spissinger that residents were chanting to “get the
snitch
outa’
here
before
someone
kills
him.”
Id.
Officer
Spissinger directed that Plaintiff be taken to medical and then
placed Plaintiff in secure management while an investigation took
place.
Id.
There are no allegations that Defendants Quick, Doe
or Spissinger were involved with labeling Plaintiff a snitch, or
planting the home madeweapon.
Nor does Plaintiff aver that any of
these named Defendants had the authority to order Plaintiff removed
from secure management confinement.
Due to the absence of an
allegation of any connection between an alleged unconstitutional
deprivation and these Defendants’ actions, the Court will dismiss
Defendants Quick, Doe and Spissinger pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(i)(B)(ii).
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
Defendants Budz and Dixon’s Motion (Doc. #48) is GRANTED
1.
to the extent that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED
without prejudice as to Defendants Budz and Dixon.
Defendant Emanoilidis’ Motion (Doc. #49) is DENIED and
2.
Defendant Emanoilidis shall file an amended answer to include
7
Officer In Charge.
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Plaintiff’s Second Claim within ten (10) days of the date of this
Order.
3.
Defendants Jane Doe, Quick and Spissinger are DISMISSED
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
4.
The Clerk shall enter judgment and correct the caption of
the case accordingly.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, on this
of September, 2012.
SA: hmk
Copies: All Parties of Record
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20th
day
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