Soliday v. 7-Eleven Inc.

Filing 203

OPINION AND ORDER denying 180 Motion for judgment as a Matter of Law, or for new trial; denying 181 Motion for new remittitur. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 8/21/2012. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JAMES SOLIDAY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

2:09-cv-807-FtM-29SPC

7-ELEVEN, INC.,
Defendant.
___________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant 7-Eleven,
Inc.’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or, in the
Alternative, For a New Trial (Doc. #180) filed on November 11,
2011.

Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition (Doc. #199) was

filed

on

December

7,

2011.

Defendant

filed

a

Notice

of

Supplemental Authority (Doc. #202) on April 20, 2012.
Also before the Court is Defendant 7-Eleven, Inc.’s Motion for
Remittitur (Doc. #181), filed on November 11, 2011.

Plaintiff’s

Memorandum of Law in Opposition (Doc. #194) was filed on November
23, 2011.
I.
Defendant 7-Eleven, Inc. (defendant or 7-Eleven) asserts that
the Court should grant judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50(b) because the evidence was legally insufficient to
support the verdict of the jury.

As to the termination of

employment

that

claims,

7-Eleven

argues

plaintiff

failed

to

establish

a

prima

facie

case,

failed

to

establish

relevant

comparators, failed to show that the relevant decision-makers were
aware of Loss Prevention investigations, and failed to prove that
7-Eleven’s proffered reasons for terminating his employment were
pretextual.

As to the reasonable accommodation claims, 7-Eleven

argues that plaintiff was able to perform the essential functions
of his job, that neither instant communication nor fax machines
were

an

essential

function

of

the

job,

that

additional

accommodation was not reasonable or required because plaintiff
claimed he performed his job satisfactorily, and plaintiff was not
entitled to the accommodation of his choice. Defendant also argues
that the Court should enter a judgment as a matter of law in its
favor as to back pay and reinstatement.
A Rule 50 judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
jury to find for the non-moving party.

Optimum Techs., Inc. v.

Henkel Consumer Adhesives, Inc., 496 F.3d 1231, 1251 (11th Cir.
2007).

“[I]n deciding on a Rule 50 motion a District Court’s

proper analysis is squarely and narrowly focused on the sufficiency
of evidence.” Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th
Cir. 2007).

As such, “[t]he jury’s findings should be excluded

from the decision-making calculus on a Rule 50(b) motion, other
than to ask whether there was sufficient evidence, as a legal
matter, from which a reasonable jury could find for the party who

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prevailed at trial.”

Id. at 1228.

The Court looks at the record

evidence drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Nurse “Be” v. Columbia Palms W. Hosp. L.P., 490 F.3d 1302, 1308
(11th Cir. 2007).

A jury verdict “must be left intact if there is

evidence from which the decision maker . . . reasonably could have
resolved the matter the way it did.”

Rodriguez v. Farm Stores

Grocery, Inc., 518 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 2008).

Even if the

evidence would have supported a verdict for the losing party,
“[t]he issue is not whether the evidence was sufficient for [the
losing party] to have won, but whether the evidence was sufficient
for it to have lost.”
The

Court

Id.

finds

that

7-Eleven

has

not

satisfied

these

standards as to any of its claims for judgment as a matter of law.
While the evidence at trial was disputed, it was sufficient for a
reasonable jury to reach the decisions it did as to termination,
reasonable accommodation, and damages. The Court continues to find
that it is authorized to require reinstatement in lieu of the
requested front pay.

Defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a

matter of law is denied.
II.
Alternatively, 7-Eleven seeks a new trial because the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence and the damages awarded by
the jury were excessive.

The Court finds that a new trial is not

warranted in this case.

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A Rule 59 motion for a new trial may be granted “for any
reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an
action

at

law

59(a)(1)(A).

in

federal

court;

.

.

.”

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

Such reasons include a verdict which is against the

weight of the evidence and excessive damages.

Resolution of a

motion for a new trial is committed to the discretion of the trial
court.

Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1295 (11th Cir. 1999).

A district court should grant a motion for new trial when “the
verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or will result
in a miscarriage of justice . . . Because it is critical that a
judge does not merely substitute his judgment for that of the jury,
new trials should not be granted on evidentiary grounds unless, at
a minimum, the verdict is against the great - not merely the
greater - weight of the evidence.” Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse
of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001)(internal
quotations and citation omitted).
The Court concludes that the verdict in this case was not
against the great weight of the evidence.

Additionally, for the

reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the damages awarded
by the jury were not excessive.

Defendant’s motion for a new trial

is denied.

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III.
As an alternative to its Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a
matter of law, 7-Eleven seeks an order of remittitur of the jury’s
compensatory ($756,000) and back pay ($177,000) damages awards. 7Eleven argues that this was a “garden variety” case in which the
jury’s determination

of

compensatory

damages

was

“monstrously

excessive” when viewed against the ADA statutory cap ($300,000),
common

law

factors,

statutory

factors,

and

comparable

cases.

Plaintiff responds that his case is not a “garden variety” case,
and that the damages are in line with whatever factors one chooses
to apply as well as comparable cases.
As a general rule, “a remittitur order reducing a jury's award
to the outer limit of the proof is the appropriate remedy where the
jury's

damage

evidence.”
omitted).

award

exceeds

Rodriguez,

518

the
F.3d

amount
at

established

1266

(internal

by

the

citation

“Once a defendant is found liable for the plaintiff's

injury, the district court has a great deal of discretion in
deciding the level of damages to be awarded.”

Ferrill v. Parker

Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 476 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Stallworth
v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985)).

“A jury verdict

may be vacated as excessive only if it is so large as to shock the
conscience.”

Sykes v. McDowell, 786 F.2d 1098, 1105 (11th Cir.

1986)(quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Court finds that

neither the back pay nor the compensatory damages are so large as

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to shock the conscience of the court.

A reasonable jury could view

the evidence in such a way as to amply justify both awards.

The

motion for remittitur is denied.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1.

Defendant 7-Eleven, Inc.’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as

a Matter of Law, or, in the Alternative, For a New Trial (Doc.
#180) is DENIED.
2.

Defendant 7-Eleven, Inc.’s Motion for Remittitur (Doc.

#181) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
August, 2012.

Copies:
Counsel of record

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21st

day of