Garcia-Celestino et al v. Ruiz Harvesting, Inc. et al

Filing 81

ORDER: Plaintiffs' Motion for Declaration of a Class Action 55 is GRANTED. With respect to the claims set forth in Counts V and VI of the amended complaint, the Court certifies a class of: All temporary foreign workers ("H-2A workers") who were employed pursuant to temporary labor certifications issued to Ruiz Harvesting, Inc. for work during the 2007-08, 2008-09 and/or 2009-10 Florida citrus harvests. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 2/24/2012. (LN)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAUDENCIO GARCIA-CELESTINO et al.
and individually, and on behalf of all other
persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 2:10-cv-542-FtM-99DNF

RUIZ HARVESTING, INC.,
BASILISO RUIZ, and
CONSOLIDATED CITRUS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaration of a
Class Action and Supporting Memorandum of Law (Dkt. 55), Defendant Consolidated Citrus
Limited Partnership’s Memorandum in opposition (Dkt. 65), and Plaintiffs’ Reply. The
Court, having considered the motion, response, reply, and record evidence, concludes that
the motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND1
This is an action by 38 migrant farm workers employed by Defendants Ruiz
Harvesting, Inc. (“Ruiz Harvesting”), Basiliso Ruiz (“Ruiz”), and Consolidated Citrus
Limited Partnership (“CCLP”) to pick citrus fruit in central Florida in the 2006-07, 2007-08,

1

The facts are taken from the amended complaint (Dkt. 34), however the Court makes no ruling on
the merits of these facts.

2008-09, and/or 2009-10 harvest seasons.

Plaintiffs bring this action, on behalf of

themselves and their co-workers who picked citrus fruit for Defendants during these periods
of time, to secure and vindicate rights afforded them by the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§1801, et seq. (“AWPA”), the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§201, et seq. (“FLSA”), the minimum wage provisions of the
Florida Constitution, federal regulations governing the temporary foreign agricultural worker
program, and common law.
Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to pay minimum wages as required
by the FLSA and Florida Constitution with regard to their employment picking oranges
during the 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, and/or 2009-10 citrus harvests. Ruiz Harvesting
employed agricultural “guest workers” recruited from Mexico pursuant to the temporary
agricultural work visa program, commonly known as the “H-2A program.” 8 U.S.C. §1188.2
These guest workers (“H-2A workers”) had written contracts of employment with Ruiz
Harvesting that included specific representations regarding wages, hours, and working
conditions. Specifically, as a condition of importing agricultural guest workers, Ruiz filed
detailed job descriptions with the United States Department of Labor. These documents,
commonly referred to as “clearance orders,” described the job terms, most of which were
dictated by federal regulations governing the H-2A program. These clearance orders served

2

The H-2A program authorizes importation of foreign nationals to perform seasonal agricultural jobs
when U.S. workers are unavailable. See Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1232-33 (11th
Cir. 2002) for an overview of the H-2A program.

Page 2 of 15

as the employment contracts between Ruiz Harvesting and the H-2A workers. See 20 C.F.R.
§653.501, 655.102, and 655.103.
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that during their employment, Defendants
breached the terms of the clearance orders by failing to pay them the promised wage for all
hours worked. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants also failed to reimburse them for costs they
incurred primarily for the benefit of Defendants to the extent that these costs reduced
Plaintiffs’ earnings for their first week of work below the required hourly rate. In sum,
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants breached the terms of the clearance orders in three respects
as follows: (1) Defendants required Plaintiffs to kick back the supplemental wages designed
to boost their weekly earnings; (2) Defendants automatically deducted an hour from each
picker’s recorded work time during the 2007-08 and 2008-09 harvests to account for travel
time between the grove check-in gate and the work site; and (3) Defendants failed to fully
reimburse Plaintiffs for their inbound and outbound transportation, visa, and subsistence
expenses.
Plaintiffs (“Representative Plaintiffs”)3 seek to represent a class consisting of:
All temporary foreign workers (“H-2A workers”) who were employed
pursuant to temporary labor certifications issued to Ruiz Harvesting,
Inc. for work during the 2007-08, 2008-09 and/or 2009-10 Florida
citrus harvests.

3

The Representative Plaintiffs include all of the named plaintiffs except Plaintiff Francisco SuarezGalan, who is a lawful permanent resident and is presenting claims under the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act.
Page 3 of 15

The alleged class is comprised of approximately 286 guest workers residing in several
different states in Mexico. Plaintiffs seek class action status on Counts V and VI of their
amended complaint. Count V is a breach of contract claim with respect to Defendants’
violations of the clearance orders. Count VI is a claim under the Florida Constitution’s
minimum wage provisions.
Defendant CCLP opposes Plaintiffs’ motion for declaration of a class action with
respect to Counts V and VI of the amended complaint.4
ANALYSIS OF CLASS CERTIFICATION
The question of whether to certify a class is left to the sound discretion of the district
court. Babineau v. Federal Exp. Corp., 576 F.3d 1183, 1189 (11th Cir. 2009). The party
moving for class certification has the burden of proof to establish the propriety of the class
certification. Busby v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., 513 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003)). As a
prerequisite to certification, the putative class representatives must have Article III standing
to pursue the claims on which class-related relief is sought. Id. Also, in order to certify a
class, all the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) must be met, as well as one requirement of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (Southeast), Inc., 2009 WL 4366953,
at *1 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2009).

4

Defendants Ruiz Harvesting and Ruiz did not file a response to the instant motion.
Page 4 of 15

The four elements required for class certification under Rule 23(a) are: (1) numerosity,
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) commonality, there
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) typicality, the claims or defenses of the
class are typical; and (4) adequacy, the class representative will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)); Hines v. Widnall, 334 F.3d 1253,
1255-56 (11th Cir. 2003); Franze v. Equitable Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1253 (11th Cir.
2002).
The district court is required to evaluate the requirements of a class certification even
if not seriously contested by the defendants. Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1188. The court
should not determine the merits of the claims at the class certification stage, however, the
court can consider the merits of the case “to the degree necessary to determine whether the
requirements of Rule 23 will be satisfied.” Heffner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala.,
Inc., 443 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Valley Drug, 350 F.3d at 1188 n. 15).
STANDING
Initially, the Court must determine that Plaintiffs have standing pursuant to Article III
to raise each class claim. Busby, 513 F.3d at 1321 (citing Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d
1241, 1250 (11th Cir.2004)). “Without individual standing to raise a legal claim, a named
representative does not have the requisite typicality to raise the same claim on behalf of a
class.” Hines, 334 F.3d at 1256.

Page 5 of 15

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants employed them as H-2A workers during the 2007-08,
2008-09 and/or 2009-10 Florida citrus harvests, and that they were subject to unlawful
practices that form the breach of contract claim and Florida minimum wage claim.
After a review of the allegations in the amended complaint, the Court concludes that
the putative class representatives have standing to pursue Counts V and VI of the amended
complaint.
CCLP argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish standing because it did not employ
Plaintiffs. Whether CCLP constitutes Plaintiffs’ “employer”, however, is more appropriate
at the summary judgment stage. Indeed, such a determination is factually intensive. In other
words, this determination does not need to be made at the class certification stage, where the
Court is to accept Plaintiffs’ substantive allegations as true.
REQUIREMENTS UNDER RULE 23(a)
I.

Numerosity and impracticability of joinder
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable.” Plaintiffs seeking class certification do not need to know the exact size of
the proposed class. Agan v. Katzman & Korr, P.A., 222 F.R.D. 692, 696 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
While the size of the proposed class is relevant to a court’s determination, other factors such
as “the geographic diversity of the class members, the nature of the action, the size of each
plaintiff’s claim, judicial economy and the inconvenience of trying individual lawsuits, and
the ability of the individual class members to institute individual lawsuits” should also be
considered. Id. (quotations omitted).
Page 6 of 15

CCLP does not challenge Plaintiffs’ assertion that Rule 23(a)’s numerosity
requirement would be met with a putative class of 286 fruit harvesters.
After reviewing the allegations of the amended complaint, the Court agrees that the
joinder of potentially 286 individual migrant farm workers, who reside in various locations
in Mexico, who do not speak English fluently, and who lack familiarization with the
American legal system would be burdensome. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs
have satisfied Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement.
II.

Common questions of law and fact
The commonality requirement typically “refers to the group of characteristics of the

class.” Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000). To
satisfy the commonality requirement, “a class action must involve issues that are susceptible
to class wide proof.” Cooper v. Southern. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 714 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled
on other grounds, (quoting Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 811 (11th Cir. 2001)).
However, it is not necessary that all members of the class have identical claims. PradoSteiman, 221 F.3d at 1279 n. 14. Commonality, like typicality, focuses “on whether a
sufficient nexus exists between the legal claims of the named class representatives and those
of individual class members.” Id. at 1278.
The Court concludes that a sufficient nexus clearly exists here. Plaintiffs assert
common questions of fact among the class members, who are all H-2A workers that
Defendants employed during the 2007-08, 2008-09 and/or 2009-10 Florida citrus harvests.
The common questions include whether Defendants failed to pay the contractual adverse
Page 7 of 15

effect wage rate by forcing them to kick back the minimum wage build-up compensation to
Ruiz, whether Defendants deducted one hour from the lapsed recorded time for each worker
for travel time, and whether Defendants did not fully reimburse workers for their preemployment, post-employment, and subsistence expenses.
Accepting Plaintiffs’ substantive allegations as true, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a). See RosarioGuerrro v. Orange Blossom Harvesting, 265 F.R.D. 619, 624-25 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Castillo
v. N & R Services of Cent. Florida, Inc., 2008 WL 1959691, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 1, 2008);
Mesa v. Ag-Mart Produce, Inc., 2008 WL 2790024, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 18, 2008)
(observing that “[w]hether these migrant workers worked in different locations, different
hours, or for different crew leaders does not change the common issue regarding
compensation, wage statements, and appropriate wage keeping.”); De Leon-Granados v.
Eller & Sons Trees, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-1473-CC (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2006) (finding
commonality even though putative class members were employed by different work crews
at various locations).
Notably, Defendant Ruiz acknowledged that the same practices and policies applied
to all of the H-2A workers, regardless of which crew they were assigned. Therefore, the
Court concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement.
III.

Typicality
Typicality requires that a class representative “possess the same interest and suffer the

same injury as the class members.” Cooper, 390 F.3d at 713. Thus, “the typicality
Page 8 of 15

requirement is satisfied if ‘the claims or defenses of the class and class representative arise
from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the same theory.’” Agan, 222
F.R.D. at 698 (quoting Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th
Cir. 1984)). Even if the fact patterns are unique to each claim, the typicality requirement will
be satisfied if the class representative and class members experienced the same unlawful
conduct. Agan, 222 F.R.D. at 698. However, like commonality, Rule 23 does not require that
all members of the class possess identical claims. Id. at 714.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to comply with their contractual promises
regarding payment of wages and they assert that their claims are identical to those of the
putative class members. Plaintiffs also assert that if any named Plaintiff is to recover, he or
she will be required to show the same breach of contract based on the same factual premises.
The representative H-2A Plaintiffs all allege that Defendants breached the
employment contract for the same reasons, namely, for failing to pay full hourly wages for
the reasons discussed in detail herein. The named H-2A Plaintiffs and the other class
members’ claims arise out of the same conduct and essentially the same factual and legal
bases. Therefore, the Court concludes that the H-2A Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)’s
typicality requirement.
IV.

Adequacy of protection of class interests
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the class.” There are two separate inquiries under this section: (1)
whether there are any substantial conflicts of interest between the named representatives of
Page 9 of 15

the class and the class members; and (2) whether the representatives will adequately
prosecute the action. Busby, 513 F.3d at 1323 (citing Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1189 ).
This requirement serves to uncover any conflict of interest that named parties may have with
the class they represent. Amchem Products, Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627, 117 S.Ct.
2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). “If substantial conflicts of interest are determined to exist
among a class, class certification is inappropriate.” Id. Minor conflicts alone will not defeat
class certification, the conflict must be “fundamental” to the specific issues in the case. Id.
Under this section, the Court must also consider the competency and any conflicts that the
class counsel may have. Amchem Products, Inc. 521 U.S. at 627 n. 20, 117 S.Ct. 2231.
Plaintiffs assert that their claims are not in conflict with any of the class members.
They contend that all class members will benefit from the relief sought by receiving
restitution of the additional wages and reimbursements from Defendants for the costs they
incurred.
The Court concludes that the representative H-2A Plaintiffs will fully and adequately
represent the interests of the class and that their claims are not in conflict with any other
potential class member. CCLP’s argument to the contrary is devoid of merit. Further,
counsel for the H-2A Plaintiffs is experienced in class action litigation and specifically in
class action litigation involving migrant farm workers. Therefore, the Court determines that
Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)’s adequacy of representation requirement.

Page 10 of 15

REQUIREMENTS UNDER RULE 23(b)
As stated above, in order to have a class certified, the Representative Plaintiffs must
not only satisfy Rule 23(a), but must also show that they meet one of the alternative
requirements of Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs assert that their claims in Counts V and VI satisfy the
requirements for certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
For class certification to be appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3), common questions must
predominate over questions that affect only individual members and the class action must be
a superior method for a “fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Cooper, 390
F.3d at 722 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)). Thus, rule 23(b)(3) imposes two additional
requirements to Rule 23(a): predominance and increased efficiency (superiority). Id. (citing
Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 1997)).
I.

Predominance
The issues raised in the class action that are subject to generalized proof and which

are applicable to the class as a whole “must predominate over those issues that are subject
only to individualized proof.” Babineau, 576 F.3d at 1191 (quoting Kerr, 875 F.2d at 1558).
“Common issues will not predominate over individual questions if, ‘as a practical matter, the
resolution of [an] overarching common issue breaks down into an unmanageable variety of
individual legal and factual issues.’” Id. at 1191 (quoting Andrews v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
95 F.3d 1014,1023 (11th Cir. 1996)). A class should not be certified if it appears that most
of the plaintiffs’ claims have highly case-specific factual issues. Id. The predominance

Page 11 of 15

requirement is “far more demanding” than the commonality requirement. Jackson, 130 F.3d
at 1005.
The Court concludes that the class claims predominate over any questions of the
individual members of the putative class. The putative class members all worked under the
same employment contract, i.e., Ruiz Harvesting’s clearance orders, as H-2A citrus pickers
for the 2007-08, 2008-09, and/or 2009-10 seasons. The class members seek to remedy the
same legal grievances for breach of the same contracts and for failure to pay the minimum
wage as a result of the kick back scheme and timekeeping adjustments made by CCLP.
Notably, a determination of whether Defendants paid the minimum wage, properly reduced
Plaintiffs’ time by an hour per day, and reimbursed inbound and outbound travel expenses
and subsistence payments “will resolve each potential class member’s underlying cause of
action under the breach of contract claim.” Rosario-Guerrero, 256 F.R.D. at 629. Similarly,
a finding that Defendants did not pay the Florida minimum wage as a result of the payment
of kick backs and timekeeping adjustments will resolve the claims for additional wages.
Simply put, Plaintiffs do not have to prove a variety of individual circumstances
supporting the alleged breaches because Defendants’ behavior was uniformly directed to all
members of the putative class. And Plaintiffs’ reply points out that the damages due each
class member can be readily calculated without testimony from the individual workers.
Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the damages can be computed by applying uniformly a
straightforward mathematical formula based on the existing evidence such as payroll records,
payroll journals, cancelled checks, and timekeeping records. See Sacred Heart Health Sys.,
Page 12 of 15

Inc. v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs., Inc., 601 F.3d 1159, 1179 (11th Cir. 2010)
(noting that “[i]ndividualized damages issues are of course least likely to defeat
predominance where damages can be computed according to some formula, statistical
analysis, or other easy or essentially mechanical methods.”) (internal citations omitted).
CCLP argues that class certification is inappropriate because each worker’s
individualized proof of compensation and the hours he worked is required to establish
liability. Notably, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that individual issues relating to
damages do not defeat class certification. See Allapattah Servs., 333 F.3d at 1261; Sacred
Heart, 601 F.3d at 1178.
CCLP also cites to Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (Southeast), Inc., 354 Fed.
App’x. 422, 424 (11th Cir. Dec.3, 2009) for the proposition that if a case requires
individualized proof of compensation for each worker, then common questions of law or fact
do not predominate over questions affecting individual members. In Luna, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not certifying a class,
however, the Eleventh Court also included the following language, “[w]e may have weighed
the issues differently. But, ‘[e]ven if we would have certified a class, that does not mean the
district court abused its discretion in declining to do so.’” Id. at 425.5

5

It is also important to note that there was no common contract, as there is here, in Vega v. T-Mobile,
USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2009). The Court further notes that the problems plaguing the proposed
class in Sacred Heart are not present here. In Sacred Heart, there were substantial variations in the terms of
over 300 hospital contracts that were individually negotiated, leading the court to find that “the diversity of
the material terms is overwhelming.” 601 F.3d at 1171-72.
Page 13 of 15

II.

Superiority of Class Action
Rule 23(b)(3) requires a finding that “[the] class action is superior to other available

methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” The Court looks to the four
non-exclusive matters listed in Rule 23(b)(3) which are:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Plaintiffs assert that it is unlikely that the individual class members would have any
interest in instituting a lawsuit or in controlling their own individual actions. The class
members’ homes are in Mexico, they lack proficiency in the English language, they are
indigent, and they seek relatively small individual damages. Plaintiffs also state that there
are no other lawsuits raising the same issues as presented in this action. Plaintiffs also point
out that it is desirable to conduct the litigation in this forum because there is personal
jurisdiction over all of the Defendants in the Middle District, the cause of action arose here,
and all documents pertaining to the litigation are located here.
The Court determines that the potential class members’ claims are predicated on a
common set of facts and concern the same employment contract. The breaches of contract
apply uniformly and each individual plaintiff will not have to testify. Moreover, the process
of bringing individual actions would be much more onerous than a class action. Therefore,
Page 14 of 15

the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have established that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs established the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
Rule 23(b)(3). Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaration of a Class Action and Supporting

Memorandum of Law (Dkt. 55) is GRANTED.
2.

With respect to the claims set forth in Counts V and VI of the amended

complaint, the Court certifies a class of:
All temporary foreign workers (“H-2A workers”) who were employed
pursuant to temporary labor certifications issued to Ruiz Harvesting, Inc.
for work during the 2007-08, 2008-09 and/or 2009-10 Florida citrus
harvests.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on February 24, 2012.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
S:\Even\J-Gunlach\2-10-cv-542.mtclassaction55.wpd

Page 15 of 15