Jarrell v. The Geo Group, Inc.
Filing
19
OPINION AND ORDER denying 17 Motion to dismiss. Defendant shall file an answer within 21 days of this Order. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 10/31/2011. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JAMES JARRELL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No.
2:10-cv-622-FtM-29DNF
THE GEO GROUP, INC.,
Defendant.
___________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
This
matter
comes
before
the
Court
upon
review
of
the
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #17, Mot. Dismiss), filed May
24, 2011.
Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #18, Response) in
opposition on June 13, 2011.
This matter is ripe for review.
I.
James Jarrell, a pro se plaintiff who is civilly detained at
the Florida Civil Commitment Center (hereinafter “FCCC”), initiated
this action by filing a Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. #1, Complaint)
on October 8, 2010, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 naming the GEO
Group, Inc.
(hereinafter
“GEO”)
as
the
sole Defendant.
See
Complaint. Plaintiff states that GEO operates the FCCC pursuant to
a contract with the Department of Children and Families. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff challenges GEO’s policy, “both written and unwritten,”
“that while transporting residents the resident shall remain in the
cage without outside intervention.”
Id. at
2.
According to the Complaint, on or about September 4, 2009,
officers transported Plaintiff from a civil trial in Santa Rosa
County, Florida, to the FCCC in Desoto County, Florida.
Id. at 2.
Plaintiff claims that the trip took approximately nine hours,
during which time he was handcuffed and shackled with a waist chain
and a black box.
Id.
Plaintiff claims that he is a diabetic and
had no access to food or fluid during this nine-hour trip, despite
his requests for both.
Id.
Plaintiff states that he felt he was
on the “edge of unconsciousness [sic]” by the end of the transport.
Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that the black box caused him
“extreme pain to the wrists”; he had “agonizing muscle cramps”;
and, he had “no means of relieving his bladder.”
Id.
Plaintiff
submits that these conditions of his confinement violated his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and he seeks compensatory and
punitive damages.
Id.
II.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court
limits its
consideration
to
well-pleaded
factual
allegations,
documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters
judicially noticed.
La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d
840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
Thus, the Court must accept all factual
allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint as true and take them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.
F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Pielage v. McConnell, 516
Conclusory allegations, however,
are not entitled to a presumption of truth.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009)(discussing a 12(b)(6)
dismissal); Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th
Cir. 2001).
The Court employs the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard when
reviewing a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 708, n.2 (11th Cir. 2010).
Randall v.
A claim is
plausible where the plaintiff alleges facts that “allow[] the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
plaintiff
allege
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ____, 129 S.
The plausibility standard requires that a
sufficient
facts
“to
raise
a
reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that supports the
plaintiff’s claim.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 (2007); Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1036, n.16. Specifically, “[w]hile
a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Id. at 555 (citations
omitted). Thus, “the-defendant-unlawfully harmed me accusation” is
insufficient.
Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
“Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.”
Id. (citations omitted).
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A complaint must satisfy the pleading requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8 by simply giving the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
However, the “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”
See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1965, 1968-69 (citations omitted).
Additionally, there is no
longer a heightened pleading requirement.
Randall, 610 F.3d at
701.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege: (1) defendants deprived him of a right secured under the
United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation
occurred under color of state law.
Arrington v. Cobb County, 139
F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. Steel, LLC v. Tieco, Inc., 261
F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
In addition, a plaintiff must
allege and establish an affirmative causal connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation. Marsh, 268
F.3d at 1059; Swint v. City of Wadley, 51 F.3d 988 (11th Cir.
1995); Tittle v. Jefferson County Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1541 n.1
(11th Cir. 1994).
A defendant who occupies a supervisory position
may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior in a
§ 1983 action.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-
692 (1978); Quinn v. Monroe County, 330 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir.
2003); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2003).
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III.
Plaintiff filed this action as a civil detainee confined at
the FCCC pursuant to the State of Florida’s Involuntary Commitment
of
Sexually
Violent
Predator’s
Treatment
generally Fla. Stat. §§ 394.910-.913.
and
Care
Act.
See
As a person who is civilly
confined, Plaintiff is in a position analogous to a criminally
confined prisoner.
See Pullen v. State, 802 So. 2d 1113, 1119
(Fla. 2001) (“the curtailment of the fundamental liberty right is
implicated in both criminal proceedings and involuntary civil
commitments”).
Nevertheless,
an
individual
who
has
been
involuntarily civilly committed has “liberty interests under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to safety, freedom
from
bodily
restraint,
and
minimally
adequate
or
reasonable
training” as required to ensure safety and freedom from restraint.
Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041 (11th Cir. 1996)(citing
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982)). Thus, while civilly
committed residents at the FCCC are “totally confined” and subject
to internal regulations much like those established by the Florida
Department of Corrections,1 they are due a higher standard of care
than those who are criminally committed.
See Id.
Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “persons subjected
to involuntary civil commitment are entitled to more considerate
1
See Fla. Stat. § 394.912(11).
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treatment
and
conditions
of
confinement
than
criminals
conditions of confinement are designed to punish.”
whose
Id.
A criminally confined prisoner, has an Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
475 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1986).
Whitley v. Albers,
As the rights of the involuntarily
civilly committed are “at least as extensive as the rights of the
criminally institutionalized,” actions which would violate the
Eighth Amendment rights of a prisoner, would likewise constitute a
violation of the due process rights of an individual who was been
involuntarily civilly committed.
See Dolihite, 74 F.3d at 1041.
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “relevant case law
in the Eighth Amendment context also serves to set forth the
contours of the due process rights of the civilly committed.” Id.;
see also Lavendar v. Kearney, 206 F. App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir.
2006).
IV.
Defendant GEO moves to dismiss the Complaint on the ground
that respondeat superior cannot be a basis for liability in a §
1983 action.
Mot. Dismiss at 4. Alternatively, Defendant argues
that Plaintiff is attempting “to side step the prohibition of
respondeat superior . . . by alleging the employees of GEO were
enforcing
both
an
oral
and
written
transport
policy
without
specifying any details regarding the nature of that policy.”
Id. at 5.
Defendant submits that Plaintiff has failed:
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to put forth any specific allegations as to what GEO’s
policy was and how it was deficient; failed to establish
that GEO personally participated in the allegations;
failed to establish an affirmative causal connection
between GEO and the alleged constitutional deprivation;
failed to allege a
history of widespread abuse
sufficient to put GEO on notice of the need to correct
the alleged deprivation; or failed to allege facts
supporting
an
inference
that
GEO
commanded the
subordinates to act unlawfully, or knowing that they
would do so failed to stop them.
Id. at 7-8.
In Response, Plaintiff submits that he has alleged that
“pursuant to written GEO policy residents must remain in ‘the cage’
without outside intervention while in transport.”
(citing Complaint at 3, 14).
Response at 1
Plaintiff states that to the extent
Defendant requires a citation to a “chapter and verse” of the
policy, he is not required to do so at this stage of the pleadings.
Id. at 2-3.
V.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on one who, under
color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
To state a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1)
Defendants deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred
under color of state law.
Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865,
872 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. Steel, LLC v. Tieco, Inc., 261 F.3d
1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff alleges a violation
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of his Fourteenth Amendment rights stemming from his nine-hour
transport shackled, in handcuffs and a black box, without food or
fluids, pursuant
to
GEO’s
policy,
custom,
or
practice.
See
Complaint.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that not every
restriction imposed during confinement constitutes “punishment.”
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979).
When determining
whether a particular restriction amounts to punishment under the
Due
Process
Clause,
the
court
must
determine
whether
the
restriction is incident to a legitimate governmental purpose or
whether the restriction is imposed as punishment.
See Id. at 538.
Absent an institution’s expressed intent to punish a detainee, this
determination “generally will turn on whether there is an alternate
purpose rationally connected to the restriction,” and whether the
restriction
appears
supporting it.
Id.
excessive
based
on
the
alternate
purpose
In other words, if a condition or restriction
is “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it
does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Id. at 539-40.
However, if it “is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal- if
it is arbitrary or purposeless- a court may infer that the purpose”
is punishment.
Id. at 539.
Nevertheless, in determining whether
restraints are reasonably related to an institution’s interest in
maintaining security and order, the Court is mindful of the Supreme
Court’s warning that
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[s]uch considerations are peculiarly within
the province and professional expertise of
corrections officials, and, in the absence of
substantial evidence in the record to indicate
that the officials have exaggerated their
response to these consideration, courts should
ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in
such matters.
Id. at 540, n. 23 (citations omitted); see also Enriquez v. Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., Case No. 2:05-cv-238-FtM-34DNF, 2008 WL 731027
(M.D. Fla. March 18, 2008)(denying in part a motion to dismiss
based on allegations that transport of plaintiff in black box
despite medical directive that he should not be transported in such
manner due to back condition stated a claim).
To state a § 1983 claim against a private entity performing
public functions there must be a policy or custom by which the
constitutional deprivation was inflicted.
F.3d 450, 452-53 (11th Cir. 1997).
Buckner v. Toro, 116
“A policy is a decision that is
officially adopted by the municipality, or created by an official
of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of
the municipality.”
Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1332
(11th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted).
A custom is established by
showing a persistent or widespread practice and an entity’s actual
or constructive knowledge of such customs, though the custom need
not receive formal approval.
1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d
“Normally random acts or isolated
incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or
-9-
policy.”
Id.
Accepting the facts as true at this stage of the pleadings,
Plaintiff, a diabetic who weighs 370 pounds, alleges that he was
transported in a “cage” that caused him to be handcuffed, shackled
with a waist chain and a black box, was not given any food or
fluids, and unable to move, for a nine-hour period of time.
Complaint at 2.
Plaintiff alleges that due to this method of
transportation he experienced “extreme pain,” “agonizing muscle
cramps,” and had no way to relieve his bladder.
Id.
Plaintiff
claims this method of transportation was dictated by GEO policy or
custom, which always requires the transportation “of residents in
the cage without any outside intervention.” Id.; see also Response
at 1.
Contrary to Defendant’s assertion that the Complaint lacks
a causal connection, Plaintiff claims that the transportation
method is pursuant to GEO policy or custom, thereby establishing a
causal connection and a claim against GEO.
The Court finds the
facts in this case distinguishable from Morales v. GEO Group, Inc.,
2:10-cv-601-FTM-36SPC (M.D. Fla. April 19, 2011) and Wean v. GEO
Group, Inc., 2:10-cv-628-FTM-29DNF (M.D. Fla. March 14, 2011).
Consequently, the Court will allow the parties an opportunity to
further develop the facts of this action.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.
Defendant GEO’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #17) is DENIED.
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2.
Defendant shall file an answer within twenty-one days of
this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, on this
of October, 2011.
SA: alj
Copies: All Parties of Record
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31st
day
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