Washington v. Sheldon

Filing 14

ORDER OF DISMISSAL dismissing Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus without prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the file. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 10/24/2011. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
REGINALD D. WASHINGTON, JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No.

2:10-cv-781-FtM-29DNF

Secretary, Dep't for Children &
Families,
Respondent.
________________________________
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This matter comes before the Court upon review of

Petitioner

Reginald D. Washington, Jr.’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. #1, Petition).
Petitioner is currently civilly confined at the Florida Civil
Commitment

Center

(“FCCC”)

pursuant

to

the

Involuntary

Civil

Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators’ Treatment and Care Act,
Fla.

Stat.

§§

394.910,

et

seq.,

after

a

probable

cause

determination by the State’s Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court.
Petitioner filed the instant Petition seeking his immediate release
from civil confinement.

Petition at 7.

The Petition raises two

grounds for relief (restated):
(1)

The State of Florida is collaterally estopped from
seeking Petitioner's continued detention for sex
offender treatment after the expiration of his term
of imprisonment because Petitioner was convicted
under Chapter 917 of the Florida Statutes, which
gave him a liberty interest in mandated sex
offender treatment only while in prison.

(2)

Florida’s Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators’ Act, Fla. Stat. § 394.901, et

seq. (the "SVP Act") violates the ex post facto
clause of the United States constitution because
the SVP Act was not in effect on the date that
Petitioner committed the offense for which he was
imprisoned.
On June 2, 2011, Respondent, the Secretary for the Department
of Children and Families, filed a response to the Petition, which
incorporates a motion to dismiss (Doc. #11, Response). Respondent
seeks dismissal of the Petition as time-barred.

Response

Alternatively, Respondent seeks dismissal pursuant to
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Id. at 5.

at 1.

Younger v.

On June 10, 2011,

Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. #12, Reply) in opposition to the
Motion.

Petitioner disputes that the one-year limitation period

set forth in § 2244(d)(1) applies to his § 2241 Petition, and
argues that Florida provides this Court with authority to rule on
Petitioner's pretrial detention. See generally Reply. This matter
is ripe for review.
II.
Upon review of the matter, the Court finds that dismissal of
the Petition is warranted because Petitioner’s civil commitment
proceedings remain pending before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit
Court, Miami-Dade County, Florida.
a

Under Younger and its progeny,

federal court is required to abstain from enjoining state

judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. Younger,
401 U.S. at 41; Green v. Jefferson County Com’n, 563 F.3d 1243,
1250 (11th Cir. 2009).

Consequently, federal courts ordinarily

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must refrain from deciding the merits of a case if: (1) there is a
pending state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates
important state interests; and (3) the parties have an adequate
opportunity

to

proceeding.

raise

any

constitutional

claims

in

the

state

Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

Ass'n, 457 U.S., 423, 432 (1982).
The relevant inquiry in assessing the Middlesex factors is
“whether the federal proceeding will interfere with an ongoing
state

court

proceeding.

If

there

is

no

interference,

then

abstention is not required.” 31 Foster Children, v. Bush, 329 F.3d
1255, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).

To determine whether the federal

proceeding would interfere with the pending state proceeding, the
courts look at the relief requested and whether granting the
requested relief would have any effect on the state proceeding.
Id.
Here, it is clear that the pending state civil commitment
proceedings

would

be

impermissibly

disrupted,

if

not

wholly

invalidated, if the Court granted Petitioner’s relief requested in
the instant Petition.

This case plainly involves an important

state interest, namely, Florida's expressed purpose of ensuring
that violent sex offenders do not harm its citizens after they have
concluded their prison terms.
that

Florida

permits

him

Further, Petitioner acknowledges

an

opportunity

to

vindicate

his

constitutional rights by filing a State habeas action during the

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civil commitment proceedings.
Petitioner

challenged

the

Indeed, the record reflects that

validity

his

probable

cause

civil

detention in a State petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was
denied.

The fact that Petitioner’s claims were not successful on

the merits at the State court level is not material.

See Pompey v.

Broward County, 95 F.3d 1543, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996)(noting that
“for

abstention

purposes,

whether

a

claim

would

likely

be

successful on the merits in the state court is not what matters .
. . [but rather] whether the plaintiff is procedurally prevented
from raising his constitutional claims in the state courts").
Finally, the Court finds that the record is devoid of any
evidence to warrant an exception to the Younger doctrine in the
present case. Significantly, Petitioner does not allege, yet alone
demonstrate, evidence that the State proceedings are motivated by
bad faith, or that irreparable injury would result, or, as noted
above, an absence of an adequate state forum.

Younger, 401 U.S. at

45, 53-54; Hughes v. Attorney General of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263
(11th Cir. 2004); News Journal v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1507-09
(11th Cir. 1991).
Because the Court finds that each of the Middlesex factors are
satisfied in this case and Petitioner has not alleged, yet alone
demonstrated, that any exception applies, the Court finds that the
Petition must be dismissed.

Consequently, the Court need not

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determine whether the one-year federal limitation bars the instant
Petition.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.

Petitioner’s Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus is

DISMISSED without prejudice.
2.

The Clerk of Court shall: (1) terminate any pending

motions; (2) enter judgment accordingly; and (3) close this file
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida, on this
of October, 2011.

SA: hmk
Copies: All Parties of Record

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24th

day