Thomas v. Mann et al

Filing 7

ORDER dismissing case. The Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1915A(b)(1) and/or Section 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions, enter judgment accordingly, and CLOSE this case. Signed by Judge Charlene E. Honeywell on 9/28/2011. (BGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
CHAUNCEY VINCENT THOMAS, SR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

2:11-cv-488-FtM-36SPC

IAN F. MANN, JESUS M. CASAS, CHARLIE
GREEN, WILLIAM J. NELSON,
Defendants.
______________________________________
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
I.
This matter comes before the Court upon review of the file.
Plaintiff

Chauncey

Vincent

Thomas,

Sr.,

who

is

a

prisoner,

initiated this action by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint
Form (Doc. #1, Complaint) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August
29, 2011. Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
See Docs. #2, #3.
II.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that the Court
review all complaints against governmental officers and entities to
determine whether the action is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1), (b)(2).

See 28

In essence, § 1915A is a

screening process to be applied sua sponte and at any time during
the proceedings.

In reviewing a complaint, however, courts must

apply the long established rule that pro se complaints are to be
liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007)(citations omitted).
Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court “shall” dismiss the complaint,
if, inter alia, it is frivolous or it fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. § 1915A(b)(1).

A claim is frivolous,

and must be dismissed, when it “lacks an arguable basis either in
law or in fact.”

Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir.

2008)(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). “The
PLRA ‘accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the
unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual
allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.’” Miller, 541 F.3d at 1100 (citations omitted).
The standards that apply to a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) apply to a dismissal under § 1915(b)(1).

Leal v. Ga.

Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001).

Under

Rule 12(b)(6), the court views all allegations in the Complaint as
true

and

construes

Plaintiff.
2008).

them

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.

Conclusory allegations, however, are not entitled to a

presumption

of truth.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1951 (2009)(discussing a 12(b)(6) dismissal); Marsh v. Butler

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County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001).

A claim is

plausible where the plaintiff alleges facts that “allow[] the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”
1949.

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. at

The plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff allege

sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence” that supports the plaintiff’s claim.
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

Bell

Specifically,

“[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Id.

at 555 (citations omitted). Thus, “the-defendant-unlawfully harmed
me accusation” is insufficient.
(citations omitted).

Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949

“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders

naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”
1937.

Id. at

Instead, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (citations omitted).
III.
The Complaint names the following defendants: Ian Mann, Jesus
M. Casas, Charlie Green, and The Honorable William J. Nelson.
Complaint at 7.

According to the Complaint, these Defendants

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apparently participated in the Plaintiff’s underlying criminal
case.

Id. at 8-9 (stating “Defense Attorney, Ian Mann, Assistant

State Attorney Jesus M. Casas, the Clerk of Circuit Court Charlie
Green, and the Honorable Judge, William J. Nelson, did act with
corrupt intent, and did conspire to deprive the criminal defendant
(case no. 01-003724CRA-WJN) Chauncey V. Thomas, of his right to Due
Process of Law, and the Equal Protections of that law defined in
both

the

6th

and

Constitution.”)

14th

Amendments

of

the

United

States

Id.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that his speedy trial rights
expired on May 2, 2002, but his defense attorney moved for a
continuance, without authorization to do so because he had not
entered a notice of appearance on the case, inter alia.

Id. at 8.

Thus, Plaintiff submits that these Defendants conspired to violate
his right to a speedy trial, without his knowledge or consent.
Id. at 10.

As a result, Plaintiff alleges he was convicted of a

crime that he is not guilty of committing.

Id. at 12.

Plaintiff

seeks “immediate release” from custody and $50,000 in damages for
each

year

he

deter[r][e]nt.”

is

wrongfully

incarcerated,

“and

to

act

as

a

Id. at 13.
IV.

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the United States Constitution or a statute of

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the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of
state law.

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir.

2010)(citations omitted).
not

meet

the

The Court finds Plaintiff’s claim does

requirements

of

§

1983,

and

must

otherwise

be

dismissed pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) as to each Defendant.
Defense counsel Ian Mann, the public defender who represented
Plaintiff in his underlying state criminal case, is not a "person"
“acting under color of state law” for the purposes of § 1983. The
United States Supreme Court has held that "a public defender does
not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's
traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal
proceeding."

Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)

(footnote omitted); Dillard v. Sec’y, DOC, 2011 WL 3966102 *2 (11th
Cir. 2011)(unpublished)(noting that “a waiver of speedy trial by
counsel

is

binding

on

defendant,

‘even

though

done

without

consulting him and even against the clients wishes.’”)(citations
omitted).

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim

under § 1983 against Defendant Mann.
Likewise, according to the Complaint, Jesus Casas was the
prosecutor

in

Plaintiff’s

underlying

criminal

action.

Prosecutorial immunity precludes Plaintiff from recovering either
compensatory, or punitive damages.

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409, 431 (1976)(“[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting
the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for

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damages under § 1983.”); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th
Cir. 1999) (“[A]bsolute immunity extends to a prosecutor’s ‘acts
undertaken . . . in preparing for the initiation of judicial
proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role
as an advocate for the State . . . . .’”)(quoting Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)).

See also Hart v. Hodges,

587 F.3d 1288, 1294-96, cert. denied, ____ U.S. _____, 230 S. Ct.
3389 (2010) (reviewing breath of prosecutorial immunity).
Plaintiff attributes liability to Judge Nelson, a deceased
circuit court judge from the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, as a
result of the Judge’s decision to grant defense counsel’s motion
for a continuance. Plaintiff attributes blame on Defendant Charlie
Green because he is the clerk of circuit court.
Judges are also absolutely immune from civil liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for any acts performed in their judicial capacity,
providing

such

jurisdiction.

acts

are

not

done

in

clear

absence

of

all

Supreme Court v. Consumers Union of United States,

446 U.S. 719 (1980); Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir.
2000) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357) (1978);
Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (11th Cir. 1996)).
immunity

in

error,

malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.”

Bolin,

225

at

applies

1239

even

(citing

when

Stump,

the

435

judge’s

U.S.

at

acts

are

“This

356).

Similarly,

nonjudicial officials, including clerks of court, are entitled to

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absolute immunity for “duties that are integrally related to the
judicial process.”

Jenkins v. Clerk of Court, 150 F. App’x 988,

990 (11th Cir. 2005).

“Absolute quasi-judicial immunity for non-

judicial officials is determined by a functional analysis of their
actions in relation to the judicial process.” Id. Here, Plaintiff
attributes liability to Defendant Green because he was the Clerk of
Court and conspired with the other defendants to waive Plaintiff’s
right to a speedy trial. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants
Judge Nelson and Green are entitled to absolute judicial and/or
quasi-judicial immunity.
To the extent Plaintiff wishes to challenge the fact or
duration

of

his

confinement

due

to

what

he

perceives

as

constitutional errors committed during his trial, Plaintiff’s
complaint presents a habeas corpus claim rather than a civil rights
claim.

However, Plaintiff must first exhaust his state court

remedies with respect to any habeas claim prior to filing a
petition in this Court.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. The Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to §1915A(b)(1) and/or
§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
2.

The Clerk of Court shall terminate any pending motions,

enter judgment accordingly, and close this case.

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DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, on this 28th day of
September, 2011.

SA: alj
Copies: All Parties of Record

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