Synergy Real Estate of SW Florida, Inc. et al v. Premier Property Management of SW Florida, LLC et al
Filing
35
OPINION AND ORDER granting 8 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs shall file an Amended Complaint within twenty-one days. See Order for details. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 9/12/2012. (AAA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
SYNERGY REAL ESTATE OF SW FLORIDA,
INC., GULF COAST MANAGEMENT GROUP,
LLC, and LOUIS PFAFF,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No.
2:11-cv-707-FtM-29SPC
PREMIER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT OF SW
FLORIDA, LLC, NAPLES NEW VENTURES,
LLC,
DEBORAH
MCCABE,
MICHAEL
DEPAOLA, KRISTIN DEPAOLA, CYNTHIA
JONES, and JAMES JONES,
Defendants.
___________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendants’ Joint Motion
to
Dismiss
and
Incorporated
Memorandum
of
Law
(Doc.
#8).
Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #10).
I.
On July 5, 2011, plaintiffs Synergy Real Estate of SW Florida,
Inc. (Synergy), Gulf Coast Management Group, LLC (Gulf Coast) and
Louis
Pfaff
defendants
filed
Premier
a
nine-count
Property
Complaint
Management
of
(Doc.
SW
#1)
against
Florida,
LLC
(Premier), Naples New Ventures, LLC (Naples New Ventures), Deborah
McCabe, Michael DePaola, Kristin DePaola, Cynthia Jones, and James
Jones. Plaintiffs bring claims against defendants for cyberpiracy,
unfair trade practices, civil conspiracy, tortious interference
with advantageous business relationships, breach of fiduciary duty,
and organized scheme to defraud.
(Doc. #1.)
Defendants contend that plaintiffs filed this Complaint in an
attempt to circumvent the state court proceedings where three
actions and two appeals arising from the same common nucleus of
facts are pending.
(Doc. #8.)
Defendants also assert that this
action is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,1 that plaintiff
Synergy
does
not
have
standing
because
it
is
a
dissolved
corporation, and that plaintiffs have failed to meet the pleading
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Id.)
As
set forth below, the Court finds that the Complaint is unmanageable
in its current form and will be dismissed with leave to amend.
II.
Defendants
argue
that
the
Court
lacks
subject
matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiffs respond
that because an appeal from the state court judgment was still
pending at the time they filed their Complaint, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is inapplicable. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine makes clear
that federal district courts cannot review state court final
judgments because that task is reserved for state appellate courts
or, as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court.”
Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).
1
Casale v.
This is a narrow
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of
Columbia Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
-2-
doctrine,
confined
to
“cases
brought
by
state-court
losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before
the
district
court
proceedings
commenced
and
inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Lance v.
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006)(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)); Casale, 558 F.3d at
1260.
Because an appeal from the state court judgment remained
pending at the time plaintiffs filed their Complaint (see Doc. #8,
p. 4), the Court agrees with plaintiffs and finds that the RookerFeldman doctrine is inapplicable here. See Nicholson v. Shafe, 558
F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009)(“[S]tate proceedings have not
ended for purposes of Rooker-Feldman when an appeal from the state
court judgment remains pending at the time the plaintiff commences
the federal court action.”).
III.
All nine counts in the Complaint contain a paragraph realleging
the allegations of all the preceding paragraphs. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 48,
57, 63, 69, 75, 79, 83, 90, 93.)
typical
shotgun
complaint
This is a shotgun pleading.
contains
several
counts,
each
“The
one
incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors,
leading to a situation where most of the counts [ ] contain
irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions.”
Strategic
Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293,
1295 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282,
-3-
1284 (11th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs will be required to replead each
of their claims and to specify which factual allegations are
relevant to each count.
See Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc.
v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998)(“These types
of cases invariably begin with a long list of general allegations,
most of which are immaterial to most of the claims for relief.
The
general allegations are incorporated by reference into each count
of the complaint; the complaint is followed by an answer that
responds to each and every statement.
If the trial judge does not
quickly demand repleader, all is lost-extended and largely aimless
discovery will commence, and the trial court will soon be drowned
in
an
uncharted
sea
of
depositions,
interrogatories,
and
affidavits.”).
Plaintiffs may also take this opportunity to address any
additional pleading deficiencies. For example, by indiscriminately
lumping “defendants” together, plaintiffs have failed to comply with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Rule 8(a) requires “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Fed.
“Under this rule, when a complaint alleges that
multiple defendants are liable for multiple claims, courts must
determine whether the complaint gives adequate notice to each
defendant.”
Pro Image Installers, Inc. v. Dillon, No. 3:08cv273,
2009 WL 112953, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2009)(citing Atuahene v.
City of Hartford, 10 F. App'x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001)); Bentley v.
-4-
Bank of Am., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
Although
a complaint against multiple defendants is usually read as making
the same allegation against each defendant individually, Crowe v.
Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1997), factual allegations
must give each defendant “fair notice” of the nature of the claim
and the “grounds” on which the claim rests.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Accordingly, at times, a
plaintiff’s “grouping” of defendants in a complaint may require a
more definite statement.
928
F.
Supp.
1161,
See Veltmann v. Walpole Pharmacy, Inc.,
1164
(M.D.
Fla.
1996);
Lane
v.
Capital
Acquisitions & Mgmt., Co., No. 04-60602, 2006 WL 4590705, at *5
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2006)(“By lumping all the defendants together
in each claim and providing no factual basis to distinguish their
conduct, the [] Complaint fails to satisfy the minimum standard of
Rule 8.”).
Plaintiffs may also review the factual allegations asserted in
support of its nine substantive claims.
The complaint “requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”
555.
Plaintiffs
should
clearly
and
Twombly, 550 U.S. at
concisely
state
the
circumstances, occurrences and events which support each of their
claims.
As the Complaint is not properly alleged, the Court need not
address defendants’ other arguments at this time.
-5-
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #8) is GRANTED
and the Complaint (Doc. #1) is dismissed without prejudice.
2.
Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint WITHIN TWENTY
ONE (21) DAYS of this Opinion and Order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 12th day of
September, 2012.
Copies: Counsel of record
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