Hatton et al v. Chrysler Canada, Inc.

Filing 60

OPINION AND ORDER denying 40 Motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 3/30/2013. (SVC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
CAROLINA HATTON, individually and
his natural guardian, C.H., a minor,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

2:12-cv-186-FtM-29SPC

CHRYSLER CANADA, INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Chrysler Canada, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Lack of
Personal

Jurisdiction

and

as

Falling

Outside

the

Statute

of

Limitations and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. #40) filed on
August 22, 2012. Plaintiffs filed a response on September 5, 2012.
(Doc. #45.)

With leave of Court (Doc. #54), defendant filed a

response in support of its motion (Doc. #55) to which plaintiffs
filed a sur-reply (Doc. #56).

For the reasons set forth below, the

motion is denied.
I.
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that on or about January
2, 2009, Christopher Sheldon was driving a 1999 Chrysler 300 M in
which

plaintiff

passenger.

Carolina

Hatton

was

a

restrained

rear

seat

The vehicle was involved in an accident on Interstate

75 in Lee County, Florida.

At the time of the impact, several

components of the 1999 Chrysler M failed, causing severe injury to

Carolina Hatton.

As a result, Carolina Hatton and her minor son,

C.H., initiated this action against Chrysler Canada, Inc. asserting
causes of action for negligence (Count I) and strict products
liability (Count II).

Chrysler Canada, Inc. is alleged to have

manufactured the Chrysler 300 M vehicle.
This matter was removed from state court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction.

In its motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction, defendant asserts that the Florida Long-Arm
Statute does not apply to this case and that exercising personal
jurisdiction does not comport with Constitutional Due Process.

In

the alternative, defendant asserts that the plaintiffs’ claims are
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs argue
to the contrary.
II.
“Jurisdiction to resolve cases on the merits requires both
authority over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter
jurisdiction)

and

jurisdiction),

so

authority
that

the

over

court’s

the

parties

decision

will

(personal
bind

them”

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999); see also
Sinchem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S.
422, 430-31 (2007). The Court previously found that it has subject
matter jurisdiction based upon complete diversity of citizenship.
(Doc. #59.)

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Personal jurisdiction is a restriction on judicial power as a
matter of individual liberty, and “a party may insist that the
limitation be observed, or he may forgo that right, effectively
consenting to the court’s exercise of adjudicatory authority.”
Ruhrgas AG, 526 U.S. at 584. Unless waived or forfeited1, personal
jurisdiction is “an essential element of the jurisdiction of a
district court, without which the court is powerless to proceed to
an adjudication.”

Id. at 584 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).
The existence of personal jurisdiction is a question of law.
Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d
1242, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010); Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora,
S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009).
court

in

Florida

may

exercise

personal

“A federal district
jurisdiction

over

a

nonresident defendant to the same extent that a Florida court may,
so long as the exercise is consistent with federal due process
requirements.” Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th
Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff

“bears

the

initial

burden

of

alleging

in

the

complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of
jurisdiction.”

United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274

(11th Cir. 2009).

A prima facie case is established if plaintiff

1

Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-04 (1982).
-3-

alleges enough facts to withstand a motion for directed verdict or
judgment as a matter of law. PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach
Constr., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2010); SEC v. Carrillo,
115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir. 1997).

If defendant challenges

jurisdiction by submitting affidavit evidence making a specific
factual denial based on personal knowledge, the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.
Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274.

Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of

establishing that personal jurisdiction is present.
F.3d at 1217.

Oldfield, 558

“Where the plaintiff’s complaint and supporting

evidence conflict with the defendant’s affidavits, the court must
construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”
Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir.
2002).

“If such inferences are sufficient to defeat a motion for

judgment as a matter of law, the court must rule for the plaintiff,
finding that jurisdiction exists.”

PVC Windoors, 598 F.3d at 810.

“A federal court sitting in diversity undertakes a two-step
inquiry in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists: the
exercise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the state
long-arm statute and (2) not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

When a

federal court uses a state long-arm statute, because the extent of
the statute is governed by state law, the federal court is required
to construe it as would the state’s supreme court.”

-4-

Diamond

Crystal

Brands,

593

F.3d

quotation marks omitted).

at

1257–58

(internal

citations

and

The Court must determine the first step

before proceeding to the second. PVC Windoors, 598 F.3d at 807–08.
The reach of the Florida long arm statute is a question of
Florida law.

Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274.

“A Florida court conducts

a two-step inquiry when determining whether jurisdiction under
Florida’s long-arm statute is proper in a given case.

Initially,

it must determine whether the complaint alleges jurisdictional
facts sufficient to invoke the statute.

If so, the court must then

examine whether the defendant has sufficient ‘minimum contacts’
with Florida in order to satisfy due process requirements.” Canale
v. Rubin, 20 So. 3d 463, 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citing Execu–Tech
Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla.
2000)).

The due process analysis itself involves a two-part

inquiry in which the Court first considers whether defendant
engaged in

minimum

considers

whether

defendant

would

contacts
the

offend

substantial justice.

with

exercise

of

traditional

the state

of

Florida, then

personal

jurisdiction

notions

of

fair

play

over
and

Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1515–16 (11th

Cir. 1990).

-5-

III.
A. Florida Long Arm Statute
(1)

General Jurisdiction

Florida’s long-arm statute provides in part: “[a] defendant
who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this
state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or
otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.”
Stat. § 48.193(2).

Fla.

“The reach of this provision extends to the

limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
(11th Cir. 2010).

Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 846

“In order to establish that [defendant] was

engaged in substantial and not isolated activity in Florida, the
activities of [defendant] must be considered collectively and show
a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary
benefit.” Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino,
447 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 2006)(quoting Sculptchair, Inc. v.
Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996)).
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Chrysler Canada is
a

Canadian

corporation

which

has

submitted

itself

to

the

jurisdiction of the court by “[e]ngaging in substantial and not
isolated activity within the State of Florida.”

(Doc. #37, ¶23d.)

Prior paragraphs assert that Chrysler Canada transacted business in
Florida (id. ¶4), ships thousands of vehicles it manufactures to

-6-

Florida every year (id. ¶5), manufactured every 300 M sold and used
in Florida (id. ¶7), manufactured and assembled the subject vehicle
in

Canada (id. ¶9), derived billions of dollars in monetary

benefit from the sale of its vehicles in Florida and continues to
derive significant gain from the sale of its vehicles in Florida
(id. ¶10), and maintained business contacts and activity with
Florida Chrysler dealers, including warranty coverage in Florida
(id. ¶13).
Chrysler Canada asserts that it is not engaged in substantial
and not isolated activity within the State of Florida. In support,
defendant provides the affidavit of Edward R. Masse (Doc. #40-1) in
which he states the following:
Defendant

Chrysler

Canada

subsidiary of Chrysler Group LLC.2

is

an

indirect

wholly

owned

Defendant’s principal place of

business is in Canada, not in Florida, and defendant has never been
licensed to do business in Florida.

Defendant does not rent or

lease property within the State of Florida.

Chrysler Canada sells

all assembled vehicles to Chrysler United States while the vehicle
is still in Canada, and Chrysler United States takes possession of
all of the assembled vehicles in Canada.

2

Chrysler Canada has no

In particular, he attests that Chrysler Canada is currently
an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Chrysler Group LLC, and was
previously an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Chrysler LLC,
formerly DaimlerChrysler Company LLC, formerly DaimlerChrysler
Corporation, formerly Chrysler Corporation. (Doc. #40-1, ¶4.) For
ease of reference, the Court will refer to this group collectively
as “Chrysler United States”.
-7-

responsibility for shipping, advertising, or selling any of the
assembled vehicles and had no role in implementing recalls on the
subject vehicle

or

any

vehicle

in

the United

States

market.

Chrysler Canada did not distribute or sell the 1999 Chrysler 300M
vehicle in the United States, and United States dealerships do not
order vehicles from defendant or pay defendant for vehicles. Other
than

incentive

trips

in

Florida,

Chrysler

Canada

has

never

“transacted business in Florida; made contracts with the state of
Florida; owned any real estate situated in Florida; maintained any
offices, manufacturing plants or equipment in Florida; had any
directors, officers, employees or agents based in Florida; had a
bank account in Florida; or directed any advertising or marketing
efforts to residents or businesses in Florida.”

(See generally

Doc. #40-1.)
In response, plaintiffs assert that “[t]he factual evidence
elicited from Chrysler Canada in the previous Florida case, Hunter
v. Chrysler Canada, Inc., 6:09-cv-01050-MSS-GJK (M.D. Fla. 2009)
overwhelmingly demonstrates Chrysler Canada was and is involved in
‘substantial and not isolated activity’ within Florida”.3
#45, p. 8.)

(Doc.

No other factual or legal argument is made with

respect to the assertion of general jurisdiction.

3

A copy of the Order is attached to the response.
#45-1.)
-8-

(See Doc.

In Hunter, the Court determined that personal jurisdiction was
proper under the Florida Long-Arm statute under Fla. Stat. §
48.193(1)(b), a specific jurisdiction provision, rather than Fla.
Stat. § 48.193(2), the general jurisdiction provision.

The Court

finds that the facts elicited in Hunter are insufficient evidence
of substantial and not isolated activity in the State of Florida by
defendant.

The fact that a vehicle manufactured by defendant in

Canada found its way in the stream of commerce to Florida is not
sufficient to give Florida general jurisdiction over defendant.
Goodyear Dunlap Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2851 (2011); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780 (2011).

Plaintiffs

have

provided

no factual

basis

for

concluding that Chrysler Canada is engaged in substantial and not
isolated activity in the state of Florida, and therefore personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2) has not been
established.
(2)

Specific Jurisdiction

The Second Amended Complaint asserts personal jurisdiction
based upon defendant (a) operating, conducting, engaging in, and
carrying

on

a

business

or

business

venture

in

Florida,

(b)

committing a tortious act in Florida, and (c) causing injury to
persons or property within Florida arising out of an act or
omission outside Florida.

Plaintiffs thus assert that the Court

has specific personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Stat. §§

-9-

48.193(1)(a), (b), and (f)(2).

Specific jurisdiction refers to

“jurisdiction over causes of action that arise from or are related
to the party’s actions within the forum.”
at 808.

PVC Windoors, 598 F.3d

Florida law requires, however, that “before a court

addresses the question of whether specific jurisdiction exists
under the long-arm statute, the court must determine whether the
allegations of the complaint state a cause of action.”

PVC

Windoors, 598 F.3d at 808 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted.
(a)
The

Sufficiency of the Allegations

parties

dispute

whether

the

Florida

choice-of-law

principles direct that Florida, Ohio, or Canada law applies as to
the statute of limitations in this matter.

No party asserts,

however, that Florida law does not provide the substantive law for
Counts I and II or that the allegations are insufficient to state
a claim.
Count I of the Second Amended Complaint sets forth a claim of
negligence.

Count I alleges that Chrysler Canada owed a duty of

reasonable care to plaintiffs (Doc. #37, ¶35), breached its duties
to plaintiffs in four specific ways (Id. at ¶36), and as a direct
and proximate result plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages (Id.
at ¶¶37-40).

Count I thus plausibly states all the elements of a

negligence claim under Florida law. Clay Elec. Co-op, Inc. v.
Johnson, 873 So. 3d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003).

-10-

Count II of the Second Amended Complaint sets forth a claim of
strict liability.

Count II alleges that Chrysler Canada designed

and/or manufactured and assembled the 1999 Chrysler 300 M and
distributed and sold similar vehicles in Florida, (id. at ¶42),
that it knew the vehicles would be operated by persons without
inspection for defects in the rear seat back, rear seat cushion,
and luggage compartment (id. at ¶43), that defendant knew or should
have known that the vehicles would be sold and rented without
substantial change in the condition from the time of manufacture
and assembly to the time of sale (id. at ¶44), that the vehicle
involved in the accident was defective and unreasonably dangerous
in four specific ways (id. at ¶45), and that as a direct and
proximate result plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages (id. at
¶¶46-49.)
law.

Count II thus plausibly states a claim under Florida

See Barrow v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 1998 WL 812318 at *27

(M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 1998); see also Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So.
2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Because plaintiffs have set forth plausible causes of action,
it is appropriate to determine whether the Florida Long-Arm Statute
affords personal jurisdiction over defendant.
(b)

Application of the Long-Arm Statute

Plaintiffs allege that personal jurisdiction over Chrysler
Canada is appropriate under three (3) provisions of the Florida
Long-Arm Statute.

Specifically, plaintiffs assert that Fla. Stat.

-11-

48.193 sections (1)(a), (1)(b), and (f)(2), all confer personal
jurisdiction over defendant.
The

Court

finds

that

plaintiffs

have

sufficiently

pled

personal jurisdiction under section (1)(f)(2) of the Florida Long
Arm Statute which provides personal jurisdiction over any person
“[c]ausing injury to persons or property within this state arising
out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state, if,
at or about the time of the injury . . . [p]roducts, materials, or
things

processed,

serviced,

or

manufactured

by

the

defendant

anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary
course of commerce, trade, or use.”

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(f)(2)

(emphasis added).

The parties dispute whether Chrysler Canada is

a “manufacturer.”

Neither party disputes, however, that Chrysler

Canada “assembled” the vehicle.
Florida

courts

have

held

that

the

term

“processed”

as

contained in section 48.193(1)(f)(2) contemplates “‘[t]he conduct
of a wholesaler in bringing together large quantities of goods for
shipment . . . .’”

Pratte v. Wuebbels, 2008 WL 423409 (M.D. Fla.

Feb. 13, 2008) citing Blumberg v. Steve Weiss & Co., Inc., 922 So.
3d 361, 364 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2006).

Florida courts have determined

that “‘[t]he statute’s use of the term ‘serviced’ connotes some
hands-on

contact

possession

of

with

the

the

product

ultimate

before

consumer.’”

it

comes

Id.

into

the

Plaintiffs

allegations, and defendant’s concession that it was an “assembler”

-12-

of the subject vehicle demonstrates that defendant “serviced” the
vehicle as the term has been interpreted, thereby coming within the
scope

of

this

Consequently,

provision
section

of

the

Florida

48.193(1)(f)(2)

Long-Arm
provides

statute.
personal

jurisdiction over defendant under the Florida Long-Arm statute.4
B.

Constitutional Considerations
The second part of the jurisdictional analysis is whether the

exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate Due Process.

In

order for jurisdiction to comport with the Due Process clause,
there

must

be

a

“purposeful

availment

of

the

privilege

of

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.”

Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau

Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1363 (11th Cir.
2006)(quotation marks omitted). As long as there is a “substantial
connection”,

even

a

single

act

can

be

sufficient

to

support

jurisdiction depending on the nature and quality of the contact.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 n.18 (1985).
Physical presence of the defendant in the forum State is not
required, id. at 476, and jurisdiction may be found if defendant’s
“conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

4

Because the Court finds personal jurisdiction is proper under
subsection (1)(f)(2), the Court need not address the parties
arguments with respect to subsections (1)(a) and (b).
-13-

(a)

Minimum Contacts

Minimum contacts requires the following: (1) the contacts must
be related to the plaintiff’s cause of action or have given rise to
it; (2) the contacts must involve some purposeful availment of the
privilege

of

conducting

activities

within

the

forum,

thereby

invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; and (3) the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state must be such that it
should

reasonably

anticipate

being

hailed

into

court

there.

Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 631 (11th
Cir. 1996).
The

parties

contest

whether

or

not

defendant

has

had

sufficient “minimum contacts” with Florida such that it should be
subjected to personal jurisdiction by this Court.

Plaintiffs rely

on the “stream of commerce” theory of personal jurisdiction, which
provides simply that Due Process is satisfied if the forum state
“asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they
will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”

Vermeulen v.

Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1546 (11th Cir. 1993), citing
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 29798 (1980).
Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that the recent Supreme
Court case of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780

(2011) dictates that the “stream of commerce plus” analysis

is applicable.

Prior to J. McIntyre, the Eleventh Circuit had

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applied, but had never explicitly adopted this test, which arose
from Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Asahi Metal Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 110
(1987).

Under this test, a defendant must both place a product in

the stream of commerce that ends up in the forum state, and do
“something more” to “purposely avail itself of the market in the
forum State.”

Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1547 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S.

at 110).
Relevant Eleventh Circuit case law is unclear which test it
would adopt under this set of facts, and the Eleventh Circuit has
not yet had the opportunity to review J. McIntyre.

See Vermeulen,

985 F.2d at 1546 (applying “stream of commerce plus” test, but not
explicitly adopting it); Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 493 n.
5 (11th Cir. 1988)(applying O’Connor’s Asahi test and noting that
satisfaction fo the narrower test articulated by Justice O’Connor
satisfied other broader tests articulated in Asahi); but see Ruiz
de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, Inc., 207 F.3d 1351,
1357-58 (11th Cir. 2000)(applying “stream of commerce” test and
Calder effects test5).

5

The effects test applies in order to determine whether
sufficient minimum contact exist in torts cases. Oldfield, 558
F.3d at 1220 n. 28 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).
Under this test, it must be shown that the defendant (1) committed
an intentional tort (2) that was directly aimed at the forum, and
(3) causing an injury within the forum that the defendant should
have reasonably anticipated.” Id. at 1221 (citing Calder, 465 U.S.
at 789-90); see also, Smith, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 1323.
As no
(continued...)
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Defendant asserts that J. McIntyre dictates that the “stream
of commerce plus” test is the applicable test in this matter.
However,
disagree.

most

district

courts

which

have

analyzed

the

issue

See, e.g., Simmons v. Big No. 1 Motor Sports, Inc., --

F. Supp. 2d ----, 2012 WL 5426281 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 5, 2012); Askue
v. Aurora Corp. of Am., 2012 WL 843939, *6-7 (N.D. Ga. 2010);
Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., 2011 WL 6291812 *2 (S.D. Miss.
2011).

J. McIntyre was a fragmented decision and no opinion

enjoyed the assent of five Justices.

Therefore, courts have

considered Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion as the holding
because he concurred in the judgment on only the narrowest of
grounds.

See

Marks

v.

United

States,

430

U.S.

188,

193

(1977)(“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices
‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds . . .’”); United States v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221
(11th Cir. 2007)(quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (same))).
Accordingly, the “stream of commerce” test remains good law in
the Eleventh Circuit, and J. McIntyre does not, as defendant
suggests, alter this.

Applying the facts of this case to that

theory, the Court finds that Chrysler Canada purposely availed

5

(...continued)
intentional torts have been alleged, the effects test is not
applicable.
-16-

itself of the protections of the State of Florida. Chrysler Canada
assembled the subject Chrysler 300 M for Chrysler United States,
which distributes nationally in the United States, and therefore
Chrysler Canada invoked the benefits and protections of those
states, including Florida.
at 297.
to

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S.

Therefore, “it is not unreasonable to subject [defendant]

suit

in

one

of

those

States

if

its

allegedly

defective

merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to
others.”
(b)

Id.
Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice

Defendant asserts that exercising personal jurisdiction over
it would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice because it will be heavily burdened if it must defend the
suit in Florida.

In particular, “almost all non-accident related

witnesses and discovery that may be relevant to the Plaintiff’s
[sic] claims against Chrysler Canada are located in states and
countries other than Florida and in the United States.” (Doc. #40,
pp. 20-21.)

Defendant

also

asserts that

Florida

has

little

interest in adjudicating the case within the State.
In response, plaintiffs assert that the United States and
Florida have a compelling interest in protecting individuals within
their boundaries from unsafe products.
that

many

officers,

crucial
EMS

witnesses,

personnel,

Plaintiffs further assert

including

health

-17-

care

investigating

providers,

and

police
records

custodians are within the State of Florida.

Further, the vehicle

is preserved in its post-crash condition in Fort Myers, Florida.
Finally plaintiffs assert that “[t]his accident occurred in Florida
on Florida highways, and exercising jurisdiction will serve to
impose the safety of Chrysler Canada’s products used by Floridians
and deter the influx of defective and dangerous products entering
its forum.”

(Doc. #45, p. 16.)

There are five factors a Court must consider to determine if
exercising personal jurisdiction would comport with traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. The factors include:
(1) The burden on the defendant; (2) the forum’s interest
in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest
in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the
shared interest of the states in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.

Croft, 2010 WL 1707426, at *7 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at
477).
Here, it would likely burden defendant, at least to some
extent, to litigate in Florida.

The Court is not persuaded,

however, that Florida does not have a strong interest in the
adjudication of the dispute.

Accepting the allegations of the

Complaint as true, defendant’s product was unreasonably dangerous
and several

of

these

vehicles

accidents every year in Florida.

were

involved

in

thousands

(Doc. #37, ¶¶21, 22.)

of

Certainly

Florida has a substantial interest in protecting drivers within the
-18-

State, regardless
vehicles.

of

citizenship,

from

unreasonably

dangerous

The Plaintiffs have an interest in convenient relief in

Florida because several of their key witnesses are within the
State.

See Foreign Imported Prods, 2004 WL 4724495 at *11;

Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 632.

As to efficient resolution of the

controversy, this would likely be available in both Florida and
Canada as some evidence and witnesses are available in both of
these jurisdictions.

As to the final factor, both jurisdictions

have an interest in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.
To be sure, the results of this balancing test are not
overwhelming.

On balance of the factors, however, the Court finds

they indicate that subjecting Chrysler Canada to suit in Florida
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.

See Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 632 (“When minimum contacts

have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the
forum . . . will justify even the serious burdens placed on the
alien defendant”)(citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114). While there will
undoubtably be a burden on defendant to a degree, this burden is
not

unreasonable

circumstances.

or

unmanageable

based

on

the

facts

and

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction is denied.

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C.

Statute of Limitations
The parties agree that Ohio and Canada both have a two-year

applicable statute of limitations and Florida has a four-year
statute of limitations.

Defendant asserts that each statute of

limitations began to run on the date of the accident, January 2,
2009.

Defendant asserts that either Canada or Ohio law applies

under

Florida

plaintiffs’

conflict

action

is

of

laws

principals

time-barred.

and

Accordingly,

therefore,
the

Amended

Complaint should be dismissed.
In

response,

plaintiffs

assert

that

there

is

a

“false”

conflict among the jurisdictions because under all three, this
matter is entitled to equitable tolling. In particular, plaintiffs
assert that

defendant

fraudulently identified

Chrysler

United

States, rather than Chrysler Canada, as the manufacturer of the
Chrysler 300 M.
2011,

that

Plaintiffs assert that it was not until December

they

discovered

manufacturer of the vehicles.

that

defendant

was

the

“true”

Therefore, plaintiffs’ claims are

entitled to equitable tolling.
In reply, defendant does not dispute that Chrysler United
States was identified as the manufacturer.

Defendant asserts that

Chrysler Canada is not the “manufacturer” and instead is the
“assembler” of the vehicles and that Chrysler United States was
correctly identified as the manufacturer.
are not entitled to equitable tolling.

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Therefore, plaintiffs

A comprehensive conflict-of-law analysis is required only if
the case involves a “true” conflict between the jurisdictions with
an interest in the case.

“A true conflict exists when ‘two or more

states have a legitimate interest in a particular set of facts in
litigation and the laws of those states differ or would produce a
different result.’”

Id. at 1219 quoting Walker v. Paradise Grand

Hotel, Ltd., No. 01-3564, 2003 WL 21361662, *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
25, 2003)).
laws of

the

On the other hand, a “false conflict” exists where the
interested jurisdictions

are:

(1)

the

same;

(2)

different but would produce the same outcome under the facts of the
case; or (3) when the policies of one jurisdiction would be
furthered by the application of its laws while the policies of the
other jurisdiction would not be advanced by the application of its
laws.

Tune v. Philip Morris Inc. , 766 So.3d 350, 352 (Fla 2d DCA

2000.
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and the
burden of proving an affirmative defense is on the defendant.
Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir.
2005).

A plaintiff is not required to anticipate and negate an

affirmative defense in the complaint.

LaGrasta v. First Union

Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).

A Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds may be granted,
however, if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the
claim is time-barred.

LaGrasta, 358 F.3d at 845-46.

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Nonetheless,

a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds should not be
granted where

resolution

depends

either

on

facts

not

yet

in

evidence or on construing factual ambiguities in the complaint in
defendant’s favor.

Omar ex rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246,

1252 (11th Cir. 2003).
The Amended Complaint alleges that “[t]he subject vehicle as
manufactured by Chrysler Canada, and assembled by employees of
Chrysler Canada . . .”
purposes

of

allegation

a
that

motion

(Doc. #37, ¶9)(emphasis added).

to

Chrysler

dismiss,
Canada,

States, was the manufacturer.

the

Court

rather

than

must

accept

Chrysler

For
the

United

As defendant has conceded, Chrysler

United States was initially identified as the manufacturer.

As a

result, plaintiffs have at least established a plausible basis for
invoking equitable tolling. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled
to equitable tolling requires resolution of facts not yet in
evidence.

Omar, 334 F.3d at 1252.

Therefore, at this stage in the

litigation, no “true” conflict has been established and plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint cannot be dismissed as untimely on its face. The
motion to dismiss on this basis is denied.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Chrysler Canada, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and as Falling

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Outside the Statute of Limitations and Incorporated Memorandum of
Law (Doc. #40) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
March, 2013.

Copies:
Counsel of record

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30th

day of