Schumann et al v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A. et al
Filing
304
OPINION AND ORDER denying 274 Motion to Bifurcate. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 4/3/2017. (KP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
BILLY
SCHUMANN,
DUSTIN
ABRAHAM,
on
behalf
of
themselves
and
others
similarly situated, LAUREN
TIDWELL, JEANIE HAKENEWERT,
STEPHANIE
ALANA
MARIE
BENJAMIN,
CHRISTOPHER
M.
BOURN, DEREK WHITE, LAHOMA
J.
NACHTRAB,
RICHARDO
ROSADO,
LANNETTE
GIBSON,
DANIEL
PENTON,
DENISE
ARMINIO,
OFELIA
BIAGAN,
SHEILA
SMITH,
CELINE
VIDAURRI, CHRISTINA VINAS,
RICARDO ROSADO, PATRICK C.
HARRELL,
RACHEL
GOODE,
JAMIESON
WISHMAN,
PAUL
CALOIAN, STEVEN TODD LITTLE,
JESSICA
LINCOLN,
and
CHRISTOPHER JALACKI,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No: 2:12-cv-347-FtM-29CM
COLLIER ANESTHESIA, P.A., a
Florida corporation, WOLFORD
COLLEGE,
LLC,
a
Florida
limited liability company,
THOMAS
L.
COOK,
an
individual, and LYNDA M.
WATERHOUSE, an individual,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to
Bifurcate (Doc. #274) filed on December 20, 2016.
Plaintiffs
filed a response in Opposition (Doc. #276) on January 6, 2017.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is denied.
I.
Plaintiffs are twenty-five former student registered nurse
anesthetists (SRNAs) who enrolled in Defendant Wolford College,
LLC’s 28-month nurse anesthesia master’s program seeking to become
Certified
Registered
Nurse
Anesthetists.
While
students
at
Wolford, Plaintiffs participated as interns in a clinical training
program supervised and subsidized by Defendant Collier Anesthesia,
P.A.
was
Though it is undisputed that Plaintiffs knew the internship
unpaid
and
that
completing
it
was
required
to
graduate,
Plaintiffs now claim they functioned as “employees” while at the
clinical sites and seek to recover minimum wage and overtime
compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 201 et seq.
The Court conditionally certified a collective
action (Doc. #91), and twenty-three former SRNAs joined the two
original plaintiffs.
(Docs. ## 176, ¶ 6; 197, ¶ 1.)
Each side filed motions for summary judgment.
Finding no
material disputed facts on the ultimate question of Plaintiffs’
employment
realities
status,
of
this
the
case
Court
concluded
establish
that
that
“the
Plaintiffs
economic
were
not
‘employees’ of any Defendant, and therefore are not entitled to
wage
and
overtime
compensation.”
(Doc.
#226,
p.
14.)
Accordingly, the Court issued an Opinion and Order (id.) on May
23, 2014 granting Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Docs.
## 174, 181) and denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. #173).
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the summary judgment
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
(Doc. #245).
Observing that “a determination of an individual’s
employment status under the FLSA is a question of law,” the
Eleventh Circuit conducted a de novo review of the undersigned’s
legal
determination
between
Plaintiffs
that
and
no
employment
Defendants.
relationship
Schumann
v.
existed
Collier
Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted).
Recognizing that “[t]he tricky part” is determining who
falls within the FLSA’s definition of “employee,” id., the Eleventh
Circuit ultimately followed the “primary beneficiary” test of
Walling
v.
Portland
Terminal
Co.,
330
U.S.
148
(1947),
but
“specifically tailored” those factors to better “identify the
primary beneficiary of a modern-day internship for academic credit
and professional certification.” 1
Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1203.
Rather than “take a position . . . regarding whether [Plaintiffs]
were ‘employees’ for purposes of the FLSA,” id. at 1215, the
Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to this Court “to apply this
test in the first instance” when evaluating the cross motions for
summary judgment and “to give the parties an opportunity to further
1
In so doing, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the list of seven nonexclusive, flexible factors identified in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight
Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2015). Schumann, 803 F.3d
at 1211-14.
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develop the record to address the components of the test.” 2
Id.
at 1203.
The undersigned entered an Order (Doc. #247) vacating the May
23, 2014 Order (Doc. #226) and the Judgment (Doc. #227) and invited
the
parties
to
file
supplemental
cross-motions
for
summary
judgment consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.
parties did so.
The
(Docs. # 248; 249; 251; 252; 253; 256; 257; 258;
259; 260; 264.)
The Court denied (Doc. #269) the three supplemental motions
for
summary
judgment.
Although
the
first
and
seventh
Glatt
factors were undisputed and weighed in favor of a finding that
Plaintiffs were students (id. p. 16), the Court found conflicting
evidence as to the other factors, which precluded summary judgment,
both
as
to
those
factors,
plaintiffs’ employment status.
and
on
the
ultimate
(Id. pp. 16-38.)
question
of
The undersigned
observed in several places that resolution of these material
evidentiary disputes will depend on the jury’s weighing each side
of the story and making credibility determinations.
(Id. pp. 26,
34.)
The Court then entered an Order (Doc. #270) reopening the
case and directing the parties to file a new joint Case Management
Report.
On November 28, 2016, the parties submitted their joint
2
The Circuit Court did, however, caution that “[i]n applying the
factors to ascertain the primary beneficiary of an internship
relationship, . . . the proper resolution of a case may not
necessarily be an all-or-nothing determination.” Id. at 1214.
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Case Management Report (Doc. #271).
Plaintiffs selected the jury
trial option, but Defendants – for the first time – designated the
trial as “non-jury” and “request[ed] briefing on this issue.”
On
December 6, 2016, the Court issued a Second Amended Case Management
and Scheduling Order (Doc. #272).
Noting that Defendants had not
filed a motion to strike Plaintiffs’ jury demand, the Court set a
jury trial for the April 2017 term.
Two weeks later, Defendants filed the instant Motion seeking
to bifurcate trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(b).
Defendants assert that because employment status under the
FLSA presents a “question of law,” the Court - not the jury should first hold a bench trial to make that determination (and,
presumably, to settle any outstanding factual disputes), before a
jury is convened to resolve any remaining issues.
Plaintiffs
oppose bifurcation.
II.
Under Rule 42(b), a court has discretionary authority to
bifurcate the resolution of certain issues or claims in a case.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vizcay, 826 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016).
Notwithstanding such discretion, a court may not grant bifurcation
where doing so would infringe upon a party’s Seventh Amendment
right to have a jury decide a particular issue or to issue a final
verdict.
federal
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (“[T]he court must preserve any
right
to
a
jury
trial.”);
Houseman
v.
U.S.
Aviation
Underwriters, 171 F.3d 1117, 1121 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[S]eparate
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trials must not be granted if doing so would violate the Seventh
Amendment.).
As an initial matter, the Court observes that there is a
“well-established . . . right to a jury trial in private actions
pursuant to the FLSA.”
(1978).
It
is
also
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580
well-established,
however,
that
“a
determination of an individual’s employment status under the FLSA
is a question of law.”
Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1207 (citing
Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.
2013)).
In practice, this means that where the material facts are
not disputed, the issue of employment status under the FLSA is
treated as a pure “question of law” and is appropriately resolved
by the judge.
E.g., Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion Int’l. Corp.,
340 F.3d 1200, 1215 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming finding on summary
judgment that paper manufacturer was not migrant farm workers’
“joint employer” where undisputed facts showed that workers were
not “economically dependent” on manufacturer); Aimable v. Long &
Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 445 (11th Cir. 1994) (same); Kaplan v.
Code Blue Billing & Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 835 (11th Cir.
2013)
(per
curiam)
(affirming
grant
of
summary
judgment
for
defendants where no genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether medical billing students were employees); Freeman v. Key
Largo Volunteer Fire and Rescue Dept. Inc., 494 F. App’x 940 (11th
Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of FLSA claim where complaint did
- 6 -
not allege facts sufficient to infer that employment relationship
existed between volunteer firefighter and fire department).
But this case presents a different scenario.
Here, the Court
has already found that material disputed facts do exist, preventing
a finding on employment status as a matter of law.
In this
posture, Eleventh Circuit case law leaves clear that employment
status becomes a mixed issue of law and fact to be resolved by a
jury, assuming one has been properly demanded, as it was here.
Such was the situation in Watkins v. City of Montgomery, 775
F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2014).
That case involved a group of fire
department lieutenants seeking unpaid overtime wages on the ground
that they were not subject to the FLSA’s “executive exemption.”
The district court denied their motion for judgment as a matter of
law, since “a reasonable jury would have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the City on the issue of the
executive
exemption.”
Id.
at
1286.
The
question
was
then
submitted to the jury, which rejected the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims.
Id.
Despite having demanded a jury trial, the plaintiffs argued
on appeal that the legal determination of whether the executive
exemption applied should not have been submitted to the jury in
the first place.
Id. at 1282.
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.
After first observing that
issues relating to employment status under the FLSA “can present
a question of law that falls outside the province of the jury,”
the Circuit Court stated that this is “not necessarily [always]
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the case, and it was not the situation [at hand].”
(emphasis
added).
Rather,
because
the
district
Id. at 1288
court
had
concluded that “the jury first had to resolve issues of fact”
relevant to the executive-exemption inquiry, “[t]hat made the
question that the jury considered a mixed question of law and
fact.”
Id.
Because, in turn, “[i]ssues involving mixed questions
of law and fact are typically resolved by juries,” id., the jury
had determined issues “properly before it.”
Id. at 1282.
Moore v. Appliance Direct, Inc., 708 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.
2013) provides further support for this proposition.
In that FLSA
retaliation case, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of
law at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief on the issue
of whether an individual defendant was an “employer” under the
FLSA.
The district court denied the motion and sent the case to
the jury, which found for the plaintiff, including on the issue of
the non-corporate-defendant’s individual “employer” status under
the FLSA.
The defendants renewed the motion for judgment as a
matter of law post-verdict, which was again denied.
On appeal,
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s denials, since it
was clear that “reasonable jurors could differ as to whether [the
defendant] was an employer under the requirements of the FLSA.”
Id. at 1237.
Other Eleventh Circuit cases have reached similar results
where material facts are in dispute.
E.g., Scantland, 721 F.3d
at 1319 (concluding “district court erred in granting summary
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judgment to [defendant]” where there existed genuine issues of
material fact regarding whether plaintiffs were “employees” under
FLSA and remanding to district court for trial); Rodriguez v. Farm
Stores Grocery, Inc., 518 F.3d 1259, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2008)
(affirming jury’s findings on “very hotly disputed facts” and
ultimate legal conclusion that grocery store managers were not
subject to FLSA’s “executive exemption”); Olivas v. A Little Havana
Check Cash, Inc., 324 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2009) (reversing
district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of
putative FLSA “employer” where facts could have led “reasonable
person” to conclude defendant was indeed plaintiff’s “employer”
and “remanding for jury trial” on that issue); cf. Werner v. Bell
Family Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F. App’x 541, 543 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“[C]ases
sensibly
acknowledg[ing]
that
courts
eschew
summary
judgment when presented with genuine disputes of fact[] . . . do
not . . . conflict[] with [appellate] FLSA precedents properly
treating employment status as a question of law.”).
Returning to the case at hand, the Court denied summary
judgment on the issue of Plaintiffs’ employment status because
there
exist
numerous
disputed
issues
of
material
fact,
the
resolution of which will sometimes turn on witness credibility.
In other words, the question of Plaintiffs’ employment status under
the FLSA is “a mixed question of law and fact.”
Watkins, 775 F.3d
at 1288; see also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 450 (1976) (“[A]n issue may be properly characterized as a
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mixed question of law and fact when it involves ‘the application
of a legal standard to a particular set of facts.’”).
it is one for the jury to resolve.
As such,
Watkins, 775 F.3d at 1288; see
also Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC, 781 F.3d 799, 804–05 (6th
Cir. 2015) (“Ordinarily, it is the court’s job to determine whether
a company has inappropriately classified a worker as an independent
contractor.
However, when the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, reveals that there is a genuine issue
of
material
fact
whether
the
worker
is
an
employee
or
an
independent contractor[] . . . it is the task of the trier of fact
to review the evidence and weigh the factors to decide [that
issue].” (citations omitted)); Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach,
304 F.3d 1144, 1154–55 (11th Cir. 2002) (“It is the jury’s task —
not
[the
judiciary’s]
inferences,
and
—
determine
to
weigh
the
conflicting
credibility
of
evidence
and
witnesses.”).
Consequently, bifurcation is not appropriate.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate (Doc. #274) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 3rd day of
April, 2017.
Copies:
Counsel of Record
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