Schumann et al v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A. et al

Filing 317

OPINION AND ORDER denying 288 Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of 269 Court's Order denying summary judgment on issues of "willfulness" and "good faith." Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 4/12/2017. (KP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
BILLY
SCHUMANN,
DUSTIN
ABRAHAM,
on
behalf
of
themselves
and
others
similarly situated, LAUREN
TIDWELL, JEANIE HAKENEWERT,
STEPHANIE
ALANA
MARIE
BENJAMIN,
CHRISTOPHER
M.
BOURN, DEREK WHITE, LAHOMA
J.
NACHTRAB,
RICHARDO
ROSADO,
LANNETTE
GIBSON,
DANIEL
PENTON,
DENISE
ARMINIO,
OFELIA
BIAGAN,
SHEILA
SMITH,
CELINE
VIDAURRI, CHRISTINA VINAS,
RICARDO ROSADO, PATRICK C.
HARRELL,
RACHEL
GOODE,
JAMIESON
WISHMAN,
PAUL
CALOIAN, STEVEN TODD LITTLE,
JESSICA
LINCOLN,
and
CHRISTOPHER JALACKI,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No: 2:12-cv-347-FtM-29CM

COLLIER ANESTHESIA, P.A., a
Florida corporation, WOLFORD
COLLEGE,
LLC,
a
Florida
limited liability company,
THOMAS
L.
COOK,
an
individual, and LYNDA M.
WATERHOUSE, an individual,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ March 8, 2017,
Motion (Doc. #288) seeking reconsideration of a portion of the
Court’s October 27, 2016 Order (Doc. #269) denying the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs filed a Response

in Opposition (Doc. #293) on March 22, 2017.

For the reasons set

forth below, the motion is denied.
I.
A non-final order may be revised at any time before the entry
of a final judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The decision to grant
a motion for reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the
trial

court

discretion.

and

may

be

granted

to

correct

an

abuse

of

Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v.

Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 806 (11th Cir. 1993). “The courts have
delineated three major grounds justifying reconsideration of such
a decision: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence; (3) the need to correct clear error
or

prevent

manifest

injustice.”

Sussman

v.

Salem,

Saxon

&

Nielsen, P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 694 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
II.
Defendants contend that reconsideration is needed to remedy
the Court’s “clear error” in denying summary judgment on whether
Defendants

“willfully”

violated

the

FLSA

and,

relatedly,

on

whether their “good faith” insulates them from having to pay
Plaintiffs
“willful”

liquidated
if

the

damages.

“employer

A

either

violation
knew

that

of
its

the

FLSA

conduct

is
was

prohibited by the statute or showed reckless disregard about
whether it was.”

Alvarez Perez v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club,

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Inc., 515 F.3d 1150, 1162–63 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing McLaughlin
v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988)); see also Davila
v. Menendez, 717 F.3d 1179, 1184 (11th Cir. 2013) (“An employer
willfully violates the Act if he should inquire as to whether his
actions violate the Act, but fails to do so.”).

The Court denied

summary judgment on the willfulness issue because the record
contains

“facts

from

which

a

reasonable

jury

could

conclude

Defendants either knowingly violated the FLSA or showed reckless
disregard for its provisions.”

(Doc. #269, p. 41.)

That a jury

would decide willfulness “in turn[] render[ed] summary judgment on
the issue of liquidated damages similarly inappropriate.”

(Id.

p. 42 (citing Alvarez Perez, 515 F.3d at 1166).)
According to Defendants, reconsideration of these conclusions
is warranted in light of findings the Court made in a prior Order
(Doc.

#226)

granting

summary

judgment

for

Defendants.

Specifically, Defendants argue that this Court’s previous “finding
that Defendants were ‘right’ under the then-applicable economic
realities test has never been disturbed by the Eleventh Circuit.”
(Doc. #288, p. 2.)

It is, therefore, “clear error (and illogical)

to find that Defendants engaged in willful conduct when the only
reason they have now been found ‘possibly wrong’ is the application
of a newly created legal test” (id.), particularly since “the same
record . . . was before the Court when it issued [the prior
decision].”

(Id. p. 8.)

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But

the

Eleventh

Circuit

vacated

this

Court’s

summary

judgment order in Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d
1199 (11th Cir. 2015).

Moreover, rather than create a “new” test

imposing FLSA liability where it did not previously exist, Schumann
“effectively

tweak[s]

the

Supreme

Court's

considerations

in

evaluating the training program in Portland Terminal 1 to make them
applicable to modern-day internships [for academic credit and
professional certification].” 2
1203

(“[W]e

now

adopt

an

803 F.3d at 1212; see also id. at

application

of Portland

Terminal's

“primary beneficiary” test specifically tailored to account for
the unique qualities of the type of internship at issue in this
case.”).
Additionally,
supplemented
remand.

the

per

this

evidentiary

Court’s
record

invitation,
with

new

the

parties

material

after

That record does not foreclose, as a matter of law, the

possibility that Defendants may have “willfully” violated the
FLSA.

See Davila, 717 F.3d at 1185 (concluding that “[t]he

district court erred when it entered a judgment as a matter of law
that the [defendants] did not willfully violate the minimum wage
laws” where the plaintiff had introduced evidence from which a

1

Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947).

2

As the Court noted when denying summary judgment on the
willfulness issue, the situation would be different if, as a matter
of law, students could never be deemed “employees” under the FLSA
prior to Schumann. (Doc. #269, p. 41, n.44.)

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reasonable jury could have reached the opposite conclusion).

To

the contrary, the record continues to support denial of summary
judgment

on

that

issue

liquidated damages. 3

and,

in

Id. at 1186.

turn,

also

on

the

issue

of

The Court thus finds no basis

for reconsideration.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #288) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 12th day of
April, 2017.

Copies:
Counsel of Record

3

Defendants argue that even if they “had ‘assumed’ that the FLSA
did not apply to [their] students (which they did not), the
Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing & Coding,
Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 833 (11th Cir. 2013) is directly on point
to this issue.” (Doc. #288, p. 10; see also id. p. 11 (“Kaplan
remains valid Eleventh Circuit precedent, and it is directly
applicable to the facts of this case . . . .”).)
Reliance on
Kaplan is misplaced.
As an unpublished case, Kaplan has never
been binding and could not have been treated as such. Moreover,
Kaplan was decided in 2013 - after Plaintiffs had already filed
suit - and thus could not have assured Defendants that the FLSA
did not apply to their students. In any event, after Schumann,
Kaplan does not state the appropriate standard by which to adjudge
whether Defendants knowingly or recklessly violated the FLSA.

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