Santana v. Florida Department of Corrections, et al.,

Filing 33

OPINION AND ORDER The Florida Attorney General is dismissed from this action as a named Respondent; denying re: 1 Petition for writ of habeas corpus. This case is dismissed with prejudice; Petitioner is denied a certificate of appealability; and not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending motions; enter judgment accordingly, and close this case. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 1/22/2015. (SLU)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JOSE SANTANA,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No: 2:12-cv-515-FtM-38CM

SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
and FLORIDA ATTORNEY
GENERAL,
Respondents.1
/
OPINION AND ORDER2
This matter comes before the Court upon a petition for habeas corpus relief filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Jose Santana (“Petitioner), who is presently confined at
the Hardee Correctional Institution in Bowling Green, Florida (Doc. 1).

Petitioner,

There “is generally only one proper respondent to a given prisoner’s habeas
petition.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). This is “the person with the
ability to produce the prisoner’s body before the habeas court.” Id. at 435-36. When the
petitioner is incarcerated and challenges his present physical confinement, “the proper
respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the attorney
general or some other remote supervisory official.” Id. at 436 (citations omitted). In
Florida, the proper respondent in this action is the Secretary of the Florida Department of
Corrections. Therefore, the Florida Attorney General will be dismissed from this action.
1

2

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proceeding pro se, attacks the convictions and sentences entered by the Twentieth
Judicial Circuit Court for Lee County, Florida in case number 08-150450-cf for two counts
of second degree felony murder, one count of armed burglary, and one count of attempted
robbery with a deadly weapon. Id. Respondent filed a response to the petition, and
Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 24; Doc. 28).
Petitioner raises one claim in his petition. He argues that the trial court erred when
it denied his motion to suppress statements made to police in the absence of Miranda3
warnings (Doc. 1 at 3). Upon due consideration of the record, the Court concludes that
the petition must be denied. Because the petition can be resolved on the basis of the
record, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,
474 (2007) (if the record refutes the factual allegations in the petition or otherwise
precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing).
I.

Background
On February 12, 2008, Lee County Sheriff’s Deputy Chester Hinton was on patrol

when he received a “shots fired” call (Ex. 4 at 121). Deputy Hinton drove to the vicinity
where the shots were heard, parked his car, and began walking down the street. Id. at
122. He heard a succession of more shots and then a shotgun blast. He saw Petitioner
run out between two houses at the same time he heard the shots fired. Id. at 123. Deputy
Hinton dove into a ditch for safety when he heard the shots. Id. at 123-24. Petitioner
began to run towards Deputy Hinton who jumped out of the ditch and demanded that
Petitioner show his hands. Id. Deputy Hinton noticed that Petitioner was wearing a bullet

3

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966), the United States Supreme
Court established that custodial interrogation cannot occur before a suspect is warned of
his or her rights against self-incrimination.

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proof vest. Id. at 125. Deputy Hinton was concerned about the possibility of additional
gunfire so he pulled Petitioner into the ditch with him. Id. Deputy Hinton then patted
down Petitioner and found a loaded gun in his back pocket. Id. Petitioner told Deputy
Hinton that his (Petitioner's) friend had been shot and asked Deputy Hinton to help him.
Id. at 127.

Deputy Hinton was aware that there had been a series of grow-house

robberies in the area, so he asked Petitioner whether this was a robbery. Id. Deputy
Hinton testified:
I initially said, I said, is this a grow house robbery, and he said
yes. I said, are you the people in the house or are you the
people robbing the house. He said he was the people
robbing the house. And I said – I tried to get how many
people were with him, and he made reference to his friend
again. And then when another deputy got there to help me,
then we secured him in the car after that initial exchange.
Id. Deputy Hinton said the entire exchange with Petitioner lasted “probably less than a
couple minutes” and that he had not given Petitioner Miranda warnings when Petitioner
was in the ditch because he was “frankly, worried about getting shot.” Id. at 127, 129.
Petitioner was taken to the police station where he was provided with his Miranda
warnings, and he made a statement to the police (Ex. 4).
II.

Procedural History
On March 13, 2008, Petitioner was charged by information with two counts of

second degree felony murder, attempted burglary, and burglary with a firearm (Ex. 1).4
Petitioner sought to suppress from use at trial his confession and any other statements
made to law enforcement officers (Ex. 2). Petitioner argued that the questions asked by

4

Unless otherwise indicated, citations to exhibits are to those filed by Respondent
on May 13, 2013 (Doc. 26).

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Deputy Hinton did not involve questions of officer safety. Id. A hearing was held on the
motion to suppress, and afterwards, it was denied (Ex. 4; Ex. 5).
After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty as charged (Ex. 5). He was sentenced
to life in prison on each second degree murder and armed burglary count and to fifteen
years in prison on the attempted robbery count (Ex. 8; Ex. 9). Petitioner's convictions and
sentences were per curiam affirmed by Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal (Ex. 13);
Santana v. State, 75 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
III.

Governing Legal Principles
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to

a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v.
Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). A state court’s summary rejection of a claim,
even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants
deference. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008).
“Clearly established federal law” consists of the governing legal principles, rather
than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time
the state court issues its decision. White, 134 S.Ct. at 1702; Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S.
70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)).

A decision is

“contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that

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contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a
different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts.
Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16
(2003).
A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of the Supreme
Court’s precedents if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but
applies it to the facts of the petitioner’s case in an objectively unreasonable manner,
Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th
Cir. 2000), or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from
[Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably
refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Bottoson, 234
F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). The unreasonable application inquiry
“requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous,” rather, it must
be “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-77 (2003) (citation
omitted); Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 17-18; Ward, 592 F.3d at 1155. Petitioner must show that
the state court's ruling was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86
(2011)).
Finally, the Supreme Court has stated that “a decision adjudicated on the merits in
a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual
grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the statecourt proceeding[.]” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (dictum). When

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reviewing a claim under § 2254(d), a federal court must bear in mind that any
“determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct[,]”
and the petitioner bears “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear
and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see e.g. Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10,
15-16 (2013); Miller–El, 537 U.S. at 340 (explaining that a federal court can disagree with
a state court’s factual finding and, when guided by AEDPA, “conclude the decision was
unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing
evidence”).
IV.

Discussion
Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by not suppressing his statements to

Deputy Hinton because Hinton failed to advise Petitioner of his Miranda rights prior to
questioning him (Doc. 1 at 7).5 Specifically, Petitioner urges that the questions posed to
him “did not fall within the limited circumstances requirement set out in New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 [1984], as argued by the prosecution and relied upon by the state
court of last resort to support denial of the motion to suppress.” (Doc. 1 at 13). Petitioner
also argues that the “public safety” exception set forth in Quarles did not apply because
there was no “immediate danger” to the police or the public at the time Deputy Hinton
questioned him (Doc. 1 at 13) (citing Allen v. Roe, 305 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2002)).
In Quarles, the Supreme Court created a “public safety” exception to Miranda,
allowing officers to question a suspect before giving a Miranda warning as long as their

In his reply, Petitioner makes clear that he “challenges only the admission of the
pre-Miranda statement involving Officer Hinton[.]” (Doc. 28 at 3) (emphasis in original).
Petitioner does not challenge the admission of the statement he made at the police station
after Miranda warnings were given. Id.
5

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questions are “relate[d] to an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the
public from any immediate danger associated with [a] weapon.” Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659
n. 8. In outlining the bounds of the exception, the Supreme Court stressed that it does
not apply to “questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.” Id.
at 659. Nor does it apply where circumstances require no “immediate action by the
officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.” Id. at 659 n. 8.
The exception “allows officers to question a suspect without first [providing Miranda
warnings] when necessary to protect either themselves or the general public.” United
States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007)).
Upon consideration of the public safety exception set forth in Quarles, this Court
concludes that this is not a situation where the state court’s denial of Petitioner's motion
to suppress was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” White,
134 S. Ct. at 1702. Deputy Hinton’s questions to Petitioner were objectively reasonable
and were not designed to obtain incriminating evidence against Petitioner. Rather, the
questions were designed to ensure that there were no other shooters in the vicinity.
Deputy Hinton heard gunfire from two different guns, and Petitioner voluntarily told Deputy
Hinton that his friend had been shot. Deputy Hinton was aware that there had been grow
house robberies in the vicinity, and considering that only Petitioner had been
apprehended at that point and that Petitioner was wearing a bullet proof vest, it was
reasonable for the deputy to query whether Petitioner was the robber or the victim and to
ask how many people were involved in the shooting.

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Although Deputy Hinton’s

subjective motivation does not affect whether the public safety exception applies, no
evidence adduced at the suppression hearing indicated that Deputy Hinton asked any
questions out of an investigatory motive or in an effort to elicit incriminating responses
from Petitioner.
Petitioner argues that pursuant to Allen v. Roe, 305 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2002), the
public safety exception is limited to situations in which there is “a need to protect from
‘immediate danger’” and that the testimony presented at the suppression hearing “does
not support a showing of an immediate danger to any specific person.” (Doc. 28 at 4-5)
(emphasis in original). Petitioner's reliance on Allen is misplaced. First, contrary to
Petitioner's assertion otherwise, Allen is not a Supreme Court decision. Rather, Allen
was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and is therefore
not “clearly established law” for federal habeas corpus purposes. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1) (noting that “clearly established law” is determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States). Next, Petitioner's argument that Deputy Hinton was no longer in
“immediate danger” after he pulled Petitioner into the ditch and confiscated his gun
misses the point. If there were other shooters in the area, they posed a continuing
immediate danger to either Deputy Hinton or to the public. It was not unreasonable for
the state court to conclude that Deputy Hinton’s questioning of Petitioner was prompted
by a reasonable concern for public safety. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of the
suppression motion was not contrary to clearly established federal law, and Petitioner is
not entitled to federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Any of Petitioner's allegations not specifically addressed herein have been found
to be without merit.

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V.

Certificate of Appealability6
Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner seeking a writ

of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must first issue a certificate of
appealability (“COA”).

“A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
make such a showing, Petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the
district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)),
or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.’” Miller–El, 537 U.S. at 335–36. Petitioner has not made the requisite showing in
these circumstances.
Because Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he is not entitled
to appeal in forma pauperis.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

The Florida Attorney General is DISMISSED from this action as a named

Respondent;
2.

The 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Jose Santana

(Doc. 1) is DENIED;
3.

This case is DISMISSED with prejudice;

6

Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts, the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability
when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” As this Court has determined that
Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief, it must now consider whether Petitioner
is entitled to a certificate of appealability.

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4.

Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability; and

5.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending motions, enter

judgment accordingly, and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 22nd day of January, 2015.

SA: OrlP-4
Copies: Jose Santana
Counsel of Record

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