Smith v. Aaron's, Inc.

Filing 60

OPINION AND ORDER denying 46 Motion for summary judgment; denying as moot 48 Motion to stay; denying as moot 54 Motion for Leave to File Reply in support of motion to stay; denying 56 Motion for Leave to File Reply in support of motion for summary judgment. Defendant shall file a response to the 49 Motion for Conditional Certification within 21 days of this Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 10/25/2013. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JAVARIS SMITH, individually
and on behalf of all those
similarly situated, opt-in
plaintiffs
LEONARD
DIXON
and ANTHONY COLLIER
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:12-cv-551-FtM-29DNF

AARONS, INC.,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This

matter comes

responses:
#46);

(1)

(2)

before

Defendant’s

defendant's

the

Motion

Motion

to

Court
for

on

four

Summary

Stay

motions

Judgment

Proceedings

and

(Doc.

Pending

Determination of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #48); (3)
defendant’s Motion for Leave to File a Reply in Support of Its
Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Determination of Its Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. #54); and (4) Defendant’s Motion For
Leave to File a Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. #56).
motions.

Responses in opposition were filed to all

(Docs. ## 52, 53, 55, 57.)
I.

On July 15, 2013, plaintiff filed an Amended Collective
Action Complaint (Doc. #44) (the Amended Complaint) setting forth

a claim for overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) for hours worked in excess of a forty hour workweek,
plus liquidated damages, fees, and costs.

(Doc. #44.)

Amended

was

Complaint

asserts

that

plaintiff

The

employed

by

defendant as a product technician from May 2008 to October 2011,
and

in

that

capacity

was

“individually

engaged

in

commerce,

transportation, transmission or communication among the several
States.”

(Doc. #44, ¶¶ 7, 15.)

The Amended Complaint further

alleges that plaintiff, and opt-in plaintiffs, “regularly used
the instrumentalities

of

interstate

commerce

while

performing

their work for the Defendant”, and “regularly used the channels
of

commerce

(Doc.

#44,

alleges

while
¶15.)

that

ownership

performing
More

defendant

business

their

work

specifically,
maintained

which

included

a

for

the

Defendant”.

the

Amended

retail

sales

residential

Complaint
and

and

lease
office

furniture, electronics, computers and appliances (Id. at ¶20.)
Plaintiff was hired to, and did in fact, deliver products to
defendant’s customers (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 22.)

At the end of the

deliveries, plaintiff was required to return the delivery vehicle
to defendant’s retail store location (Id. at ¶22.)
Defendant

filed

affirmative defenses.

an

Answer

(Doc.

#45)

which

contained

On September 13, 2013, defendant filed a

2

Motion

for

Summary

Affirmative

Judgment

Defense,

and

a

(Doc.

#46)

request

to

based
stay

on

all

its

Third

proceedings,

including discovery, pending resolution of the motion for summary
judgment.

Defendant

argues

that

it

is

entitled

to

summary

judgment because the Motor Carrier Act exemption in the FLSA bars
plaintiff’s claim for overtime compensation.
plaintiff
Notice

filed

of

a

This

Motion

Action

for
to

an

Order

Potential

On the same day,

Permitting
Opt-In

Supervised

Plaintiffs

and

Conditional Certification of This Case as a Collective Action
(Doc.

#49).

response

The

to

this

Court
Notice

temporarily
and

stayed

Conditional

pending a decision on the motion to stay.

the

filing

Certification

of

a

Motion

(Doc. #51.)

II.
Summary

judgment

is

appropriate

only

when

the

Court

is

satisfied that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

“An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if

the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the nonmoving party.”

Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R”

Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010).
“material”

if

governing law.

it

may

affect

the

outcome

of

the

A fact is
suit

under

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

3

248 (1986).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views
all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007);

Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010).

However,

“if reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from
undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment.”
St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 198
F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Warrior Tombigbee Transp.
Co.

v.

M/V

Nan

Fung,

695

F.2d

1294,

1296-97

(11th

Cir.

1983)(finding summary judgment “may be inappropriate where the
parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the factual
inferences that should be drawn from these facts”)).

“If a

reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more
than

one

introduces

inference
a

genuine

from
issue

the

facts,

of

and

material

should not grant summary judgment.”

if

that

fact, then

inference
the

court

Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ.,

495 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007).
III.
The FLSA requires employers to pay covered employees at a
time-and-a-half rate for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours
per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).

4

The FLSA provides, however, a

number of exemptions to the overtime pay provision.
213(b)(1)-(30).

29 U.S.C. §

These exemptions are construed narrowly against

the employer, and the
exemption applies.

employer has the burden to show that an

Walters v. Am. Coach Lines of Miami, Inc.,

575 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2009); Jeffery v. Sarasota White
Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 594 (11th Cir. 1995).
One such exemption is known as the Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”)
exemption.

The MCA exemption provides that the FLSA overtime pay

requirement “shall not apply with respect to any employee with
respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to
establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to
the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49.”

29 U.S.C. §

213(b)(1). Whether the MCA exemption applies “is dependent on
whether the Secretary has the power to regulate, not on whether
the Secretary has actually exercised such power.”

Baez v. Wells

Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 938 F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (11th Cir.
1991).

See also Abel v. Southern Shuttle Servs., Inc., 631 F.3d

1210, 1213 (11th Cir. 2001); Walters, 575 F.3d at 1226.

The MCA

exemption is triggered if two requirements are met:

(1) the

employee

was

employed

by

a

carrier

“whose

transportation

of

passengers or property by motor vehicle” subjects them to the
jurisdiction of the MCA; and (2) the employee was engaged in

5

activities

“of

a

character

directly

affecting

the

safety

of

operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on the public
highways

of

passengers

or

property

in

interstate

or

commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act.”
§ 782.2(a).

foreign

29 C.F.R.

See Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82; Walters, 575 F.3d at

1227. “The applicability of the motor carrier exemption ‘depends
both on the class to which his employer belongs and on the class
of work involved in the employee's job.’” Walters, 575 F.3d at
1227 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 782.2(a)).
Defendant’s summary judgment motion asserts that plaintiffs
have virtually pled the case into the MCA exemption.

Plaintiffs

disagree, and argues that discovery must be allowed prior to
resolving the issues.

The Court concludes that while a fair

reading of the Amended Complaint comes close to establishing the
MCA exemption, there appear to be disputed facts at least as to
the interstate commerce aspect of the case, which impacts the
applicability of the MCA exemption.

Even if plaintiffs’ factual

allegation in the Amended Complaint that he “individually engaged
in commerce, transportation, transmission or communication among
the several States” (Doc. #44, ¶15) gives way to his contrary
affidavit

that

Florida,

there

he
are

did

no

work-related

potential

facts

6

activities

which

could

outside

of

nonetheless

establish the MCA exemption.

The Court agrees that discovery is

needed in this case prior to resolving this dispositive issue.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #46) is

DENIED.
2.

Defendant's

Motion

to

Stay

Proceedings

Pending

Determination of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #48) is
DENIED as moot.
3.

Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File a Reply in Support

of Its Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Determination of Its
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #54) is DENIED as moot.
4. Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File a Reply in Support
of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #56) is DENIED.
5.

Pursuant to the Court’s September 23, 2013, Order (Doc.

#51), defendant shall file its response to the Motion for an
Order Permitting Supervised Notice of This Action to Potential
Opt-In Plaintiffs and Conditional Certification of This Case as a
Collective Action (Doc. #49) within TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of this
Opinion and Order.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
of October, 2013.

7

25th

day