McCrea v. Traffic Control Products of Florida, Inc.
Filing
47
OPINION and ORDER granting 25 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Opinion and Order for details. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate all pending motions and deadlines as moot, and close the file. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 8/18/2014. (MAW)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
RODNEY MCCREA,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:12-cv-557-FtM-29CM
TRAFFIC CONTROL PRODUCTS OF
FLORIDA, INC.,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. #25) filed on May 30, 2014. Plaintiff filed
a Response (Doc. #36) on June 20, 2014.
With leave of the Court,
Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. #41) on July 14, 2014 and Plaintiff
filed a Surreply (Doc. #42) on July 21, 2014.
For the reasons set
forth below, the motion is granted.
I.
Plaintiff Rodney McCrea (Plaintiff or McCrea) has filed a
four-count Complaint (Doc. #1) against Defendant Traffic Control
Products of Florida, Inc. (Defendant or TCP).
TCP
unlawfully
discriminated
and
McCrea alleges that
retaliated
against
him
in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Section 1981), and the Florida Civil Rights Act
of 1992 (FCRA).
(Id.)
The undisputed facts are as follows.
TCP is a subcontractor in the road construction industry,
performing highway signing, road striping, attenuator installation
and repair, temporary concrete barrier wall installation, handrail
installation, and Maintenance of Traffic (MOT) services.
#25, p. 3; Doc. #36, p. 4.)
(Doc.
Defendant performs work for the
Florida Department of Transportation, as well as various cities
and counties throughout the state.
(Id.)
TCP operates offices in
Fort Myers, Orlando, Gainesville, and Leesburg, Florida.
(Id.)
On August 29, 2007, TCP’s Fort Myers office hired McCrea, who
is African-American, as an MOT Laborer.
#36, p. 5.)
(Doc. #25, p. 5; Doc.
When he was hired, McCrea had no prior experience in
the road construction industry and received an initial hourly wage
of $9.00 per hour.
(Doc. #25, pp. 5-6; Doc. #36 p. 5.)
During
the time he was employed by TCP, his wage increased twice: to $9.75
per hour beginning February 22, 2008 and to $10.00 per hour
beginning June 20, 2008.
(Id.)
During his employment at TCP,
McCrea was directly supervised by John Roberts (Roberts), an
African-American who served as assistant manager of TCP’s Fort
Myers office.
(Doc. #25, p. 6; Doc. #36, p. 6.)
Plaintiff also
fell under the supervision of Joel Hawkins (Hawkins) a Caucasian
who served as manager of the Fort Myers office.
On
general
July
28,
operations
2011,
Tom
manager,
Wasielewski
met
with
(Id.)
(Wasielewski),
Hawkins
to
TCP’s
discuss
the
financial condition of the Fort Myers branch and determined that
2
a reduction in its workforce was required.
(Doc. #25, pp. 7-8;
Doc. #36, pp. 7-9.)
Pursuant to that meeting, two TCP Fort Myers
employees,
Bennett
Nelson
(Williams), were laid off.
(Bennett)
and
Charles
Williams
(Id.)
Subsequent meetings determined that it would be necessary to
terminate a total of five Fort Myers employees.
(Id.)
On August
15, 2011,1 Hawkins authored a memo suggesting the five employees
to be terminated as part of this reduction.
(Id.)
According to
Hawkins, seniority was the sole factor he considered in determining
which employees would be laid off.
(Id.)
McCrea was among the
five employees selected for layoffs and was terminated on August
23, 2011.
(Id.)
Bennett and Williams, the two employees who were
already laid off pursuant to the July 28, 2011 meeting between
Wasielewski and Hawkins, were also on the list.
(Id.)
The
additional two employees selected for layoffs were Jimmy Falligan
(Falligan), and Andrew James (James).
August 17, 2011.
They were terminated on
(Id.)
1
McCrea concedes that the memo is dated August, 15, 2011. (Doc.
#36, p. 7.) Because the memo exists in paper form only, there is
no electronic metadata confirming its date of creation. However,
other than pointing out the lack of metadata and insinuating
misconduct by TCP in this regard (Doc. #36, pp. 3, 9; Doc. #42,
pp. 4-5), McCrea offers no evidence that the memo was misdated,
whether intentionally or unintentionally.
To the contrary,
Hawkins’s uncontroverted testimony explicitly states that he
created the memo on August 15, 2011. (Doc. #29, ¶ 28.)
3
Prior to his termination, on August 18, 2011, McCrea filed a
charge of discrimination (the Charge) with the Lee County Office
of Equal Opportunity.
(Doc. #25, p. 11; Doc. #36, p. 7.)
In the
Charge, McCrea alleged that he was being discriminated against on
the basis of his race because African-American employees were paid
less than those who were not African-American.
(Doc. #36-13.)
The Charge also alleges that McCrea was subject to harassment and
verbal abuse on account of his race, which resulted in a hostile
work environment.2
(Id.)
TCP was notified of the Charge on
August 22, 2011, the day before McCrea was terminated.
(Doc. #25,
p. 21; Doc. 36, p. 7.)
McCrea alleges that TCP’s decision to terminate him (and its
subsequent decision not to rehire him) was made on the basis of
his race and/or served as retaliation for filing the Charge.
McCrea also alleges that he suffered racial discrimination prior
to his termination because he was paid less that TCP’s non-AfricanAmerican employees.
According to McCrea, TCP’s actions violate
Title VII, Section 1981, and the FCRA.
TCP now moves for summary judgment, arguing (1) that McCrea’s
termination was the result of seniority-based layoffs; (2) that
TCP did not rehire McCrea because he never re-applied; and (3)
that its salary determinations were race-neutral.
2
McCrea is not asserting a hostile work environment claim in this
case. (Doc. #36, p. 12 n.1.)
4
II.
Summary
judgment
is
appropriate
only
when
the
Court
is
satisfied that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if
the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party.”
Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us,
Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010).
A fact is “material”
if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views
all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Tana
v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010).
However, “if
reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from
undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment.”
St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 198
F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Warrior Tombigbee Transp.
Co.
v.
M/V
Nan
Fung,
695
F.2d
1294,
1296-97
(11th
Cir.
1983)(finding summary judgment “may be inappropriate where the
parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the factual
inferences that should be drawn from these facts”)).
“If a
reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more
than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces
5
a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant
summary judgment.”
Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 495 F.3d 1306,
1315 (11th Cir. 2007).
III.
A.
McCrae’s Discrimination Claims (Counts I, III, And IV)
McCrea alleges that TCP violated Title VII, Section 1981, and
the FCRA by treating him less favorably than non-African-American
employees.
Specifically, McCrea contends (1) that a Hispanic TCP
employee received higher wages than he did despite having the same,
or similar, job responsibilities; and (2) that following his
termination, TCP rehired a Hispanic former employee instead of
McCrea despite the fact that McCrea had more seniority.
Discrimination
claims,
whether
brought
under
Title
VII,
Section 1981, or the FCRA, are subject to the same standards of
proof and employ the same analytical framework.
Bryant v. Jones,
575 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) (Title VII and Section 1981 claims
employ identical analyses); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826,
834 (11th Cir. 2007) (FCRA is construed in accordance with Title
VII).
Accordingly,
to
establish
a
prima
facie
case
of
discrimination based upon disparate treatment, a plaintiff must
show that: “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was
subjected to adverse employment action; (3) his employer treated
similarly situated employees outside of his class more favorably;
6
and (4) he was qualified to do the job.” Hall v. Dekalb County,
503 F. App’x 781, 787 (11th Cir. 2013).
When the alleged adverse employment action is a claim of
disparate pay, the prima facie case boils down to a showing that
the plaintiff “occupies a position similar to that of a higher
paid employee who is not a member of [his] protected class.”
Drake-Sims v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of Alabama, Inc.,
330 F. App'x 795, 803 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Crawford v.
Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974-75 (11th Cir. 2008)). “If the plaintiff
presents a prima facie case, the employer must offer a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
If
the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show
that
the
stated
reason
is
a
mere
pretext
for
unlawful
discrimination.” Hall, 503 F. App’x at 787.
1.
Prima Facie Case – Disparate Pay
To satisfy the prima facie case for his disparate pay claim,
McCrea must demonstrate that he occupied a position similar to
that of a higher paid employee who is not African-American. DrakeSims, 300 F. App’x at 803.
In support of this claim, McCrea
compares his compensation to that of Bennett.3
3
Prior to his
In its motion, TCP also argues that McCrea’s discrimination
claims are time-barred. However, that argument is premised upon
McCrea’s anticipated use of certain other TCP employees as
comparators.
As McCrea no longer relies on those individuals’
alleged preferential treatment, the Court need not address TCP’s
arguments that such claims are untimely.
7
employment with TCP, Bennett, who is Hispanic,4 had no prior
experience in the field (Doc. #36-2, ¶ 11), and TCP does not
contest McCrea’s assertion that he and Bennett performed similar
job functions.
Bennett was hired at a wage of $12.00 per hour in
December 2010 and remained at that wage until he was terminated in
July 2011 as part of the lay-offs that also impacted McCrea.
at ¶ 4.)
(Id.
During the time Bennett was employed by TCP, McCrea
earned only $10.00 per hour.
(Doc. #25, p. 6; Doc. #36 p. 5.)
Accordingly, McCrea has presented a prima facie case.
2.
Prima Facie Case – Failure To Rehire
a.
Membership In A Protected Class
McCrae is African-American, and therefore indisputably a
member of a protected class.
See, e.g., Maddox-Jones v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 448 F. App'x 17, 20 (11th Cir. 2011).
Accordingly, this element of the prima facie case is satisfied.
b.
An Adverse Employment Action
McCrea alleges that TCP’s failure to rehire5 him was an
adverse employment action.
“An employer's failure to recall or
4
TCP argues that because McCrea has previously identified Bennett
as African-American, McCrea is precluded from alleging that
Bennett is not a member of McCrea’s protected class.
However,
what matters for the purposes of McCrea’s prima facie case is
whether or not Bennett is African-American, not McCrea’s
perception of Bennett’s race.
Bennett’s testimony explicitly
states that he is Hispanic. (Doc. #36-2.)
5
The Court notes that McCrea acknowledges that he is currently
employed by TCP. (Doc. #36, p. 24 n.6 (“McCrea was offered and did
accept an unconditional offer of reinstatement . . . .”).)
8
rehire an employee is undoubtedly an adverse employment action
where the employee reapplied for the position after termination.”
Jones v. Alabama Power Co., 282 F. App'x 780, 785 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quotation omitted).
“If the employer uses formal procedures to
announce positions and identify candidates, the plaintiff cannot
make out a prima facie case unless he shows that he applied for
the position.”
Id.
Here, McCrae acknowledges that he did not
reapply for a position at TCP.
(Doc. #42, p. 6.)
However, there
is no evidence in the record concerning the means by which TCP
announced the position and identified candidates.
Absent such
evidence, the Court cannot conclude that McCrea’s failure to
reapply
for
his
position
is
fatal
to
his
prima
facie
case.
Accordingly, this element of the prima facie case is satisfied.
c.
A Similarly-Situated Individual Treated Differently
This element of the prima facie case requires McCrea to
identify similarly-situated employees not within his protected
class who did not suffer the same negative employment action as
McCrea.
“To be an adequate comparator, the preferentially treated
individual
from
outside
plaintiff's
protected
class
must
be
similarly situated to the plaintiff in all relevant respects. If
this is not the case, the different application of workplace rules
does not constitute illegal discrimination.”
Brown v. Sch. Bd. of
Accordingly, McCrea’s allegation that TCP failed to rehire him is,
in actuality, a claim that TCP did not rehire him soon enough.
9
Orange Cnty., Florida, 459 F. App'x 817, 819 (11th Cir. 2012).
“The comparator must be nearly identical to the plaintiff to
prevent courts from second-guessing a reasonable decision by the
employer.”
Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091
(11th Cir. 2004).
Here, McCrea once again points to Bennett as a comparator.
As explained above, Bennett is not a member of McCrea’s protected
class
and
respects.
more
was
similarly-situated
to
McCrea
in
all
relevant
Further, TCP does not contest that it treated Bennett
favorably
by
rehiring
him
prior
to
rehiring
McCrea.
Accordingly, this element of the prima facie case is satisfied. 6
d.
A Qualified Individual
To satisfy the final element of his prima facie case, McCrae
must show that he satisfied TCP’s objective qualifications for
employment.
McCrae alleges, and TCP does not contest, that McCrae
was qualified for his position.
Therefore, McCrae has established
this element of his prima facie case.
Accordingly, as McCrae has established prima facie cases for
his disparate pay and failure to rehire claims, the burden now
6
McCrea also hints that his termination was discriminatory. (Doc.
#36, p. 16.)
However, McCrea never follows-through with this
allegation and never identifies a non-African-American employee
who was not laid off despite being less senior than McCrea.
Bennett cannot serve as a comparator for such a claim because he
was laid off at the same time as McCrea.
Accordingly, to the
extent McCrea intends to bring such a claim, it must be dismissed
for failure to satisfy this element of the prima facie case.
10
shifts
to
TCP
to
provide
non-discriminatory
reasons
for
its
treatment of McCrea.
3.
TCP’s Non-Discriminatory Reasons For Its
Decisions and McCrae’s Allegations Of Pretext
Employment
As explained above, McCrae can establish prima facie cases of
discrimination.
Nevertheless, TCP may be entitled to summary
judgment if it “articulate[s] a legitimate reason for the action
it took against the employee. Once such a reason is articulated,
the employee must show that the employer's proffered reason for
the adverse action is pretextual.” Bailey v. City of Daytona Beach
Shores, 560 F. App’x 867, 871 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotations and
citations omitted).
TCP
argues
that
McCrea’s
termination
was
the
result
of
seniority-based layoffs and that McCrea was not rehired because he
did not reapply.
(Doc. #25, pp. 7-8; Doc. #41, pp. 5-6).
assertions have support in the record.
articulated
McCrea.
non-discriminatory
reasons
Both
Accordingly, TCP has
for
its
treatment
of
Therefore, the burden shifts back to McCrae, who must
demonstrate
that
TCP’s
stated
reasons
were
mere
pretext
for
unlawful discrimination.
A plaintiff can demonstrate pretext “by identifying such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or
contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for
its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy
of credence.”
Ritchie v. Indus. Steel, Inc., 426 F. App'x 867,
11
872 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106
F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997).
Additionally, a plaintiff can
“show pretext by demonstrating that the employer did not follow
its
normal
decision.
keep
in
procedures”
Id.
mind
in
reaching
its
adverse
employment
When analyzing a claim of pretext, courts must
that
they
“do
not
sit
as
a
‘super-personnel
department,’ and it is not [their] role to second-guess the wisdom
of an employer's business decisions.”
Developers,
Inc.,
610
F.3d
1253,
Alvarez v. Royal Atl.
1266
(11th
Cir.
2010).
Accordingly, “[c]onclusory allegations of discrimination, without
more, are not sufficient to raise an inference of pretext or
intentional discrimination where an employer has offered extensive
evidence
actions.”
of
legitimate,
non-discriminatory
reasons
for
its
Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376
(11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Isenbergh v. Knight–Ridder Newspaper
Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 443–44 (11th Cir. 1996)).
a.
Pretext – Disparate Pay
On the issue of disparate pay, McCrea’s sole argument is that
TCP’s explanation that Bennett’s pay rate was the result of an
administrative
error
is
unworthy
of
credence
because
it
is
inconsistent with TCP’s assertion that it closely evaluates an
applicant’s prior work experience, the prevailing labor market,
and other relevant factors to determine what to pay each new hire.
(Doc. #27, ¶¶ 11-13.)
However, an assertion that one pays careful
12
attention to a particular task is not the same as an assertion
that mistakes are never made.
Nevertheless, to the extent TCP’s
two statements could be considered contradictory, such a minor
inconsistency would not permit a reasonable jury to conclude that
TCP’s proffered reason was pretext for racial discrimination.
Moreover, despite having access to TCP’s pay records, McCrea
identifies no similar errors in favor of Caucasians or Hispanics.
To the contrary, TCP’s records indicate that TCP corrected its
error by reducing Bennett’s pay to $10.00 per hour (the same rate
McCrea was earning at the time of his layoff) when Bennett was
rehired in 2012.
(Doc. #27-5.)
Accordingly, the only relevant
evidence in the record supports TCP’s proffered explanation that
Bennett’s initial pay rate was an administrative error.
In sum,
McCrea has not provided evidence sufficient to allow a jury to
infer
that
TCP’s
nondiscriminatory
explanation
for
disparate pay was pretext for racial discrimination.
McCrea’s
Therefore,
TCP is entitled to summary judgment on McCrea’s disparate pay
claim.
b.
Pretext – Failure To Rehire
As explained above, there is no evidence in the record
concerning
the
means
by
which
TCP
identifies candidates for rehiring.
announces
positions
and
For his part, McCrea argues
that he did not reapply because he was unaware that a position at
TCP was available.
(Doc. #42, p. 6.)
13
Therefore, for the purposes
of TCP’s motion, the Court will analyze TCP’s decision to rehire
Bennett
under
individuals
the
were
assumption
potential
Bennett over McCrea.
that
TCP
candidates
was
and
aware
TCP
that
actively
both
chose
Accordingly, McCrea can show pretext by
providing evidence that would allow a jury to infer that TCP’s
preference for Bennett over McCrea was the product of unlawful
racial discrimination.
It is undisputed that McCrea was senior to Bennett at TCP.
(Doc. #27-7, pp. 3, 46.)
Accordingly, TCP could not have based
its rehiring decision on seniority alone.
According to McCrea,
this is evidence of pretext because it is inconsistent with TCP’s
stated policy of conducting layoffs on the basis of seniority.
However, McCrea has offered no evidence that TCP’s policy (whether
stated or unstated) was to rehire based upon seniority.
To the
contrary, TCP creates Termination Reports (Reports) which contain
an evaluation of each employee’s performance and indicates whether
or not TCP would consider rehiring that employee.
(Doc. #27-7.)
This is evidence that TCP’s rehiring decisions were based, at least
in part, on criteria other than seniority.
Thus, as layoffs and
rehiring are separate employment decisions, the mere fact that TCP
employed different criteria for each is not evidence of pretext.
Additionally, a comparison of Bennett’s and McCrea’s Reports
demonstrates that TCP had reason to prefer Bennett to McCrea due
to each individual’s job performance. Bennett received a decidedly
14
more favorable evaluation.
(Doc. #27-7, pp. 3, 46.)
Further,
Bennett’s Report states that he “has been a good employee who has
always performed his tasks,” while McCrea’s contains no similar
comments.
(Id.)
Likewise, Bennett’s Report notes that he is
eligible for rehire “without reservation,” while McCrea’s states
that he is eligible “with some reservation.”
(Id.)
McCrea argues
that these discrepancies demonstrate pretext because they show
that
TCP
However,
employees
treated
McCrea
were,
reservation.
African-Americans
ignores
like
that
and
numerous
Bennett,
slated
Hispanics
other
for
unequally.
African-American
rehire
without
(Doc. #26, pp. 36-37, 108, 110, 162; Doc. #27-7, pp.
8, 23, 34, 39.)
This strongly suggests that race was not a factor
in TCP’s creation of the Reports or its rehiring decisions.
Thus,
the only relevant evidence in the record supports a conclusion
that TCP’s rehiring decisions were race-neutral.
Accordingly, McCrea has not provided evidence sufficient to
allow a jury to conclude that TCP’s decision to rehire Bennett was
anything
judgment.
but
a
non-discriminatory
exercise
of
its
business
Therefore, TCP is entitled to summary judgment on
McCrea’s failure to rehire claim.
B.
McCrae’s Title VII Retaliation Claim (Count II)
In addition to prohibiting employment discrimination in and
of itself, Title VII also prohibits retaliation against an employee
who opposed an unlawful employment practice or “made a charge,
15
testified,
assisted,
or
participated
in
any
manner”
in
investigation concerning alleged violations of Title VII.
U.S.C. § 20003-3(a).
an
42
McCrae alleges that his termination was
impermissible retaliation for filing the Charge.
To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must
show that: “(1) she engaged in an activity protected under Title
VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there
was a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.”
Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961,
970 (11th Cir. 2008).
Here, McCrae cannot satisfy the third prong of his prima facie
case.
McCrae alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for
filing the Charge.
McCrae is correct that his August 23, 2011
termination date post-dates TCP’s receipt of the Charge on August
22nd.
(Doc. #25, p. 21; Doc. 36, p. 7.)
However, it is undisputed
that on August 15, 2011 Hawkins authored the memo selecting McCrae
as one of the five individuals subject to layoffs.
7-8; Doc. #36, pp. 7-9.)
(Doc. #25, pp.
Thus, it is undisputed that by the time
TCP received notice of the Charge, TCP had already decided to lay
off McCrea.
therefore,
Logically, an effect cannot precede its cause and,
McCrae
cannot
establish
the
between the Charge and his termination.
necessary
causal
link
Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate
Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Drago
v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n a retaliation
16
case, when an employer contemplates an adverse employment action
before
an
proximity
employee
between
engages
the
in
protected
protected
activity
activity,
and
the
temporal
subsequent
adverse employment action does not suffice to show causation.”).
Accordingly, TCP is entitled to summary judgment on McCrea’s
Title VII retaliation claim.
To the extent that McCrea is also alleging that TCP’s failure
to rehire him gives rise to a separate retaliation claim,7 that
claim also fails because, for the reasons set forth above, McCrea
has not provided any evidence that TCP’s decision to rehire Bennett
was anything but a permissible exercise of its business judgment.
See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th
Cir. 2001) (“The ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the reason provided by the employer is a pretext
for prohibited, retaliatory conduct remains on the plaintiff.”)
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Defendant’s
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
(Doc.
#25)
is
GRANTED, judgment is entered in favor of Defendant, and Plaintiff
shall take nothing.
The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly,
7
Neither the Complaint nor McCrea’s voluminous briefing makes
clear which alleged adverse employment actions apply to which
theories of recovery.
17
terminate all pending motions and deadlines as moot, and close the
file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
August, 2014.
Copies: Counsel of record
18
18th
day of
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