Schutt v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 19

OPINION AND ORDER affirming the decision of the Commissioner. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Douglas N. Frazier on 7/15/2014. (brh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
PETER SCHUTT,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:13-cv-370-FtM-DNF

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) filed on May 16, 2013.
Plaintiff, Peter Schutt seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his claim for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits.

The Commissioner filed the Transcript of the proceedings (hereinafter

referred to as “Tr.” followed by the appropriate page number), and the parties filed legal
memoranda in support of their positions. For the reasons set out herein, the decision of the
Commissioner is affirmed pursuant to §205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
I. Social Security Act Eligibility, the ALJ Decision, and Standard of Review
A. Eligibility
The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months. 42 U.S.C. §§416(i), 423(d)(1)(A), 1382(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505, 416.905. The
impairment must be severe, making the claimant unable to do his previous work, or any other
substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy.

42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(2),

1382(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505 - 404.1511, 416.905 - 416.911. Plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion through step four, while at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, n.5 (1987).
B. Procedural History
On December 9, 2009, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits
alleging a disability onset date of October 1, 2008. (Tr. p. 137-140, 149-152). Plaintiff’s
application was denied initially on March 2, 2010, and denied upon reconsideration on August 26,
2010. (Tr. p. 80-83, 85-86). A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Marcus Christ
(“ALJ”) on October 17, 2011. (Tr. p. 38-72).

The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on

November 8, 2011. (Tr. p. 23-31). On March 19, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review. (Tr. p. 1-6).

The Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) in the United States

District Court on May 16, 2013. This case is now ripe for review. The parties consented to
proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings. (Doc. 16).
C. Summary of the ALJ’s Decision
An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if a claimant
has proven that he is disabled. Packer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 542 F. App’x 890, 891 (11th Cir.
2013) (citing Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999)). An ALJ must determine
whether the claimant (1) is performing substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment;
(3) has a severe impairment that meets or equals an impairment specifically listed in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) can perform his past relevant work; and (5) can perform other
work of the sort found in the national economy. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-40 (11th
Cir. 2004). The claimant has the burden of proof through step four and then the burden shifts to

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the Commissioner at step five. Hines-Sharp v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 511 F. App’x 913, 915 n.2
(11th Cir. 2013).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act on December 31, 2010. (Tr. p. 25). At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from October 1, 2008, the
alleged onset date and December 31, 2010, the date last insured. (Tr. p. 25). At step two, the ALJ
found that the Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: back disorder and arthritis
of the shoulder (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c). (Tr. p. 25). At step three, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals
the severity of any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20
C.F.R. 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526). (Tr. p. 27). At step 4, the ALJ determined that the
Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work. (Tr. p. 27). He
further found that Plaintiff
can lift and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and stand,
walk, and sit for 6 hours each in an 8-hour work day. The claimant should not
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and
stairs, crouch, kneel, and crawl. The claimant can occasionally overhead reach
with his right arm and perform frequent fine manipulation. The claimant should
avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected heights.

Tr. p. 27. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could return to his past relevant work as a security
guard and this work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by
Plaintiff’s RFC. (Tr. p. 30).
D. Standard of Review
The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standard, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether

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the findings are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390
(1971). The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. §405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla; i.e., the evidence must do more
than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence
as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67
F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995), citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982)
and Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401.
Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court
will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if
the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision.
Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356,
1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account
evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord, Lowery
v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (court must scrutinize the entire record to determine
reasonableness of factual findings).
II. Analysis
Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal. As stated by Plaintiff, they are:
1) Whether the ALJ properly considered the opinion of orthopedist. Dr. Ahearn. given
that the ALJ is required to state with particularity when accepting or rejecting medical
opinions and provide reasons for accepting or rejecting them; given that the ALJ gave
“some weight” to Dr. Ahearn's opinion as it is generally consistent with the record and
otherwise provided no reason for accepting or rejecting it; and given that the ALJ then

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failed to provide any reasons for his failure to include Dr. Ahearn's standing and sitting
limitations in the Plaintiff’s RFC.
2) Whether the ALJ properly found that the Plaintiff can return to his past relevant work
as a “security guard” given that the exertional requirement of this work (lifting 100
pounds or more) exceeded the Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity ("RFC") (lifting
no more than 20 pounds); given that the ALJ may not bifurcate past relevant work
according to its least demanding function when determining whether the individual
could perform it as generally performed; and given that Commissioner's own policies
instruct ALJ's not to evaluate “composite work” at step four under the “generally
performed” test.
3) Whether the ALJ properly determined that the Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a
“security guard” was in fact past relevant work, given that the Plaintiff only earned
$1,702.78 while working there.
A. Consideration of Dr. Ahearn’s Medical Opinion
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to explain with particularity the weight he gave
to the opinion of Dr. Ahearn. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to include
the following limitations found by Dr. Ahearn in Plaintiff’s RFC: unable to stand for more than 30
minutes at a time, unable to perform work requiring stooping and bending, and unable to perform
work that requires sitting such as data entry station or a work station which would then require a
sit/stand option. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ considered Dr. Ahearn’s opinion and
gave it some weight, but decided that some of the limitations found by Dr. Ahearn were not
consistent with the evidence of record.

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Mason Ahearn, M.D. of Bay Orthopaedic Associations was an examining state agency
physician. (Tr. p. 422). Dr. Ahearn reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and conducted a
physical examination of Plaintiff. (Tr. p. 422). Dr. Ahearn noted that Plaintiff complained of
constant low back pain, intermittent right sciatica, and pain and arthritis in his right shoulder and
hands. (Tr. p. 422). Dr. Ahearn noted that Plaintiff lives by himself and is able to cook, clean, do
light yard work, go to church, walk his two dogs, and socialize with friends. (Tr. p. 422). Dr.
Ahearn noted that Plaintiff drives without a handicapped sticker, and pushes a cart at Wal-Mart
and Food Lion. (Tr. p. 422). Dr. Ahearn noted that Plaintiff spends his day, taking care of his two
dogs, taking them for long walks twice daily, and doing some fishing. (Tr. p. 422).
Dr. Ahearn found that Plaintiff had a normal gait and stance. (Tr. p. 423). He was able
to get on and off the examining table rapidly, walked on heels and toes without difficulty, did
tandem and heel-toe gait, could do a full squat, had full cervical range of motion, and had full
range in all joints with the exception of his right shoulder. (Tr. p. 423). Plaintiff’s right shoulder
abducted 120 degrees and forward flexed 120 degrees with pain. (Tr. p. 421, 423). Dr. Ahearn
found that the right shoulder had crepitation on internal and external rotation at 90 degrees
abduction. (Tr. p. 423).
Dr. Ahearn found no tenderness in the AC joint, and that Plaintiff had normal gross
mechanical dexterity on the JMAR and good fine mechanical dexterity. (Tr. p. 423). Dr. Ahearn
noted that Plaintiff abducted and adducted his fingers, made and unmade his fists, opposed
fingertips to thumb tips in sequence and thumb tips to hypothenar eminences rapidly. (Tr. p. 423).
Plaintiff had lumbar forward flexion to fingertips even with ankles, a good reversal of lumbar
curve on extension, good lateral rotational bending, and a well-healed midline low lumbar
laminectomy scar. (T. p. 423). Dr. Ahearn ordered x-rays of the lumbar spine and found very

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definite degenerative changes with disc space narrowing of the L5-S1 and L4-5 and some lipping
in the lumbar level above. (Tr. p. 423). Dr. Ahearn concluded that Plaintiff had very definite
lumbar arthritic and discogenic chronic disease despite a prior laminectomy. (Tr. p. 423). He
determined that Plaintiff has evidence of arthritis in his right shoulder with very mild problems in
his hand. Dr. Ahearn concluded that Plaintiff
cannot do any job involving standing more than 30 minutes at a time, stooping,
bending, single lifting over 25 pounds, repetitive lifting, working with catwalks or
ladders, repeated flights of stairs. He cannot sit at a work station or a data entry
station because of his lumbar problem. Given these restrictions, this patient is
capable of light gainful activity. He could work as a telephone receptionist, he
could do light office work with frequent changes of position. He could [do] library
work. He could [do] light delivery work involving frequent changes of driving
position.

(Tr. p. 423-24).
The ALJ included some of Dr. Ahearn’s findings in his Decision. (Tr. p. 28). The ALJ
noted that Dr. Ahearn found Plaintiff to have a normal gait and station; was able to get on and off
the examination table rapidly; could walk on his heels and toes without difficulty; did tandem and
heel-toe gait; was able to flex his lumbar forward where his fingertips were even with his ankles;
had negative straight leg test on the left; was only mildly positive on the right leg test; and had a
full range of motion in his lower extremities with no musculature atrophy or weakness. (Tr. p. 28).
The ALJ considered Dr. Ahearn’s opinion and stated that Dr. Ahearn concluded that Plaintiff was
able to perform a range of light work with some limitations. (Tr. p. 29). The ALJ concluded that
“[a]s this opinion is generally consistent with the overall evidence of record and supported by a
physical examination, it is accorded some weight.” (Tr. p. 29).

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An ALJ is required to state with particularity the weight he gives to the medical opinions
of record and the reasons why. Shaw v. Astrue, 392 F. App’x 684, 686 (11th Cir. 2010) 1, (citing
Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987)), See also, McCloud v. Barnhart, 166 F.
App’x 410, 418-19 (11th Cir. 2006). Without such a statement, the reviewing court is unable to
determine whether the decision of the Commissioner was supported by substantial evidence. Id.
(citation omitted). “Generally, the opinions of examining or treating physicians are given more
weight than non-examining or non-treating physicians unless ‘good cause’ is shown. Poellnitz v.
Astrue, 349 F. App’x 500, 502 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(d)(1), (2), (5); and
Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)). A doctor’s opinion may be discredited
when it is contrary to or unsupported by the evidence of record, or the opinion is inconsistent with
the doctor’s own medical records. Id. (citing Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th
Cir. 2004)). “Where an ALJ articulates specific reasons for failing to accord the opinion of a
treating or examining physician controlling weight and those reasons are supported by substantial
evidence, there is no reversible error.” Id. (citing Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th
Cir. 2005)).
The ALJ set forth some but not all of the findings of Dr. Ahearn. They both agreed that
Plaintiff was able to perform light work with limitations. The ALJ found that Dr. Ahearn’s opinion
was “generally consistent with the overall evidence of record and supported by a physical
examination” and accorded it “some weight.” (Tr. p. 29). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff
could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, crouch,

1 Unpublished opinions may be cited as persuasive on a particular point. The Court does not rely on
unpublished opinions as precedent. Citation to unpublished opinions on or after January 1, 2007 is expressly
permitted under Rule 32.1, Fed. R. App. P. Unpublished opinions may be cited as persuasive authority pursuant to
the Eleventh Circuit Rules. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

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kneel, and crawl; could occasionally reach overhead with his right arm; could perform frequent
find manipulation; and must avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected heights.
Dr. Ahearn found additional work limitations. Some of these additional limitations are
that Plaintiff was unable to perform work that required stooping and bending. The ALJ’s RFC did
limit Plaintiff to only occasionally crouching, kneeling and crawling which basically encompass
Dr. Ahearn’s limitations as to stooping and bending. Further, Dr. Ahearn’s own examination
showed that Plaintiff “did a full squat” and “had lumbar forward flexion to fingertips even with
ankles. A good reversal of lumbar curve on extension. He had similar good lateral rotational
bending.” (Tr. p. 423). Dr. Ahearn’s own examination conflicts with Dr. Ahearn’s limitation of
Plaintiff being unable to perform work that required stooping and bending. Therefore, the Court
determines that the ALJ’s RFC generally included the limitations of stooping and bending, and
restricted these activities to occasionally which is consistent with Dr. Ahearn’s own examination.
The Court finds that the ALJ did not err in failing to include limitations of stooping and bending.
Dr. Ahearn limited Plaintiff to jobs that did not require standing for more than 30 minutes
at a time, and also limited Plaintiff from jobs that include sitting at a work station or data entry
station, and determined Plaintiff would need a sit/stand option.

The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s

testimony that he was able sit for two hours at a time and was able to stand for only 30 to 40
minutes at a time before needing a break. (Tr. p. 28). Immediately after summarizing this
testimony, the ALJ stated that after careful consideration of the evidence he did not find that
Plaintiff was credible.
The ALJ reviewed the medical records including Dr. Ahearn’s records and Plaintiff’s
chiropractor, Christopher Garner, D.C.’s records. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had a gap in
treatment with his primary care physician for almost a year, and that Plaintiff’s back pain was

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relieved by his visits to a chiropractor. (Tr. p. 28). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was not
prescribed prescription pain medication and used Advil, which helped. (Tr. p. 28). Additionally,
the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s daily activities and determined that Plaintiff had a “fairly active and
varied lifestyle and [these activities] are not indicative of a significant restriction of activities.”
(Tr. p. 29). Plaintiff lives alone and his daily activities include cooking cleaning, light yard work,
driving, shopping, and socializing. (Tr. p. 29). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff takes his dogs on long
walks twice a day, fishes occasionally, exercises regularly by walking and the ALJ noted Plaintiff
also did weight lifting. (Tr. p. 29). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living are
not consistent with Plaintiff’s statements as to his limitations, but are consistent with the RFC set
forth by the ALJ.
Plaintiff’s activities of daily living are also not consistent with Dr. Ahearn’s additional
limitations of jobs that do not require standing for more than 30 minutes at a time, jobs that include
sitting at a work station or data entry station, and jobs that require a sit/stand option. Plaintiff is
able to perform all of his activities of daily living, take long walks twice a day with his dogs, and
exercise regularly. The Court also took into account that Plaintiff had a year-long gap in seeking
medical attention from his primary care physician, and was not prescribed prescription pain
medication. The ALJ’s Decision included specific reasons to afford some weight to Dr. Ahearn’s
opinions, but not great weight, and the ALJ’s decision to afford Dr. Ahearn’s opinions some weight
is supported by substantial evidence of record.

Some of Dr. Ahearn’s limitations are not

completely consistent with his own medical examination. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in
affording Dr. Ahearn’s opinion some weight.

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B.

Return to Past Relevant Work

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that he could return to his past relevant work
as a security guard. Plaintiff argues that his past job as a security guard, as he actually performed
it, required Plaintiff to lift 100 pounds or more, and the ALJ limited Plaintiff to lifting up to 20
pounds. Further, Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff’s job as a security guard is actually a composite
job that included not only security guard requirements, but also the ability to unload delivery trucks
and to set up tables and chairs. The Commissioner asserts that Plaintiff described his past relevant
work as a security guard, and the vocational expert and the ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s past
relevant work to be as a security guard with a few additional duties such as setting up tables and
receiving deliveries. Further, the Commissioner argues that Plaintiff is able to return to his past
relevant work as a security guard as it is generally performed in the national economy, and that his
job was not a composite job.
A plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he can no longer perform his past relevant
work as he actually performed it, or as it is performed in the general economy. Waldrop v.
Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 379 F. App’x 948, 953 (11th Cir. 2010). (citing Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d
1291, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 1986). Even though a plaintiff has the burden of showing he can no
longer perform his past relevant work, the Commissioner has the obligation to develop a full and
fair record. Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). To
develop a full and fair record, an ALJ must consider all of the duties of that past relevant work and
evaluate a plaintiff’s ability to perform the past relevant work in spite of the impairments. Levie
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 514 F. App’x 829, 831 (11th Cir. 2013). SSR 82-62 requires the ALJ to
make the “following specific findings of fact: 1. A finding of fact as to the individual's RFC. 2. A

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finding of fact as to the physical and mental demands of the past job/occupation. 3. A finding of
fact that the individual's RFC would permit a return to his or her past job or occupation.” SSR
82-62, 1982 WL 31386 *4 (1982). 2 A plaintiff is the primary source for vocational documents,
and “statements by the claimant regarding past work are generally sufficient for determining the
skill level; exertional demands and nonexertional demands of such work.” Id. at *3. A plaintiff
must show that he is not “’able to perform his past kind of work, not that he merely [is] unable to
perform a specific job he held in the past.’” Douglas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App’x 72
(11th Cir. 2012) (citing Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 1986)).
The ALJ solicited the testimony of a Vocational Expert at the hearing.

The ALJ

summarized Plaintiff’s past work. (Tr. p. 62-4). The Vocational Expert noted that Plaintiff
worked as a security guard at the Medieval Times for a period of approximately a year. (Tr. p.
63-4). The Vocational Expert noted that a security guard job is considered light work, but as
Plaintiff actually performed it including setting up table and hauling things, would not fall within
the parameters of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) definition of light. (Tr. p. 64).
The Vocational Expert did not consider these additional duties to fall within the definition of a
composite job, and determined Plaintiff could return to his past relevant work as a security guard
as generally performed in the national economy.
A composite job is “one that has significant elements of two or more occupations and, as
such, has no counterpart in the DOT. Paxton v. Colvin, 2013 WL 1909609, *4 (M.D. Fla. May
8, 2013). In this case, the ALJ relied on the Vocational Expert to determine Plaintiff’s past

2 “Social

Security Rulings are agency rulings published under the Commissioner’s
authority and are binding on all components of the Administration. [citation omitted]. Even
though the rulings are not binding on us, we should nonetheless accord the rulings great respect
and deference . . .” Klawinski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 772, 775 (11th Cir. 2010).

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relevant work, and the Vocational Expert considered the testimony of Plaintiff and the information
in the record to determine that Plaintiff’s past relevant work was as a security guard, DOT 372.667030 with a few additional duties. Therefore, the Court determines that the ALJ did not err in
determining that Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a security guard was not a composite job.

C. Earnings Records
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in determining that Plaintiff’s work as a security guard
was substantial gainful employment because his earnings showed that he only earned $1,702.78
while performing this job.

To determine if a plaintiff has engaged in substantial gainful

employment, the commissioner considers the nature of the work, how well a plaintiff performed,
how much time a plaintiff spent at work, and whether the work was done under special conditions
or in a sheltered workshop. Green v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., ___ F. App’x ____, 2014 WL 503557,
*2 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2014). A primary consideration for substantial gainful employment is a
plaintiff’s earnings from the work. Id. “If a claimant receives wages exceeding those set out in
an earnings guidelines table, a presumption arises that she was engaged in substantial gainful
activity during that period.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§404.1574(b)(2); 416.974(b)(2) and Johnson
v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 596, 598 (11th Cir. 1991).
In this case, the earnings records included in the Transcript only showed that Plaintiff
earned $1,702.78 as a security guard with Medieval Times. (Tr. p. 216). However, Plaintiff
testified at the hearing that he worked as a security guard at Medieval Times for about a year,
working three days a week, eight-hour days.

(Tr. p. 66).

Plaintiff also completed forms

indicating the same. (Tr. p.172). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff worked as a security guard for
approximately a year, and he worked for $10.00 per hour, eight hours a day, three days a week.

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(Tr. p 30). The Court will accept the Plaintiff’s testimony and documents of record over earnings
records that appear to be incomplete. Therefore, the Court determines that the ALJ did not err in
determining that Plaintiff’s prior job as a security guard was substantial gainful employment.
III. Conclusion
Upon consideration of the submissions of the parties and the administrative record, the
Court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and decided
according to proper legal standards.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.
§405(g). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and
deadlines, and close the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on July 15, 2014.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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